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(DSC/DSE)

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(CBCS in Accordance with NEP 2020)

SEMESTER-IV

METAPHYSICS

PHILOSOPHY

Surya Kumar Bhuyan School of Social Sciences
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COURSE INTRODUCTION

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy which enquires into the nature of reality. It is an enquiry into the general nature of reality as opposed to appearances. It was called 'First Philosophy' by Aristotle. Metaphysics tries to determine the real nature of the world, life and God. It discusses the nature of the world including matter and life, the nature and existence of God, the immortality of the soul and freedom of the human will. Etymologically, the term 'metaphysics' is derived from two Greek words 'meta' and 'physica'. 'Meta' means 'after' and 'Physica' means physics'. Hence, the term 'metaphysics' literally means 'what comes after physics'.

This course consists of fifteen units. The first unit starts with "**Nature of Metaphysics".** It includes the concepts like Nature of Metaphysics, Metaphysics and Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Metaphysics and Science, Metaphysics and Religion, Metaphysics and Mysticism, Metaphysics and Logic, and Possibility of Metaphysics

The second unit is '**Space and Time: Kant".** The concepts included in this unit are: Forms of Sensibility, Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time, Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time

The third unit is '**Realism: Naïve and Scientific".** It deals with the issues such as Classification of Realism, Naïve Realism, Scientific Realism, Difference between Naïve and Scientific Realism, and Conclusion

The fourth unit is "**Neo-realism".** It basically discusses the concepts like Neo-Realism or New Realism, Epistemological Monism, Naive Realism and Neo–Realism

The fifth unit is "**Subjective idealism: Berkeley".** The concepts included in this unit are-

Meaning of Subjective Idealism, Berkeleyan Idealism, Berkeley's Idealism: Subjective or Objective? Solipsism: Was Berkeley a Solipsist?

The sixth unit is "**Objective idealism: Hegel".** The concepts included in this unit are Meaning of Objective Idealism, Objective Idealism of Hegel, Hegel's Dialectical Method

The name of the seventh unit is **'Mind-Body relation: Interactionism'.** It discusses the issues like Descartes view on Mind- Body relation, and Interactionism

The eight unit is "**Mind-Body relation: Double aspect theory"(Spinoza).** It deals with the issues such as Spinoza's View on Mind-Body relation and Parallelism

This nine unit "**Anti-metaphysics: Kant".** It includes the concepts like Possibility of Metaphysics, and Immanent Versus Transcendental Metaphysics.

The tenth unit is '**Personal Identiity".** The concepts included in this unit are: Bodily criterion, Memory criterion, Jean Paul Sartre's Viewpoint on Self-Identity, Critical Appreciation

The eleventh unit is '**Strawson's concept of person'.** The concepts included in this unit are: what is the Concept of Person? Strawson on No-ownership theory, Strawson on Cartesianism, Strawson's distinction between P- and M –Predicates, Strawson's view on P-predicates, and Bernard William's view on Strawson's concept of p-predicates

The twelfth unit is "**The problem of values".** The concepts covered in this unit are: What is value, what is axiology, meaning of value, definitions of Value, kinds of value: Subjective and objective, Intrinsic and Extrinsic value, Fact- Value Relation, and Reality and Value

The thirteenth unit is '**Universals: Realism**' (Plato and Aristotle). It basically discusses the concepts like Universal: Its nature and theories, Realism, Plato's realism, and Aristotle's realism.

The fourteenth unit is '**Nominalism**' (Hobbes and Hume). The concepts discussed in this unit are: Nominalism, Hobbes' and Hume's views on nominalism.

The fifteenth unit is '**Appearance and Reality**". The basic issues covered in this unit are Bradley's Concept of Reality, and Criteria of Reality.

While going through this course you will come across some boxes which are put on the left side or right side of the text. These boxes will give us the meanings of some words and concepts within the text. Apart from this, there will be some broad and short questions included under Activity and Check Your Progress in every unit. Activities will increase our thinking capacity because questions put in Activity are not directly derived from the text. But answers to the short questions are put in the section Answers to Check Your Progress. Besides, there are some text-related questions which are put in Model Questions. These questions will help you in selecting and mastering probable topics for the examination so that you can prepare for the examination with confidence.

UNIT 1: NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

UNIT STRUCTURE

1.1 Learning Objectives

1.2 Introduction

1.3 Nature of Metaphysics

1.4 Metaphysics and Philosophy

1.5 Metaphysics and Epistemology

1.6 Metaphysics and Science

1.7 Metaphysics and Religion

1.8 Metaphysics and Mysticism

1.9 Metaphysics and Logic

1.10 Possibility of Metaphysics

1.11 Let us Sum Up

1.12 Further Reading

1.13 Answers to Check Your Progress

1.14 Model Questions

1.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to :

- explain the nature of metaphysics
- discuss the relation of metaphysics with philosophy and epistemology
- describe the distinction of metaphysics from natural and formal sciences
- explain the relation of metaphysics with religion, mysticism and logic
- discuss the possibility of metaphysics.

1.2 INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is an attempt to explain life and the universe as a whole. It is a rational speculation of life, its experience, and their ultimate value. It is

a speculation of the universe as a whole. So, philosophy is the most comprehensive of all enquiries and as such has the widest scope. The universe appears before us as a realm of phenomena. But behind phenomena there must be a reality from which the phenomena spring and by which they are ultimately explained. Metaphysics deals with the nature of this ultimate reality. In this unit, we shall discuss the nature of metaphysics and its relation to other disciplines.

1.3 NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy which enquires into the nature of reality. It is an enquiry into the general nature of reality as opposed to appearances. It was called 'First Philosophy' by Aristotle. Metaphysics tries to determine the real nature of the world, life and God. It discusses the nature of the world including matter and life, the nature and existence of God, the immortality of the soul and freedom of the human will. Etymologically, the term 'metaphysics' is derived from two Greek words 'meta' and 'physica'. 'Meta' means 'after' and 'Physica' means physics'. Hence, the term 'metaphysics' literally means 'what comes after physics'. The term 'metaphysics' was introduced accidentally in the 1st century B.C. when Andronicus of Rhodes placed Aristotle's writings on first principles immediately after his writing on physics. Subsequently, the Scholastics used the term 'metaphysics' for studies which came after studies of natural phenomena. Later on, metaphysics came to mean the study of those phenomena which lie beyond nature.



LET US KNOW

Noumenon: A term associated with Kant, denoting things which lies behind the mind-imposed forms of time, space, and causation, and is therefore, unknowable.

Andronicus of Rhodes:(FI.C. 60 B.C) A Greek Philosopher from Rhodes was the eleventhsscholarch of the peripatetic School.

Ontology is an important part of metaphysics. The term 'Ontology' is derived from two words 'Onto' and 'Logia', meaning 'real thing' and 'discourse' respectively. So, by Ontology we mean the science of reality as such or pure being. Pure being or reality as such is what only is or exists apart from any becoming- any changes, qualities or movements. Metaphysics deals with the nature of this pure being or reality as such.

Everything in this world has two aspects- an external aspect and an internal aspect. The external aspect is always changing whereas the internal aspect, unseen from outside, remains unchanged amidst changes in the external forms. Ordinary sciences deal only with the external aspects of things i.e. phenomena but not with reality as such or noumena. Metaphysics, on the other hand, deals with the internal, unseen, unchanging aspect of things. It deals with transcendental reality or noumenon.

Metaphysics starts with a reflective distinction between appearance and reality. For example, a straight stick half immersed in water looks bent. We say that the bent stick is the appearance and the straight stick is the reality. But the straight stick to be known as straight must appear straight to us and hence is itself an appearance. By 'appearances' we mean objects as they are given in our immediate experience or perception. All objects of our immediate experience are appearances. By 'reality' we mean objects as they are in themselves independent of our experience of them. Metaphysics deals with such questions-Is there any Reality behind the world of experience which is appearance? What is the nature of such a Reality if there be any? Is the ultimate reality material or spiritual?

Metaphysics deals with three issues. First, it makes a distinction between reality and appearance. Secondly, metaphysics provides a more comprehensive understanding of the world than which is provided by common sense and science. Thirdly, metaphysics refers to man's earliest attempt to understand the mystery of nature, its origin and future possibilities. In this sense, it is concerned with the first cause of the world.

Metaphysics investigates the nature of the world including matter and life, the soul and God or the Absolute. There are three main parts of

metaphysics viz. Ontology of Nature, Ontology of the Soul and Ontology of the Absolute. Ontology of nature investigates the nature of matter, time, space, causality, evolution, mechanism and teleology. Ontology of the soul investigates the nature, origin and destiny of the soul and its relation to body. Ontology of the Absolute investigates the nature and attributes of God or the Absolute and its relation to the world and the soul. It also discusses and examines proofs for the existence of God.

The aim of metaphysics is to apprehend reality. By reality we mean the ultimate reality which is the basis of everything and is beyond all contradictions. The ultimate reality is characterized by infinity, independence, transcendence and immutability. From the Indian point of view, metaphysics attempts to give spiritual perception, direct and immediate vision of reality.

Metaphysics investigates the nature of ultimate reality applying analytical and critical procedures. So, it is not totally speculative. It uses analysis as its method. But it also attempts to construct a comprehensive view of the universe and the ultimate reality. So, its method is constructive too. Metaphysical enquiry, therefore, combines in itself the elements of observation, analysis, deduction and common sense, intuition, dialectic and synthetic vision.

In order to bring out the nature of metaphysics clearly, we shall now discuss its relation to philosophy, epistemology etc.



LET US KNOW

Dialectic: The inverstigation of the truth of opposing opinions by logical discussions.

Plato (428-348 BC) Greek Philosopher. Major works- Theaetetus, Gorgias, Protagoras etc.

Aristotle (348-322 BC) Greek philosopher, Logician



Hegel (1770-1831) German idealist philosopher

Bradley: (1864-1924) British philosopher.

1.4 METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Different philosophers hold different views regarding the relation between metaphysics and philosophy. According to Plato, philosophy and

metaphysics are identical. Plato takes philosophy to mean 'knowledge of reality of being as such, of that which is.' It is the knowledge of 'the universal, unchangeable and eternal'. Like Plato, Aristotle also means by philosophy 'the science of being as such or of pure being'. Thus, Plato and Aristotle identified philosophy with metaphysics. Similar view was also held by modern idealists like Hegel and Bradley. Hegel holds that 'philosophy is the metaphysics of absolute reality which is a supreme conscious being'. Bradley in his 'Appearance and Reality' defines philosophy as 'an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance'. Thus, according to philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Bradley, philosophy and metaphysics are identical. But it is not correct to regard philosophy and metaphysics to be identical because metaphysics is only a branch of philosophy. The logical positivists, who were a group of philosophers of the 20^{th} century with a scientific bent of mind, deny the existence of any transcendental reality. According to them, what is given in our sense experience alone is real. Since metaphysical entities like God, Soul etc. cannot be perceived, they are thought to be unreal. Thus, the logical positivists deny the possibility of metaphysics. According to them, philosophy does not have any relation with metaphysics. But the above view of the logical positivists is untenable because sense experience is not the only source of knowledge. The Agnostics, on the other hand, do not deny the existence of any transcendental reality. They only maintain that such reality is unknown and unknowable. But a problem arises here i.e. if reality is unknown and unknowable then how can we know that it exists? To say that reality exists is to know something of it. Hence, reality is not unknown and unknowable. Therefore, the view of the Agnostics is also not acceptable.



LET US KNOW

Agonstics: A person who holds the existence of the ultimate cause, or God, and the essential nature of things are unknown and unknowable.

Logical positivists: Philosophers of 20th century with a scientific bent of mind. Moritz, Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudlof Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Reichenbach are some important logical positivists.

In short, we can say that there is an intimate relation between metaphysics and philosophy. Metaphysics is an indispensable part of philosophy. But the scope of philosophy is wider than that of metaphysics. Philosophy includes not only metaphysics but also epistemology and axiology. Therefore, we can say that the relation between metaphysics and philosophy is the relation between part and whole.



ACTIVITY: 1

Give two exampls from day to day life showing the difference between appearance and reality.

Ans. .....

.....

.....



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is metaphysics? (Answer in about 63 words)

.....

.....

Q 2: What are the three main parts of metaphysics? ((Answer in about 20 words)

.....

.....

Q 3: What is the aim of metaphysics? (Answer in about 20 words)

.....

.....

Q 4: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) Metaphysics deals with the nature of reality. (True/False)

b) Metaphysics is synonymous with ontology. (True/False)

c) Aristotle first introduced the term metaphysics. (True/False)

d) Metaphysics is not an indispensable part of philosophy. (True/False)

e) Plato identified philosophy with metaphysics. (True/False)

Q 5: Fill in the blanks:

a) The term ontology is derived from the words ——— and ———.

b) Aristotle called metaphysics————————.

c) Metaphysics starts with a reflective distinction between ——— and ————————

1.5 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology is the science of knowledge. It is derived from the terms 'Episteme' meaning knowledge and 'Logos' meaning science. Epistemology is a science which enquires into the nature, origin, range and conditions of knowledge. It seeks to answer the following questions- What is knowledge? What is the origin and source of knowledge? What are the conditions of validity of knowledge? Is knowledge of ultimate reality possible at all or not? What is the range or limit of knowledge? Thus, epistemology is concerned with the investigation into the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge. Metaphysics, on the other hand, investigates the nature of reality.

Let us discuss the relation between metaphysics and epistemology in more detail. In discussing this relationship we are confronted with the question- whether the theory of knowing necessarily implies the theory of being.

The ancient philosophers did not attach much importance to epistemology as a necessary pre-requisite to metaphysical speculations. They dogmatically assumed an ultimate reality and deduced everything from it without any prior enquiry into the conditions, limits and possibility of

knowledge. They were rigid in assuming that it was possible to know the ultimate reality. This dogmatism on the part of the ancient philosophers led to conflicting theories of reality. For example, Thales regarded water to be the ultimate reality. Anaximenes regarded air, Parmenides regarded being, Heraclitus regarded fire, Pythagoreans regarded number as ultimate reality and so on. Thus, early Greek philosophers gave conflicting views of reality. So, before we indulge in metaphysical speculations, we must first know whether we are competent to know reality or not. If men are so constituted that they cannot know reality then metaphysics is impossible. A philosophy which does not include a discussion on the nature of knowledge is dogmatic. In modern times, Locke holds that epistemology is an indispensable preliminary to metaphysics. Kant carried on a transcendental enquiry into the problem of knowledge. To Kant, philosophy is merely the criticism of cognition. According to Locke and Kant, a metaphysical enquiry into the structure of reality should be preceded by an enquiry into the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge.

Thales(624-550 BC)Father of Greek philosopher.
Locke(1632-1704)British Empiricist Philosopher

But there are other philosophers who do not recognize the necessity of epistemological discussion in metaphysics. According to them, metaphysics is independent of epistemology. Bergson, for example, maintains that the mind can intuitively know the reality without taking the help of intellect. According to the Neo-Realists, there is no relation between metaphysics and epistemology. Both are distinct and independent sciences. The Neo-Realists hold that epistemology cannot give us any knowledge of the ultimate reality, for the existence of things is not dependent on knowledge.



Kant(1724-1804)German philosopher
Bergson(1859-1941) French Intuitionist Philos-opher

The Idealists, on the contrary, hold that metaphysics is dependent on epistemology. Metaphysics enquires into the nature of ultimate reality. But before we try to know the ultimate reality, we must make sure whether human knowledge is competent to know the ultimate reality. This can be known by an enquiry into the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge. Thus, epistemology is the fundamental basis of metaphysics.

Though epistemology is an indispensable preliminary to metaphysics, we must not identify the two. Epistemology and metaphysics are so intimately related to each other that one cannot stand without the other. Metaphysics depends on epistemology in so far as epistemology ascertains whether reality can be known at all. Epistemological enquiries are the foundation stones on which metaphysics can stand. Metaphysics, on the other hand, ascertains the nature of reality. Without a prior knowledge of the nature of reality, it is not possible to ascertain whether this reality can be apprehended by knowledge. Hence, epistemology is also dependent on metaphysics. A particular theory of knowledge leads to a particular theory of reality. Again, a particular theory of reality determines the theory of knowledge. Thus, the question of nature and validity of our knowledge and the question of the nature of ultimate reality are two sides of the same enquiry- two aspects of philosophy.



LET US KNOW

Cognition: The process of obtaining knowledge through thought, experience and the senses.

1.6 METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE

According to Aristotle, metaphysics is the science of being as such or pure being. Although metaphysics is the science of pure being or reality as such, it is to be distinguished from natural sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy etc. While natural sciences deal with a particular department of the world, metaphysics deals with the world as a whole. So, it is the most comprehensive of enquiries. Secondly, natural sciences deal with the phenomenal world which we perceive but metaphysics deals with the noumenal world or super sensible world. Thirdly, natural sciences give us knowledge of the characters of existent facts but not of their existence

or reality itself. It tells us what a thing is or how it is related to other things but not that it is. But metaphysics deals with things as it is in itself or reality. Moreover, the existence of physical things is taken for granted in natural sciences but metaphysics examines the grounds of existence. It claims to question whether there are really physical objects. Fourthly, empirical or natural sciences carry on them investigations of Nature on the assumption of certain basic concepts like space, time, causality, substance etc. These fundamental concepts are not thoroughly examined by these sciences but more or less assumed to be true. But metaphysics critically examines these fundamental concepts presupposed by the empirical sciences. It thus deals with the presuppositions of these sciences. Fifthly, metaphysics also differs from formal sciences like mathematics in being non-quantitative and non-numerical in method. It differs from empirical sciences because it does not increase our knowledge of particular facts or events but merely discusses the ways in which facts or events are to be interpreted.

Natural Science investigates whatever is perceptible to our senses. But the ultimate reality, which is the first cause of the world, is not given to our sense perception. So, science cannot investigate these phenomena. Therefore, it is left to metaphysics to investigate them. As distinguished from natural sciences, metaphysics may be considered as supra-scientific knowledge because it transcends scientific knowledge.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 6: Does Metaphysics depend on epistemology?

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Q 7: What is the relation between metaphysics and epistemology according to the Idealists? (Answer in about 56 words)

.....

.....

Q 8: Mention three points of difference between metaphysics and natural sciences. (Answer in about 73 words)

.....

.....

Q 9: State whether the following statements True or False

a) Ancient philosophers gave much importance to epistemology as a necessary pre-requisite to metaphysics. (True/False)

b) According to Neo-Realists, there is relation between metaphysics and epistemology. (True/False)

c) Thales regarded air to be the ultimate reality. (True/False)

d) Metaphysics deals with the transcendental reality or noumenon. (True/False)

e) Metaphysics does not differ from natural sciences. (True/False)

10. Fill in the blanks:-

a) According to Bergson we can know reality through ———

b) Locke holds that epistemology is an indispensable —— to metaphysics.

c) Metaphysics deals with the nature of ————

1.7 METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION

Metaphysics as an enquiry into the meaning of reality has some affinity with religion. Both aim at interpreting the reality which lies behind them. Both are directly concerned with ultimate reality. But metaphysics differs from religion both in its spirit and method. Unlike religion, metaphysics deals with the ultimate problems of existence or being in a purely scientific spirit. Its object is intellectual satisfaction and its method is not one of immediate intuition alone as in religion but of critical and systematic analysis of our conceptions.

1.8 METAPHYSICS AND MYSTICISM

The fundamental aim of the mystic is to penetrate behind the veil of appearance to some ultimate reality. So, there is a common purpose between the mystic and the metaphysician. But there is a difference in their methods. The mystic does not have any interest in the world of appearance. His attitude towards appearance is purely negative. The metaphysician, on the other hand, ascertains the general character of the real as opposed to the merely apparent. But he also re-examines the realm of appearance in the light of his theory of reality to ascertain the relative truth of appearances. He arranges the various appearances in the order of varying approximation to truth. He shows not only what are the marks of reality but also how far each appearance succeeds in revealing the character of reality which is its ground. Thus, unlike the mystic, the metaphysician's attitude towards appearance is not negative. Further, the mystic's attitude towards the ultimate reality is emotional but that of the metaphysician is intellectual.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 11: What is the aim of metaphysics and religion? (Answer in about 20 words)

.....

Q 12: How does metaphysics differ from religion?

.....

Q 13: Explain the metaphysician's attitude towards appearances. (Answer in about 83 words)

.....

.....

Q 14. State whether the following sentences are True or False

a) Both metaphysics and religion aim at interpreting the reality which lies behind appearances. (True/False)

b) Metaphysics does not differ from religion in its spirit and method. (True/False)

c) There is a common purpose between the metaphysician and the mystic. (True/False)

d) The metaphysician's attitude towards appearance is negative. (True/False)

Q. 15. Fill in the blanks:

a) Both metaphysics and religion are directly concerned with_____.

b) The difference between a metaphysician and a mystic lies in their_____.

c) The mystic attitude towards the ultimate reality is_____ but the metaphysican's attitude is_____.

1.9 METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC

Metaphysics investigates the nature of reality by rational reflection and synthesis. Its method is logical and rational. Thus, metaphysics is related with logic. Logic is generally defined as the science of reasoning or rational thought. It deals with the general principles of correct reasoning. Metaphysics and logic resemble each other on the universality of their scope and the analytical character of their methods. But there are important differences between metaphysics and logic.

1. Metaphysics deals with the general nature of reality but logic deals with the general principles of correct reasoning or inference. Metaphysics is the science of reality but logic is the science of reasoning.
2. Logic is concerned with both formal truth and material truth of reasoning. It examines if a conclusion follows from the given premises. Inductive logic examines whether the premises are materially true i.e. correspond with facts. But metaphysics deals exclusively with the characteristics of validly inferable reality. It investigates the ontological reality of the world, soul and God.

Hegel identified logic with metaphysics. According to Hegel, thought and reality are ultimately identical. He says, "whatever is rational is real and whatever is real is rational." The world is the external expression of the

Absolute Mind or Reality. The finite mind is also a finite reproduction of the Absolute Mind. The dialectical movement of thought in human mind corresponds to the dialectical movement of the Absolute Mind or the Reality. Thus, the framework of thought corresponds to the framework of Reality.

But the above view of Hegel is wrong. For human thought, though coherent and systematic, may not correspond with reality. Internal harmony or coherence is not the only test of truth. So, logic should be regarded as a distinct science from metaphysics. Logic is independent of metaphysics. However, metaphysics indirectly depends on logic because its methods must be logical. Metaphysics must depend on reflection and metaphysical reflection must be systematic and logical.

1.10 POSSIBLITY OF METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics makes a distinction between appearance and reality. All the objects of sensible experience are regarded as appearances or phenomena. They are things as they appear to us and cannot be regarded as reality. For things that appear to us may be very different from what they are in reality. For example, the earth appears to be flat, but it is actually round. Since reality may be something different from what it appears to be, we have no means of knowing the reality as it is in itself independent of sense experience. For whenever we try to know things as they really are, we are turning them into appearances. For instance, a straight stick to be known as straight must appear straight to us and hence it is an appearance. By reality we mean things in themselves which are independent of sense experience.

By metaphysics we mean knowledge of super-sensuous reality or things as they are themselves independent of our experience of them. If such knowledge of super sensuous reality is not possible, then metaphysics will become impossible. Empiricists like Hume have rejected the possibility of metaphysics. He says that all books written on the nature and character of super-sensuous “realities” like God, soul or immortality should be consigned to flames because we do not have sense experience about them.

Such books cannot but contain sophistry and illusion. Kant also rejected the possibility of metaphysics but he was not so thorough-going as Hume. He holds that metaphysical speculations about the super-sensuous reality is only natural to man. Our reason naturally forces us to speculate about things-in-themselves. But according to Kant, we have no knowledge of the super-sensuous things-in-themselves. Hence, though we have the psychological tendency to think about things-in-themselves, we have no knowledge about them. Therefore, metaphysics is impossible.

Herbert Spencer takes up the agnostic position of Kant when he holds that the super-sensuous Reality or the Absolute is unknown and unknowable. He holds that all objects of true human knowledge are relative. For example, when you know a tree you necessarily relate it to other trees you have seen and distinguish it from houses, rivers etc. Thus, a tree as known is related to other things. If there is Absolute which is not related to anything even to the knowing mind, then such and Absolute can never be known. Hence, things-in-themselves being unconditioned and absolute are beyond the scope of human knowledge.

In the twentieth century, Logical Positivists dubbed all metaphysical statements as
utterly meaningless and nonsensical. According to them, a statement is meaningful only if it can be verified by sense experience. Metaphysical statements such as 'God is good', 'The ultimate Reality is one', 'God is the cause of the world', 'The soul of man is immortal' etc. are not verifiable by sense experience, nor are they analytical statements like 'Snow is snow'. Metaphysical statements being neither empirical statements nor analytic statements are, therefore, meaningless and utterly nonsensical. The above view of the logical Positivists is not acceptable. It is no doubt true that metaphysical statements cannot be conclusively verified by sense experience but they can be weakly verified by facts of experience. Weak verification means that some observation is relevant to the statement's truth or falsity. If weak verification is accepted then metaphysics cannot be rejected as nonsensical. Moreover, the Logical Positivists unduly equate

experience with sense experience. But there are other types of experiences viz. moral religious, artistic etc. If we include all these experiences, then metaphysical statements will not appear to be nonsensical as the logical positivists have held.

In the history of philosophy we find many great philosophers who not only think that metaphysics is possible but have also done serious metaphysical speculations. Plato held that we can know reality with the help of reason and not by sense experience. Metaphysical speculations may also be of the nature of mystic insight but that is not the sufficient reason for rejecting metaphysics. Bradley very aptly says, "the critics of metaphysics are themselves brother-metaphysicians", for, in holding that reality is unknown and unknowable they only give us an alternative theory of reality. If we do not limit ourselves to sense experience alone but also include our moral and religious experiences we may have a glimpse of the transcendental thing-in-itself. Further, reality apart from its manifestations or appearances is a bare abstraction. It is reality that manifests itself in and through its appearances. Appearances are appearances of reality. Hence, there is no logical opposition between them. Thus, philosophy comprehends both phenomenology of the sciences and metaphysics within its scope. Metaphysics is an indispensable part of philosophy because philosophy seeks to understand phenomena not as such but as manifestations of some ultimate reality.



ACTIVITY: 1.2

- Give an example of metaphysical statement.

.....

.....

.....

.....

- Do you agree with the Logical Positivists view that metaphysical statements are meaningless? Give reasons.

. .....

.....



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 16: What is the similarity between metaphysics and logic? (Answer in about 63 words)

.....

.....

Q 17: Distinguish between metaphysics and logic? (Answer in about 63 words)

.....

.....

Q 18: Who said, "Whatever is rational is real and whatever is real is rational"

.....

Q 19: State whether the following sentences are True or False

a) Hume rejected the possibility of metaphysics. (True/False)

b) According to Kant we have knowledge of the things - in - themselves. (True/False)

c) Herbert Spencer holds that the Absolute is unknown and unknowable. (True/False)

d) Logical positivists do not deny the possibility of metaphysics. (True/False)

Q 20: Fill in the blanks:

a) According to Hegel, thought and reality are ultimately _____

b) The critics of metaphysics are themselves _____

c) According to Logical Positivists, metaphysical statements are____and____.

d) Herbert Spencer takes of the _____ position of Kant.



1.11 LET US SUM UP

- Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy which enquires into the nature of reality. It is the study of reality behind appearances.

- Metaphysics tries to determine the real nature of the world, life and God.
- There are three main parts of metaphysics viz. Ontology of Nature, Ontology of the Soul and Ontology of the Absolute.
- Metaphysics is synonymous with Ontology which is the science of pure being or reality as such.
- Metaphysics starts with a reflective distinction between appearance and reality. By 'appearances' we mean objects as they are given in our immediate experience or perception. By 'reality' we mean objects as they are in themselves independent of our experiences.
- Metaphysics deals with such questions as-Is there any reality behind the world of appearance? What is the nature of such a reality? Is the ultimate reality material or spiritual? etc.
- There is an intimate relation between metaphysics and philosophy. Metaphysics is an essential part of philosophy and philosophy as a whole includes metaphysics as its part.
- Epistemology is an indispensable preliminary to metaphysics.
- Although metaphysics is the science of reality, it is to be distinguished from natural and formal sciences.
- Both metaphysics and religion aim at interpreting reality. But metaphysics differs from religion in its spirit and method.
- There is a common purpose between a metaphysician and a mystic. But there is difference in their method.
- Logic is not to be identified with metaphysics as done by Hegel.
- Metaphysics is not impossible. Metaphysician statements are not meaningless as held by the logical positivists.



1.12 FURTHER READING

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3) Martin, Gottfried (1968): *General Metaphysics- Its problem and Method*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.

4) Baruah, Girish (2008): *Metaphysics- Problems and Perspective*. Kalyani Publishers, Guwahati.

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1.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No. 1 : Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy which enquires into the nature of reality. It is the study of reality behind appearances. Metaphysics tries to determine the real nature of the world, life and God. It discusses the nature of the world including matter and life, the nature and existence of God, the immortality of the soul and freedom of the human will.

Ans to Q No. 2 : There are three main parts of metaphysics viz. Ontology of Nature, Ontology of the Soul and Ontology of the Absolute.

Ans to Q No. 3 : The aim of metaphysics is to apprehend reality which is the basis of everything.

Ans to Q No. 4 : a) True b) True c) False d) False e) True

Ans to Q No. 5 : a) Onto and Logia. b) First Philosophy c) appearance and reality

Ans to Q No. 6 : Yes, metaphysics depends on epistemology

Ans to Q No.7: The Idealists hold that metaphysics is dependent on epistemology. Metaphysics enquires into the nature of ultimate reality. But before we try to know the ultimate reality, we must make sure whether human knowledge is competent to know the ultimate reality. This can be known only by an enquiry into the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge.

Ans to Q No. 8 : The three points of difference between metaphysics and natural sciences are - 1) Natural sciences deal with a particular department of the world but metaphysics deals with the world as a

whole. 2) Natural sciences deal with the phenomenal world which we perceive but metaphysics deals with the noumenal world or super sensible world. 3) Natural sciences presuppose certain basic concepts like space, time, causality, substance etc. which are assumed to be true. But metaphysics critically examines these fundamental concepts presupposed by the natural sciences.

Ans to Q No. 9 : a) False b) False c) False d) True e) False

Ans to Q No. 10 : a) intuition. b) preliminary c) reality

Ans to Q No. 11 : The aim of metaphysics and religion is to interpret the ultimate reality which lies behind appearances.

Ans to Q No. 12 : Metaphysics differs from religion in its spirit and method.

Ans to Q No. 13: The attitude of the metaphysician towards appearance is not negative like that of the mystic. He not only ascertains the general character of the real as opposed to the merely apparent but also re-examines the realm of appearances to ascertain its relative truth. He arranges the various appearances in the order of varying approximation to truth. He shows not only what are the marks of reality but also how far each appearance succeeds in revealing the character of reality which is its ground.

Ans to Q No. 14 : a) True b) False c) True d) False

Ans to Q No. 15 : a) ultimate reality. b) methods c) emotional and intellectual

Ans to Q No. 16 : The similarity between metaphysics and logic lies in the universality of their scope and the analytic character of their methods.

Ans to Q No. 17 : The differences between Metaphysics and logic are - 1) Metaphysics deals with the general nature of reality but logic deals with the general principles of correct reasoning or inference. Metaphysics is the science of reality but logic is the science of reasoning. 2. Logic is concerned with both formal truth and material truth of reasoning. But metaphysics deals exclusively with the characteristics of validly inferable reality. It investigates the ontological reality of world, soul and God.

Ans to Q No. 18 : Hegel

Ans to Q No. 19 : a) False b) False c) True d) False

Ans to Q No. 20 : a) Identical b) brother-metaphysicians

c) meaningless and nonsensical d) agnostic



1.14 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very short Questions

Q 1: What is the etymological meaning of metaphysics?

Q 2: What do you mean by ontology?

Q 3: What is the aim of metaphysics?

Q 4: What is reality?

Q 5: What is appearance?

B) Short Questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Briefly explain the nature of metaphysics.

Q 2: State Aristotle's definition of metaphysics.

Q 3: What are the three main parts of metaphysics? Explain briefly

Q 4: Is philosophy identical with metaphysics? Discuss

C) Write Short Notes (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Metaphysics

Q 2: Relation between metaphysics and epistemology

Q 3: Logical positivists' view on metaphysics

(D) Distinguish between (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Appearance and reality

Q 2: Metaphysics and epistemology

Q 3: Metaphysics and natural science

Q 4: Metaphysics and religion

Q 5: Metaphysics and logic

(E) Long Questions (Answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q 1. Discuss the nature of metaphysics

Q 2. Explain the relation of metaphysics with philosophy

Q 3. Is epistemology an indispensable preliminary to metaphysics? Discuss

Q 4. Distinguish metaphysics from natural and formal sciences

Q 5. Discuss the possibility of metaphysics

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UNIT 2: SPACE AND TIME: KANT

UNIT STRUCTURE

2.1 Learning Objectives

2.2 Introduction

2.3 Forms of Sensibility

2.4 Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time

2.5 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time

2.6 Let us Sum Up

2.7 Further Reading

2.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

2.9 Model Questions

2.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the forms of human sensibility
- describe two *apriori* forms of sensibility, namely space and time.
- discuss the metaphysical and transcendental exposition of space and time.

2.2 INTRODUCTION

Kant states that, there are two stems of human knowledge. They are sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, objects are given to us. Through understanding, they are thought. Sensibility is the faculty of intuitions and understanding is the faculty of concepts. Without sensibility no object would be given to us and without understanding no object would be thought. Kant regards thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

Kant holds that through intuition, knowledge is in immediate relation to objects. But intuition takes place only when we have the objects. In order for the objects to appear, thought must relate to the intuition, and to the sensibility. Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving the

representations through the mode in which we are affected by the objects. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility.

Kant says that the sensations are posited and ordered in a certain form. This form is not derived from the sensible intuition and must therefore be found in the mind *a priori*. This pure form of sensible intuition is space and time. This pure form of sensibility is also known as 'pure intuition'. Space and time are pure intuitions, because they are like intuited *objects* in that they are individuals with which our intuition places us in an immediate cognitive relation. Space and time are like objects in that any intuition of an object is also an intuition of the space in which the object is located and of the time in which the experience itself takes place.

2.3 FORMS OF SENSIBILITY

Kant in the transcendental doctrine of elements discusses two pure forms of sensible intuitions, in which all the manifold of intuition is intuited in certain relations. These two pure forms of sensible intuitions are space and time. They must be found in the mind *a priori*. Kant discusses space and time under the two heads, metaphysical and the transcendental. A metaphysical exposition of space aims to expose the origin and content of our representation of space, while a transcendental exposition aims to explain whether and how our representation can serve as a principle or ground for cognition. The arguments offered in the Metaphysical Exposition are meant to show that our representation of space is a pure intuition, its source is non-empirical, and its content is singular and immediately given. It will follow from this that the object of our representation of space is an individual, whose features are knowable *a priori*. Kant will proceed to show in the Transcendental Exposition that the representation so described is a subjective element of cognition that provides the ground for a body of synthetic *a priori* cognition"namely, geometry, the science of space.

Kant introduces the Metaphysical Exposition of Space by describing features of our sensible experience that he takes to be evident upon simple inspection: we represent things "outside us" as spatially determinate, and we represent

things internal to our conscious experience as temporally determinate. For example, an item in our visual field that we might reach out and touch can be represented as having a determinate shape, size, and position in space; a mental state can be represented as having a determinate location and duration in time. However, it should be noted that relation between outer and inner objects is not symmetrical with respect to space and time. The reason is that outer objects can be temporally located, but inner objects cannot be spatially located. This asymmetry, and the temporality of outer objects, plays an important role in Kant's Refutation of Idealism.

2.4 METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE AND TIME

Kant in the metaphysical exposition gives four arguments in favour of the concept of space and five arguments in favour of the concept of time, in order to prove them *a priori.*

First argument of the concept of space: Space is not an empirical concept, which has been derived from outer experiences.By outer experiences, Kant refers to a property of our mind, through which we represent to ourselves objects as outside us. According to Kant, a representation is a kind of cognitive process through which objects are regarded as outside us. Kant states that sensations arise, when objects, which are outside us, act on our senses. In order to regard different representations as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. It appears that the representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance.

Second argument: Space is a necessary *a priori* representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It is an argument, which concerns about the *a priori* character of the concept of space. Kant argues that it is not possible to have the representation of an object without space, though it is possible to conceive of the concept of space without the representation of any object. Third argument: Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in

general, but a pure intuition. Kant states that there is only one space. If we speak of different spaces, then, we mean that they are the parts of that one space.

Fourth argument: Space is represented as an infinite *given* magnitude. This argument is based on the third argument, where, Kant argues that we can conceive of only one space and the different spatial representations are parts of that unique space. This says that the concept of one space contains within itself an infinite number of representations within itself. Therefore, it follows that the concept of one space, which contains within itself infinite number of representations, cannot be derived from sensible intuition, and must be regarded as *a priori*.

These arguments are put forward in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space. Kant also puts forward five arguments in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time. They are–
First argument: Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. The concept of time is presupposed as the coexistence and the succession of an object. Hence, time is regarded as an *a priori* concept, because it presupposes for the representation of coexistence and the succession of an object.

Second argument: Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore, given *a priori*. Kant says that representation and the succession of object is possible only in relation to time though time can be conceived without any representation.

Third argument: Time has only one dimension, that is, one after another. Different temporal representations are conceived in the one dimension of time. Time is *a priori* and hence it possesses the elements of certainty and necessity. Kant argues that these principles cannot be derived from experience, for experience would give neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty.

Fourth argument: Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts

of one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition. Time, like space is one. Different times are the parts of that one time. The concept of time is a pure form of sensible intuition and hence it is regarded as *a priori*.

Fifth argument: The original representation, *time*, must therefore be given as unlimited. This argument is based on the previous argument where Kant remarks on the concept of one time and the different representations of the coexistence and the succession of objects are conceived as parts of that one time. He regards the concept of time as unlimited, where infinite representations of coexistence and succession of objects take place. The concept of time as unlimited cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must be regarded as *a priori*.

2.5 TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE AND TIME

Kant also offers the transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time. Through the transcendental exposition, Kant argues that, even though, space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuition, yet every manifold of sensible intuition has to be received in the form of space and time, so that we can have the synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Kant explains transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time, by giving examples from the context of geometry and physics respectively. Kant regards that our knowledge in physics or geometry is possible only through recognition of the concept of space and time as synthetic and *a priori*. Kant argues that, Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet *a priori*. He says that the proposition 'the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles' is a synthetic proposition because, in order to find out the triangle and the sum of its three angles as equal to the two right angles, we take the help of the sensible intuition. Therefore, the proposition is regarded as synthetic. Again, this proposition also contains the elements of 'necessity' and 'certainty'. Hence, this proposition is also regarded as *a priori*.

T. E. Wilkerson is of the opinion that Kant makes a very intimate connection between space, time and mathematics. One of Kant's aims is to show against Hume that we can have substantive knowledge of the world *a priori*, in the form of the general truths of the mathematics and physics. The Aesthetic is devoted among other things to justifying the necessity of mathematics, the necessary application to experience of mathematical truths. It seems that the necessity of mathematics is guaranteed by the central role of space and time in our experience.

Kant in the transcendental exposition of the concept of time states that the third argument put forward in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time is actually a transcendental exposition. According to the third argument of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time, time has only one dimension, i.e., one after the other. Kant holds that the concept of time possesses the elements of certainty and necessity and hence, it is regarded as *a priori*. At the same time, Kant argues that the concept of *alteration* and with it the concept of *motion* is possible only through the representation of time.

Space and time are the two forms of human sensibility, through which we can obtain *a priori* synthetic knowledge. Pure mathematics is an example of this *a priori* synthetic knowledge. Space and time are pure forms of all sensible intuition which gives an essential basic structure to our experience. Kant regards that space and time as empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Space and time are empirically real with respect to things, which can be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. He regards the empirical reality of the concept of space as all things, as outer appearances, are side by side in space. The rule is valid universally and without limitation. Similarly, time is also empirically real, in the sense in which its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses. Empirically, space, time, and spatio-temporal objects are real. They are not illusions, which can be distinguished from 'mere appearances' (like dreams, hallucinations, mirages and the like). Their empirical reality, however, does not consist in their being things existing in themselves, independently of the conditions under which we cognise them. It consists

rather in the way they conform to an order of nature that is transcendentally necessary if experience is to be possible at all.

Space and time are also transcendentally ideal with respect to *things*, which cannot be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. Space and time are neither wholly mind independent, self-subsistent entity, nor determinations. They are not objective property of things in themselves, rather they are merely the subjective conditions of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What are the two stems of human knowledge?

.....

Q 2: What is sensibility?

.....

Q 3: What is understanding?

.....

Q 4: Who says “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”

.....

Q 5: What is pure intuition?

.....

Q 6: What are two forms of sensible intuition?

.....

Q 7: What are the two heads, according to Kant, under which space and time are discussed?

.....

Q 8: What is a synthetic proposition?

.....

Q 9: Why is time considered as a priori?

.....

Q 10: Why is space and time considered as empirically real?

.....



2.6 LET US SUM UP

- Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving the representations through the mode in which we are affected by the objects.
- By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions.
- Kant says that the sensations are posited and ordered in a certain form. This form is not derived from the sensible intuition and must therefore be found in the mind *a priori*. This pure form of sensible intuition is space and time. This pure form of sensibility is also known as 'pure intuition'.
- Kant discusses space and time under the two heads, metaphysical and the transcendental. A metaphysical exposition of space aims to expose the origin and content of our representation of space, while a transcendental exposition aims to explain whether and how our representation can serve as a principle or ground for cognition.
- Kant regards that space and time as empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Space and time are empirically real with respect to things, which can be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions.
- Empirically, space, time and spatio-temporal objects are real. They are not illusions, which can be distinguished from 'mere appearances' (like dreams, hallucinations, mirages and the like). Their empirical reality, however, does not consist in their being things existing in themselves, independently of the conditions under which we cognise them. It consists rather in the way they conform to an order of nature that is transcendentally necessary if experience is to be possible at all.

- Space and time are also transcendentally ideal with respect to *things*, which cannot be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. Space and time are neither wholly mind independent, self-subsistent entity, nor determinations. They are not objective property of things in themselves, rather they are merely the subjective conditions of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.



2.7 FURTHER READING

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2.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: Sensibility and understanding

Ans to Q No 2: Sensibility is the faculty of intuition.

Ans to Q No 3: Understanding is the faculty of concepts

Ans to Q No 4: Kant

Ans to Q No 5: According to Kant, sensation are posited and ordered in a certain form. This form is not derived from the sensible intuition and must be found in the mind 'a priori'. This form of sensibility is also known as 'pure intuition'

Ans to Q No 6: Space and time

Ans to Q No 7: Metaphysical and transcendental exposition of space and time

Ans to Q No 8: Kant says that the proposition 'the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles' is a synthetic proposition because, in order to find out the triangle and the sum of its three angles as equal to the two right angles, we take the help of the sensible intuition. Therefore, the proposition is regarded as synthetic.

Ans to Q No 9: Kant holds that the concept of time possesses the elements of certainty and necessity and hence it is regarded as apriori.

Ans to Q No 10: Space and time are empirically real with respect to things, which can be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions.



2.9 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Objective questions

Q 1: What is sensibility?

Q 2: What is understanding?

Q 3: What is metaphysical exposition of space and time?

Q 4: What is transcendental exposition of space and time?

Q 5: What are the two forms of sensible intuition?

B) Short questions (Answer in about 100=150 words)

Q 1. What is metaphysical exposition of space and time? Explain briefly

Q 2: What is transcendental exposition of space and time? Explain briefly

Q 3: Write a note on metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.

Q 4: Write a note on metaphysical exposition of space.

Q 5: Write a note on forms of sensibility.

C) Long questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q1: What are the two *a priori* forms of sensibility? Discuss.

Q2. Explain the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space?

Q3. Explain the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.

Q4. Discuss the transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time.

Q5. What is meant by space and time as 'empirically real and transcendentally ideal? Discuss.

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UNIT 3: REALISM: NAIVE AND SCIENTIFIC

UNIT STRUCTURE

3.1 Learning Objectives

3.2 Introduction

3.3 Classification of Realism

3.4 Naïve Realism

3.5 Scientific Realism

3.6 Difference between Naïve and Scientific Realism

3.7 Conclusion

3.8 Let us Sum Up

3.9 Further Reading

3.10 Answer to Check Your Progress

3.11 Model Questions

3.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will be able to:

- define realism
- explain the characteristics of realism.
- discuss the concept of Naive realism
- discuss the concept of Scientific realism
- explain the difference between Naïve and Scientific Realism.

3.2 INTRODUCTION

Philosophy deals with knowledge and reality. In philosophy various analyses of reality are found. Realism is a philosophical theory according to which, objects of our knowledge are real. This view is also called Objectivism. Realism as a metaphysical theory is concerned with existence of objects or things. Epistemological analysis of Realism is that objects are independent of knowing minds or the knower. According to Realism, knower and the object of knowledge are only externally related. The reality of an object is not affected by its relation with the knower. Therefore, the basic

principle of Realism is that, the object and its qualities are independent of knowing mind.

A few characteristics of Realism are,

- Existence of objects is independent of knowledge.
- Qualities of objects are inherent in the objects.
- Knowledge does not affect an object.

3.3 CLASSIFICATION OF REALISM

There are various types of Realism. Two chief forms of Realism are, Naïve Realism and Scientific Realism. The supporters of common sense view propounded the Naïve Realistic view. According to this view, an object is precisely what it is seen to be. On the other hand Scientific Realism is basically based the scientific view. John Locke put forwarded the scientific theory, according to which objects exist mind-independently. It is a positive epistemic attitude.

3.4 NAÏVE REALISM

Naïve Realism is the most common and simple form of Realism. A perceived object independently exists. It neither depends on our perception nor on our knowledge. This is the Realistic approach for all common individuals. Therefore, it is also called Natural Realism and Commonsense Realism. The central theme of Naïve or popular Realism is that the knower of the objects knows something directly with all its qualities.

The term Naïve Realism was firstly coined by Durant Drake in his "Invitation to Philosophy". The chief characteristics of Naïve-Realism are,

- Objects exist independently of knowledge of them:
  Objects do not come into existence after being known or perceived. All the objects of the world continue to exist independently. They can exist without the knowing mind. For example, a stone has its independent existence. We may or

may not know about it or may not perceive it. And this perception or knowledge in no way, influence its existence.

- Objects possess their own qualities:

  Each object has its quality and characteristics. And these qualities are inhered by the object. The perceiver or the knower does not impose qualities upon the object. For example hardness is a quality of a stone. This quality resides in the stone. Thus, just like an object qualities and characteristics of objects also exist independently.

- Knowledge does not influence objects:

  Knowledge of an object in no way influences the object and its existence. It has its own independent existence. For example as mentions above, a stone and its qualities are never affected by its knowledge of a person.

- The object is that what appears to be:

  The form and the nature of an object cannot be differentiated. An object is that what appears to be. In the same way, a person can not show any difference between the knowledge and experience of an object. While perceiving an object our knowledge and perception of it will be the same.

- Objects are public:

  Objects are always public. Therefore, the knowledge of an object is also public and not limited by an individual. Different people can have knowledge of the same object. For example everyone can experience an object and also can acquire knowledge of that.

- World of external objects:

  There is a self existent external world which is outside of human mind and knowledge.

- Objects can be known directly:

  Objects are known directly. Individuals can directly experience an object. Both knower and the known can have direct relation.

Thus, according to Naïve Realism, our ideas are the copies of the objects of the external world. All the qualities of the objects are real. They have objective existence of their own. All the qualities of the objects are also equally essential and real.

3.5 SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Scientific Realism is, primarily the view that the world described by the science is the real world as it is. Thus, Scientific Realism is basically, a) Positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best scientific theories and models and b)Basically, it is the idea that science, although not perfect, is doing a decent job of explain the world. Scientific Realism is a form of Realism which was established by John Locke. The origin of Scientific Realism has come with a negative approach by criticising the limitations of Naïve Realism. As a kind of Realism, Scientific Realism believes in the existence of an external world independent of human mind. Locke in his analyses tried to give a scientific account of the experiences of the external world. Locke was an empiricist philosopher. In his book, "*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*", he describes the nature of knowledge. According to him, knowledge proper is certain, instructive and real. He believed in the independent world of objects. As an empiricist philosopher Locke believes that, there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously present in the senses. Thus, Locke explains knowledge in terms of experience.

The chief characteristics of Scientific Realism are,

- Objects are independent of knowledge:
  As a form of Realism, Scientific Realism believes that objects exist independently of the knowledge of them. They exist by themselves.
- Objects are not known directly:
  One can know an object by its qualities. In explaining, this Locke introduced the idea of primary and secondary qualities. Locke describes knowledge as an indirect process.

- There is a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects:

  John Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities are immune to any influence of knowledge, because they belong to the object itself. A few examples of primary qualities are shape, size, length, solidity, number and mobility etc. These are primary qualities, because they belong to the objects. On the other hand, the qualities those do not exist in the objects, are called secondary qualities. For example, colour, taste, smell, heat etc are secondary qualities and they vary to different person or same person at different time.

- The primary qualities of the objects do not depend on the knower:

  As the primary qualities belong to the object, therefore knowledge cannot influence the primary qualities. The primary qualities are objective and general. Mind does not conjure up the primary ideas, because they are images of primary qualities. But, secondary ideas are copies of secondary qualities and they are influenced by knowledge.

- Primary ideas originating in objects are public:

  For primary ideas objects are public. As the fundamental criterion on realism, objects do not depend on knowledge for their existence. By differentiating between primary and secondary qualities, Scientific Realism holds that objects, primary qualities and primary objects are public or objective. They do not differ from person to person.

  In this way, by showing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Locke tried to give away a scientific interpretation of the nature of external world. Knowledge is obtained as a representation of the objects of the external world. Hence, his view of knowledge is also known as Representationalism.

3.6 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NAÏVE AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Naïve and Scientific Realism are two types of realism, which put forward their own versions of Realism. Both types of Realism possess the Realistic attitude. But, Naïve and Scientific Realism differ in the following points,

- According to Naïve Realism, objects exist independently of knowledge of it. Scientific Realism also accepts that objects are independent of knowledge, but also accepts that metaphysical speculation depends upon the mind.
- According to Naïve Realism, qualities of objects exist in it. But, in Scientific Realism, the secondary qualities of the objects are imposed by the mind in the objects.
- According to Naïve Realism, knowledge does not influence the objects. But according to Scientific Realism, ideas can influence the objects in some cases.
- According to Naïve Realism, object is what appears to be. But, in Scientific Realism, there is a difference between the actual object and its ideas, which is only an image of the real object.
- According to Naïve Realism, knowledge is direct. But, in Scientific Realism, knowledge is indirect.
- According to Naïve Realism, objects are known directly. But, Scientific Realism holds that, knowledge of an object is in its complex form through the help of simple ideas.
- Naïve Realism holds that objects are public. But Scientific Realism states that primary ideas are public. But, in case of secondary idea, objects are not public. Because, they differ from person to person for the same object.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The basic criterion of Realism is that object of knowledge is independent of the knowing mind. But, on the basis of whole or partial

independence of the objects on the knower's mind, Realism is divided into different types. Naïve or Popular Realism is the simplest form of Realism. It is called Natural Realism and it put forward the commonsense view of the external world. For the Naïve Realists, nature of the object is just like as we perceive. On the other hand, empirical interpretation of John Locke establishes to the Scientific Realistic view, according to which there is a real world of the objects. But, unlike the Naïve Realists, these objects are not directly known. They are known by the qualities of objects. All objects possess their own qualities. The qualities of the objects are divided into two types by the Scientific Realistic thinkers. They are primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are unchanging and objective properties of mind. On the other hand, secondary qualities are changing and subjective. Locke in his attempt to reform the limitations of Naïve Realism established a new version of Realism, which is called Scientific Realism or Representationalism. Although Scientific Realism is also criticised by some later thinkers, yet it bears a lot of significance in the history of epistemology.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1: What is Realism?

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Q2: What are the two different types of Realism?

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Q3: What is Naïve Realistic approach?

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Q4: How the Naïve Realistic thinkers describe the status of the objects?

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Q5: Who for the first time coined the term Naïve Realism?

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Q 6: "Naïve Realism is also known as Representationalism" – True or false?

.....

Q 7: Who established Scientific Realism?

.....

Q 8: How the Scientific Realism described the status of the objects?

.....

Q9: "For the Scientific Realism objects are directly known" – true or false?

.....

Q10: What is primary quality according to Locke?

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Q11: What is secondary quality of an object, according to Locke?

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Q12: Are primary qualities of an object, subjective or objective as described by Locke?

.....

Q 13: Are secondary qualities of an object, subjective or objective as described by Locke?

.....



3.8 LET US SUM UP

- Philosophy deals with knowledge and reality.
- Realism is a philosophical theory according to which, objects of our knowledge are real.
- Realism as a metaphysical theory is concerned with existence of objects or things.
- Epistemological analysis of Realism is that objects are independent of knowing minds or the knower.
- Two chief forms of Realism are, Naïve Realism and Scientific Realism.

- Naïve Realism is the most common and simple form of Realism according to which, a perceived object independently exists.
- The term Naïve Realism was firstly coined by Durant Drake in his "Invitation to Philosophy".
- According to Naïve Realism, objects exist independently of the knowledge of them and knowledge does not influence objects
- Scientific Realism was established by the Empiricist philosopher, John Locke.
- In his book, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Locke describes the nature of knowledge according to which, knowledge proper is certain, instructive and real.
- As a form of Realism, Scientific Realism believes that objects exist independently of the knowledge of them and they exist by themselves.
- According to Locke, one can know an object by its qualities.
- Locke introduced the idea of primary and secondary qualities.
- Locke describes knowledge as an indirect process.
- According to Scientific Realism, primary qualities are objective and secondary qualities are subjective
- Scientific Realism of Locke is also known as Representationalism
- Scientific Realism holds that, knowledge of an object is in its complex form through the help of simple ideas.



3.9 FURTHER READING

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2) Sharma,R.M (2010). Western and Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. Surjeet Publication.

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3.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q 1: Realism is a philosophical theory according to which, objects of our knowledge are real.

Ans to Q 2: Two chief forms of Realism are, Naïve Realism and Scientific Realism.

Ans to Q 3: The Realistic viewpoint, according to which an object is precisely what it is seen to be, is known as Naïve Realism.

Ans to Q 4: According to Naïve Realism, objects exist independently of the knowledge of them

Ans to Q 5: The term Naïve Realism was firstly coined by Durant Drake in his "Invitation to Philosophy".

Ans to Q 6: False. Naïve Realism is also known as Natural Realism or Common sense.

Ans to Q 7: Scientific Realism was established by the Empiricist philosopher, John Locke.

Ans to Q 8: As a form of Realism, Scientific Realism believes that objects exist independently of the knowledge of them and they exist by themselves.

Ans to Q 9: False. According to Scientific Realism, objects are not known directly

Ans to Q 10: According to Locke, the qualities those exist in the object are called primary qualities. For example, shape, size, length, solidity, number and mobility etc are primary qualities and they are immune to any influence of knowledge.

Ans to Q 11: According to Locke, the qualities those do not exist in the object are called secondary qualities. For example, colour, taste, smell, heat etc are secondary qualities and they vary to different person or same person at different time.

Ans to Q 12: According to Locke, primary qualities are objective.

Ans to Q 13: According to Locke, primary qualities are objective; because they exist in the object themselves and they are immune to any influence of knowledge.



3.11: MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions:

Q 1: What is Realism?

Q 2: What are the types of Realism?

Q 3: What is Naïve Realism?

Q 4: What is Scientific Realism?

Q 5: Define primary quality?

Q 6: Define secondary quality?

Q 7: What is the status of objects of external world in Realism?

B. Short Questions: (Write in about 150 words)

Q 1: Write briefly about characteristics of Realism.

Q 2: Write a short note on Naïve Realism.

Q 3: Briefly explain Locke's Representationalism.

Q 4: What are the differences between primary and secondary qualities?

Q 5: Write briefly about the Scientific Realism.

C. Long Questions: (Write in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What is Scientific Realism? Write the characteristics of Scientific Realism.

Q 2: What is Naïve Realism? Write the characteristics of Naïve Realism.

Q 3: Explain the differences between primary and secondary qualities.

Q 4: Distinguish between Naïve Realism and Scientific Realism.

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UNIT 4: NEO–REALISM

UNIT STRUCTURE

4.1 Learning Objectives

4.2 Introduction

4.3 Neo-Realism or New Realism

4.4 Epistemological Monism

4.5 Naive Realism and Neo–Realism

4.6 Let us Sum Up

4.7 Further Reading

4.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

4.9 Model Questions

4.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to :

- explain Neo-Realism as theory of Reality
- define Epistemological Monism
- discuss the relation of Neo-Realism to Naïve Realism

4.2 INTRODUCTION

In the history of Philosophy, 'Reality' or the object of knowledge has been conceived and propounded in different ways by different thinkers giving rise to different theories of Reality.

Realism as a theory, holds that the object of knowledge exists independently of the mind. The general tenet of Realism is that, whatever is, is real in the sense that it has being and functions as something out there independently of any mind. But Realism admits of various types and degrees because the object may be held to be either wholly independent of mind and distinct from the mind or to be partly so, and to different extents.

The realistic attitude, that objects of knowledge has extra mental existence is not a new one in philosophy. Realism, says the realist, is the instinctive belief of man and it is, therefore, as old as man. Modern realism

draws its sustenance from the different forms of ancient realism. Modern Realism has flourished mostly in America and Great Britain.

Neo-Realism is a movement in philosophy representing modified form of realism. This new realist movement developed largely as a protest against the Absolute Idealism of the 19th Century and against the absurd claims of subjective idealism or solipsism, taken as the basis of the Absolute Idealism. In 1912, six prominent American realists, namely, Edwin Bissell Holt, Walter Taylor Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter Boughton Pitkin and Edward Gleason Spaulding jointly published a book with the title 'The New Realism' in which they expounded and defended a form of realism which differed in certain fundamental respects from the older varieties of realism.

4.3 NEO-REALISM OR NEW REALISM

Neo-Realism is one of the Chief forms of Realism prevalent in America. The Neo-Realism or New Realism is primarily a doctrine concerning the relation between the knowing process and the thing known. Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin and Spaulding, the six authors of the book 'The New Realism' advocates direct realism and believes in the presentative theory of perception. "Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented." According to Neo-Realism, external objects are directly perceived as independent of and external to the mind. Objects are not perceived through the medium of ideas. The external objects exist independently of being perceived by any mind. They are not mind-dependent. They are independent of mind, - finite or infinite.

Neo-Realism, while it insists like all realism that things are independent, also asserts that when things are known they become immediate objects of knowledge. Things enter directly into the mind and are technically called "sensa" or immediate objects of knowledge. The immediate objects of knowledge or perception – "sensa", for example, a rap of a sound heard, or a patch of colour seen are conceived as physical.

So external things are nothing else than sensa in a certain relation. The sensa are not subjective.

But the crux of neo-realism is the relation between the sensa and the physical object or thing independent of mind. The direct object of man's perception is not the table (physical reality) but certain sensa – hardness, brown colour, a certain shape etc. If the sensa are parts of the physical reality, then the same table must possess contradictory sensa as its real parts, for the table looks rectangular from one point of view and square from another. But the table cannot be the sum of contradictory sensa. It may then be said that the sensa are produced by the table in the mind and thus the physical reality is the cause of sensa. This clearly leads to the representationalism of Locke who inferred the existence of external reality as the cause of sensations. The sensa then are not physical, but the reflections of the physical reality on man's mind. Man can know only the sensa and not the physical object which is external.

Moreover, some critics point out that knowledge of objects is not as immediate and direct as thought by the Neo- realists. The object of immediate perception cannot be external physical reality. For example, a man with normal eyesight see a flower red and a colour blind man perceives it as grey. If the colour is physical then the flower must be red and grey at the same time, which is absurd. Sensa as physical cannot explain the phenomena of error, illusion and the experience of seeing double.

Some neo-realists try to say that dream objects, illusory appearances, hallucination etc are not subjective but belong to the same physical world as percepts and are equally objective; they are, of course, entities subsisting in addition to ordinary physical objects. For example, when a person perceive snake in a rope, the rope has existence in space and time, but the snake does not. The snake is not existent, since it does not exist in space and time, but the snake has subsistence.

The Neo-realists point out that the world of objectivity is not exhausted by the world of existence. The objective world is the world of subsistence and the world of existence is only a part thereof. Whatever is existent is subsistent but not vice-versa. Neo-realists take up this distinction between

existence and subsistence to safeguard the objectivity of illusory content. The illusory objects do not exist in time and space like real physical things. But they are as good objects of experience as physical things and subsist in the all-inclusive universe of being. Thus to be objective and to be real are not the same thing. Similarly, to be false does not mean to be subjective. As E.B.Holt, remarks, “The gist of realism is not to insist that everything is real , far from it, but to insist that everything that is, is and is as it is.” Thus in Neo-realism the false object is found to be an unreal and yet objective entity.

But the contention of the neo-realists that there may be subsistent entities which have no spatio-temporal existence are fanciful. Whether things are subsistent or existent entities, they must be thought of by minds. Moreover, dreams, illusions and hallucinations cannot be objective. These are subjective, since they are different in different individuals.

Neo-realism conceives of all relations as external. Relations are external to the things related. The world is an aggregate of things externally related to one another. The world is not universe but multiverse. Relations are objective and do not depend on mind. They are not subjective creations of the mind; they are independent of mind. Space, time, causality are real and existent. The Neo-Realist do not consider the world as expression of the Absolute. Neo-realism believes in pluralistic Universe.

Critics point out that all relations are not external. Some relations are internal. Matter, Space, and time are inseparable from one another. They are the matrix of the physical universe. There are internal relations among them. Within these internal relations there are external relations among certain things. For example, conjunction between my hand and a pen is an external relation.

Neo-realism is intellectualistic and analytic. It believes in the method of intellectual analysis and intelligibility of the world. Intellect can understand the nature of the world. Neo-realism supports analysis as the only method to follow in philosophical investigation. E.G. Spaulding defends “analysis as a method of knowing , which discovers entities or parts which are real in quite the same sense as are the wholes which are analysed.” The wholes

and the parts both are real. Analysis does not falsify them. It simply discovers the parts which exist in the wholes. This position is called 'Analytical Realism'.

The most notable feature of Neo-Realism is what W.T. Marvin calls "the emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology". This means that the nature of things is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge, but things must be studied in the objective way, in their objective setting. Epistemology neither gives any theory of reality nor solves any metaphysical problem.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1. What is the name of the book published by the six American realists?

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Q2. What is the technical name for immediate objects of knowledge, according to the Neo-realists?

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4.4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL MONISM

The main epistemological question is : whether the object perceived is numerically identical with (i.e. one and the same entity as) the object as it is (unperceived). Neo-realism answers the question in the affirmative, holding that the two are one. They say that "the content of knowledge, that which lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically identical with the thing known." "In other words, things when consciousness is had of them become themselves contents of consciousness; and the same things thus figure both in the so-called external world and in the

manifold which introspection reveals." This view, that the object known and the object as it is are one and the same, is known as epistemological monism. It is opposed to epistemological dualism according to which the object known and the object as it is are two entities.

As Neo-Realism or New Realism favours epistemological monism, it tries to show that knowing does not change the object, but grasps it as it exists independently. Thus, as Neo-Realism is based on what Perry calls 'epistemological monism' it does away with the distinction between ideas and things. These two are not different from one another in so far as their contents are concerned but they differ only as belonging to two different groupings. Just as the same person may be a member of two or more different associations, so the same content may form an element of the external world when it is viewed under one set of relations and may also be the part of the world of ideas when viewed under a different set of relations. The aim of the neo-realists is to abolish the subjective and to interpret mental phenomena in an objective relational manner. E.B.Holt defines consciousness as the cross-section of the universe defined by the specific response of the nervous system. Thus, consciousness is not any subjective existence, but only a particular collection of objects defined by the specific response of the organism in relation to the physical environment. It is only a peculiar grouping of a certain objects arranged in a peculiar and definite context. The objects constituting the conscious manifold may yet be members of other manifolds and are really integral parts of the environment from which the collection is made. Thus, according to the neo-realists, knowledge has to be understood exclusively in the language of objects. There is no such thing as consciousness apart from the things of which we are conscious.

The epistemological monism as advocated by the neo-realists involves serious difficulties lurking beneath its apparent simplicity. Neo-realism which holds that the content of knowledge, that which lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically identical with the thing known, completely ignores the distinction between mental act and object as basal to all forms of experience. It reduces consciousness to the level of an object.

If the immediate data of perception are identical with parts of independent physical objects, then how can the same object appear differently to two or more persons at the same time. Moreover, if the object known is identical with the object as it is, then how can we explain errors and illusions. Neo-realism, therefore owes an explanation of error and illusions.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 3: What is epistemological monism?

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4.5 NAIVE REALISM AND NEO-REALISM

Naïve Realism is also known as popular realism, common sense realism, natural realism, and direct realism. According to Naïve Realism, ideas are exact copies of external real things and their qualities. All the qualities of matter are real and objective existences in nature; they exist in things themselves. Thus colour, taste, smell, heat and cold are as much absolute and objective qualities of things extension, impenetrability, motion, rest solidity and the like are . Amongst the primary qualities are extension, impenetrability, motion, inertia and the rest. Among the secondary qualities are colour, taste, smell, temperature etc. Matter and all their qualities exist, and are known by the mind. The primary qualities are independent of our congnitions and the secondary qualities are dependent on them.

Neo-realism like Naïve realism also holds that primary qualities, secondary qualities, and tertiary qualities are real and objective. None of

them are merely subjective ideas of the mind. So Neo-realism agrees with naïve realism, which regards extension, solidity, rest and motion (primary qualities), color, sound, taste, smell, heat and cold (secondary qualities), and beauty and ugliness (tertiary qualities), as objective and real.

Naïve Realism conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be. Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas, they are themselves directly presented . Consciousness is like a beam of light which shines through the sense-organs and illuminates the world just as it is.

Like Naïve Realism, Neo-Realism also advocates direct realism and believes in the presentative theory of perception. “Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented.”

Naïve realism as a theory of Reality is however handicapped by its failure to explain error, illusions etc. Naïve realism can hardly explain the phenomena of dreams, hallucinations, reveries and double visions. The objects of experience in these phenomena cannot be said to exist as real things “out there” in the world. They cannot be material or physical entities. It can be said that they exist only in the minds as ideas or mental states.

Neo-realism which reduces the data of perception to physical existence cannot obviously explain illusory experiences . According to Neo-realism, what is illusory subsists, independently of all experience, but it does not exist in space and time and is therefore unreal. But the difficulty in this view is that it goes against the report of our immediate feeling. An illusory object is perceived by us as existing in space and time and not merely as subsisting in a shadowy world of being.

One of the Neo-realist viz, E.B.Holt ascribes a sort of reality to illusory and hallucinatory objects. Even dreams, illusions and hallucinations are independent of minds; they have real objective existence. But to consider dreams, illusions and hallucinations as objective existence is to go too far towards pan-objectivism, that is, only objects exists. There is no mind, consciousness or subjective existence.

From the above discussion it is seen that Neo-realism is broadly speaking , a return to Naïve or Natural Realism which was abandoned previously owning to its inability to explain dreams and illusions Thus the relation of Neo-realism to Naïve realism is historically very significant.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 4: What other names by which Naïve Realism is known?

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Q5. What are primary qualities of matter?

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Q6. Does Neo-Realism advocate direct realism?

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4.6 LET US SUM UP

- Neo-Realism is a movement in Philosophy representing modified form of realism. This new Realist movement developed largely as a protest against the Absolute Idealism of the 19th Century.
- Neo-realism or New-realism is primarily a doctrine concerning the relation between the knowing process and the thing known.

- Holt, Marvin, Monatague, Perry, Pitkin and Spaulding the six authors of the book 'The New Realism' advocates direct realism and believes in the presentative theory of perception.
- According to Neo-realism, external objects are directly perceived as independent of and external to the mind. Objects are not perceived through the medium of ideas.
- The Neo-Realists say that even dreams, illusions, hallucinations etc. have objective existence.
- The illusory objects do not exist in time and space like real physical things. But they are as good objects of experience as physical things and subsist in the all-inclusive universe of being.
- Neo-realism conceives of all relations as external. Relations are external to the things related. The world is an aggregate of things externally related to one another. The world is not universe but multiverse.
- Neo-realism is based on what Perry calls 'Epistemological Monism' which does away with the distinction between ideas and things. These two are not different from one another in so far as their contents are concerned but they differ only as belonging to different groupings.
- According to Naïve Realism, ideas are exact copies of external real things and their qualities. All the qualities are real and objective. Neo-Realism agrees with Naïve realism that all qualities – primary , secondary and tertiary are objective and real.
- Neo-realism is, broadly speaking, a return to Naïve realism. The relation of Neo-realism to Naïve realism is historically very significant.



4.7 FURTHER READING

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4) Sinha, Jadunath, (2009) *Introduction to Philosophy*. Kolkata: New Central Book Agency (P) Ltd.

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4.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q.No.1: The name of the book published by the six American Realists is 'The New Realism'

Ans to Q.No 2: The immediate objects of knowledge are technically called 'sensa' by the Neo-realists.

Ans to Q.No 3: The view that object known and the object as it is are one and the same.

Ans to Q.No 4: Naïve Realism is also known as Popular realism , Commonsense realism, Natural realism and Direct realism.

Ans to Q.No.5: Extension, solidity, rest and motion are primary qualities of matter.

Ans to Q.No.6: Yes, Neo-realism advocates direct realism.



4.9 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: Name the place where Neo-realism flourished.

Q 2: Who are the authors of the book 'The New Realism'?

Q 3: Is Neo-Realism direct or indirect Realism?

Q 4: What is 'Sensa'?

Q 5: What method does the Neo-realists adopt in philosophical investigation?

B. Short Questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Write a short note on ‘Epistemological Monism’

Q 2: Write a short note on Naïve Realism.

Q 3: How do the Neo-realists conceive relation?

C. Long Questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Describe the theory of Neo-Realism

Q 2: Discuss the relation of Neo-Realism to Naïve Realism.

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UNIT 5: SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM - BERKELEY

UNIT STRUCTURE

5.1 Learning Objectives

5.2 Introduction

5.3 Meaning of Subjective Idealism

5.4 Berkeleyan Idealism

5.5 Berkeley's Idealism: Subjective or Objective ?

5.6 Solipsism: Was Berkeley a Solipsist?

5.7 Let us Sum Up

5.8 Further Reading

5.9 Answers to Check Your Progress

5.10 Model Questions

5.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the meaning of Subjective Idealism
- describe the Subjective Idealism of George Berkeley
- distinguish between Subjective Idealism and Objective Idealism

5.2 INTRODUCTION

Idealism is that systematic philosophy which teaches the supremacy of spirits over matter. It denies the reality of external objects independent of the knowing mind. Idealism asserts that there is no extra-mental reality, everything knowable being a content of consciousness. The mind is the primary reality. Ideas are not representations of external objects independent of minds. The doctrine of Idealism regards the reality as ideal or mind dependent.

Idealism takes various forms - Subjective Idealism of George Berkeley, Phenomenalistic Idealism of Immanuel Kant, Objective Idealism of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel etc. George Berkeley's system is idealistic, since it teaches that reality consists of spirits and their ideas only.

5.3 MEANING OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Subjective Idealism is a philosophical view based on the idea that nothing exists except through a perceiving mind . In this view, the natural world has no real existence as such. It only exists in the mind of those who perceive it. Subjective Idealism denies the existence of external objects and reduces them to the subjective ideas of the finite minds that perceive them. Finite minds and their ideas are the only realities and there is no world outside. This is what is known as the subjective idealism of Berkeley

5.4 BERKELEYAN IDEALISM

George Berkeley (1685 - 1753) an Irish Bishop and philosopher may be said to be the founder of idealism in the modern period. George Berkeley, a distinguished idealist, denies the existence of any transcendent extra - mental reality. Berkeley's idealism arose as a logical consequence of the most unpsychological distinction of qualities into primary and secondary made by Locke. Berkeley developed the empiricism of John Locke to its logical consequence in idealism. Locke holds that we cannot directly perceive the external objects , but can only have an indirect knowledge of their existence through the ideas which are the effects of these objects.

If the 'substance' in which the primary qualities inhere, is unknown, as Locke maintains, we cannot even say that it exists. Berkeley therefore, concludes, that our minds and their ideas are the only realities and there is no world outside. Objects have no external existence apart from the mind that knows them. Hence Berkeley argues that the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived Esse - est- percipi To be or to exist is to be perceived or known. The existence of extramental matter is only a dogmatic and superfluous assumption. Instead of supposing that mind is in the world, we have rather to suppose that the world is in mind. This position is often classified as subjective idealism.

Berkeley's Subjective Idealism is sometimes called Mentalism since Berkeley claims that all that is real is mental. It is called Immaterialism since he denies the reality of material substance . His doctrine is also called

spiritualism, since he believes only in the reality of spirits and the Infinite Spirit, and their ideas. Thus it is seen that, according to this theory there is no extra mental matter, and only minds or spirits with their ideas exist.

Berkeley rejects any distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke thought primary qualities i.e. weight, extension, solidity etc. to be objective and secondary qualities i.e. taste, colour etc. to be subjective states of our mind. Berkeley offers the following arguments for the subjectivity of primary qualities. First, if the secondary qualities - colour, taste etc, cannot exist except in relation to our sensibility, and are, therefore ideas of our mind, the primary qualities, extension, weight, solidity etc, are ideas of our mind, since they are also perceived by the mind. Secondly, the primary qualities like the secondary qualities appear different to different persons. A stone that appears heavy to one may appear light to another. Thirdly, primary qualities and the secondary qualities cannot be perceived apart from each other. It is impossible to conceive an extended thing without any colour, or colour without any extension. Thus to Berkeley, all qualities, primary and secondary are subjective.

Berkeley again says that an object can never be perceived apart from its sensation . He says, "It is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. In truth, the object and sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other. An object can never be perceived apart from its sensation. Therefore a perceived object is identical with a sensation. It has no existence outside of mind.

Berkeley's assumption that the world of objects does not exist apart from our perceiving mind raises some important questions. If things be only ideas in our mind, will they cease to exist when we cease to think of them? It appears at first from what has been said by Berkeley that they do not exist independently of our thought. How can we explain the apparent objectivity, independence, permanence, and unity of the world consistently with this theory?

Berkeley answers such questions fully in his later writings by shifting

his ground of idealism from the finite mind to the Infinite Mind. He says that, in order to explain the permanence and unity of the system of ideas which we call the world, we must assume an absolute and universal mind in whose thought it is transferred to and partially reproduced in the finite minds of men. Thus things are ideas of the Divine mind. Human perceptions means rendering explicit of what was lying implicit in the Divine mind.

Berkeley in his earlier writings sometimes speaks as if the world has no existence except in our finite minds. God creates or raises in our minds the ideas which constitute things, and these ideas exist only in our own minds where God creates the world as a system of ideas in the minds of men merely, so that the world has no existence except as a system of human ideas. This is complete Subjective Idealism, because, according to it, the world exists only subjectively in finite minds.

Berkeley, in his later writings, distinctly says that God creates and sustains the world as a system of ideas within His own mind; and that our perception is a reproduction from a finite point of view, of the ideas of the Divine Mind. This view of Berkeley gives an objective existence to the world. Berkeley's contention that the objects depend on the mind's knowing has been severely criticized by different schools of Realists of the present day.

According to the Realists, the object exists; it is independent of the mind and its knowledge of it; its existence is not affected by the mind's knowledge of it. Esse is percipi: it means that being is, and therefore it is perceived . If there were no being or object it would not be perceived. Its being does not consist in being perceived as Berkeley erroneously supposed; it is perceived because there is being or existence of the object. Knowing is a subjective mental state, but it refers to an object independent of it.

Berkeley argues that whenever we perceive an object (blue) we perceive a sensation of the object at the same time. We can never separate the two from each other in actual perception. So they must be identical with each other. The sensible object (blue) must be identical with the sensation of blue. According to Berkeley, 'blue' and 'sensation of blue' are identical with each other, because they can never be perceived apart from each other. But it has been pointed out to Berkeley that inseparability in perception

does not prove identity. If A and B cannot be perceived or conceived apart from each other, it does not prove that they are identical with each other. From inseparability, identity does not follow.

It is also true that the things which we know exist in a cognitive relation to us. From this we cannot say that they cannot exist outside this relation. It is also true that we cannot know everything about things unperceived. But it does not mean that there are no unperceived things.

Hume believed Solipsism to be the logical outcome of Berkeley's doctrine of esse-est-percipi. Solipsism affirms that I and my ideas alone exist. If to be real is to be perceived then the only real things, for any one, would be one's own mind and experiences. So Hume developed Berkeley's idealism to Solipsism. But Berkeley maintains that the sensations in our mind depend on God. Thus the conception of God saves Berkeley's philosophy from lapsing into Solipsism. But the way in which God has been introduced into his philosophy seems to prove the weakness of his doctrine. Purely subjective idealism is therefore untenable.

Thus due to the defects involved in the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley it cannot be accepted as the true theory for explaining the nature and object of knowledge.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1: By what other names Subjective Idealism is known ?

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Q2. What is Esse-est-percipi, according to Berkeley?

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5.5 BERKELEY'S IDEALISM: SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?

George Berkeley, an eminent Idealist denies the existence of any transcendent extra-mental reality. According to him, material bodies are only ideas, their existence consists in their being perceived by some mind. But Berkeley held the reality, externality and permanence of the real world on the basis of Divine perception. Now, the question is : How are we to characterize Berkeley's Idealism ? Is it subjective or objective?

To answer this question we must understand precisely the meanings of the two expressions Subjective Idealism and Objective Idealism. Subjective Idealism taken in the strictest sense, means, that the world of things has no existence except in the consciousness of finite minds. In other words, it implies that the world exists only as a system of ideas in the minds of finite subjects. Objective Idealism, again, taken in the strictest sense, means that the world exists objectively or independently of our finite minds, but it is evolved by and contained in the Universal mind of God. In other words, it implies that the world is created and sustained by God as a system of ideas in His own mind, and that our perception consists in the reproduction of the ideas of the Divine Mind in our own minds. Now, if this be the true distinction between Subjective Idealism and Objective Idealism, then Berkeley's earlier theory may be called Subjective, and his later theory Objective.

But it has become customary to regard Berkeley's theory, whether in its earlier or later form as Subjective Idealism and to look upon the Idealistic theory of Hegel and Neo-Hegelians as the true form of Objective Idealism.

Critics of Berkeley have raised the question whether Berkeley is to be regarded as a subjective or an objective idealist . A few admirers of Berkeley have conceded to Berkeley's idealism an objective character in view of the later development of his philosophy though, however, the majority of the critics are of the opinion that idealism of Berkeley lacks that fuller connotation which objective idealism of Hegel and his followers has acquired. Now, let us examine how Hegelian theory differ from the later Berkeleyan

theory. Like the Berkeleyan theory in its later phase, the Hegelian theory also supposes that the world is evolved from, sustained by, and included within the all-embracing energy and consciousness of God or the Absolute Mind. But in Hegelian Idealism the evolution and maintenance of a world of things are contained in the very nature of God or the Absolute - that the existence of a world is essential to His concrete self-conscious life. God realizes Himself as a concrete self -conscious subject in and through the world of objects evolved and sustained by Himself. God or the Absolute Idea by its self-differentiation and self-objectification makes itself into the world of things and minds. The relation between the Absolute Idea and the world of things and minds is such that the one cannot be without the other. Now if these be the fundamental points in the conception of objective idealism, we cannot call Berkeley's idealism objective. Berkeley and his followers assume that God as a thinking subject may exist without a world as the object - that the existence of a world as of things is not at all essential or indispensable to His conscious life, but is dependent on an act of choice on His part. Hence their theory may be called Subjective, though in a different sense.

It may be concluded that Berkeley's idealism remains subjective inspite of its attempt to be objective.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 3: In Berkeley's Idealism, is the world essential to God's conscious life?

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Q 4: Whose theory is regarded as the true form of Objective Idealism ?

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5.6 SOLIPSISM: WAS BERKELEY A SOLIPSIST ?

The word Solipsism has been derived from two Latin words 'solus' and 'ipse', meaning "myself alone." According to Solipsism, I and my ideas alone exist. That is, I am certain of my own existence and of my ideas which are real. I do not know anything beyond myself and my ideas. "Each person is shut up to himself alone, solus ipse."

The question has been raised : whether Berkeley was a solipsist ? It is true that Berkeley affirms that all that is real is mental. But from this we cannot say that he is a solipsist. Berkeley is not a solipsist. He believes that experience is a result of an external activity, and not of our own solely. He depends on God to escape from the magic circle of the self. He holds that the sensations in our mind depend on God. God is the cause of all our sensations. Berkeley recognizes the existence of finite spirits and God. The sensations are excited in the finite minds by God - according to certain fixed laws. Again, certain sensations are produced in us by other finite spirits; and our belief in their existence and our communion with them are guaranteed by our faith in God. Thus the conception of God saves Berkeley's philosophy from lapsing into Solipsism.

Philosopher Johnston says, " His doctrine is not really solipsistic, for he explicitly holds (a) that the world contains, in addition to me and my ideas, other finite spirits with their ideas, and (b) that I am not the source of my presentations, but am dependent for them on God, who causes them to occur in a fixed and regular order."



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q5. What does the Latin words "solus' and 'ipse' mean?

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5.7 LET US SUM UP

- Subjective Idealism is a philosophical view based on the idea that nothing exists except through a perceiving mind. The natural world exists in the mind of those who perceive it.
- George Berkeley, a distinguished idealist - denies the existence of any transcendent extra-mental reality.
- Berkeley says that our minds and their ideas are the only realities and there is no world outside.
- Berkeley argues that the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived "Esse-est-percipi" To be or to exist is to be perceived or known.
- Berkeley's Subjective Idealism is sometimes called Mentalism, Immaterialism and Spiritualism because according to this theory there is no extra-mental matter, and only minds or spirits with their ideas exist.
- Berkeley says that inorder to explain the permanence and unity of the system of ideas which we call the world, we must assume an absolute and universal mind in whose thought it exists permanently and from whose thought it is transferred to and partially reproduced in the finite minds of men. Thus things are ideas of the Divine mind.
- Berkeley argues that whenever we perceive an object (blue) we perceive a sensation of the object at the same time. We can never separate the two from each other in actual perception. So the sensible object (blue) must be identical with the sensation of blue, because they can never be perceived apart from each other.
- Hume believed Solipsism to be the logical outcome of Berkeley's doctrine of esse-est-percipi. Solipsism affirms that I and my ideas alone exist. If to be real is to be perceived then the only real things, for any one, would be one's own mind and experiences. So Hume developed Berkeley's Idealism to Solipsism.

- Subjective Idealism taken in the strictest sense, means that the world of things has no existence except in the consciousness of finite minds. Objective Idealism, again taken in the strictest sense, means that the world exists objectively or independently of our finite minds, but it is evolved by and contained in the universal mind of God.
- In Hegelian Idealism the evolution and maintenance of a world of things are contained in the very nature of God or the Absolute - that the existence of a world is essential to His concrete self-conscious life. Berkeley and his followers assume that God as a thinking subject may exist without a world as the object - that the existence of a world of things is not at all essential or indispensable to His conscious life, but is dependent on an act of choice on His part.
- The word Solipsism has been derived from two Latin words 'Solus' and 'ipse' meaning 'myself alone.'
- Berkeley is not a solipsist. He believes that experience is a result of an external activity, and not of our own solely. He depends on God to escape from the magic circle of the self. The conception of God saves Berkeley's philosophy from lapsing into Solipsism.



5.8 FURTHER READING

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5.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: Subjective Idealism is also known as Mentalism, Immaterialism and Spiritualism

Ans to Q No 2: By Esse -est-percipi Berkeley means to be or to exist is to be perceived.

Ans to QNo 3: In Berkeley's Idealism the existence of the world is not at all essential or indispensable to God's conscious life.

Ans to QNo 4: The theory of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians are regarded as the true form of Objective Idealism.

Ans to Q No 5: The words 'Solus' and 'ipse' means myself alone.



5.10 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: Who is the founder of Idealism in the modern period?

Q 2: Who is the cause of all sensations in the finite mind?

Q 3: Why is Berkeley's Subjective Idealism called Immaterialism?

Q 4: Why is Berkeley's Subjective Idealism called Spiritualism?

Q 5: Are primary qualities subjective, according to Berkeley?

Q 6: Does Berkeley accept the distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities of John Locke?

B. Short Questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Write short notes on Subjective Idealism

Q 2: Write a short note on Solipsism.

C. Long Questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Give an estimate of the Philosophy of Berkeley.

Q 2: Define Subjective Idealism and apply your definition to determine Berkeley's position.

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UNIT 6: OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: HEGEL

UNIT STRUCTURE

6.1 Learning Objectives

6.2 Introduction

6.3 Meaning of Objective Idealism

6.4 Objective Idealism of Hegel

6.5 Hegel's Dialectical Method

6.6 Let us Sum Up

6.7 Further Reading

6.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

6.9 Model Questions

6.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- explain the meaning of Objective Idealism
- discuss about Hegel's Absolute or Objective Idealism
- describe the dialectical method of Hegel

6.2 INTRODUCTION

Idealism whose psychological foundation was laid in the modern period by Berkeley, and which received epistemological and formal stamp in the hands of Kant, failed to satisfy the hunger and thirst of the truly philosophical mind for the unity of a basic principle of the universe, the co-ordination of all the sides of experience in one unitary spiritual principle. So the post-Kantian thinkers developed epistemological idealism of Berkeley and Kant to a metaphysical form of idealism. The epistemological idealism merely asserts that the object of our knowledge is idea or mental construction. Metaphysical idealism, on the other hand, says something about the nature of reality and holds that reality is ideal, mental or spiritual. Hegel shows that though the world of knowledge depends upon mental construction yet it exists beyond an individual mind. Knowledge and reality, thought and being

are identical. In Hegelian idealism we find a more pronounced and comprehensive form of idealism.

6.3 MEANING OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Objective Idealism is the philosophical view which asserts the reality or the objective existence of the external world and is thus realistic or objective; at the same time it derives the world from One Absolute Idea or Thought and is thus idealistic. It is both objective and idealistic. Hence it may be called Absolute Idealism, Idealistic Realism, Realistic Idealism or briefly Ideal-Realism.

6.4 OBJECTIVE IDEALISM OF HEGEL

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German philosopher, known for his dialectic process for reconciling opposites. The fundamental question before Hegel was : what must be the nature and characteristic of the ultimate principle of the universe in order that we may explain by it the origin, growth and development of mind and nature, their mutual relation. This ultimate principle of his quest he finds in Absolute Reason, Thought or Idea. According to Hegel, the Absolute Idea is an active dynamic principle and as such it must act, grow and develop. The object of the Absolute Thought is the world which is only its 'other'. Now the world consists of both mind and nature, subject and object, self and not-self. According to Hegel, subject and object , mind and the world are correlative to each other, being the manifestation of the Absolute Spirit. The world is the material of God's thought and activity, in and through which he raises himself from being an abstract power or potentiality into being a concrete self-conscious reality as subject and object , and thereby as absolute spirit. Objective Idealism recognizes the existence of matter independent of the finite minds, but not of the Divine Mind.

Finite things and minds exist as necessary factors of the life of the Absolute. God as a self-conscious, active, thinking subject requires a world of finite things and minds. How can there be a life without activity or an actual power without any expression. We must suppose that the evolution

and preservation of a world of finite beings is an essential part of Divine life. God is the Absolute subject without relation to whom no object can exist and whose own existence as a real self-conscious power depends upon His manifestation in the universe of inter-related objects. God apart from the world of finite things and minds would be an abstract potentiality and not a concrete living power. Thus finite beings have a real existence , though their reality is relative, dependent or conditional.

The world is the externalization of the Absolute or God. The finite minds are finite reproduction of God. The world is intelligible to the finite minds because it is the expression of God. God is the Infinite Spirit. Finite minds are akin to God. God evolves the world from within Himself according to the same categories through which the human mind knows it. The framework of thought is identical with the framework of reality. "What we call nature is thought externalized ; it is the Absolute Reason revealing itself in outward form. But nature is not is final goal. Returning it expresses itself more fully in human self-consciousness and in the end finds its complete realization in art, religion, and philosophy." In Hegel's Objective Idealism, the Absolute Spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason. It is unconscious reason in nature and becomes conscious reason in finite minds. The Absolute is the universal reason. It is manifested more and more in matter, life and mind. It becomes conscious in the human mind. The individual mind is the Subjective Mind . The society is the Objective Mind. God is the Absolute Mind.

The Absolute Idealism of Hegel is monistic spiritualism since it postulates one spiritual reality as the source and foundation of all. The world of things and minds which is the objectification of this spiritual principle is nothing different in nature and essence from but consubstantial with it, and at the same time has reality of its own, though limited in character, so that, the unity or the spiritual principle is not an abstract unity but unity in plurality. Hegel sought to establish a real connection between one self and the other by conceiving them as manifestations of an all inclusive Absolute Spirit in which the finite selves live and move. Thought is reality but an individual thought is only partially real. The Absolute Self or Thought, which is all-

inclusive and all-coherent, is the fullest reality. The finite knower and the known object are manifestation of the inclusive Absolute Thought; they are thus, at bottom identical. For this reason, the object is not unintelligible to the subject. 'I can know the reality as it is in itself, because I am that reality myself.' So we may appreciate the famous dictum of Hegel that "whatever is rational is real and whatever is real is rational." Laws of thought are ultimately the laws of nature. The rationality of thought implies an analogous rationality in nature without which the objective nature would remain incomprehensible to thought.

Hegel's doctrine of Absolute Idealism contains important truths which must not be overlooked. It incorporates the truths of Idealism and Realism. Objective Idealism admits the reality of the external world, the reality of the finite minds and God. It admits the capacity of the human minds for knowing the world. It admits the intelligibility of the world to human minds. Hegel regards mind as living, dynamic and concrete and conceives it as an active law-giver to nature. The objective world of knowledge is quite independent of individual minds (realism), but not of mind in general or Universal Reason (idealism) which is its sustainer.

Thus, according to Hegel, the Ultimate Reality is the dynamic Absolute Spirit which realizes itself as a concrete power and self-conscious spirit, by evolving and sustaining the entire world of finite things and minds. Hegel regards God as a dynamic thought process, realizing higher and higher ideals.

Hegel's idealism, however, has not universally appealed to the philosophic world inspite of his best efforts to build up a system. Hegel makes too much of the Absolute Spirit or Universal reason. He leaves too little scope for human freedom. His emphasis on the Absolute Spirit has been misinterpreted as complete determinism. His doctrine is called Panlogism. All is reason. Whatever is real is rational. Whatever is rational is real. Everything seems to be determined by the Absolute Spirit. It determines the evolution of nature and the course of human history and the life and growth of the individual finite spirits. Hegel belittles the importance and significance of the human spirit. Hegel recognizes human freedom, which

is not absolute, but limited by Divine Freedom. Human freedom, initiative and creativity appear to be swallowed up in the divine freedom. Hegel seem to know too much of the Absolute Mind



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: In Hegel's idealism, is the Absolute Spirit immanent in nature and mind?

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Q 2: According to Hegel, are subject and object correlative to each other?

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6.5 HEGEL'S DIALECTICAL METHOD

The word 'dialectic' literally means the "art of discussing by questioning." It is now used to mean two different forms of reasoning by finding out contradictions or oppositions . One may be called negative dialectic, the other positive dialectic. Hegel followed the positive dialectic method. It is so called, because it is essentially a process of reconciliation or unification. Hegel conceived both thought and reality as dynamic and developing according to the dialectic method. Since reality is at bottom rational, it can be known only by thought. The world is not static, it moves on, it is dynamic; so is thought or reason. Hegel declares that contradiction is the root of all life and movement. Everything in the world is contradiction. Everything tends to change, to pass over into its opposite. The movement goes on and oppositions are overcome and reconciled, that is, become parts of a unified whole. This process in the thing of passing over into its opposites, Hegel calls the dialectical process.

Now to know and follow such a dynamic nature, the method must be suited to its end. Hegel holds that by the dialectic method of thesis,anti-thesis and synthesis, thought proceed from the most simple, abstract, and empty concepts to the more complex, concrete, and richer ones to notions. Hegel distinguishes three moments or stages in the dialectical method. We begin with an abstract universal concept (thesis); this concept gives rise to a contradiction (antithesis); the contradictory concepts are reconciled in a third concept which, therefore, is a union of the other two (synthesis). Hegel points out that human thought proceeds dialectically, i.e. its movement involves a process of contradiction and reconciliation. We know that an idea can be understood only in relation to its opposites or contradictory. We can understand A as A i.e. we can give it a definite meaning only by contrasting it with something which is not -A. If we begin with the thesis or affirmation that A exists, we cannot avoid passing over to the anti-thesis or counter affirmation that not - A exists; and this anti-thesis is just as certain as the thesis. The thesis and anti-thesis exist by contrast with and in dependence on each other. But the opposition between the two drives the mind on to seek the reconciliation in a higher unity or synthesis say B. The synthesis B again is a thesis giving rise to anti-thesis not - B; and these, again, in their turn, are reconciled in a higher synthesis. In this way thought moves onward till it reaches the highest or the absolute synthesis which comprehends and reconciles within itself all contradictions or oppositions.

It should be borne in mind that, according to Hegel, the dialectical process is not a mere logical process or process of human thought. It is the process of the world as a whole. The dialectical evolution of the concepts in the mind of the philosopher coincides with the objective evolution of the world. The movement of thought and reality is through opposition of thesis and anti-thesis and the reconciliation of it by synthesis, which again becomes a thesis giving rise to an anti-thesis both being reconciled by a higher synthesis. Human mind proceeds dialectically, because it is essentially a reproduction of the Absolute Reality which is a mental being proceeding dialectically and realizing and expressing itself in and through the dialectical evolution of the universe. The movement of thought corresponds to the

movement of things. The dialectic movement of thought corresponds to the dialectic movement of reality. So thought and reality are ultimately identical. The framework of thought corresponds to the framework of reality. The real is rational. The rational is real. In both, there is a dialectical progress from unity through diversity to unity-in-diversity. Thought and reality follow the same law. Logic and metaphysics are one. In the essential laws or concepts of human thought, we have a key to ontological truth. In the words of Dr. Paulsen, "the dialectic development of concepts is only the subjective repetition of the objective process of the Idea-i.e.-the ultimate reality itself." So from the dialectical development of concepts we can have true knowledge of reality. This according to Hegel, is the importance of dialectic method in the study of Philosophy.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 3: In the dialectical method of Hegel, how many moments or stages are there?

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Q 4: What is the importance of dialectic method in philosophy, according to Hegel ?

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6.6 LET US SUM UP

- Objective Idealism is the philosophical view which asserts the reality or the objective existence of the external world and at the same time it derives the world from One Absolute Idea or Thought. So it is both objective and idealistic.

- According to Hegel, the Absolute Idea is an active dynamic principle and as such it must act, grow and develop. The object of the Absolute Thought is the world which is only its 'other.'
- Objective Idealism recognizes the existence of matter independent of the finite minds, but not of the Divine Mind.
- The world is the externalization of the Absolute or God. The finite minds are finite reproduction of God. The world is intelligible to the finite minds because it is the expression of God.
- In Hegel's Objective Idealism, the Absolute Spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason. It is unconscious reason in nature and becomes conscious reason in finite minds.
- The Absolute Idealism of Hegel is monistic spiritualism since it postulates one spiritual reality as the source and foundation of all.
- The rationality of thought implies an analogous rationality in nature without which the objective nature would remain incomprehensible to thought.
- Hegel's doctrine of Absolute Idealism incorporates the truths of Idealism and Realism. Objective Idealism admits the reality of the external world, the reality of the finite minds and God.
- Hegel followed the positive dialectic method. It is so called, because it is essentially a process of reconciliation or unification.
- According to Hegel, human thought proceeds dialectically, i.e. its movement involves a process of contradiction and reconciliation.
- The dialectical evolution of the concepts in the mind of the philosopher coincides with the objective evolution of the world. The movement of thought and reality is through opposition of thesis and anti-thesis and the reconciliation of it by synthesis, which again becomes a thesis giving rise to an anti-thesis both being reconciled by a higher synthesis.
- From the dialectic development of concepts , we can have true knowledge of reality.



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5) Chakravarty, Sibapada (1992) An Introduction to Philosophy, J.N.Ghose & Sons, Calcutta.



6.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q. No 1. Yes, the Absolute Spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason.

Ans to Q. No 2. According to Hegel, subject and object, mind and the world are correlative to each other.

Ans to Q. No 3. Hegel distinguishes three moments or stages in the dialectical method.

Ans to Q. No 4. The importance of dialectical method in Philosophy, according to Hegel is that from the dialectical development of concepts we can have true knowledge of reality.



6.9 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: Does Objective Idealism recognizes the existence of matter ?

Q 2: What is Panlogism ?

Q 3: Is Nature static or dynamic ?

Q 4: Is the individual an objective or subjective mind ?

Q 5: Is the world intelligible to human mind according to Hegel's Objective Idealism ?

B. Short Questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Write briefly about Hegel's Objective Idealism .

Q 2: Write a short note on the Dialectic Method of Hegel.

C. Long Questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Discuss critically the Objective Idealism of Hegel.

Q 2: State and examine Hegel's Dialectical process.

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UNIT 7: MIND-BODY RELATION: INTERACTIONISM

UNIT STRUCTURE

7.1 Learning Objectives

7.2 Introduction

7.3 Descartes view on Mind- Body relation

7.3.1 Interactionism

7.4 Let Us Sum Up

7.5 Further Reading

7.6 Answers to Check Your Progress

7.7 Model Questions

7.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain Descartes' view on mind-body relation
- describe the concept of interactionism

7.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you different theories forwarded by different philosophers regarding the problem of Mind-Body relation. We will discuss here the theories like Interactionism given by Descartes, Parallelism by Spinoza, Pre-established harmony by Leibnitz, Russell's view on Leibnitz's concept of Mind- Body relation, and Strawson's view on Mind-Body relation etc.

7.3 DESCARTES VIEW ON MIND-BODY RELATION

Descartes concept of mind and body necessarily follows from his self-imposed doubt, which is the stepping stone of his philosophy. As a rationalist philosopher, Descartes opines that Mind and Body are two independent substances. Regarding the concept of Mind-Body relation, we find the different theories like Occasionalism, Parallelism of Spinoza, Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz and Subjective Idealism of Berkeley. This problem still persists in the philosophical viewpoints of modern philosophy in a different style.

Now, we will discuss Descartes philosophical viewpoints in the problem of Mind- Body relation. Descartes was a dualist because he divides knowledge into ideas and ideas of things. Locke was the first philosopher to have introduced this epistemological dualism in philosophy which to be followed by Descartes and was to be criticized by Berkeley. Apart from this, Locke as a dualist also divides ideas into primary and secondary ideas and was criticized by Berkeley. Now let us turn our attention to Descartes concept of interactionism.

7.3.1 Interactionism

As a staunch dualist Descartes holds that the mind which possesses the quality of consciousness need not refer to extension. In the same way, the body which implies the quality of extension need not refer to consciousness. So, mind and body are the two independent substances.

Human beings have both body and mind. Human body is compared to a machine. Just as a machine moves with the help of energy, so also the body moves with the energy produced in the heart. The death is due to the destruction of some valuable parts of the body machine. Apart from body and mind, God in his Creation additionally puts soul in case of human beings. That is why, it can be said that there can be no real relation between body and soul. Body and soul are diametrically opposed to each other. However, the relation between body and mind can be compared to the nature of relation between the pilot and his machine.

Descartes, in this context, introduces the concept of Interactionism where he speaks of the interaction between the mind and the body. In case of Interactionism, the bodily activities are sometimes influenced by the mind. Similarly, mental activities are sometimes influenced by the body. As for instance, although sense perception, imagination, memory, and act of remembering are all considered as mental activities, yet these acts also refer to material objects which we observe in human beings. Similarly, we observe

that the bodily acts like eating, playing, working etc. also refer to mental acts which we cannot ignore. As for instance, when we write something it is not only our body that is associated with this particular action, but also our mind or reasoning power, having an equal participation in this action. Therefore, it can be said that the mind and the body interact with each other. Just as we cannot simply talk of mental activities apart from the bodily activities so also we cannot talk of the bodily activities apart from mental activities. We perceive the intimate connection between the two but Descartes is not absolutely clear about the relationship between the two within the framework of dualism. Rather, he warns us against the confusing or mixing of mind and body with one another. In contrast to the opinion supposing the intimate relation of mind and body Descartes opines that the mind (thought) and the body (extension) are combined only in unity of composition and not in unity of nature. So, the union of mind and body should not be compared with a mixture of two bodies. Descartes shows that although thought (mind) is affected by sense organs still it cannot be said to be the product of sense-organs; however, sensations, feelings, and appetites are the products that originate in the soul because of their union with the body. Descartes holds that in spite of the union of soul with the body the two remain distinct and therefore, he brings the concept of God to put them together. He holds the position that the mind and the body are not such that one becomes the cause of the other or vice-versa. But Descartes sometimes also accepts the theory of causal connection in the context of mind and body. Although the soul is united with the body, still it has its principal seat in the pineal gland of the brain. Descartes considers the pineal gland to be the only undivided portion of the brain. The bodily affection moves the animal spirits in the nerves, so the movements in the animal spirits are the results or causes of sensible objects and which are finally transferred to the pineal gland. And in this way sensations are produced in the brain. In the same way, the soul also can move the gland and this movement is transferred to the animal spirits and in this way the

movement is conducted by them (animal spirits) over the nerves into the muscles. Here, the relation between the mind and the body is considered as causal, but this causal relationship takes place through an interaction between the mind and the body of the pineal gland. But Descartes is not successful in showing how this interaction is compatible with his metaphysical dualism of mind and body.

Side Box: Pineal gland: A small gland at the back of the skull within the brain, producing a hormone like substance. n some mammals.

While discussing Descartes interactionism it will be useful to discuss epiphenomenalism which is also a dualistic theory.

- Epiphenomenalism is a dualistic theory which states that the mind is separate and distinct from the body. This theory allows that the mind is utterly dependent causally upon the body. So, everything which occurs in the mind is a result of events in the body and the mind in this regard is utterly powerless to affect the body. That is why it can be stated that the epiphenomenalist accepts one half of the interactionist contention, which holds that bodily events cause mental events. But, this theory denies the possibility of the other half, that is, the mental events can ever cause the bodily events. It allows that whatever happens in the mind is merely a by-product of bodily activity. This view is known as epiphenomenalism.

Although we observe an interaction between mind and body in cases like appetites of hunger and thirst, emotions and passions of the mind etc. still Descartes seems to conceal the relationship by putting an analogy of the rider and the horse. Just as the rider pushes on the horse to speed up the movement with his energy, so the mind affects the bodily movement without giving its own energy into the material bodies. However, this relationship of mind and body is not free from difficulties because like the metaphorical relation of the rider and the horse, mind and matter cannot not be discussed in concrete terms. The relation between mind and body is not mechanical like the relation between the rider and the horse. Mind and body are different

in nature; but the rider and the horse are essentially of the same nature. Although we fail to establish a direct interaction between mind and body still it can be said that there is a watertight relation between body and mind. As the discussion of mind and body deals with human being, so a partial interaction of mind and body cannot be ruled out. Mind and body influence each other through animal spirits. Interaction of mind and body occurs when we admit that the soul is excited to activity by the animal spirits or the soul moves the animal spirits. If the animal spirit is material that influences the soul, there is no problem in thinking of interaction of mind and body and vice versa. However, Descartes position in this regard is not clear because he takes help of mechanical and spiritual principles in order to explain the corporeal world.

Side Box: Gilbert Ryle: (19 August 1900- 6 October 1976) A British Philosopher

The difficulty involves regarding the division of the mind and the body. The concept of an analysis of a person into mind and body in Descartes philosophy fails to provide inclusive information about a person. Generally, we never discuss a human being by analysing into two parts, one is mental and the other is physical. By this division we invite the problem that the mind and the body are two different parts in nature because the mind which has the attribute of consciousness is not extended and the body which has the quality of extension is not conscious. Therefore, it will be difficult to make a bridge between the two diametrically opposed entities. So, Descartes seems to fail in this context to render a satisfactory answer regarding the concept of mind-body relation.

Gilbert Ryle holds that Descartes concept of dualism (mind and body) leads to a categorical mistake with the sense that while mind stands for consciousness and body for extension, the both belong to two categories. The Mind which possesses the attribute of consciousness is mental and the body which possesses the attribute of extension is corporeal or physical. Therefore, the concept of direct

or indirect interaction of the body and the mind by which we try to explain the mind through the body and the body through the mind leads to a fallacy which Gilbert Ryle calls categorical mistake.

But the important question is, do the mental acts refer to material bodies? Descartes holds that mental ideas do not refer to material bodies. It simply represents the material objects. According to Descartes, there are real material objects or bodies which are based on the veracity of God. But to know a material body we at first know only the primary qualities of the particular material body. But the secondary qualities, which are so called confused ideas, are caused by the material bodies. That is why, Descartes holds the view that material bodies affect the mental states through human body.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) According to Descartes, Mind and Body are two independent substances. (True/False)

b) Locke introduced the concept of epistemological dualism. (True/False)

c) Locke advocates the theory of Interactionism. (True/False)

d) Descartes holds that the locus of Soul is the pineal gland of the brain. (True/false)

e) Ryle views that Descartes concept of dualism leads to categorical mistake. (True/False)

Q 2: What do you mean by Interactionism? (Answer in about 109 words)

……

……

……

Q 3: Write a critical view on Descartes interactionism. (Answer in about 73 words)

……

……



ACTIVITY 7.1

Do you support interactionism? If yes, give your reasons in support of your answer. Discuss

……

……



7.4 LET US SUM UP

- Descartes introduces the concept of interactionism in case of mind-body problem. He holds that bodily activities are influenced by the mind. Similarly, the mental activities are also influenced by the body. So, mind and body are interacted to each other.
- Instead of being regarded as the two entities or substances Spinoza holds that mind and body are the two attributes of Substance or God. Therefore, Spinoza's theory of mind-body relation is known as parallelism.
- Descartes propounded the theory of occasionalism. It holds that matter is not the cause of thought and similarly mind is not the cause of matter and vice-versa. Rather, it is thought that God uses the occasions for his thinking and will.
- According to epiphenomenalism, the mind is separate and distinct from the body. This theory allows that the mind is utterly dependent causally upon the body. So, everything which occurs in the mind is a result of events in the body and the mind in this regard is utterly

powerless to affect the body. That is why, it can be viewed that the epiphenomenalist accepts one half of the interactionist contention, which holds that bodily events cause mental events.



7.5 FURTHER READING

1) Russell, Bertrand (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibnitz. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

2) Goswami, S.P(2006). Persons: A Strawsonian Study. Guwahati: Anwesha

3) Thrilly, Mark( ). A History of Western Philosophy.

4) Shaffer A. Jerome(1968). Philosophy of Mind. U.S.A: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.



7.6 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: a)True b)True c)False
d)True e)True

Ans to Q No 2: Interactionism holds that bodily activities are sometimes influenced by the mind; similarly, mental activities are also influenced by the body. As for instance, the act of sensing, imagination, memory, remembering are mental activities that refer to material objects. Similarly, the bodily activities like eating, playing, working etc. refer to mental acts which we cannot ignore. It can be shown that when we play a particular game (football, cricket, tennis ball etc.) not only our body is actively associated with this particular action, but our mind or reasoning power equally participates in this action. That is why it can be stated that mind and body are interacted to each other.

Ans to Q No 3: Gilbert Ryle is a critic of Descartes concept of interactionism. To Ryle, Mind and body belong to two categories. The Mind which ascribes the attribute of consciousness is mental and body which

denotes the attribute of extension is corporeal or physical. That is why the process of explaining the mind through the body and the body through the mind alone is erroneous. So, to Ryle, Descartes commits a fallacy that is categorical mistake.



7.7 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very Short Questions

Q 1: Who propounds the theory of Interactionism?

Q 2: What is Interactionism?

B) Short Questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Briefly explain the theory of Interactionism?

C) Write short notes on (Answer in about 150 words)

Q 1: Occasionalism

Q 2: Interactionism

D) Long Questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What is interactionism? Explain

Q 5: What according to you are the limitations of Interactionism? Discuss

Q 6: Which one of the three theories like Parallelism, Interactionism, Pre-established harmony would you prefer most in case of the mind-body relation? Explain

Q 7: Is there any distinction between Interactionism and Parallelism? Discuss

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UNIT 8: MIND-BODY RELATION: PARALLELISM

UNIT STRUCTURE

8.1 Learning Objectives

8.2 Introduction

8.3 Spinoza's View on Mind-Body relation

8.3.1 Parallelism

8.4 Let Us Sum Up

8.5 Further Reading

8.6 Answers to Check Your Progress

8.7 Model Questions

8.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain philosophers' view on mind-body relation
- describe Spinoza's view on mind and body

8.2 INTRODUCTION

In the previous unit, we have already discussed the theory of interactionism forwarded by Decscartes. Now, in this unit we will discuss mainly the theory of parallelism introduced by Spinoza. The issues to be covered in this unit are:

- Spinoza's view on mind-body relation
- Concept of Parallelism

8.3 SPINOZA'S VIEW ON MIND-BODY RELATION

Spinoza also participated in the discussion of mind-body relation. His view on mind-body relation is to be deduced from his concept of Substance. According to him, Substance is one and an irreducible whole out of which everything is deduced or explained. So, it can be viewed that Spinoza tried to solve the mind-body problem through his concept of Substance. Instead of regarding the two entities or substances as separate, Spinoza holds that mind and body are the two attributes of Substance or God.

8.3.1 Parallelism

Spinoza's theory of mind-body relation is known as Parallelism. He thought that matter and mind, also known as thought and extension, are the two attributes or aspects of the same spiritual reality viz. God. In contrast to this, Descartes, in his theory of interactionism, had held that mind and body are the two relative substances which were quite independent of each other. Spinoza views that Descartes theory of interactionism is not satisfactory, because he thought that Substance is one all-inclusive whole. Therefore, there cannot be more than one Substance. If there were more than one Substance, they would limit each other and would ultimately destroy their very nature by which we are familiar with the word 'Substance'.

Again, Spinoza holds that Descartes position is not clear in the context of interactionism. His interactionism of mind and matter goes against his dualistic tendency in his theory. His position further deteriorated when the later Cartesians propounded the theory of occasionalism. This theory of occasionalism holds that matter is not the cause of thought and similarly the mind is not the cause of matter and vice-versa. Rather it is thought that God uses the occasions for His thinking and will. As for instance, when we say that someone performs the work successfully, it is not that he performs the work, because it is God who uses His will as an occasion for His producing change in the world. That is why, it can be said that both the mind and the body are the occasions for God's act and thought. Therefore, this theory propounded by the later Cartesians has been known in the history of philosophy as the theory of occasionalism. But Spinoza did not accept God's intervention in case of the relation between mind and body. That is why, he rejected Cartesian dualism and upheld the theory of Parallelism.

According to this theory, mind and matter or body are considered the two aspects or attributes of a single, all inclusive reality. As the attributes or aspects of one single substance, mind and body or



Panpsychism: In philosophy, panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect.
Side Box: Fechner: (1801-1887) A German experimental psychologist

extension and thought cannot interact upon each other. Fechner as another representative of parallelism did not give equal status to mind and body and also did not show any distinction between them. But Spinoza distinguishes between mind and body and gives equal status to mind and body. Fechner wanted to show that every material object is endowed with consciousness or soul. This view of Fechner indicates that each and every object in the universe has a soul. This position of the supremacy of mind and its control over body makes a distinction between Fechner's and Spinoza's view on Substance. Fechner's view is out and out panpsychistic; but Spinoza's view is parallelstic in the sense that both mind and body run parallel without showing any over-power to one another. This doctrine shows that neither the body can be explained from the mind nor the mind can be explained from the body. Therefore, both mind and matter are the two different manifestations of one and the same universal reality. Again, it can be viewed that neither the mind can be the cause of the body nor the body can be the cause of the mind, as the two are considered to be the two different aspects of one and the same reality. Rather, they are considered the effects of the same cause which is the one indivisible and all inclusive whole that is Substance. That is why, mind and matter are the two different aspects of one single indivisible whole. On this ground, Spinoza's theory is also known as psycho-physical parallelism.

If mind and matter do not interact upon each other, then the question is, how are they related? Spinoza answers the question by saying that both Substance and Mind run parallel. They are independent and infinite in their own nature and can express God infinitely by their own nature without taking help of one another. It indicates that the mind or thinking can express God independently by its own nature and God is in its own unique nature possesses both extension (body) and thinking (mind). That is why they are two inseparable aspects of the same thing like the two lenses, convex and concave, of the same

spectacles. Similarly, from one point of view God is extended and from another God is thinking. So, they are two inseparable aspects of the same thing. Although the two aspects namely matter and mind or extension and thinking, can run parallel without interfering each other, still none can exist independently without the other. So, Spinoza's theory of Parallelism excludes both materialism and idealism without giving due importance to mind over matter and matter over mind.

Spinoza's concept of parallelism is not satisfactory. According to Spinoza, Substance is both extended and thinking. So, human being can know only two aspects or attributes of substance. That is why, the question is, why it is that human being can know only two aspects, namely matter and mind and why not the other aspects? Spinoza, in this context, answers that human beings can know only two attributes because human beings are embodied spirits. Again, if the attributes of Substance are infinite in its own nature, then human beings cannot confine the attribute of mind to thinking alone; because the attribute of mind or thinking can go beyond its boundary. Therefore, the question of strict parallelism cannot be accepted in case of Spinoza's theory of mind and body relation.

Spinoza's Double Aspect Theory offers some difficulty. In case of the relation between the mind and the body he never put importance to one in order to explain the other. Still his theory cannot be said to be free from idealistic bias, because Spinoza categorically announces that Substance is one and an all inclusive whole. Matter and mind, extension and consciousness, are only the two aspects of Substance. Substance is indeterminate, infinite and an all inclusive whole and everything is deduced only from Substance. Therefore, it can be said that Spinoza's theory of parallelism is not satisfactory from this point of view.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: Fill in the blanks

a) According to Spinoza, ……..and …….are the two attributes of substance.

b) Spinoza's concept of mind and body relation is known as……

c) ……..is one and all inclusive whole, to Spinoza.

d) According to…… mind and body are the two aspects of one single all inclusive whole.

Q 2: Who advocates the theory of Occasionalism?

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Q 3: What is Parallelism? (Answer in about 104 words)

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Q 4: On what Ground is Spinoza's theory known as psycho physical parallelism? (Answer in about 46 words)

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Q 5: Why is Spinoza's theory not satisfactory? (Answer in about 67 words)

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ACTIVITY 8.1

Do you support parallelism? If yes, give reasons in support of your answer. Discuss

……

……



8.4 LET US SUM UP

- Spinoza's theory of parallelism holds that mind and body are the two attributes of Substance or God. Therefore, Spinoza's theory of mind-body relation is known as parallelism.
- ccording to the theory of Occasionalism, matter is not the cause of thought and similarly the mind is not the cause of matter and vice-versa. Rather it is thought that God uses the occasions for His thinking and will. As for instance, when we say that someone performs the work successfully, it is not that he performs the work, because it is God who uses His will as an occasion for His producing change in the world. That is why, it can be said that both the mind and the body are the occasions for God's act and thought.
- Mind and matter or bodies are the two different aspects of one single indivisible whole. On this ground, Spinoza's theory is also known as psycho-physical parallelism.



8.5 FURTHER READING

1) Russell, Bertrand (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibnitz. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
2) Goswami, S.P(2006). Persons A Strawsonian Study: Guwahati: Anwesha
3) Thrilly, Mark ( ). A History of Western Philosophy.
4) Shaffer A. Jerome(1968). Philosophy of Mind. U.S.A: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.



8.6 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: a) Mind, Body b) Interactionism c) Substance

Ans to Q No 2: a) Spinoza b) Leibnitz

Ans to Q No 3: According to this theory, mind and matter or the body are considered the two aspects or attributes of a single, all inclusive whole. He thought that as the attributes or aspects of one single Substance, mind and body or extension and thought cannot interact upon each other. Rather, he holds that both mind and body go on parallel without showing any over power to one another. Neither body can be explained from the mind nor can mind be explained from the body. That is why mind and body are the two different aspects of one single indivisible whole. Therefore, Spinoza's theory is known as parallelism.

Ans to Q No 4: Spinoza holds that neither mind can be the cause of body nor can the body be the cause of mind. In this regard mind and body are the two different aspects of one single indivisible whole. That is why Spinoza's theory is known as psycho-physical realism.

Ans to Q No 5: Spinoza's theory of parallelism cannot be said to be free from idealistic bias, because he announces that Substance is an all inclusive whole and mind and body are the two aspects of one single all inclusive whole that is Substance. It is indeterminate, infinite and all inclusive and everything is derived from Substance. Therefore, Spinoza's strict sense of parallelism cannot be accepted from this point of view.



8.7 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very Short Questions

Q 1: Define Parallelism

B) Short Questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Briefly comment on Spinoza's theory Parallelism.

Q 3: What is psycho-physical realism? Discuss briefly.

C) Write short notes on (Answer in about 150 words)

Q 1: Parallelism

D) Long Questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 2: Discuss Spinoza's theory of parallelism.

Q 5: What, according to you, are the limitations of parallelism? Discuss

Q 6: Which one of the three theories like Parallelism and Interactionism would you prefer most in case of the mind-body relation? Explain

Q 7: Is there any distinction between Interactionism and Parallelism? Discuss

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UNIT 9: ANTI-METAPHYSICS: KANT

UNIT STRUCTURE

9.1 Learning Objectives

9.2 Introduction

9.3 Possibility of Metaphysics

9.4 Immanent Versus Transcendental Metaphysics

9.5 Let us Sum up

9.6 Suggested Readings

9.7 Answers to Check Your Progress

9.8 Model questions

9.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be to:

- explain the concept of metaphysics as the 'first philosophy.'
- discuss the position of Kant regarding abolition of metaphysics.
- describe the position of Kant regarding the possibility of metaphysics.
- explain the concept of transcendental metaphysics
- explain Kant's position concerning immanent metaphysics.

9.2 INTRODUCTION

Aristotle describes metaphysics as the 'first philosophy' to be understood as the science of being as such in this definition, the term science is used in the classic sense of knowledge by causes. Knowledge here has been contrasted with opinion; whereas cause has been regarded as the first principle in natural order, in the sense that there is no higher and more complete principle than this. Thus, metaphysics begins to include any serious enquiry into the fundamental questions and answers regarding 'Reality' as such, and naturally metaphysics comes to be regarded as a vital part of the discipline of philosophy.

Anti-metaphysics is a kind of thought which demands the abolition of metaphysics. It regards metaphysics as an impediment to the progress

of knowledge. Anti-metaphysics wants to maintain that metaphysics cannot produce any true statement of reality; rather, it is a kind of pointed 'Paradox' and a sort of 'illuminating falsehood.'

Thus, metaphysics which is once regarded as the "queen of science" is now being haunted out of the domain of philosophy. The traditional meaning of metaphysics has not been supported by the modern philosophers who hold the view that metaphysics attempts to explain the experience of the philosopher about the world as a whole, by the help of a set of basic presuppositions. This definition of metaphysics is related with the question of language system. According to A.J. Ayer, the meaning of the world depends upon the conceptual system of the philosophers. He has pointed out that 'philosophy can change the world formally by refashioning the structure of the language.'

This is how metaphysics has been looked into and interpreted with changed outlook by different sections of the philosophers at different times.

Metaphysics has to take different garbs at the hands of different metaphysicians of different times, but it is essentially the science of reality understood by the metaphysicians. Ours is an age of science, but no science has been perfect for ever, sometimes it embraces some absurdities. Naturally, therefore, the cry of "no more metaphysics" raised by some philosophers influenced by scientific absurdity is meaningless.

As there are different types of metaphysics with new observations, so also there are different forms of anti-metaphysics with a purpose of elimination or demand of abolition of metaphysics. Ironically, in every type of anti-metaphysics, the method of criticising metaphysics, brings forth some evidence of the possibility of metaphysics, as such methods cannot get rid of themselves of metaphysical method of arguments against any metaphysical system. R.G. Collingwood says that whatever stands logically committed to the principle that metaphysics is impossible is ultimately indulged in some sorts of metaphysics.

In this unit, we shall examine the anti-metaphysical position of Kant.

9.3 POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS

Kant develops his anti-metaphysics with a critical outlook to philosophy. Being aroused from his 'dogmatic slumber,' Kant longer believes that Wolff's metaphysics regarding God, Freedom of the will and immortality of the soul is adequate. He is also not impressed by scepticism of Hume. In order to avoid the dogmatism of the Wolffian school, as well as the scepticism of Hume, Kant advocates a critical theory of knowledge wherein he seeks to reject metaphysics, on the ground that metaphysics is not a science. He holds that unlike mathematics and physics, metaphysics cannot yield synthetic a priori judgments. He holds that knowledge is a combination of sense-experience and the categories of understanding; and sense-experience is possible only with two a priori forms of sensibility, that is space and time. These three essential conditions-sense experience, the categories of understanding and the forms of intuition for the possibility of knowledge can be applied to the phenomenal realm only, leaving aside the unknown domain of the noumenon. If the noumenon is unknowable at all, then according to Kant, metaphysics is not possible. Kant however, does not stop here. He contends that though metaphysics is not possible, yet intellectual man has the disposition of intending to know the things discussed in metaphysics.

Question arises whether Kant is successful in arguing about the impossibility of metaphysics. This obvious question arises because the unknown noumenon is very much needed for the exposition of Kant's philosophy. Kant posits the noumenon as sources of our sense-experience. So the noumenon is to exist without the touch of space and time. The thing-in itself is unknown and unknowable, but its existence can be thought without knowledge.

According to Russell, 'thing-in itself is an awkward element in Kant's philosophy.' Yet thing-in itself cannot easily be rejected from philosophical discussion as it carries serious implications. The concept of noumenon has inconsistencies and contradictions too.

Among these inconsistencies regarding the thing-in itself, some are:

(1) The thing-in itself is unknown; at the same time that its existence is known.

(2) The categories of understanding cannot be applied to the thing-in itself, whereas at the same time, it is held as the cause of phenomenon.

These inconsistencies of Kant's exposition of the thing-in itself result from his transition in his thought from a dogmatic to a more critical position. But his critical theory becomes inconsistent as the thing-in itself is held as an independent object, stripped of all primary and secondary qualities, and appearances are regarded as subjective sense data. On this ground, the thing-in itself becomes really superfluous and Kant should have abandoned the concept of thing-in itself altogether.

Professor D.P. Dryer in his book "Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics", has shown that Kant is wrongly interpreted as asserting that empirical knowledge can be get only of appearances, but cannot get of thing-in itself. Moreover, he also objects to the view that the knowledge by sense- experience is altogether illusion. Dryer has shown that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon as laid down by Kant does not limit the empirical knowledge; rather the distinction is made mainly to show things as appearances and things in themselves, as well as to main that some portion of reality is actually known to us by our senses. Dryer has revealed how Kant argues that no knowledge can be had of reality as a whole. This is because in thinking of the universe as a whole, we have to think of an object of which no empirical knowledge can be had. Kant has made the distinction to show how a thing looks like and what the thing is.

With such interpretation, we may also make the noumenon as real as the phenomenon. The thing-in itself does not appear to us, it may not come into the boundary of empirical intuition. As the empirical intuition is one of the conditions of our knowledge, so the thing-in itself remains unknowable. But as soon as it appears to us, it informs us about the thing-in itself and thus it becomes the 'thing for us.' Naturally, therefore, if metaphysics is the knowledge of reality, then there is the possibility of metaphysics in Kant's anti-metaphysics and he may properly be regarded as a metaphysician.

9.4 IMMANENT VERSUS TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSICS

In "Metaphysical Systems," S.N. Hampshire has pointed out that Kant has not proved anywhere that there is no such thing as metaphysics, he has only proved that there is no transcendental metaphysics. Kant is rather sceptical about the fate of the traditional metaphysics as to whether it contains synthetic a priori knowledge. He proposes to replace traditional metaphysics with a new science of transcendental philosophy. This inquiry begins not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects in so far as this is to be possible a priori. Kant argues that we can have immanent metaphysical knowledge of synthetic a priori principles that structure all possible human experience, because they are grounded in our pure forms of intuition (space and time) and the pure concepts of our understanding (the categories). But Kant's argument for this immanent metaphysics rests on his claim that human knowledge can result only from applying concepts to intuitions, or more precisely to schemata mediating the application of concepts to appearances. This key claim implies that transcendent metaphysical knowledge-knowledge of objects that transcend the boundaries of possible human experience-is impossible for us, since it will involve deploying concepts independently of intuitions or schemata. In fact, this is what Kant wants to establish in the Transcendental Analytic, the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge in the phenomenal domain leaving aside the unknown domain of things as they are in themselves. However, Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic also argues that transcendent metaphysics is not only possible but actual. He wants to establish the position that we can have a priori knowledge about three transcendent objects in particular: the human soul, the world-whole, and God. This is one of Kant's main goals in the Dialectic, which he pursues mainly in Book Two of the Critique, to have found arguments for transcendent metaphysical claims.

Kant insists that although pure reason cannot prove that there is an immortal soul, a perfect and necessary God, and so on; neither can anything disprove them. Thus, the failure of pure reason's theoretical arguments still

leaves room for the possibility of belief in immortality of the soul, freedom of the individual and the existence of God. He also holds that unless it can be proven otherwise, we are entitled to assume that everything grounded in the nature of our powers must be purposive and consistent with their correct use, if only we can gourd against a certain misunderstanding and find out their proper direction. This leads Kant to show that pure reason must not be merely a source of speculative fallacies, but must also have a positive use. In point of fact, Kant argues that the positive use of pure reason is two folds: on the one hand, he argues in an appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, reason's ideas of the unconditioned give rise to indispensable regulative principles for the conduct of scientific inquiry, and on the other hand, he argues in the "Canon of Pure Reason" in the Doctrine of Method, reason also gives rise to the unconditionally valid moral law, as a prescription of how the world ought to be, rather than a description of how it actually is.

We have thus found that Kant's project in the Dialectic differs from that of the Analytic on the following points. First, the subject matter of the Dialectic is not about general metaphysics, which deals with being as such, but the traditional sciences of special metaphysics, which deal with particular kinds of being. In the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, the central topics of special metaphysics are the soul (rational psychology), the world-whole (rational cosmology), and God (rational theology). Kant classifies these as branches of transcendental metaphysics because they purport to deal with a priori knowledge about objects that transcend the boundaries of possible experience. Second, the transcendent metaphysics is something natural to human reason and can never be uprooted. In the Introduction and Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic, he develops an account of the faculty of reason according to which human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole and God; yet these ideas are illusory, because they unavoidably seem to give us a priori knowledge of transcendent objects, though in fact they are only subjective ideas. Kant distinguishes here between the faculties of understanding and reason. The concepts and principles of the understanding do not inevitably bid us to make a transcendental use of them: the cause of this mistake is not the understanding's principles

themselves but our optional misuse of them, which is caused in turn by our avoidable failure to engage in criticism. Kant calls the understanding's principles "immanent," because their proper application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience. But in the Dialectic, he introduces reason as a distinct cognitive faculty, whose principles he calls "transcendent," because they actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory beyond the limits of possible experience. In other words, merely possessing reason itself motivates us to make judgments about transcendent objects.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: Who considered metaphysics as the first philosophy?

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Q 2: What is anti-metaphysics, according to Kant?

.....

Q 3: What is regarded as 'Queen of Science'?

.....

Q 5: On what ground did Kant reject metaphysics?

.....

Q 6: What are the two apriori forms of sensibility?

.....

Q 7: What are the three essential conditions of knowledge, to Kant?

.....



9.5 LET US SUM UP

- Aristotle describes metaphysics as the 'first philosophy' to be understood as the science of being.

- Anti-metaphysics is a kind of thought which demands the abolition of metaphysics.
- The traditional meaning of metaphysics has not been supported by the modern philosophers who hold the view that metaphysics attempts to explain the experience of the philosopher about the world as a whole, by the help of a set of basic presuppositions.
- Kant develops his anti-metaphysics with a critical outlook to philosophy.
- Kant advocates a critical theory of knowledge wherein he seeks to reject metaphysics, on the ground that metaphysics is not a science.
- He holds that unlike mathematics and physics, metaphysics cannot yield synthetic a priori knowledge.
- Kant proposes to replace traditional metaphysics with a new science of transcendental philosophy.
- Kant argues that we can have immanent metaphysical knowledge of synthetic a priori principles that structure all possible human experience.
- Transcendental metaphysical knowledge-knowledge of objects that transcend the boundaries of possible human experience-is impossible for us.



9.6 FURTHER READING

1) Ayer, A.J., Metaphysics and Common Sense, (London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1994).
2) Burnham, Douglas and Young Harvey Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2007).
3) Cassirer, H.W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1961).
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6) Ewing, A.C., A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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8) Hampshire, S.N. "Metaphysical System", in The Nature of Metaphysics, edited by D.F. Pears and Others, (London: Macmillan, 1959).
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10) O'Connor, D.J., (ed.), A Critical History of Western Philosophy, (New York: The Free Press, 1964).
11) Russell, B., History of Western Philosophy, (London; Routledge, 2004).
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9.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: Aristotle

Ans to Q No 2: Anti-metaphysics is a kind of thought which demands the abolition of metaphysics. It regards metaphysics as an impediment to the progress of knowledge. Anti-metaphysics wants to maintain that metaphysics cannot produce any true statement of reality; rather, it is a kind of pointed 'Paradox' and a sort of 'illuminating falsehood.'

Ans to Q No 3: Metaphysics

Ans to Q No 4: Metaphysics is not science

Ans to Q No 5: Space and time

Ans to Q No 6: Sense experience, the categories of understanding, and the forms of intuition.



9.8 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Objective questions

Q 1: Who considered metaphysics as the first philosophy?

Q 2: What is anti-metaphysics?

Q 3: What are the a priori forms of sensibility?

Q 4: Who considered metaphysics as Queen of Science?

B. Short questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Briefly explain Kant's position regarding the possibility of metaphysics.

Q 2: What is anti-metaphysics? Briefly explain

Q 4: Why is metaphysics not possible to Kant, Briefly explain.

C. Long questions (Answer in about 300-350 words)

Q 1: Discuss metaphysics as a branch of Philosophy.

Q 2: Examine the possibility of metaphysics.

Q 3: Discuss Kant's position regarding the possibility of Metaphysics.

Q 4: Is Transcendental Metaphysics Possible, according to Kant? Explain.

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UNIT 10: PERSONAL IDENTITY

UNIT STRUCTURE

10.1 Learning Objectives

10.2 Introduction

10.3 Bodily criterion

10.4 Memory criterion

10.5 Jean Paul Sartre's Viewpoint on Self-Identity

10.6 Critical Appreciation

10.7 Let Us Sum Up

10.8 Further Reading

10.9 Answers to Check Your Progress

10.10 Model Questions

10.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the Bodily criterion
- describe Memory criterion
- discuss Jean Paul Sartre's viewpoint on Self-identity
- write a critical appreciation on Self-identity

10.2 INTRODUCTION

The problem of personal identity is a philosophical enquiry of re-identifications of persons. Some philosophers have said that we are never concerned with this problem because sameness and changes are themselves incompatible, while some others opine that sameness and changes are compatible. In this regard philosophers accept two criteria of personal identity in order to explore the mystery of personal identity. They are : i) Bodily identity and ii) Memory identity. Now, we will discuss the above two criteria one by one in order to discuss the problem.

10.3 BODILY CRITERION

Bodily criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of bodily identity. In an article on *Spiritualism*, F.H. Bradley argues that bodily identity is a necessary criterion for self-identity. The necessity of identifying self by their bodies has been urged by B.A.O Williums in Personal Identity and Individuation. Like Bradley Williums argues that "Bodily identity is always a necessary condition of personal identity". But A.J. Ayer holds that personal identity cannot be defined in terms of bodily identity. The self or person is not the same as the body even if the identity of the self rests on the identity of the body. The body is our means of identification, but is not the identity that is identified in case of personal identity.

There are some philosophers like Strawson and Ayer, who are directly or indirectly agreed with the criterion of bodily identity. According to Strawson, the concept of personal identity is "of relatively minor significance." He discusses this concept in the light of the thesis that the concept of person alone is primitive. He points out that we can identify a person by his corporeal characteristics as well as his other characteristics. He denies the primary existence of the particular consciousness and avoids the claim of body as the criterion of personal identity.

Like Strawson, Ayer also discusses the concept of personal identity in a different style. He does not accept the problem of personal identity. Ayer does not accept the view that there can be perceptions independent of any physical body. There is no principle by which independent perceptions can be identified or grouped together. Memory is related to the bundles of experiences. But this is open to the charge of circularity because memory implies the thinking of an event as well as an experience of one's own.

The view that personal identity depends upon the identity of the body is open to the subject of criticism because the bodily criterion seems to be non-functional in case of disembodied existence. Ayer thinks that Strawson was misled by the 'picture of a heap of experiences' which have to be assigned to their respective owners. But this picture is not correct because the question - are experiences dependent upon a particular body?- cannot

be raised in the context of personal identity. Experiences of a person cannot be counted unless by reference to the persons.

Ayer holds that persons are identified in terms of their bodies. An experience denotes one's own body which is a necessary condition of the occurrences of experiences. There is no question of the occurrence of experiences when one's body does not exist. That is why Ayer's view is that a person's body is immediately necessary for experience. But it cannot be stated that my experiences are dependent on the state or behaviour of another person. However, one's experiences can affect other perceptions. In order to be influenced by another's behaviour, one must observe other behaviour, which is considered necessary for my having experience. Ayer comes to the conclusion that his theory about the identity of the person in terms of the body is immediately necessitated by the states of the body of the person. Ayer does not want to hold the physicalistc thesis that persons are bodies. Nor does he hold that mental phenomena are physical phenomena. He recognizes a separate identity and existence of mental phenomena, but not independent of the body. Similarly, he recognizes that memory plays a part in the identity of a person but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion or condition. It cannot independently be the criterion of personal identity without the identity of the body.

Bernard Williams', Terence Penelhumand and others also advocate the view that personal identity consists in the identity of the body. Ayer's thesis on the bodily identity rules out any possibility of disembodied existence or person. However, from the religious point of view disembodied existence or life after death is accepted. In this context, Anthony Flew maintains: "a disembodied person is no more a special sort of person than is an imaginary person and disembodiment is no more a possible state of a person than is non-existence." (Flew, A: Can a man witness His own funeral?" in Blackstone, W.T.(ed.) Meaning and Existence (p.614)

Sydney Shoemaker views that memory is a criterion, but this does not mean that it is a logically necessary and logically sufficient criterion for personal identity. Memory criteria cannot be used independently without

presuming a stable relation between bodily identity and links of memory. That is why, the bodily identity is fundamental.

Bernard Williams' in his *Personal identity and Individuation* deals with this view prior to Shoemaker in a different but convincing style. His example is that of a Charles who claims to remember the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes. Williams in this regard opines that if it is possible then Charles should undergo the changes (described) like the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes. Similarly, it is also conceivable that Charles' Brother, Robert should undergo exactly the similar changes. And both should claim to remember the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes to be their own actions and experiences. But, the point is that they cannot be both Guy Fawkes. And if it is possible then Guy Fawkes would be in two places at once, which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both identical with Guy Fawkes, they would be identical with each other, which is also absurd." (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1956-57)

Materialism is a term which refers to a philosophy in which value is ascribed to physical objects rather than to moral or aesthetic qualities. This theory of personal identity is used particularly in two areas. They are i) The philosophy of mind, ii) and Marxist philosophy. The first one holds that matter alone exists and mind and matter can be explained in terms of changes in matter. And the second one refers to the mechanism which generates social change. The strict sense of materialism holds that the mind is regulated completely by the physical activities or functions of the brain. In this context different viewpoints from different groups of philosophers are found in this regard. The first group, which is formed by materialists like David Armstrong, advocates that the mind is regulated fully by the physical functions of the brain. Besides they hold that all the human sciences can be reduced to physics.

The second group of philosophers, who follow the viewpoints of Brentano, claim that there is a difference between two types of functions of the mind. The first one involves the processing of information, which is subject to the laws of nature, while the other involves the intentionality, which is free from some of the restrictions imposed by physical laws.

Some philosophers view that the body criterion is not the criterion at all because there are some occasions in which we find human bodies that are not persons. As for example, a man in a state of comma is biologically alive but incapable any bodily or mental function.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.1: What are the two critera of personal identity?

……..……..

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Q.2: Name the two philosophers who advocate the criterion of bodily identity.

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Q.3: What is the view of materialism in case of personal identity? (Answer in about 20 words)

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Q.4: State whether the following statements are True or False:

a) Bodily criterion is the only criterion for self identity. (True/ False)

b) Bernard Williums advocates the bodily criterion. (True/ False)

c) Aristotle advocates bodily criteria in personal identity.(True/ False)

Q.5: What are two specific areas of materialism?

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……

Q.6: What do you mean by strict sense of materialism in case of personal identity?(Answer in about 20 words)

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ACTIVITY: 10.1

Do you agree to the view that bodily criterion is the sole criterion of personal identity? Discuss

Ans: ……....

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10.4 MEMORY CRITERION

It is admitted that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. It has been suggested that memory is a criterion of self-identity. One knows that he is the same person who has witnessed, endured, felt, so and so without knowing about his body. So, when someone does not apply the bodily criterion, he must apply some other criterion which could only be memory.

Locke says that it is the consciousness that constitutes personal identity. He argues that only by consciousness we can identify ourselves. It is this consciousness which indicates different senses and perceptions, and thoughts and desires at any time, that belongs to one self and accounts for the sameness of the self at different times.

Locke clearly states that the existence of a spiritual substance or soul does not determine the personal identity because if there were soul substances, then, presumably, the substance can be re-incarnated. As for instance, Let us presume that 'A' may have the soul of Socrates but he has no consciousness of any of the Socrates' action or thought; then Locke argues that he is not the same person as Socrates.

There is circularity reasoning associated with Locke's view that memory is the sole criterion. The circularity reasoning has been pointed out by Butler for the first time. Butler rejected Locke's view that memory can be recognized as the sole criterion on the ground that consciousness of a personal identity presupposes personal identity. This is the circularity objection.

Descartes' holds that the concept of person is both extended and thinking. As a thinking being he is unextended and from the bodily point of view, he is extended. And therefore, to Descartes, mind and body are separable. Locke accepts Descartes' point of view in case of a thing, which is found itself in a body. According to him, a person is 'a thinking reasoning, and reflective being' to consider himself to be the same thing in different places and times. Like Descartes, he did not deduce the view that mind and body were inseparable. The main intention of Locke is to deduce the criteria for determining the continued identity of a person over time in case of personal identity.

Locke introduced the concept of criteria in order to identify a person. Unlike Descartes he distinguished between the person, what he was and the criteria which is needed to re-identify the person. Locke in this regard put forward two types of questions, *what is a person*? And *how do we identify a person*? Locke holds that a person stands for " a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."(1690, II, Chap, 27, Section 9) Although this definition of a person refers to intrinsic property of the person without requirement of criteria to identify a person, yet he is concerned with the second question that is how do we identify a person as the same person on different occasions? Locke addresses this question in his book *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* with these words *'For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only,……..*' Through this saying Locke holds that the continuity of consciousness determines the continuing identity of a person. Locke completes the sentence by stating "whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances." (1690- Chap.27, Sec 10)

Descartes, Hume and Kant uphold consciousness as the sole key to personal identity. Most modern philosophers and psychologists would argue that you cannot have a concept of 'who you are' unless you are also sometimes self-conscious. Conversely, you cannot even be self-conscious unless you have some sense of identity. The two concepts are so interrelated

that one cannot be separated from the other. Many philosophers have argued that not only self-consciousness is crucial in order to know one's own individuality but it is also crucial for establishing that one is an enduring self that is the same person ever time. Descartes is an example who holds the criteria of self-consciousness in order to identify a self. Regarding the question of what am I? Descartes replies that I am a thing with desires, who perceives light and noise and feels heat. Descartes concept of self is of thought or consciousness which is considered a human essence. Generally each person possesses it and by which each person identifies himself or herself. Descartes, by his concept of doubt, wants to show that the concept of body is not important in case of personal identity. Therefore, he concludes that it is not my body that provides me with an identity; rather he claims that the concept of self provides me with an identity. It follows from this that the particular aspects of my self- whether I am male or female, black or white, tall or short, handsome or ugly, strong or weak are associated with my body only and in fact these cannot be essential to my identity. "My self-identity is in my mind, thinking, doubting, feeling, perceiving, imagining, and describing. I am, essentially a "thing that thinks." (Descartes')

Descartes in *Mediations VI* mentions that self identity depends on consciousness. Our identity does not depend on our body, which remains the same, and so human identity is different from the identity of anything else in the world.

Like Descartes, John Locke also holds that self- consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes, he views that self-identity does not depend on our remaining the same thinking substance that is the soul. Because, to Locke, in course of our life our soul might be replaced with new souls just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. The tree remains the same tree because the same life is present in spite of changes in its physical structure. And what makes a person the same person is that the same consciousness and memories are present. Therefore, Locke differs from Descartes' in distinguishing between the soul and consciousness. It is our consciousness that we call our 'self'.

Although Locke's theory has some advantage over Descartes' personal identity in terms of consciousness without requirement of a persisting immaterial soul, still it has some difficulties. Although we can remember our past experiences, still there is every possibility of forgetting our own experiences. So, the question is, can we remember everything that has ever happened to us? It is not possible for a human being to remember everything that had happened in life. Even a person who has a very good memory does not remember being born, learning to walk or what he had for breakfast on June 3, 2001. Can anybody claim that he remembers everything that had happened in life earlier? That is why, the memory criterion is not a satisfactory criterion in case of personal identity.

Our memories are not always accurate. Sometimes we remember things that have never happened. As for instance, we do remember that this book was in the hand of my friend, but unfortunately this book was in my almirah when I opened it. So, in this case the memory criterion sometimes deceives us. Again, we can speak of deluded and deranged memories. Here, these types of memories fail to play a key role as a criterion of personal identity. They are not considered genuine memories; rather they are considered apparent memories which guarantee self-identity. In this case we must find a way to distinguish between cases in which a memory is genuine and those in which it is not. If we were able to do it, then the memory criterion is to be circular. Again, in case of distinguishing the genuine from apparent memories, we search for the existence of a persisting, self-identical person. It raises the question: whether the self-identity can be explained through memory criterion. (It raises the question: was it not for the fact that the concept of self-identity is probably what we trying to explain?) So, we cannot use the concept of memory to explain self-identity. Here, it seems that in stead of explaining the concept of self identity through memory criterion, we use the concept of self identity to explain memory. That is why, if we reflect on the nature of genuine memory, we can say that Locke was putting the cart before the horse, that is, he was explaining the memory criterion through the personal identity.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.7: State the names of two philosophers who advocate the memory criterion for self-identity.

Ans:……

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Q.8: Write Locke's view on memory criterion. (Answer in about 40 words)

Ans: ……

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Q.9: What is the circularity objection raised by Butler against Locke? (Answer in about 40 words)

Ans:……

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Q.10: What is the difference between Locke and Descartes in case of personal identity? (Answer in about 85 words)

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Q. 11: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) To Hume, Personal identity is nothing but fictitious identity. (True/False)

b) Hume defines man as nothing but the bundle of perception or experiences. (True/ False)

c) Descartes in his book *Meditations VI* holds that self identity depends upon consciousness. (True/False)

Q 12: Explain one of the difficulties of memory criterion. (Answer in about 100 words)

Ans:……

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Q 13: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) Aristotle did not believe in memory criterion**.** (True/False)

b) According to Hume, "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception." (True/False)

c) Memory criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. (True/False)

d) The circularity objection is associated with Locke in case of Personal identity. (True/False)



ACTIVITY: 10.2

Do you support that memory is the sole criterion? If it is so, discuss.

Ans:……

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10.5 JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S VIEWPOINT ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

One of the most powerful schools of contemporary thought is existentialism. It views that self-identity is a matter of individual choice. Jean Paul Sartre, a French Philosopher, is one of the serious advocates of existentialism. According to Sartre, there are no set standards for self-

identity, either for individual or for people in general. Existence is prior to essence. Man is responsible for what he is. And when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that is he is also responsible for all men. The question that can be asked regarding the self identity is- is self identity a matter of choice? According to the existentialist, a person chooses as to which facts are to be considered as existential. Are the facts alone ever sufficient to determine our identity? According to Sartre, it is not possible, which he adapted from the German existentialist Martin Heidegger. The facts that are true of a person are always only indicative of what a person has been and has done so far. In case of judging personal identity or self identity we must always consider more than the facts that are true of him or her. It indicates that we must also consider their projections into the future, their ambitions, planes, intentions, hopes and fantasies. Sartre calls these considerations a person's transcendence. This way of viewing the person makes the question of self-identity complex and irresolvable. For example, we can consider Sartre's example of **bad faith** in his important work *Being and Nothingness.*

Bad faith implies the denial of oneself. This can happen in two different ways- either you can refuse to accept the facts and actions as relevant to your self identity or you can go too far in the opposite direction believing that your actions conclusively and unalterably establish your identity as a coward. In case of Bad faith, he points out an example: a homosexual frequently has an intolerable feeling of guilt, and his whole existence is determined in relation to this feeling. One will readily see that he is in bad faith. Sartre tells us, *"One is what one is not, and one is not what one is."* The homosexual in Sartre's example is a homosexual to the extent that all his past actions and desires are those of a homosexual. He falls into bad faith by refusing to accept his past actions as a homosexual. However, at the same time, there is a genuine sense in which he is not homosexual. Because, in the future he may radically alter his life style which totally denies that he was a homosexual in the past. As long as a person is alive, he or she is identified by intentions, plans, dreams, and hopes. Therefore, the

problem of deciding "who I am" makes the issue of personal identity dramatic and more complicated.

10.6 CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Sydney Shoemaker has argued that it is a logical truth that memory claims are usually true, not an inductive one.

A) If someone frequently said that he remembered the events which did not occur then we would conclude that he did not know how to use the word 'remember.'

B) A child learns language only through the word 'remember.'

C) Memory is not criterion. The criterion is qualitative similarity between the body I now see and the body I now remember

Memory merely supplies one half of the material in terms of re-identifying of persons.

According to Hume, personal identity is nothing but fictitious identity. It is fictitious because the memory criterion and the bodily identity are irrelevant. Hume realized that certain basic notions are contained in Locke's view of personal identity. But against the view of Locke, he opines that there is nothing immaterial substance as claimed by Locke. Hume defines man as nothing but a bundle of perceptions or experiences.

It can be viewed that both are ineluctable components of our concept of a person. The bodily criterion is fundamental but the memory criterion is indispensible because of the basic epistemological status of memory itself. But the important result is that it is absurd to consider memory as the sole criterion of identity. Again, it is absurd to regard that bodily criterion fares better than memory criterion. In this context Shoemaker's view is important: "Just as the memory criterion is dependent upon the bodily criterion, so also the bodily criterion is dependent upon the mental criterion." The bodily criterion is more extensive than memory criterion. The bodily criterion is more varied. There are more ways in which we can determine whether a person is physically same or not. As for instance, blood tests, finger points, photographs, the testimony of witness are the ways of re-identifying of persons.

It is the empirical self that identifies individual persons. The transcendental self makes human consciousness possible. What is it that makes one "the same person from moment to moment and year to year? The sptio-temporal continuity of the body would seem to be a part of the answer. But philosophers since Descartes have seen quite clear that this is never enough, so, he puts the view that self-consciousness provides the key to self identity. But this has not solved the problem. As for instance, Jones has an emergency brain operation. His own brain is removed and replaced by the brain of Brown. "Jones" still looks like Jones, still carries the same driver's license and lives in the same house, but all of his memories and personality traits are those of Brown. Is he still Jones? Or is he Brown in Jones' body? Suppose you had been Brown, could you claim to be still alive in Jones' Body? This example beautifully shows that neither bodily identity nor memory identity can be the sole criteria for personal identity. It indicates that both are equally important in case of identification of a person. As we enquire after a person involving the issue of personal identity, so, re-identification of a person directs that both memory and bodily identity are equally important. That is why, the discussion of this issue by taking the criteria of one without the other would be incomplete or mere discussion only.

Modern theories of personal identity advocate the notion of memory, self consciousness or psychological continuity. But, it is worth mentioning that Aristotle did not believe this criterion like Descartes and Locke did. According to Aristotle, self-identity was essentially bodily identity without any particular reference to self-awareness.

Hume does not accept Locke's and Descartes' view of self-identity. He holds that any idea must be derived from an impression. Hume argues that when we are self-conscious it means that we are only aware of feeling, thoughts, and perceptions. But, we do not have an impression of the self or a thinking substance. According to Hume, "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception." He concludes that the idea of self is simply only a fiction. We are never aware of any enduring self. Again, we are never justified in claiming

that we are the same person we were a year or a minute ago. According to Hume, the concept of identity to things and persons arises due to spatio-temporal continuity of things. As for instance, the tree is in the same place at different times. People, however, have the troublesome habit of moving around, going to Europe for the summar or college for the semester. We can still see the continuity of his or her movement. The same person receives postcards from appropriate places at the appropriate times. Therefore, we conclude that it is the same person. In addition to spatio-temporal continuity we ordinarily rely on resemblance as a criterion of identity. We tolerate small changes, a hair cut or a new scar, perhaps even a lost leg or a bit of plastic surgery. As long as there is a strong resemblance between two individuals, we think of them as the same. Hume, however, argues that spatio-temporal continuity and resemblance do not in fact guarantee identity.

Kant holds the view that the self is not the bundle of our experiences. It is rather the transcendental thread that holds them together and is as real as any experience. Kant agrees with Hume in the sense that the enduring self is not an object of experience. Kant agrees with Descartes in some respects. Descartes thought that we had to be self conscious all the time, but Kant points out that it is only necessary for the " the 'I think' to be able to accompany all experiences." It is not necessary to be always conscious of ourselves but only to be, at any point in our experience, capable of becoming self conscious. According to Descartes, this is not possible because to exist as a human being is to exist self-consciously. But in this regard Kant holds that to exist as a human being is 'to be able" to be self- conscious. Kant objects to Descartes' view that the thinking self is a thinking thing. Kant disregards this view that the self is not in our experience but rather behind it and responsible for it. He says that the self must be thought of as an activity. This is the modified view of Kant which was earlier found in Plato, in Christianity, and also in modern thought. The soul is simply self-conceived of as a thing, an enduring thing that can survive after the death of the body. By saying that the self is an activity Kant undermines the traditional concept of soul.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 14: What is bad faith, according to Sartre?(Answer in about 90 words)

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Q 15: What is Sartre's view on Personal identity? (Answer in about 70 words)

Ans:……

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ACTIVITY: 10.3

Are memory and bodily criterion equally important in the discussion of personal identity? What do you think? Discuss

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10.7 LET US SUM UP

- Generally philosophers accept two criteria in case of re-identification of a person. They are: Bodily criterion and memory criterion.
- Bernard Williams, Terence Penelhumand and others advocate the view that personal identity consists in the identity of the body.
- Shoemaker opines that memory is a criterion, but this does not mean that it is a logically necessary and logically sufficient

criterion for personal identity. Memory criteria cannot be used independently without presuming a stable relation between bodily identity and links of memory. That is why, the bodily identity is fundamental.

- Locke introduced the concept of criteria in order to identify a person. Unlike Descartes he distinguished between the person, what he was, and the criteria which is needed to re-identify the person.
- Descartes in Meditations VI mentions that self identity depends on consciousness. Our identity does not depend on our body, which remains the same, and so human identity is different from the identity of anything else in the world.
- Like Descartes, John Locke holds that self-consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes he views that self-identity does not depend on our remaining the same thinking substance that is the soul. According to Locke, our soul might be replaced with new souls in course of our life just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. The tree remains the same tree because the same life is present in spite of changes in its physical strucrure.
- Bodily criterion asserts that self-identity can be defined in terms of bodily identity. In an article on *Spiritualism*, F.H. Bradley argues that bodily identity is a necessary criterion for self-identity. The necessity of identifying self by their bodies has ben urged by B.A.O Williams in *Personal identity and Individuation.* Like Bradley, Williams argues that bodily identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
- A.J. Ayer holds that personal identity cannot be defined in terms of bodily identity. The self or person is not the same as the body even if the identity of the self rests on the identity of the body. The body is our means of identification, but is not that, that is identified in case of personal identity.

- Memory criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. One knows that he is the same person who witnessed, endured, felt so and so without knowing about his body. So, when the body criterion does not function, he must apply the memory criterion.
- The circularity reasoning is associated with Locke's view that memory is the sole criterion. It has been pointed out by Butler for the first time. He rejected Locke's view that memory can be recognized as the sole criterion on the ground that consciousness of a personal identity presupposes personal identity. This is the circularity objection.
- Both body and memory criterions are ineluctable components of our concept of a person. It is absurd to consider memory as the sole criterion of identity. Again, it is absurd to regard that bodily criterion fares better than memory criterion. In this sense Shoemaker's view is important: "Just as the memory criterion is dependent upon the bodily identity, so also the bodily criterion dependent upon the mental criterion."
- Existentialism views that self-identity is a matter of individual choice. One of the serious advocates of existentialism is Jean Paul Sartre, who views that there are no specific standards for self identity either for individual or for people in general. In case of judging personal identity, he holds that we must consider people's projections into the future, ambitions, planes, intentions, hopes and fantasies.
- Bad faith implies the denial of one's own identity in the context of past behaviour of a man in comparison to the present status of the person.



10.8 FURTHER READING

1. Solomon, C. Robert. (2008). *Introducing Philosophy*. New York. Oxford University Press
2. Roberts, Francis. (2003). *The Philosophy Workbook*. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press
3. Hospers, John. (1971). *An introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private limited
4. Goswami, Sauravpran. *The Strawsonian Concept of Person*. Guwahti. Anwesha Book House



10.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: Bodily and memory criterion

Ans to Q No 2: Bernard Williums, Terence Penelhumand

Ans to Q No 3: It holds that matter alone exists and mind and matter can be explained in terms of changes in matter.

Ans to Q No 4: a) True b)True c) True

Ans to Q No 5: a)The philosophy of mind and the Marxist philosophy

Ans to Q No 6: The strict sense of materialism holds that the mind is regulated fully by the physical activities or functions of the brain.

Ans to Q No 7: Locke, Descartes

Ans to Q No 8: Locke holds that we can identify ourselves by consciousness. Our consciousness indicates different senses and perceptions and thoughts and desires which belong to a person and which shows the sameness of the self at different times.

Ans to Q No 9: The circularity objection has been raised by Butler against the memory criterion of Locke in self-identity, who holds that memory is the sole criterion to re-identify the self. Butler relies on this view on the ground that consciousness pre-supposes the self-identity.

Ans to Q No 10: Like Descartes John Locke holds that self-consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes, he views that self-identity does not depend on our thinking Substance, that is the soul. Locke in this regard views that in course of our life our soul might be replaced with new souls just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. Therefore, Locke differs from Descartes in distinguishing between soul and consciousness. It is our consciousness that we call our 'self'.

And to Q No 11: a) True b)True c)True
d)True e)True

Ans to Q No 12: Locke's theory is not free from difficulties. Although we can remember our past experiences, still there is every possibility of forgetting our own experiences. Therefore, the question is, can we remember everything that has ever happened to us? It is not possible for a human being to remember everything that has ever happened in life. Even a person who has a good memory does not remember being born, learning to walk or what he had breakfast on June 3, 2001. That is why, the memory criterion is not a satisfactory criterion in case of personal identity.

Ans to Q No 13: a) True b)True c) True
d)True e)True

Ans to Q No 14: Bad faith implies the denial of one's own identity by refusing to accept the past occurrences in life. Sartre says "One is what one is not, and one is not what one is." Sartre takes the example of a homosexual to explain the concept of bad faith. A person is homosexual to the extent that all his past actions and desires are those of a homosexual. He falls into bad faith by refusing to see that his past actions point to his having a self-identity as a homosexual.

Ans to Q No 15: Sartre views that there are no set standards for self-identity either for individual or for people in general. Sartre holds that it is not possible to derive our identity from the facts alone. This view was adapted by him from Martin-Heidegger. Apart from the facts in judging a person's identity we must also consider a person's

projections into the future, his ambitions, plans, intentions, hopes and fantasies.



10.10 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: What are the criteria of personal identity?

Q 2: Who are the advocates of bodily criterion?

Q 3: What do you mean by bodily criterion?

Q 4: State three philosophers' names who advocate memory criterion.

Q 5: What is memory criterion?

Q 6: What is bad faith?

B. Short Questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Briefly comment on memory criterion.

Q 2: What is bodily criterion? Discuss briefly.

Q 3: Discuss briefly Sartre's concept of bad faith.

Q 4: Briefly comment on Locke's personal identity.

C. Write short notes on (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Descartes' view of memory criterion

Q 2: Bodily criterion

Q 3: Bad faith

Q 4: Sartre's exposition on personal identity

Q 5: Locke's view on personal identity

D. Long Questions (Answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What is memory criterion? Discuss

Q 2: Explain the bodily criterion.

Q 3: Do you find any defects of memory criterion. Explain

Q 4: Do you accept the view that bodily criterion is more satisfactory than the memory criterion? Explain

Q 5: What are the defects involved in memory criterion? Discuss.

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UNIT: 11 STRAWSON'S CONCEPT OF PERSON

UNIT STRUCTURE

11.1 Learning Objectives

11.2 Introduction

11.3 What is the Concept of Person?

11.4 Strawson on No-ownership theory

11.5 Strawson on Cartesianism

11.6 Strawson's distinction between P- and M –Predicates

11.6.1 Strawson's view on P-predicates

11.6.2 Bernard William's view on Strawson's concept of p-predicates

11.7 Let Us Sum Up

11.8 Further Reading

11. 9 Answers to Check Your Progress

11.10 Model Questions

11.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- explain Strawson's Concept of person
- learn the Cartesian Concept of person
- describe the No-ownership theory
- discuss the incoherence of the No-ownership theory
- explain the concept of P-Predicates
- distinguish between P- and M- predicates

11.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you Strawson's concept of person. Strawson's Concept of person is found in the third Chapter of his celebrated work *Individuals* which is subtitled *Essays in Descriptive Metaphysics*. As suggested by the subtitle, Strawson is here engaged in describing the actual structure of our thought about the world and not in presenting a better

structure as done by revisionary metaphysics. The basic concepts included in this unit are:

- What is person, according to Strawson?
- Strawson's analysis of Cartesian dualism
- Strawson's distinction between P and M Predicates
- Bernard William's view on Strawson's concept of P- predicates

11.3 WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF PERSON?

In ordinary usage the word 'person' is taken to be synonymous with the word man. But in Strawson's terminology the word person is used in a special sense although it is not different from the ordinary sense.

Strawson begins his essay by distinguishing persons from non-persons. He uses the expressions 'ourselves and states of ourselves' to represent persons and their states and 'what is not ourselves or states of ourselves' to represent non-persons and their states. While speaking of ourselves ordinarily we ascribe to ourselves many things, such as actions and intentions (I am doing this, I want to do this), sensations (I am in pain), thoughts and feelings (I think, I am angry), perceptions and memories (I see this, remember this), and many other things. Again, we also speak of ourselves not only in terms of such temporary conditions of sensations, perceptions and feelings, but also in terms of relatively permanent characteristics such as height, weight, colouring, shape, size etc. (I am five foot tall, weigh fifty kilo, of fair complexion).



Dichotomy: A separation between two things that are opposed or different

Strawson points out that these two ways of speaking about ourselves are different. While it is obvious that the second way of speaking in terms of height, weight, colouring, shape and size are also the way in which we speak of material bodies (the pillar is five foot tall, weighs fifty kilo, of brown colour), the former way of speaking in terms of actions and intentions, sensations, thoughts and feelings etc. is not applicable to material bodies. These states of consciousness are peculiar to ourselves alone. What Strawson goes to emphasize at this point is that while speaking of ourselves as five foot tall and as being happy or angry, we ascribe both – physical

characteristics and states of consciousness – to the very same thing. That is, I admit of both, physical states and states of consciousness, at the same time in the same sense. In other words, it may be said that Strawson does not recognize the dichotomy between mind and body insofar as a person, the same person, can be spoken of in either of the ways – in terms of his thoughts and feelings, or in terms of his height and weight.

At this point Strawson goes to consider two possible reactions to his thesis that both physical characteristics and states of consciousness are ascribed at the same time to one and the same thing, viz. persons. These reactions are to the effect that it is a linguistic illusion that we ascribe both these states to one and the same thing.

The *first reaction* Strawson considers is from the camp of the Cartesians, that is, from the followers of Descartes. According to them, what we call a person is actually a combination of two distinct substances belonging to two different types, each of which has its own characteristic states and properties. None of the states or properties belonging to one substance can ever be possessed by the other. Hence, the Cartesians challenge the claim of Strawson that both states of consciousness and physical characteristics are ascribed to one and the same thing. Rather, they opine that states of consciousness are ascribed to one substance while the physical states are ascribed to the other.

11.4 STRAWSON'S VIEW ON NO-OWNERSHIP THEORY



Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (1889-1951) Austrian Philosopher.

The second reaction, Strawson thinks, comes from Wittgenstein and Schlick. It maintains a view that our states of consciousness are not ascribed to anything. This view is called by Strawson 'no-ownership' or 'no-subject' doctrine of the self. In order to illustrate this 'no-ownership' doctrine Strawson takes the help of an example given by Wittgenstein of the two uses of 'I' in the two sentences 'I have a toothache' and 'I have a bad tooth'. These two sentences, although grammatically similar, are completely different in nature.

The sentence 'I have a bad tooth' says that there is a bad tooth in my mouth. This bad tooth is in my possession in the same sense that a match box is in my possession when I say 'I have a match box'. This 'I' as appeared in this sentence is logically equivalent with 'Skinner' (a different person) because there is nothing peculiar about my having the match box than Skinner's having the match box. Both I and Skinner are of the same status. One important point is to be taken note of is that when we put 'I' and 'Skinner' on a same level, then we put emphasis on the physical aspects alone. That is in this sentence both I and Skinner are understood only as physical bodies. This use of the word 'I' is the possessor sense. But this possessor sense of 'I' is different from the non-possessor sense as represented by the sentence 'I have a toothache'. A toothache is an experience, a state of consciousness which, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be possessed by anyone. Hence, there is no place for an ego to own the experience.



Schlick, Mortiz:(1882-1936) German Philosopher and leading light of the Vienna Circle.

Strawson here distinguishes, within the Wittgensteinian scheme, between two senses of the verb 'to have': *having1* and *having 2*. The first kind 'having' is characterized by the logical transferability of ownership as in the case of a match box or a car. But experiences (e.g. a toothache) are not owned in this sense as its ownership cannot be so transferred. This kind of having is *'having 2'* and cannot be called a having at all. So, experiences are not owned by anything except in the dubious sense of being causally dependent upon the state of a particular body. But in the Cartesian scheme an Ego is feigned in order to provide an owner, in a logically non-transferable sense, to experiences. But the No Ownership theorist maintains that since a non-transferable ownership is not possible, there is no need to imagine an Ego for the purpose , and Ego should be eliminated from the picture altogether. Belief in Ego is because of confusion.

Strawson, however, does not think that the theory is coherent. In his analysis, the theory believes only in that kind of 'having' where the ownership is logically transferable so that a statement that 'I have X (a match box)' becomes a contingent statement, because the 'X' which I have now could be had by someone else also. Now that they also believe that experiences

can be had by someone in the sense that they are causally dependent on the state of a particular body, the owning of these experiences must be in the transferable sense. This implies that the statement that 'I have a toothache' is also a contingent statement. The statement takes the form in the hands of the theorist like "All my toothaches are had by (uniquely dependent upon the states of) body B". What Strawson points out here is that the theorist cannot drop the possessive word 'my' without contradicting his own position. For one thing, the word 'my' cannot be simply dropped, in which case the sentence would be "All toothaches are causally dependent upon the states of body B" because it is an obviously false statement. If on the other hand, he goes to replace the word 'my' with the expression 'person P's' then also he cannot get rid of a possessive word. But if he goes to reduce the word to 'body B's' then the sentence would be 'All body B's toothaches are causally dependent upon the states of body B'. Obviously the sentence then becomes a tautology or a necessary truth. But the theorist maintains that all sentences asserting possession are contingent sentences, because he does not believe in any kind of possession where ownership is not transferable. Thus, the theorist has to find himself in a dilemma: he cannot either drop the possessive word 'my' or if he drops it then he cannot maintain his own position that ownership is always transferable, and that since the experiences are said to be owned by the ego in a non-transferable sense, they are not owned by anything. This inability to drop the word 'my' or any other possessive word like yours, his, theirs or that person's, while referring to experiences is because of the fact that experiences, e.g., a toothache, a headache, pleasure or pain, are particulars of a sort such that they cannot be understood without reference to a person. "States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are" (Strawson Individuals, P.97).

Pointing to this internal incoherence of the No ownership theory Strawson goes to establish that the states of consciousness and experiences are necessarily possessed by a particular person in the logically non-transferable way. For it is not possible that a particular state or an

experience that actually belongs to one should have been possessed by someone else.

At this point, Strawson also goes to state that a particular state of consciousness or an experience has got *two* aspects of ascribability: *one* with respect to oneself, and the other with respect to others. That is, the experience of toothache can be ascribed to myself, as in the sentence "I have a toothache" and to another as in the sentence "Mr. X has a toothache". The important point here is that in both the ascriptions the state refers to the same state; 'toothache' has the same meaning in both the cases. The dictionary does not have two sets of meanings – one for first person use and another for second and third person use of a particular state.

We can observe here that with this thesis of two-way ascribability of states and experiences Strawson tries to avoid the problems given rise to by the theses of no-ownership theory and the Cartesianism. Also, it is supposed to have solved the problem of other minds.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: State whether the following statements are True or False.

a) Strawson's concept of person is found in his book 'Individuals'. (True/False)

b) Strawson emphasizes that we ascribe both-physical characteristics and states of consciousness to the very same thing. (True/False)

c) According to the Cartesians, a person is not a combination of two distinct substances. (True/False)

d) According to the second reaction, our states of consciousness are not ascribed to anything. (True/False)

e) Strawson says that the No-ownership theory is coherent. (True/False)

Q 2: What do you mean by the concept of person, according to Strawson? (Answer in about 50 words)

.....

Q 3: What is meant by Cartesian concept of person? (Answer in about 50 words)

……

Q 4: What is 'No-ownership theory'? (Answer in about 50 words)

……



ACTIVITY: 11.1

Do you find any difficulties of 'No-ownership theory' advanced by Strawson? Discuss

Ans:……

11.5 STRAWSON ON CARTESIANISM

Descartes advocated of two substances – mind (ego) and body. Each of the two is diametrically opposed in character to the other; mind is non-physical and body is physical. Hence for him, mind cannot possess any of the physical characteristics such as length, breadth, height, weight etc. Similarly body also cannot have any of the states of consciousness such as thought, feeling, willing etc. Therefore, it is not possible, according to him, to ascribe both types of characteristics to one and the same thing. In other words, all states of consciousness and experiences are ascribed to the ego. This ego is the owner of our experiences.

But Strawson points out a serious difficulty with the Cartesian thesis of an ego owning our experiences. The difficulty lies in the fact that in order to ascribe a state or an experience to something, that 'something' should be identifiable and individualizable. But the problem is that in the absence of any physical characteristics an ego remains unidentifiable and unindividualizable; that is, we cannot point to anything and say that it is an ego, because anything without shape, size, colour or other physical attributes cannot be pointed at as 'it'. 'It' means a thing that is distinguished

from other things, and the basis of this distinction is physical characteristics such as colour, shape and the like. It is distinguished means it is individuated and identified. But ego cannot be so identified in absence of the physical attributes. Hence, the question of ascribing states and experiences to it does not arise.

Strawson here considers a defence of Cartesianism: the ego or the subject of consciousness can be thought to be identified indirectly with reference to the particular body to which the subject stands in a special relation. But such a solution is of no use, because in that case there would be no point in ascribing experiences to an ego rather than to the body. Moreover, there is the logical possibility that there may be more than one subject attached to one and the same body. "The uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian soul" (Individuals, P. 101).

What Strawson thinks is the way to come out of this difficulty is to acknowledge the primitiveness of the concept of person. "What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" (Individuals, pp.101-102).

What Strawson means by calling the concept of person a primitive concept can be explained in his own words in the following way: "We are tempted to think of a person as a sort of compound of two kinds of subjects: a subject of experiences (a pure consciousness, an ego) on the one hand, and a subject of corporeal attributes on the other." But Strawson points out a lot of difficulties in maintaining this duality. After considering all these difficulties he, therefore, concludes that the concept of person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. "The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima" (p. 103). However, he does not rule out the possibility of an ego existing as a secondary entity. "A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having been a person" (p. 103).

11.6 STRAWSON'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN P AND M PREDICATES

Strawson makes it a point to be noted that one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only when one ascribes or is prepared to ascribe them to others. These 'others', including oneself, are of a type of entity that can be individuated, that is, they must admit of both the states of consciousness and the corporeal characteristics at the same time. Here Strawson makes a distinction between two kinds of predicates that are applied to persons. The first kind of predicates are those that are also applied to material bodies to which states of consciousness are never applied. He calls this first kind **M-predicates** which include predicates like "weighs 10 stone", "is in the drawing room" etc. The second kind of predicates consists of "all other predicates we apply to persons" like "is smiling", "is going for a walk" as well as "is in pain", "is thinking hard" etc.



Predicate: A part of a sentence containing a verb that makes a statement about the subject of the verb. e.g. He is in the drawing room.

Strawson insists that both these two types of predicates are ascribed to one and the same thing, viz. persons. The concept of a person is a primitive concept in the sense that it is not analyzable into a particular consciousness (mind) and a body, because a person is not a combination of a mind and a body. He also says that there is no 'type ambiguity' between 'I' and 'Smith'; that means, 'I' and 'Smith' are not individuals of two different types. Type ambiguities are found only in case of predicates like 'is in the drawing room', and 'is hit by a stone'; because they have completely different meanings when applied to a person and when applied to a material body.

11.6.1 Strawson on P- Predicates

Of the two kinds of predicates, P and M, the latter is not at all problematic – they are but predicate ascribing material properties. But what Strawson means by 'P-predicates' requires special care to be understood. This is because under the heading P-predicate, he includes all those which "we would not dream of applying to material bodies." In other words, P-predicates are ascribed to persons only. All P-predicates are however, not consciousness

predicates like 'is intelligent' or 'is in a pensive mood', but still "they imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed" (p.105). Thus, 'is going for a walk' is not a consciousness predicate since it has nothing directly to do with consciousness, but still it is a P-predicate because it is exclusively applied to a person and not to anything else.

A P-predicate is ascribed to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour. But this behaviour on the part of others is not just a sign from which the presence of a state of consciousness is to be inferred. Rather, Strawson emphatically states that behaviour is the logically adequate criteria for ascribing P-predicates to others. The argument from analogy of one's own case for applying states of consciousness to another does not arise at all, because Strawson maintains that a state of consciousness can be ascribed to something only when that 'something' can be identified; and this identifiability depends upon its having a physical body. So the skeptical doubt about the presence of a state of consciousness in another does not arise. One's behaviour logically justifies ascription of a state of consciousness to one. But one does not rely upon this behaviour criterion to apply some of the P-predicates to oneself, as for example, 'am angry', 'am sad', 'am happy' etc. But in case of some other class of P-predicates that concerns assessment of character ('am honest') or capability ('can lift 50 Kg weight'), one has to rely on the same behaviour criteria even in order to apply them to oneself. Strawson here considers a possible difficulty – the difficulty of resolving the question: which of the ascriptions of P-predicates- first person ascription or third person ascription- is primary? There seems to be two contrary approaches. Suppose we write Px as the general form of expression for ascription of P-predicates. Now, according to one version, x is to be replaced by 'I' in the primary sense, and its replacing with any other second or third person pronoun or noun is secondary and derivative. On the other hand, according to the other version, x is to be replaced by

'he', 'that person' and other third person pronoun or noun in the primary sense. In that case the use of 'I' in place of x would be secondary and not proper. But, Strawson maintains, "it is essential to the character of these predicates that they have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses, that they are both self ascribable….and other-ascribable…" (p.108). To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. That is, to ascribe these P-predicates to oneself one has to know how to ascribe them to others. One also has to admit that others can also ascribe them to themselves as well as to those who are different from themselves. And in both the ascriptions it means the same thing. Strawson here gives the example of the mental state of depression. When Mr. X says, "I am depressed" it is a feeling on X's part, but it is a particular set of X's observable behaviour for others. But it is the same thing in both the cases. "X's depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X" (109). This line of thinking can rid us of the dichotomy between philosophical skepticism and philosophical behaviourism.

Throughout the essay (Essays in Descriptive Metaphysics) Strawson takes great care to establish that the states of consciousness are ascribed to one and the same thing, to which also are ascribed physical situations etc. And that these ascriptions of consciousness predicates have two aspects – self ascriptive and other ascriptive. Both being the aspects of the same status, neither is primary to the other. He further maintains that this line of thinking is possible only when the primitiveness of the concept of person is acknowledged.



LET US KNOW

Skepticism: It is the denial that knowledge or even rational belief is possible either about some specific subject matter or in any area.

Behaviourism: It holds that mental states are logical constructions out of dispositions to behaviour. In other words, it describes the mental aspects of a person, so it is a shorthand for describing the various dispositions to behavior that the person possesses.

11.6.2 Bernard Williams View on Strawson's Concept of P-Predicates

Bernard Williams in his book *Problems of the Self* (Ch. 7) points out certain difficulties in the concept of P-predicates as stated by Strawson. Certain P-predicates have nothing peculiarly to do with consciousness; as for example, in case of 'is playing ball', 'is coiling a rope' or 'is in drawing room'. "For once we see that many P-predicates are highly corporeal, we may begin to wonder which corporeal predicates really are M-predicates" (B. William: Problem of the Self, p.123). These predicates are mostly dominated by physical movements on the part of the person concerned. Hence they are not characteristically different from M-predicates. Again, the predicate *is running down hill* can be meaningfully applied to a person, a dog, and also to a stream. Now, in the Strawsonian scheme it would be a P-predicate in case of person while it would be an M-predicate in the other two cases.

It may be mentioned here that when applied to a stream, 'is running down hill' is a figurative use of the predicate borrowed from its original and appropriate use in case of a person. However, it may be said to be a lapse in Strawson not to speak anything about lower animals. A dog runs in the same sense in which a man runs. But whether we can call a predicate applied to a lower animal a P-predicate, Strawson is silent on this point.

Again, although Strawson is against any analysis of the concept of person into a body and an ego, he still maintains that ego can have a logically secondary type of existence. "A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person,

retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having been a person" (*Individuals*, p.103). But this assertion of existence of a disembodied ego is not in conformity with his concepts of individuation and identification. For a disembodied ego, by definition, does not possess any of the physical characteristics and, hence, cannot be either individuated or identified. Again, following his definition of a person as a type of entity to which both physical as well as conscious states are ascribed at the same time, we probably cannot call a disembodied ego, even if there is one, a (former) person as this ego does not admit of any physical states.

Despite these loopholes, Strawson's concept of person occupies a very unique position in modern analytic philosophy.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 5: State whether the following statements are True or False:

a) According to Descartes, we cannot ascribe both physical characteristics and states of consciousness to one and the same thing. (True/False)

b) Strawson says that the concept of person is a primitive concept. (True/False)

c) According to Strawson, the concept of person is analyzable into a mind and a body. (True/False)

d) Strawson says that P-predicates are ascribed to persons only. (True/False)

e) Bernard Williams is not a critic of Strawson's concept of person. (True/False)

Q 6: How does Strawson criticize the Cartesian concept of ego? (Answer in about 104 words)

Ans: .....

.....

Q7: Distinguish between M-predicates and P- predicates.(Answer in about 110 words)

Ans:……..…….

Q 8: What do you mean by Strawson's concept of P-predicates? (Answer in about 88 words)

Ans:..……..……

…….....……..



ACTIVITY: 11.2

Is Strawson's view on the concept of Person satisfactory?

Ans: .....…….....

Do you support Bernard Williams's criticism on Strawson's concept of P-predicates? Discuss

Ans:…….....….....……....

.....…….



11.7 LET US SUM UP

- Strawson holds that both physical characteristics and states of consciousness are ascribed at the same time to one and the same thing, viz. Persons.
- Strawson's concept of person is a primitive concept in the sense that it is not analyzable into a particular consciousness (mind) and a body, because a person is not a combination of a mind and a body. He also says that there is no 'type ambiguity' between 'I' and 'Smith'; that means, 'I' and 'Smith' are not individuals of two different types.
- According to the Cartesians, a person is actually a combination of two distinct substances – mind and body, each of which has its own characteristics.

- According to the 'No-ownership theory', our states of consciousness cannot be ascribed to anything.
- Strawson goes to establish that the states of consciousness and experiences are necessarily possessed by a particular person in the logically non-transferable way.
- Strawson points out that a particular state of consciousness or an experience has got two aspects of ascribability: one, with respect to oneself, and the other, with respect to others.
- According to Strawson, the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates of consciousness and predicates of corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to single individual.
- Strawson makes a distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates. M-predicates can also be applied to material bodies to which states of consciousness are never applied. P-predicates consist of all other predicates such as smiling, walking, thinking etc. which we apply to persons.
- Strawson insists that both M-and P-predicates are ascribed to one and the same thing, viz. Persons.
- Strawson's concept of person is also not free from difficulties, yet it occupies a very unique position in modern analytic philosophy.



11.8 FURTHER READING

1. Sen, P.K.&Verma, R.R.(1995) (ed) *The Philosophy Of P.F. Strawson. New Delhi:* I.C.P.R.
2. Strawson, P.F.(1974). *Freedom and Resenement and Other Essays.* London. Metheun &Co. Ltd.,
3. Shaffer, J. A. : (1988) *Philosophy of Mind*. New Delhi. Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd.
4. Ghose, R. : (1990) *The Idea Of a Person.* Calcutta: Punthi Pustak

11.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: a) True b) True c) False
d) True e) False

Ans to Q No 2: According to Strawson, the concept of person is a primitive concept, because it is not analyzable into a particular mind and a body. He says that both M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed to one and the same thing, viz. persons. A person is not a combination of a mind and a body. The concept of person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. It is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima.

Ans to Q No 3: According to the Cartesians, a person is actually a combination of two distinct substances belonging to two different types. These two distinct substances are mind and body. Each of them has its own characteristic states and properties. They say that states of consciousness are ascribed to one substance while the physical states are ascribed to the other.

Ans to Q No 4: Wittgenstein and Schlick maintain a view that our states of consciousness are not ascribed to anything and this view is called by Strawson 'No-ownership theory' of the self. We may illustrate the 'No- ownership theory' with the help of an example of the two uses of 'I' in the two sentences: 'I have a toothache' and 'I have a bad tooth'. Although these two sentences are grammatically similar, they are completely different in nature. In the sentence ' I have a bad tooth', we put emphasis on the physical aspect alone. But Wittgenstein says that a toothache is an experience, a state of consciousness which cannot be possessed by anyone.

Ans to Q No 5: a) True b) True c) False d) True e) False

Ans to Q No 6: According to the Cartesians, all states of consciousness and experiences are ascribed to the ego. But Strawson in this regard points out a serious difficulty that in order to ascribe a state or an

experience to something, that something should be identifiable and individualizable. But the problem is that in the absence of any physical characteristics an ego remains unidentifiable and unindividualizable. Because, anything without shape, size, colour or other physical attributes cannot be pointed at as 'it'. So, an ego cannot be identified in the absence of the physical attributes. Hence, the question of ascribing states and experiences to it does not arise.

Ans to Q No 7: Strawson makes a distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates. M-predicates are predicates of ascribing material properties. M-predicates can also be applied to material bodies to which states of consciousness can never be applied. But P-predicates are predicates of ascribing properties to persons only. P-predicates consist of all other predicates which we apply to persons. M-predicates include predicates like 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing room' etc. P-predicates include predicates like 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', 'is in pain', 'is thinking hard' etc. Thus, it becomes clear that P-predicates can be ascribed only to persons; on the other hand, M-predicates can be ascribed to both persons and material bodies.

Ans to Q No 8: According to Strawson, P-predicates are predicates of ascribing properties to persons only. P-predicates include all other predicates which we apply to persons only. They can never be applied to material bodies. However, all P-predicates are not consciousness predicates like 'is intelligent' or 'is in a pensive mood'. He says that 'is going for a walk' is not a consciousness predicate since it has nothing directly to do with consciousness, but still it is a P-predicate because, it is exclusively applied to a person and not to anything else.



11.10 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: What are the two distinct substances, according to Descartes?

Q 2: Give examples of P-predicate

Q 3: Give an example of M-predicate.

Q 4: What are the two substances advocated by Descartes?

Q 5: Who advocates the no-ownership theory?

B. Short Questions(Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: What are the reactions considered by Strawson?

Q 2: What is Person for Strawson?

Q 3: What is 'M-predicates'?

Q 4: What is 'P-predicates'?

Q 5: What are the two aspects of the ascriptions of consciousness predicates?

Q 6: What is 'No-ownership theory?

Q 7: Briefly comment on the view that the concept of person is a primitive concept.

C. Distinguish between (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: First reaction and Second reaction on persons.

Q 2: M- predicates and P-predicates.

Q 3: Cartesianism and No-ownership theory.

D. Long Questions (Answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Critically discuss the No-ownership theory.

Q 2: Discuss Cartesianism in the light of Strawson.

Q 3: Critically discuss Strawson's concept of P-predicates.

Q 4: How would you resolve the conflict between First and Second reactions on persons?

Q 5: Do you think that Strawson's concept of person is satisfactory? Give reasons for your answer.

*** **** ***

UNIT 12: THE PROBLEM OF VALUES

UNIT STRUCTURE

12.1 Learning Objectives

12.2 Introduction

12.3 Value: What it is

- 12.3.1 Axiology: What it is
- 12.3.2 Meaning of value
- 12.3.3 Definitions of Value

12.4 Kinds of value

- 12.4.1 Subjective and objective: What they are
- 12.4.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic values: what they are

12.5 Fact- Value Relation

12.6 Reality and Value

12.7 Let Us Sum Up

12.8 Further Reading

12.9 Answers to Check Your Progress

12.10 Model Questions

12.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will be able to:

- define value and explain its nature
- discuss subjective and objective meanings of values
- distinguish intrinsic values from extrinsic values
- explain fact- value relation;
- describe place of value in reality.

12.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you the concept of value. There is no field of social activity in the present age which is not affected by the idea of value. Value has played a prominent part in all ethical theories beginning with Plato.

The term 'Value' has a wide range of current usage in Philosophy and the Sciences.

In this unit, we have tried to arrive at a clarification of the concept of value, its kinds, fact-value relation and the place of value in reality. To achieve this purpose, we are proceeding with an analysis of the concept. There is difference of opinion with regard to the question: Are values subjective or objective? The Central distinction in the theory of value is between Intrinsic and Extrinsic values. There is also the question of whether values exist and if so, how they relate to facts.The place of value in reality has also occasioned much discussion and difference of opinion.

12.3 VALUE: WHAT IT IS

This unit deals with the concept of value. In this connection we shall discuss in detail the term axiology which is a modern term. Meaning, definition and significance of value are some other important points to discuss here.

12.3.1 Axiology

Before we talk about the concept of value, let us think about what is **axiology** in philosophy. Values are studied in the branch of Philosophy called Axiology or value theory and it is of relatively recent origin. One major theme in axiology is concerned with defining values and characterizing their nature in order to develop a general theory of values. It enquires into the process through which we get the knowledge and appreciation of values, and the relative importance of different human faculties, intellect, feeling, will, in this process. Another theme of the distinction between different kinds of values and developing methods for their classification e.g. relative values and absolute values, **instrumental values** and end values, intrinsic values and extrinsic values, idealistic and practical values (subjective and objective).



Axiology:- Modern term for theory of value.




Instrumental value:-The value an entity possesses in virtue of the value of the consequences it produces.

12.3.2 Meaning of Value

Now that you have an idea about Axiology, let us look at the meaning of value. Value is an ambiguous term. Our sense of value is an essential attribute of the human consciousness. Value serves as the basis for judgement, reference, choice and action. The term 'value' itself came to ethics by way of economics. In Economics, it is used for (a) value in use, that is, the capacity of object to satisfy a human need or desire and (b) value in exchange or the amount of one commodity that can be obtained in exchange for another. Generally, an object is said to have value, if it contributes to the satisfaction of a human need.

The word 'value' is derived from Latin 'Valere' i.e., "to be strong" or "to be worth". Therefore, etymologically the term value denotes the worth of something. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 'value' is worth, utility, desirability and qualities on which these depend. In general the word 'value' expresses the **qualitative** significance we assign to ideas, feelings, activities and experiences. Values are the evaluative standards we use for deciding what is right and what is wrong, what is desirable and what is undesirable. Our value judgments are expressed through statements like. "She is a good person", "He is an honest man", "It is a beautiful sunset", "We should respect the elders" etc. The Indian concept of value is represented in the concept of fourfold aim of human life (catuºpuruºârtha) which consists of (a) politico-economic values (artha), (b) **hedonistic** values (kârma), (c) moral values (dharma) and (d) religio-spiritual values (moksa).

Therefore, the term 'value' may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions and attractions and many other modalities of selective orientation. Thus, the word 'value' is used in a variety of ways both in and out of Philosophy.



Qualitative: Relating to quality.



Hedonistic: That part of ethics or psychology that treats of pleasure.

In our everyday speech and philosophical literature the term 'value' appears in three basic senses, which often overlap and are even more often confused:

- Value is what a thing is worth
- Value is a valuable (a) thing or (b) property (quality) something to which valuableness is ascribed.
- Value is an idea which makes us consider the given objects, qualities or events as valuable

12.3.3. Definitions of Value:

By now you have an idea about the meaning of value. Let us discuss the definitions of value. According to the International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Value is the "relative level of worth goodness, significance, or utility possessed by an entity, attribute, or event or an intangible quality or attribute that has intrinsic worth in itself".

Different philosophers have tried to define value in a variety of ways. **W.M. Urban** rightly says, "That alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves or to self-realisation". Man is a person or self. So what is conducive to self realization is intrinsically valuable. Man is not a mere animal. So what satisfies his isolated desires or promotes his life is not **intrinsically** valuable to him. But what satisfies his personality or contributes to his self-realization, is ultimately valuable to him. In the beginning, it appears that whatever satisfies desire is a good or value. But we find on closer examination that our wants and desires must themselves in turn be valued in terms of their relation to the survival and enhancement of life. Man is not only body, life, and mind, but also a person, a self, a spirit. Our life gets its value from the kind of life it is. Satisfaction of desires also is not intrinsically valuable. Man must go beyond organic welfare and satisfaction of desires to reach the concept of what is intrinsically valuable.



W.M. Urban:- (1873) American Idealist philosopher. Major works –Valuation its Nature and Laws 1909 Fundamentals of Ethics 1949.



Intrinsically:- in its Nature

James Ward rightly points out that value resides in the object of desire. The object that satisfies a desire has value. When an object satisfies a desire it gives rise to pleasure. The feeling of pleasure is the sense of value but not value in itself. According to I. Mackenzie, "Pleasure may fairly be described as a sense of value. The feeling of pleasure is the accompaniment of objects which have a certain value for the consciousness to which they are presented." Value resides in objects which satisfy our desires. When they are attained, pleasure ensures as a consequence.



James Ward (1843-1925): English Philosopher major works Psychological Principles, A Study on Kant.

In twentieth century Axiology particular attention has been attracted by definitions of value formulated by R.B. Perry. According to **R.B. Perry**, a value is an object of interest to someone, for it emanates from the peculiar relation between the interest and its object." Thus, he defines value in terms of 'interest'. He, therefore, states that value is the special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it.' But the intimate relation between interest and value does not imply that we should impute value only to that which interests us.



Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957):- American Philosopher Major works General Theory of Value, Realms of Value, Present Philosophical Tendencies.

John Dewey has stated, 'Value may be connected inherently with liking, and yet not with every but only with those judgement has approved, after examination of the relation upon which the object liked depends." We may, for example, like sweets whole heartedly but if we are aware that it will injure our health it can have no value for us. Obviously, interest or liking is not the final measure of value. Value is determined by the standard of right and wrong. Even when not liked the right object can be valuable and the wrong one valueless irrespective of whether it is liked or not.



John Dewey (1859-1952):- American Pragmatist Philosopher Major works Psychology, Outline of Ethics, Studies in Logical Theory.

Finally, we can define value as a unique, ultimate and underivable concept, which has its own essence and being. It belongs to "the being" which Plato first discovered, the realm which we can spiritually discern, but cannot see or grasp. **Nicolai Hartmann** subscribes to this view when he maintains that "Values are essences". In their modes of being they are Platonic Ideas. According to Hartmann

"There is a self-existent ideal sphere in which values are native, and as the contents of this sphere. Values, self-existent and dependent upon no experience, are discerned a-priori. (Ethics, Vol-I p.165).

From this we know that values are not formal or empty structures but they possess contents. They are not capable of being directly grasped by thought; they can only be immediately discerned by an inner vision. The essence of values always remains transcendent to the existential reality. Thus, Hartmann defines, values as essences having ideal self-existence or Being of an Ethical ideal sphere. If Values are Being or existence, they will lose their unique and fundamental character for axiology. Here values become a part of metaphysical reality. Hartmann makes value real in a Platonic World of super sensible essences.



Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950):- German realist Philosopher Major works Three volumes of "Ethics" "Plato's Logic of Being" "Outlines of a Metaphysic of Knowledge"



ACTIVITY: 12.1

- What do you think about value? Discuss

Ans:……

- Do you accept R.B. Perry's definition of value? Give reasons.

Ans:……



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is the meaning of Value? (Answer in about 30 words)

……

Q 2: What are the four values found in Indian Philosophy?

……

Q 3: What is value, according to Nicholai Heartman?

……

Q 4: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) According to objectivist, value is the basis of judgment. (True/False)

b) Subjectivists hold that value is the thing produced by judgment. (True/False)

c) The term value is an ambiguous terms. (True/False)

d) According to N. Hartman "Values are essences" (True/False)

Q 5: Fill in the blanks

a) Axiology is the branch of Philosophy concerned with _____

b) The word value is derived from Latin _____

12.4 KINDS OF VALUES

Let us now discuss about how Philosophers distinguish values. The theory of value has three main traditions

- Subjectivism
- Objectivism
- Neo-Kantian Rationalism

Subjectivism: It holds that valuable - goods are only the subjective states of the sentiment beings. Objectivism claims that while values must be human related, they exist independently of us. Neo-Kantian rationalism suggests that value, is postulated on the basis of practical reason.

Philosophers have distinguished values in a variety of ways and for a variety of purposes.

Central distinctions in the theory of value are between:

- Subjective and objective values
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic values

12.4.1 : Values: Subjective or Objective

There has been a traditional controversy–Are values subjective or objective. In the history of philosophy we find differenent opinions with regard to this question.

Values as Subjective:

The empirical and pragmatic philosophers are of the opinion that objects have no inherent value of their own. A fact may remain independently of a mind but the value of a fact depends upon its relation to a mind, which it must satisfy. **Lotze** defines value by saying, 'what we mean by value in the world lies wholly in the feeling of satisfaction or of pleasure which we experience from it". Satisfaction or pleasure being a state of feeling within the mind, value is entirely subjective. Appreciation depends upon individual preferences because a thing which satisfies me may not satisfy you. The ideal of beauty varies from country to country, from time to time, from man to man. What is morally good in one country may be immoral in another. Truth, Beauty and Goodness have no meaning without reference to the thinking, feeling and willing of the human mind. Therefore, nothing is valuable in itself, but our feeling makes it so. Values are projections of our mind. Objective reality is valueless. The **subjectivists** analyse valuational judgement like 'x is good' as equivalent to "I like x' or 'I approve x". Therefore, objects are mere objects, facts are only existent facts and nothing more. They are neither good nor 'bad', neither 'beautiful' nor 'ugly'. If these qualities are really existent in the facts they would be observable like the objects. We cannot observe such qualities as existing in the objects, we are to conclude that values are not objective. There is an important element of truth in the above contention but the theory that values are only subjective is not entirely correct.



Rudolf Harmann Lotze (1817-1881):- German Philosopher Major works Metaphysik, Logik .



Subjectivist: - The state of being subject.

Values as Objective:

Objective thinkers (Realists) argue that value is inherent in object itself. Value is not identical with satisfaction or pleasurable feeling as Lotze holds. Feeling of satisfaction is only an index of value and not the value as such. The object has value and so it gives us satisfaction. Our test or appreciation differs but there is something intrinsic to the nature of the object that forces us to say that it is



Objective :- Possessing the character of a real object existing independently of knowing mind.

beautiful or good. When we say that 'the rainbow is beautiful', the judgement does not depend on our sweet will. There is something in the rainbow which compels us to judge in that way. Hence value is objective. Broadly speaking, beauty exists for all men alike and adequate training or education tends to bring aesthetic judgments towards a common standard. We do dispute about our tests. The possibility of educating our faculty of appreciation and thus developing a common standard shows that values may be universal and objective. Thus, we can say that values are objective i.e. Truth, Beauty and Goodness are objective standards or norms of comparison, not wholly constituted by our appreciation of them. However, values cannot be wholly objective, we believe that values without valuation or appreciation by some mind or other are not values at all.

Values: Both Subjective and Objective :



S. Alexander (1859-1938) :- British Neo-realist. Major work - Space, Time and Deity.

Philosophers differ in their opinions on the extent to which value is objective or subjective in a particular object. Some philosophers attempt a synthesis between the two extreme opinions. **S. Alexander** describes values as a tertiary quality as distinguished from the primary and secondary ones, which are wholly objective. According to him values are subjectively conditioned objective qualities. The ideals or values, truth, beauty and goodness exist in objects as well as in human minds. We can judge a fact as true or beautiful or good because these values are in the fact.

Values of things are the functions of two variables - environmental (objective) and organic (subjective). Value of an object is determined by man's desire, but whether men find an object desirable or undesirable obviously depends on some properties of the object. For example, Gold would have no value unless men desired it, but perhaps men desire it because it glitters and is a durable metal.

Value judgments are, in a sense, factual judgments describing qualities that are valued. Man's life is a progressive realization of

the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. They are not created by him, but they manifest themselves to him when he is drawn nearer and nearer by them as objective **spiritual** forces which make up Absolute Spiritual Reality. Reality itself is valuable. Many of the thinkers who believe that values are intrinsic try to achieve some kinds of synthesis between the objective and subjective approaches.



Spiritual: Pertaining to spirit (the soul)

12.4.2: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values

The idea of intrinsic (Absolute) value has been explained in many different ways. A central line of thought, found in **G.E. Moore**, is that intrinsically valuable things are the source of their own value where as extrinsically valuable things derive their value from another source. Intrinsic value is grounded on, but not reducible to the, 'natural' intrinsic properties of the object. G.E. Moore regards things of **intrinsic** value as 'organic unity'. Combination of valuable things can form 'organic wholes' whose value is greater than the sum of the value of their component parts. The colours of a picture separately have little value, but the picture as a whole has a great value.



G.E. Moore (1873-1938):- British Neo-Realist Philosopher. Major work Principia Ethica



Intrinsic : Value in relation of parts to whole.

According to Wright, "An intrinsic value is of worth on its own account, and instrumental value because of its consequence". Here instrumental value also means extrinsic value. Examples of intrinsic value are truth, beauty, goodness etc. They are themselves the end, not the means to achieving some other end. Moral values are another example of intrinsic values. Moral value is itself good since it contains moral obligation and moral duty and leads to good conduct. The only difference of opinion regarding intrinsic values lies in the question whether such a value exists in the object or in the individual.

On the other hand, extrinsic (Relative) value means that the worth of something has for the sake of something else. Values which are not ends in themselves but the means of achieving some other end are called extrinsic values. Extrinsic values are subjective in nature

and based on the principle of utility. According to the pragmatists values have no prior existence. They are created by man by a process of successful experimentation. When the problems are solved they emerge. Extrinsic value is not desirable or worthy in itself. Money and wealth are accepted as extrinsic values since they have no utility of their own but they are valuable only as long as we can use them to buy objects which will satisfy our desires. Money, therefore has extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is valuable in itself. We have to value many things. It is, therefore, difficult to determine which values are intrinsic and which are extrinsic. Truth, beauty and goodness are universally accepted as intrinsic values of human life.



ACTIVITY: 12.2

Do you find any distinction between subjective and objective Values? Discuss

Ans:……..……..……

Can you distinguish intrinsic Values from extrinsic Values. Discuss

Ans:……



CHECK YOUR PROGESS

Q 6: What are the three main traditions of value?

……

Q 7: What is subjectivism? (Answer in about 40 words)

……

……

Q 8: What is objectivism? (Answer in about 30 words)

……

……

Q 9: Who describes value as a tertiary quality?

……

Q 10: Define the concept of value, according to S. Alexander.

……

……

Q 11: What is intrinsic value? (Answer in about 40 words)

……

Q 12: What is extrinsic value (Answer in about 50 words)

Q 13: Why intrinsic values are called as instrumental values? (Answer in about 30 words)

Q 14: State whether the following statements are True or False:

a) An Intrinsic Value is an end in itself. (True/False)

b) Values are only objective. (True/False)

Q 15: Fill in the blanks

a) G.E. Moore regards things of Intrinsic Value as ……

b) Extrinsic values are …….. in nature.

12.5 FACT AND VALUE

Now let us discuss the fact-Value relation. Fact and value are two contending concerns in all ethical discussions. In ethics we generally move from questions of fact to considerations of value.

It was **David Hume** who first brought our attention to the problematic aspect of the ethical situation by maintaining that the move from fact to value is logically suspect. In ethical discussions the fact-value problematic is referred to as the "Is-Ought To Question". The illegitimacy of defining value (ought) statements from factual (is) propositions alone was later labelled by G.E. Moore as the '**naturalistic fallacy**'.

There is a question of whether values exist and if so, how they relate to facts. A fact can be regarded as what really exists in nature. But value is connected with the appraisal of worth of the object. Positive sciences deal with facts, on the other hand Normative sciences deal with values.



David Hume (1711-1776):- British Philosopher Major works. A Treatise of Human Nature, Enquiry concerning Human understanding



Naturalistic fallacy :- Which consists in defining value in terms of naturalistic object like desire, interest etc.

Generally, we find the distinction between 'Judgments of fact' and 'Judgments of Value'. A judgment of fact concerns itself with the description of fact of an experience and such description may be either true or false, e.g. "This rose is red". On the other hand, a judgment of value tries to appraise the worth on value of an object, e.g. 'The rainbow is beautiful'. Therefore, judgments of facts are descriptive based on perception or inference. But judgments of value are evaluative (appreciative). They refer to the norms, ideals, standards or patterns with the help of value predicates like good, bad, right, wrong, beautiful, ugly etc. We express our approval or disapproval, liking or disliking of some facts. Thus judgments of fact merely describe the nature of object or facts on the other hand judgments of value do not merely describe the object, but also appraise the worth of the object.

Let us discuss this in some more detail.

- Our factual judgements deal with actual states-of-affair, on the other hand our value judgements deal with the ideal state-of-affair. Value judgements are normative, involving with a norm, as distinguished from descriptive judgements of the positive sciences. Judgements of facts tell us what the case is, whereas judgements of value tell us what ought to be the case. Therefore, values are not identical with the fact or reducible to the facts.
- Factual judgements are objective because they emphasize description of actual qualities of objects. Value judgements are not purely subjective or entirely objective.
- Values judgements are subjective depending upon valuations or individual preferences. For example, the rose may be a fact independent of my knowing, but it cannot be beautiful unless there are eyes to appreciate it. Value concepts like good, bad, beautiful etc. indicate the attitude of the subject towards something. Thus value judgements are subjective in the sense that they depend upon appreciation evaluation or appraisal by the knowing mind.
- But value judgements are also objective. The contention of the subjectivists is only partially true. When we judge that an object is beautiful we feel that the judgment is not arbitrary, but there is

something in the object judged that makes the judgment necessary. Value judgements describe some objective character of the fact-valued. The goodness of a thing or rightness of an action cannot depend merely on somebody's liking or approval. Thus value judgements are objective in the sense that they depend upon the values of objects and actions, which are facts.

- There is a standard value or norm with which comparison is involved in value judgment and this is something that satisfies us completely. This ideal cannot depend merely upon an individual's choice or preference. The ideal is objective or real in the sense that it is the necessary standard of evaluation. Thus value judgements are both subjective and objective.

Finally, we can conclude that there is a relation between fact and value. Though fact exists independent of the knowing mind yet fact depends on mind for their valuations or preference. All ethical discourses are characterized by a combined use of both description (factual) and evaluative (value) judgements.

12.6 REALITY AND VALUE:

By now you have some idea about the concept of value. Now let us discuss the place of value in reality. The problem of the relation of reality to values has always had great importance in the philosophical systems of the past.



Normative: Means consisting in a standard.

From the idealistic point of view:

- Value is identified with reality; the real is the valuational. 'To be real' is used to be considered as the same thing as 'to be of highest value'. Perfectly real is identical with the perfectly rational. (Universal reason) Perfectly rational must be perfectly valuable.
- The Degrees of reality are the same as the Degrees of value.
- The essential contrast between 'the real' and the 'unreal' also means the distinction between 'value' and 'disvalue'.
- The highest reality is the supreme value at the same time. Supreme (ultimate) value is only an ideal.



Josiah Royce (1855-1916) :- American Idealist philosopher. Major works -The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.

All these propositions seem to be implied in the Platonic doctrine of 'Ideas'. 'Ideas' are essences. These 'Ideas' of Plato belong to a realm which is distinct from the realm of actual objects. They are the principles of reality. The highest among those ideas is the idea of 'the Good'. The idea of 'the Good' becomes the supreme principle of reality. Thus, according to Plato, the ideal is more real than the actualities. Plato holds that values are superior to reality.



Plato (B.C. 427-347):- Greek Philosopher. His extensive writings – the Dialogues -which touch upon every major problem of Philosophy.

Spinoza, Bradley and Samkara hold that Absolute Reality is superior to human values. For Bradley value is a relational concept and is, therefore not applicable to the Absolute which is above all relations. Samkara also holds that values are real from the practical (Vyavaharika) point of view, but are non-existent from the Absolute (paramarthika) point of view. Values are thus illusory or fictitious from the Absolute point of view. Values are real only from the human point of view.

Most of the other philosophers reject this standpoint, since any system of philosophy that treats values as illusory, strikes at the very root of moral and spiritual life. Modern or contemporary philosophers therefore, realize that human values must be treated as part of reality.

We human beings are unable to realise value completely in our lifetime. Values must be regarded as real and objective, otherwise our spiritual life loses all significance. Therefore, there must be an eternally perfect being (God) to conserve or preserve our values. Theistic idealist holds that values are supreme ends foreseen, planned, desired and willed by God, the Cosmic Mind. Royce, the follower of Hegel holds that ultimate reality (God) is the conservation of human values. It is the fulfilment of all values, which is infinite self-consciousness, will and love. Pringle Pattison also regards the Absolute as the eternal embodiment of Truth, Good and Beauty. For human beings perfect and ultimate value is only ideal but real in God's experience. God can be regarded as the ultimate standard of our value judgments.



F.H. Bradley (1846-1924):- British Idealist Philosopher. Major works, Appearance and Reality.



ACTIVITY: 12.3

- Do you find any distinction between 'Judgments of Fact' and 'Judgments of Value'? Discuss

Ans:……

.....

- Do you accept the relation between Reality and Value? Discuss

Ans:……

……



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 16: What is naturalistic fallacy? (Answer in about 30 words)

……

……

……

Q 17: Who for the 1st time maintained that move from the fact to value is logically suspect?

……

Q 18: State whether the following statements are True and False

a) Factual judgments are judgments of positive sciences. (True /False)

b) Plato holds that values are superior to reality. (True/False)

c) Positive sciences deal with facts. (True/False)

d) Normative sciences deal with values. (True/ False)

e) Judgments of value refer to norms, ideals, standard etc. (True/False)

f) According to Plato, ideas are essences. (True/False)

g) Samkara holds that values are the illusory or fictitious from the absolute point of view. (True/False)

h) Factual judgments are judgments of positive sciences. (True / False)



12.7 LET US SUM UP

- There is considerable ambiguity of the term 'value'. Value is what makes actions, character traits, and objects good or bad
- There are conflicting views among philosophers regarding values. Value is determined by the standard of right and wrong. Value has been defined in terms of many concepts e.g., (a) value as reality, (b) Value as pleasure, (c) Value as an intrinsic good.
- Both objective and subjective elements exist in value. Philosophers differ in their opinion with regard to the question. Value can be regarded as an objective quality of facts conditioned by our subjective appreciation
- Generally, two types of values may be distinguished. Some of the values of life are sought for their own sake while others are desired as means to an external end. The former are absolute or intrinsic value and the letter are relative or extrinsic values. There are many things which we value. It is extremely difficult to determine which values are intrinsic and which are extrinsic.
- There is a relation between value and fact and opinions are divided as to its logicality. A fact is what really exists or happens in nature but value is connected with the appraisal of worth of the object.
- The problem of the relation of Reality to Values has always had great importance in the philosophical systems. Reality or the Absolute is the conservation of the values; it is the fulfilment of the values. So, the values or ideals are not illusory. Modern or contemporary philosophers realize that human values must be treated as part of reality.



12.8 FURTHER READING

1. Mackenzie. John S. (1975). *A Manual of Ethics.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2/11 Ansari Road, daryaganj
2. Sinha, J.N. (1984) *Manual of Ethics*. Calcutta: New Central Book Agency
3. Lillie, William. (1990). *An Introduction to Ethics*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers limited
4. Chakraborty, D.K. (1995) Problems of Analytics Ethics. New Delhi: Omsons Publications, T-7, Rajgouri garden
5. Chatterjee, Phanibhusan. (1950). *Principles of Ethics*. Calcutta: Beadon Street
6. Frankena, William K. (1989). *Ethics*. USA : Prentice Hall, Inc, Engelwood Chiffs



12.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: 'Value' may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral objections, desires, wants, needs, aversions and attractions and many other modalities of selective orientation

Ans to Q No 2: Plato's economic values (artha), hedonistic values (kama), moral values (dharma), religio-spiritual values (moksa)

Ans to Q No 3: He mentions that values are essences and self existent in the sense that they do not depend upon experience. It is viewed that the concept of values are not directly grasped by experience. They are apriori in the sense that they are immediately grasped by inner vision. That is why values are part of metaphysical reality. Heartman views that values are real in a platonic will of supersensible experiences.

Ans to Q No 4: a) True b) True c)True d) True

Ans to Q No 5: a) Value b) Valere

Ans to Q No 6: Subjectivism, objectivism and Neo-Kantian Rationalism

Ans to Q No 7: This tradition holds that the value of a fact depends on our mind. It indicates that values lies in the feeling of satisfaction or of pleasure regarding an object depends on our mind. Lotze advocates this theory.

Ans to Q No 8: Unlike the subjectivists, objectivists hold that value exist independently of our mind. They hold that value exists in an object. It does not require existing in a human mind.

Ans to Q No 9: S. Alexander

Ans to Q No 10: According to S. Alexander, values are subjectively conditioned objective qualities.

Ans to Q No 11: Intrinsic values are those kinds of values which exist in itself and not considered as a means in order to achieve some other end. As for instance, Truth, Beauty and Goodness are the examples of intrinsic values.

Ans to Q No 12: Extrinsic values are those values which are considered as a means in order to achieve some other end. As for instance, money is considered as a means to purchase things like car, house, dress, eatable things etc. In this sense money is considered as extrinsic value for the mentioned items.

Ans to Q No 13: The values which are considered as a means in order to achieve some other end are known as instrumental values. As for instance, money and wealth are considered as instrumental values.

Ans to Q No 14: a) True b) False

Ans to Q No 15: a) Organic unity b) Subjective

Ans to Q No 16: The move to define value statements from factual statements leads philosophers to commit a fallacy that is known as naturalistic fallacy.

Ans to Q No 17: David Hume

Ans to Q No 18: a) True b) False c)True d)True
e) True f) True g) True d) True



12.10 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very short Questions

Q 1: What do you mean by axiology?

Q 2: What do you mean by subjective value?

Q 3: Define extrinsic and intrinsic value.

Q 4: What is naturalistic fallacy?

Q 5: Who advocates value as both subjective and objective?

B) Short Questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Briefly explain the meaning of value.

Q 2: Discuss briefly the subjectivists analysis of value.

Q 3: What is intrinsic value? Discuss briefly.

Q 4: Discuss briefly the fact-value relation.

Q 5: What are judgments of value? Briefly explain it with reference to judgments of fact.

C) Write short notes on (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Axiology

Q 2: W.M. Urban's Definition of Valuemmmm

Q 3: Intrinsic Value

Q 4: Extrinsic Value

Q 5: Naturalistic fallacy

D) Distinguish between (Answer each question in about 150 words)

Q 1: Intrinsic and Extrinsic values

Q 2: Subjective and Objective value

Q 3: Judgments of fact and Judgments of value

E) Long Questions (Answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What are values? Explain definitions of values

Q 2: Discuss the different kinds of values.

Q 3: Discuss Fact-Value relation.

Q 4: What is naturalistic fallacy? Explain it with reference to G.E.Moore.

Q 5: What is the place of value in reality? Explain.

Q 6: Are values subjective or objective? Discuss.

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UNIT 13 UNIVERSALS: REALISM (PLATO AND ARISTOTLE)

UNIT STRUCTURE

13.1 Learning objectives

13.2 Introduction

13.3 Universal: Its nature and theories

13.4 Realism

1 3.4.1 Plato's realism

13.4.2 Aristotle's realism

13.5 Let us Sum Up

13.6 Further Reading

13.7 Answers to Check Your Progress

13.8 Model Questions

13.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will be able to:

- explain the problem of universal
- discuss the relation between universal and particular
- discuss the theories of universal
- define realism
- explain the views of Plato and Aristotle

13.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you the problem of universals sprang from our experience, thought and language. It is matter of common experience that particular things exist in space and time. Particular things like a chair, a table, a red colour, a cow, a tree etc exist in a particular space and in a particular time. They are different from and exclusive of one another. However, we do not call each one of them by a specific name like we call our friends by their names. Rather we group them, give them a collective name which says they belong to a particular class. Now, questions bound: what makes them come under a particular class? What underpins our

attempt to bind them in a group? Why are all cows, to cite an example, named by the term 'cow' regardless of their innumerable differences? Is it essence which is shared in common by all the members of a class? Or, is it simply similarity among them? The problem of universal, so to speak, mainly deals with these questions.

13.3 UNIVERSAL: ITS NATURE AND THEORIES

In nature, we have broadly two kinds of knowledge of things— sensuous and conceptual. Sensuous knowledge presents a thing in a particular part of space and time. Thus we have particular knowledge of manifold of objects viz. chair, a table, a red colour, a cow etc. Conceptual knowledge, on the other hand, presents a thing without any note of particularity. It is not limited to any space and time. However, it is a sort of thing without which we cannot think of particular objects. Though we can see and touch particular objects, we have to use general concepts while thinking or talking about them. For they are perceived by us as belonging to a certain class. The particular things have something common in them by virtue of which they are grouped together in the same class and called by the same name. Red, white, yellow, blue, green etc. have something common in them on account of which they are grouped into the class of colours and called by the same name 'colour'. Similarly cows, dogs, cats, horses etc. have something common in them because of which they are brought under the same class of animal and called by the same name 'animal'. This something which is common to all the members of a class is called universal or generality. Thus the universal may generally be defined as something which is common to and shared in common by all the members of a particular class, and is the ground of their being grouped into the same class and called by the same name.

Now the knotty questions that often churn up the philosophers' mind are— What is common to a group of things (or particulars)? What sort of thing is universal? Does the universal stand for something that is objectively real? Or is it merely a word that we use for a group of things due to their similarity between them? Philosophers answer to these questions from

their own stance. And since their views are different, we have several theories regarding the nature of universal, viz., Realism, Conceptualism, Nominalism etc. All these theories have got supporters from both the corners of Indian and Western philosophy.

Realism is a theory according to which the universal is extra-mental. It has independent reality. It is the essence residing equally in all the members of a class. Conceptualism states that universal is a concept in mind; it is a pure mental entity. There is no universality in things outside mind. According to Nominalism, universals are mere words or names. For this theory, names are made universal by being used for a number of different particulars.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.1 State whether the statements are true or false (True/False)

a) Womanhood is universal. (True/False)

b) Tree, cow, table, etc are not particulars. (True/False)

c) Sensuous knowledge presents a thing in a particular part of space and time. (True/False)

d) Conceptual knowledge presents a thing without any note of particularity. (True/False)

e) According to the theory of realism, universal is mind-dependent. (True/False)

Q.2. Define universal.

Q.3. What are particulars?

Q.4. Mention the main theories of universal.

Q.5. What is conceptualism?

Q.6. Define nominalism in a sentence.

13.4 REALISM

Realism holds that universal exists independent of the knowing mind. It has objective reality. Universal is the essence that is equally present in all the members of a class. However, this theory has got various forms in the

hands of its upholders as they have espoused their views in accordance with their own philosophy. While some regard universals to be substantive, some others hold them to be adjectival even though they all agree on the core notion of realism. Thus we have many supporters of this theory both from Indian and Western camps. They are— Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa, Plato, Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore and S. Alexander. Here, however, we shall discuss the views of Plato and Aristotle, the champions in realism, in a brief detail.

13.4.1 Plato's Realism

Plato advocates extreme realism. For him, a universal is substantive, an entity which exists in a non-temporal, non-spatial world without depending on mind. It is not affected by whatever happens to the particulars in the world of space and time. Although the existence of the particulars in the universals logically depends upon the existence of the universals in the particulars, the other way round is not true. Even if there is not any example of perfect square anywhere, perfect squareness exists in the transcendental world of universals. To Plato, a universal is a model to which particular things approximate.

In his theory of Ideas, Plato advocates the existence of universal entities which are different from the particular things. Plato maintains that there must be an essence common to all things of a given kind. For him, a thing will not be a table unless it has the essence of tablehood that all other tables possess in common. A table may differ from other tables in shape, size and colour, but it must possess a single form or essence which constitutes their being table and which distinguishes them from other things like chairs, beds or doors etc. Thus Plato holds that we always postulate one single form for every class of particulars to which we assign the same name. It is not only true of objects indicated by nouns, such as chairs, tables, beds, trees, etc but also of qualities indicated by predicates, such as beautiful, ugly, greater than, less than etc. Just

as there must be a form or essence of tablehood common to tables, so there must be a form or essence of ugliness common to all ugly things. Plato gives the name **'Ideas'** or **'Forms'** to these objective essences.

Thus for Plato, there is an absolute difference between the Forms or universals, and sensible objects or particulars. The universals are patterns in the nature of things, while the particular things are made in their image and hence are likenesses of the 'Forms'. The 'Forms' exist in themselves. According to Plato, the universals are substances. A substance is that which has its whole being in itself and which does not derive its reality from anything else except itself. It is the ground of other things, but it does not have any ground except itself. In this sense, the universals are self-caused and self-determined; they are absolute and ultimate realities. The particulars, on the other hand, are not self-caused or self-determined; they are relative, for they have to depend upon other things for their existence. Unlike the particular things, the universals are thoughts. Universals are not found in nature like any particular thing. There is no such thing as the cow-in-general. However, 'thought', in this case, should not be taken as my thought or your thought or the thought of God. For it is absurd to think that our thoughts can be the cause of the universe. They are not subjective ideas, but are objective Ideas having reality on their own. The universal or the Idea is a unity. It is one amidst many. But the particular things are many. The Idea of horse is one, but the horses are many. There cannot be more than one Idea for every class of things. Universals are immutable and imperishable, while the particulars are ever-changing and perishable.

In spite of these differences, there is a close connection between universals and the particulars. Their relationship is described in two ways: (i) as a participation of the particular thing in the Idea (ii) as an imitation of the Idea by the particular thing, the

particular things being the copy of the Idea and the Idea being the exemplar.

Now, as universals are not given in sense-perception, the question pertinent here is: How are they known? Plato's answer, however, is mythical. For, he said that the soul is said to possess the universals (in Plato's words, pure Forms or Ideas) in the incorporeal world before embodying the present body. When we perceive the similar things in the present life, we remember the Forms forgotten in earthly life. Again in the Timaeus, Plato said that God makes the things of this world according to the model of the Forms. God takes the model of the Forms in creating things of the world. This implies that the Ideas or the Forms exist apart, not only from the things of the sensible world, but also from God. Hence, the Ideas are something hanging in the air.

Plato also spoke about different levels of Forms related as higher and lower in a hierarchy. Just as many individual things are presided over by one Idea which is the common element in them, so many lower Ideas are presided over by one higher idea which is the common element in them. Again, over this higher Idea together with many others still a higher Idea will rule. For example, the Ideas of whiteness, blackness, greenness, blueness, yellowness, all come under the Idea of colour. The Ideas of sweetness, sourness, bitterness, all come under the Idea of taste. Now these two Ideas of colour and taste are subsumed under the still higher Idea of quality. In this way, the Ideas form a pyramid with an apex. Over all these Ideas, there must be one highest Idea which is the supreme of all of them. This is the final and absolutely real being. It is the ground of itself, of other Ideas and of the whole universe. Plato calls this Idea the Idea of Good. Thus we find that though the Ideas are many, they culminate in one single Idea. In brief, the Ideas form one organised system culminating in one supreme Idea which is the highest expression of its unity. And every individual Idea is a many in one.

Considered in itself, it is one and as considered in relation to others, it is many.

13.4.2 Aristotle's Realism

Aristotle rejects the mysterious world of substantive universals. He advocates a moderate form of realism. According to him, a universal is not a substantive at all but a property which belongs to particulars. While Plato treats universals as nouns, Aristotle treats them as adjectives. According to Aristotle, there is a logical interdependence between the universals and the particulars. Just as there can be no chairs, unless each chair possesses the property of being a chair, so no such property (chairness) can exist unless there are chairs.

Aristotle sharply criticises Plato's theory of universals and regards the 'Ideas' as quite unnecessary. His objections to Plato's theory of Ideas go like this—

1. Plato unnecessarily doubled the number of things to be explained. The Forms or Ideas are as many as the particular things whose causes are the Ideas themselves. For Plato holds that there is an entity corresponding to each thing bearing the same name with it that exists independently of the particular things. Such postulation does not solve any problem, as it makes repetition on a different level. The same questions that are raised in cases of the particulars may also be raised in cases of the Ideas or Forms. Thus, mere multiplication of objects cannot be said to be a solution to any problem.

2. Plato's Ideas fail to explain the existence of things. The main problem of philosophy is to explain why the things exist. By following Plato's theory of Ideas, we cannot explain this. Even if we accept that the Idea of whiteness exists, we cannot see how it produces white objects.

3. Even if the existence of things is explained, their motion will be left unexplained. The world of things is a world of change, motion, life and becoming. But Plato's Ideas cannot explain this fact.

According to Plato, the Idea of whiteness produces white things, the Idea of beauty beautiful things and so on. But, since the Ideas themselves are changeless, motionless, so the world of things, which are their copies, will be alike. Thus the world will turn into a static one, which is impossible.

4. Plato has not explained properly the relation between the Ideas and particular things. He holds that particular things are the "copies" of Ideas and they "participate" in them. For Aristotle, such a contention is nothing but talking in empty metaphor.

5. The Ideas, which are supposed to be non-sensuous by Plato, are, in fact, sensuous. Plato thinks it necessary to seek a non-sensuous principle to explain the sensible world. But not finding such a principle, he takes the sensible things over again and regards them non-sensuous. In fact, there is no difference between the cow and the Idea of the cow, between the man and the Idea of man, except a meaningless and unnecessary "in-general" or "in-itself" which is attached to each sensible thing to give it a different look. Aristotle holds that Ideas are like the anthropomorphic gods of popular religion. These are nothing but the eternalized things of nature. He alters Plato's version by stating that things are not the copies of Ideas, but Ideas are the copies of things.

6. The view of Plato that the Ideas cause the particular things cannot be said to be true because the Ideas being changeless patterns without any principle of motion cannot function as the efficient cause. Even Plato's recognition of Ideas as the final cause cannot solve the problem, since it does not explain the efficient causality.

7. Plato commits the logical mistake of regarding Form or Idea both as an individual substance and a property. Forms are regarded as individual substances, as they have separate existence, and they are regarded as properties, since they are universals. But the question is: how can one and the same thing be both an individual substance and a property? Aristotle argues that it is impossible for anything 'general' to become an individual substance or a 'primary being', as an individual substance or primary being is such a thing

which is peculiar to an individual object and on the other hand, 'general' is something which is common to a group of things. According to Aristotle, a substance is the same as subject to which predicates are assigned. It is not a predicate of something else. So, if Forms or Ideas are treated as individual substances, they cannot be universals, since substances possess properties. Again, if Forms are treated as universals, they cannot be individual substances, as common property never indicates a "this-something" but a "this-such". Hence it is a logical impossibility to regard Form as both individual substance and a universal.

8. Aristotle's argument of the "Third Man" is noteworthy. The 'Third Man' argument states: An individual man is like the idea of man in being man and so there must be a further Idea, the 'third man', in which both the individual man and the idea of man participate. It leads to infinite regress.

9. If the Ideas are the essences of things, they must reside in the things themselves and not outside them. But Plato has isolated the Ideas from particular things and has placed them in a non-sensuous, non-temporal, mysterious world. Plato seems to have ended in absurdity when he asserts that there is horse-in-general existing independently somewhere beyond the particular horses. Plato's theory of Ideas is self-contradictory as it starts with stating that the universal is real and the particular is unreal and ends by lowering the universal at the level of the particular.

10. Even if Forms are supposed to exist apart, it is not possible to say in which cases it does so and in which it does not. Definitely, it cannot exist apart in the cases of all particulars or individuals, e.g., individual men. It is absurd to say that the essence of all men is the same, because all particular things whose essence is same or one are themselves one. It is also unreasonable to take essence as multiple and different.

All these criticisms against Plato's Ideas or Forms may be subsumed under two headings — first, that Plato introduced an unnecessary and useless duplication by making the Forms perfect

and independent or separate substance. Secondly, Plato confused the categories of substance with property.

Thus Aristotle rejects Plato's view that universals exist apart from particular objects. The universal is not something which has a higher reality than the individual things experienced by us. It is a common predicate which resides in many objects of a class. Thus the concept of cow is what is common to all cows. The concept of cow is the same thing as the predicate 'cowness'. Now this 'cowness' cannot exist apart from cows , just as softness cannot exist apart from the soft things. The universal is real in the particular in the sense that it realises itself in particular. Unlike Plato, Aristotle holds that the individual man is not the imperfect copy of the universal man. He is an actual man. He is called man because he has certain essential qualities of man. These certain essential qualities constitute the nature of man. Likewise, being an object of certain kind is determined by the properties possessed by the object. As the universals cannot exist by themselves, they cannot be called substances; nor are they particular substances, for there is not anything like absolute particular or isolated thing. If cowness does not exist independently of cows, then cows also do not exist independently of cowness. If we take away from cow what it has in common with other cows, we shall find nothing, as all qualities are taken away from it.

Both Aristotle and Plato hold that the knowledge of universal is acquired by the intellect. But while Plato regards it to be a priori, Aristotle regards it to be derived from sense-experience by abstraction.

From the foregoing discussion, what comes in the fore is that Aristotle's theory of universals is more moderate than that of Plato. Moreover, Aristotle's theory is more economical than Plato's, as he recognizes one world instead of two. Plato's theory is a theory of universalia ante rem, i.e., universals independent of particulars and Aristotle's is universalia in rebus, i.e., universals in things.

Aristotle's theory of universals is similar to the Indian realistic theories of universals in certain respects. Like Aristotle, the Nyaya-Vaisesika also holds that the universals do not exist independently of the particulars in a world of their own. They reside in the particular things as their predicates which are the basis of their classification and generalization. However, a subtle difference is there between these two camps. For Aristotle, the universals do not have existence different from and independent of the particular things. But the Nyaya, as differed from Aristotle yet being closer to Plato, holds that the universals are existentially independent of the particulars, although they depend on the particulars for their awareness.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 7: What is the main thesis of realism?

Q 8: Name some supporters of realism.

Q 9: State briefly Plato's view of realism.

Q 10: How are the Ideas known according to Plato?

Q 11: Define Aristotle's realism.

Q 12: Write whether the following statements are true or false. (True/False)

a) Plato treats universals as properties. (True/False)

b) Aristotle regards universals as adjectives. (True/False)

c) According to Plato, universals exist in a separate world beyond the particulars. (True/False)

d) Aristotle's theory is universalia in rebus. (True/False)



ACTIVITY 13.1

- Whose view do you think to be more plausible— Plato's or Aristotle's?

Ans. .....

.....

.....



13.5 LET US SUM UP

- What we have understood from the foregoing discussion is the problem of universal is a very knotty one.
- The two views discussed here seem to be right from their own perspectives, though none of them are above criticism.
- However, the definition of universal that is commonly held is—universal is something which is common to and shared in common by all the members of a particular class, and is the ground of their being grouped into the same class and called by the same name.
- According to realism, this common element is mind-independent and has objective reality.
- While for Plato, universal exists in a non-spatial and non-temporal world, for Aristotle, it exists in particular things.
- The problem of universal is originated from our experience, thought and language.
- Universal provides the ground of grouping things together. It establishes a unity among the discrete particulars.
- Realism, conceptualism and nominalism are the some main theories of universal.
- Realism is the theory according to which universals have independent reality. Champions of this theory are Plato and Aristotle.
- According to Plato, universals are substantive, but for Aristotle, they are adjectival. For Plato, universals exist apart from the particulars, but for Aristotle, it is impossible.



13.6 FURTHER READING

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13.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q no 1: a) True b) False c) True d) True e) False

Ans to Q no 2: The universal may generally be defined as something which is common to and shared in common by all the members of a particular class, and is the ground of their being grouped into the same class and called by the same name.

Ans to Q no 3: Particular things are those that exist in a particular space and time. For example, a chair, a table, a red colour, a cow, a tree etc.

Ans to Q no 4: Realism, Conceptualism and Nominalism.

Ans to Q no 5: According to conceptualism, universal is a concept in mind; it is a pure mental entity. There is no universality in things outside mind.

Ans to Q no 6: According to Nominalism, universals are mere words or names which are made universal by being used for a number of different particulars.

Ans to Q no 7: The main thesis of realism is that universal exists independent of the knowing mind. It has objective reality. It is the essence that is equally present in all the members of a class.

Ans to Q no 8: Nyaya-Vaisesika amd Mimamsa, Plato, Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore and S. Alexander are the supporters of realism.

Ans to Q no 9: Plato's realism is extreme realism. For him, a universal is substantive, an entity which exists without depending on mind in a non-temporal, non-spatial world. It is not affected by whatever happens to the particulars in the world of space and time. Particulars depend on universals for their existence, but the other way round is not true.

Ans to Q no 10: According to Plato, Ideas are known through the theory of reminiscence. He said that the soul is said to possess the universals (in Plato's words, pure Forms or Ideas) in the incorporeal world before embodying the present body. When we perceive the similar things in the present life, we remember the Forms forgotten in earthly life.

Ans to Q no 11: Aristotle advocates a moderate form of realism. He rejects the mysterious world of substantive universals. According to him, a universal is not a substantive at all but a property which belongs to particulars. For him, there is a logical interdependence between the universals and the particulars.

Ans to Q no 12: a) False b) True c) True d) True



13.8 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q1: Is Russell a supporter of realism?

Q2: Which Indian thinkers advocate realism?

Q3: Which theory of universal admits essence as identically present in all the particulars of a class?

Q4: What is particular?

Q5: Give an example of universal.

Q6: Give some examples of particular.

Q7: Name the theory by which Ideas are known according to Plato?

Q8: According to Aristotle, does universal exist apart from the particulars?

Q9: Which Indian theory assimilates Aristotle's view?

Q10: Which philosopher is associated with the concept the Idea of Good?

B. Short questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q1: Define universal.

Q2: What is realism?

Q3: Write the difference between universal and particular.

Q4: Write short notes on Plato's Idea of Good?

Q5: Write how Aristotle's view assimilates that of Nyaya-Vaisesika.

Q6: Mention some differences between the views of Plato and Aristotle.

C. Long questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q1: Discuss critically Plato's theory of universal.

Q2: How does Aristotle criticise Plato's theory of Ideas?

Q3: Give an account of Aristotle's realism.

Q4: In what sense is Aristotle's realism more moderate than that of Plato?

Q5: What do you mean by the hierarchy of universals? Discuss in the light of Plato's view.

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UNIT: 14 NOMINALISM (HOBBES AND HUME)

UNIT STRUCTURE

14.1 Learning objectives

14.2 Introduction

14.3 Nominalism: What this theory says

14.3.1 Hobbes' view

14.3.2 Hume's view

14.4 Let us Sum Up

14.5 Further Reading

14.6 Answers to Check Your Progress

14.7 Model Questions

14.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the theory of Nominalism
- discuss Milder nominalism of Hobbes
- explain Hume's theory of nominalism

14.2 INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the previous unit, universal is something which is common to and shared in common by all the members of a particular class, and is the ground of their being grouped into the same class and called by the same name. Then regarding the exact nature of that 'common something' different philosophers gave their views differently. Hence we have several theories that deal with the question 'What is universal?' Nominalism is a theory that finds the answer in observed similarity among the things of a group.

14.3 NOMINALISM: WHAT THIS THEORY SAYS

Nominalism thoroughly denies the objective metaphysical universals. For this theory, there is not any identical thing which resides in a group of particular objects at the same time. According to this theory, the problem of

universals can be solved by the mere fact of observed resemblance among different particular things of a group. Thus nominalism defines universal in terms of resemblance or similarity such that the particulars are required only to resemble each other in being called by the same name. Hence this theory is also called the resemblance or similarity theory.

According to this theory, the attributes of any particular object are as particular and localized as the object itself. Nominalism denies the realist theories of universals, both in their Platonic and Aristotelian form. A universal, this theory holds, is not an entity at all — substantive or adjectival. This theory, which has several variations, defines universal in terms of particulars and of the relation of resemblance between them. Thus in one sense, this theory is closer to Aristotle than to Plato, as a universal is definable in terms of particulars, and hence cannot be found in the absence of instances. But it is unlike Aristotle in holding that a universal is not a feature reproduced in a number of particulars as numerically identical in each of them. Thus Nominalism does not deny that things have a common name. What this theory denies is the particular objects as designated by a general term possess a feature which is identical in all of them. The supporters of this theory are the Buddhist, William of Ockham, Hobbes, Berkeley and Hume.

The Western theory of nominalism finds its fullest expression in the hands of some empiricist thinkers. They stress on the observance of the particulars and the avoidance of abstract speculation. Instead of upholding objective metaphysical universals, this theory considers the observed resemblance among various particulars as enough to work out the problem of universals. This view has its origin in the philosophy of William of Ockham. His theory is popularly known as the principle of Ockham's razor. For him, it is wastage of time to employ a number of principles when it is possible to use a few.

14.3.1 Hobbes' view

Nominalism is found in its explicit form in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes advances his nominalism in a milder form. He holds that a group of particulars resemble each

other in being called by the same name and that each of these particulars is called by the same name as the rest because it resembles the rest in some other way besides merely being called by the same name. According to Hobbes, there is no universal but a general word, or, there is nothing common to a group of things except their being called by the same name. His theory rejects not only realism but also conceptualism. Universal is not anything that exists in nature, nor is it any idea formed in the mind. It is always the name of some word.

However, Hobbes, in his nominalism, seems to have failed to distinguish between 'type' and 'token'. 'Type' and 'token' have a significant difference between them. The following two sentences exemplify how the same word 'red' is used in the senses of 'type' and 'token' in two different occasions.

(i) 'Red' occurs ten times on this page, and

(ii) His red handkerchief hung down from his pocket.

In uttering the first sentence, the speaker is referring to the type 'red'. Here it has the same meaning wherever it occurs. In uttering the second sentence, the speaker is referring to the token word 'red', i.e., to one of the particular occurrences of the type word 'red'.

Now, as Hobbes fails to make the distinction, he is unable to find that the sense in which a name is common to a set of particulars each of which is called by it is a type sense, and also that each time a different token is used in naming any one of the group. If he made the distinction between 'type' and 'token', he would have known not only the fact that a numerically different token is used each time, but also that tokens of a single type may vary qualitatively, too. Moreover, to think that there is something literally common to and identical in each instance of a given word is not only to blot out the distinction between type and token, and to reject the qualitative variations in tokens of the same type, but also to reintroduce the Aristotelian theory with its difficulties making the universal not a

common feature of a group of instances, but a single identical name common to them.

Thus Hobbes' theory of universal faces some serious questions: Why are different things called by the same name? Is calling certain things by the same name the basis of classification? When everything in the world is singular, how can Hobbes be consistent in talking of the name being the universal? All these difficulties are must to face for anyone holding extreme nominalism. Hobbes seems to have understood this, so he takes the stand of milder nominalism. He takes resemblance between individual things as the basis of their being called by the same name. One universal name is applied to several things because of their similitude in some quality or other. 'A man' refers to any one of the multitude of men and 'a cow' denotes any one of the multitude of cows. There is a relation of similarity between 'this man' and 'that man', and between 'this cow' and 'that cow'. When Hobbes says that a general word is a name common to a group of particulars, what he means to say is a similar token word as used for each of the particulars belonging to the group. The similitude of objects is the basis of classification. Classification is not merely naming, it has a specific foundation, i.e., similarity between things. Thus Hobbes' theory stands or falls with the theory of resemblance.

Hobbes' nominalism differs from the Buddhist nominalism (apohavada). Like the latter, Hobbes' nominalistic position is not extreme. The Buddhist does not recognise any positive similarity amongst particulars. Only the unique particulars (sva-laksana) are real and similarity, names etc. are all mental constructions. Similarity or identity does not have any room except in our imagination. Neither things can be said to be similar, nor can the words be said to be the same. 'Sameness' and 'similarity' — all these are make-beliefs. The Buddhist denies identity or similarity of any kind, for he, being a consistent nominalist, knows that the acceptance of identity or similarity on any plane would be to entertain the realism.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.1 State whether the statements are true or false (True/False)

a) According to Nominalism, universal is essence. (True/False)

b) Hobbes Nominalism is a milder Nominalism. (True/False)

c) Buddhist Nominalism is called apohavada. (True/False)

Q 2: Define Nominalism.

Q 3: What is type?

Q 4: What is token?

Q 5: How does Hobbes define universal?

14.3.2 Hume's view

Hume's account of general words is found in his celebrated work "A Treatise of Human Nature". Hume holds that general ideas are particulars used in a representative way. He developed this idea—which is pretty similar to that of Berkeley— by formulating the disposition or propensity theory and resemblance theory. Hume starts his doctrine with the view that we cannot generalise without having a particular image in mind. He is against the view of abstraction. For him, the general idea itself is a particular concrete individual. The ideas are the copies or faint images of impressions in thinking and reasoning. Hume does not regard them to be intellectual idea apprehended by reason. There are only those ideas which copy impressions.

Hume appreciates Berkeley's assertion that universals or general ideas are nothing but particular attached to a certain word which assigns them a more extensive signification and makes them remember in cases of other individuals similar to them. He maintains that corresponding to every general word there must be a particular mental idea. While Berkeley holds that a word becomes general by its relation to a particular but representative idea, Hume states it the

other way round. For him, a particular idea becomes general by being added to a general term.

Hume puts forward three arguments in support of his view. They are—

Firstly, we cannot have an image of a line which is not of some particular length. Thus we cannot form any idea of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each.

Secondly, since an idea copies impression and every impression being determinate and definite, an idea must be determinate and definite, even though it is fainter than the impression from which it is derived.

Thirdly, in nature, whatever exists must be individual, i.e., a precisely determined particular. For instance, no triangle can exist without its particular characteristics. It is an absurdity to postulate an existent triangle which is at the same time all and none of the possible kinds and sizes of triangle.

While Berkeley had contended himself with maintaining that an idea becomes general by representing all ideas of the same sort, Hume goes further to give an account of how a particular idea represents others. He finds this explanation in his Resemblance theory. He gives two accounts of resemblance. First, two things resemble when they have one or more elements in common. This is the traditional account of resemblance. Secondly, resemblance may occur where there are no elements in common. This is Hume's additional theory which provides the foundation for the resemblance theory proper. The first theory asserts that two composites are said to resemble each other when at least one simple amongst the simples of which they are formed is found to be common in them. To take an example, if a composite A consists of a b c d and another composite B consists of a b e f, then the composites A and B may be said to resemble each other as they have in common the simples a and b. But this account of resemblance involves a difficulty. For this theory can be observed only in cases of composites possessing

common components in the sense explained above and it implies that simples cannot resemble each other and consequently we cannot generalise in their case.

Realising this problem, Hume says that when we find resemblance among several things observed by us, we are in the habit of applying the same name to all of them. For instance, having observed the cows frequently and having noticed resemblances among them, we apply the same word 'cow' to all of them, in spite of the differences among jersey cow, local cows, white cows, black cows, brown cows, tall cows, short cows, and so on. In this way, we may generalise without discovering common elements but by counting resemblance where there are no known identical common qualities. Thus, according to Hume, generalisation is done by finding resemblances. His new account is applied in the cases of composite also.

However, Hume's theory of resemblance in simples is not free from question. Regarding the question what enables us to group all simples together under the abstract term simple idea, Hume holds that they resemble each other in their simplicity. Now, if we go to interpret the term as per the similarity theory, this would mean that the simplicity of one simple idea resembles, but not identical with, the simplicity of another simple idea. Yet this is not the meaning of what Hume amounts to say. He surely means that the simplicity in both simple ideas is identical. Thus resemblance theory seems failed to keep Hume's position firm.

Again, in Disposition or Propensity theory, Hume discussed vividly about the association of ideas on the one hand and of belief on the other. Hume illustrates the Disposition theory by certain analogies. And by these analogies he wants to establish the following points in relation to the use of general words:

(1) We have to acquire a certain technique in order to use general words successfully. This is a technique of using word to

cover a number of things much of which is not in our thought at the time of using the word.

(2) The general word revives a habit. It acts as a stimulus. By using a single word we can revive several instances of habits. For instance, a man who cannot remember the verses can be put in remembrance of the whole by that single word or expression with which they begin.

(3) When we use the general word, its meaning cannot be said to be fixed. It is not precisely defined; it is used in somewhat loose manner. Yet it is not used foolishly, it is used intelligently and significantly in thinking and conversation with others. By conversation and reading we are accustomed to use them properly in appropriate situation, though we can hardly define them precisely.

Thus Hume's theory begins with the finding of resemblances and Hume has also shown that it is possible to observe a resemblance without discovering a common character. Hume replaces the abstraction of a common character by custom and the natural association of ideas. He says that when we find resemblance between the things we come across, we are accustomed to apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences they may have. After we have acquired the habit of applying the same word to the things resembling one another, the hearing of that word revives the idea of one of these things and makes the imagination conceive it. The hearing of the word can call up only one of the things. It cannot call up ideas of all things to which the word applies. But it, at the same time, brings in action 'a certain custom' to produce any other thing resembling this idea, if the occasion demands it. That is, the hearing of the word or name produces them all before it, though potentially and not actually. They are not present really to the mind, but only in power. We do not place them distinctly in imagination. What we do is to keep ourselves in a readiness to produce any one of them when the situation demands. Generally only a few ideas are recalled. In fact, the

recollection of all ideas to which the word or name may be applied is almost impossible. For our mind not only recalls, but also rejects. It is ready to reject anything which it is not accustomed to.

Hume's Disposition or Propensity theory may be regarded as a protest against the view that there is always a conscious selection of common qualities followed by the formation of a universal before the use of general words. We can generalise without discovering the common characteristic or characteristics, and simply by noting resemblances where there are no identical common qualities. Hume was the first among the empiricists who explained the use of general words at the level of daily life below the scientific level. We cannot think in cases of children that they first set out to isolate common characteristics and then abstract them to frame the universal. Here custom is the predominant thing in their cases as in the cases of adults. When the mind observes recurrence of certain resemblances among several things, then it, almost without our knowledge, groups them whose links are strengthened by the assertion of the common name. While determining the meaning of the word 'figure' we may not rest on one image or idea, rather we may revolve in our minds the ideas of circles, triangles, squares, rectangles, parallelograms of different sizes and proportions. Here the mind is doing explicitly what the custom for the most part does for it unknowingly. Thus the mind determines the meaning of the word 'figure' according to what the custom brings forth. Giving much importance on custom and habit debars us from saying that the central feature of the theory is taking one particular and making it stand for all others of the same sort. Here the important thing is not the taking of one particular; rather it is this custom-induced suggestibility of the mind, this habit or 'propensity'.

Hume holds that logic cannot be wholly divorced from psychology. For him, a concept must be thought of in terms of the conceiving of a concept. Conceiving a concept is having a particular expectation on hearing a name, a certain readiness to recognise an

instance and to reject that is not an instance. A universal should not be regarded as a solid ideal content possessed by the mind, but as a readiness and expectation which has an emotional aspect along with its cognitive one.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 6: State whether the statements are true or false (True/False)

a) Hume's view of universal is known as resemblance or similarity theory. (True/False)

b) Hume is associated with Disposition or Propensity theory. (True/False)

c) For Hume, a particular idea becomes general by being added to a general term. (True/False)

Q 7: Write one similarity between Berkeley and Hume regarding universal.

Q 8: Define Hume's Nominalism.

Q 9: What does Hume want to prove by Propensity theory?



ACTIVITY 14.1

- Is resemblance or similarity theory tenable as a theory of universal? Give reasons in support of your answer.

Ans. .....

.....



14.4 LET US SUM UP

Thus from the foregoing discussion it is evident that Nominalism thoroughly denies the objective metaphysical universals. It is not ready to admit any identical thing which is supposed to be present commonly at the same time in a group of particular objects. Rather this theory defines universal in terms of resemblance or similarity such that the particulars are

required only to resemble each other in being called by the same name. Thomas Hobbes advanced his theory in a milder form. And Hume handled the problem of universal with the formulation of Disposition or Propensity theory coupled with similarity theory.

Some main points of this unit are:

- Nominalism denies outright the common essence identically present in a group of things.
- According to this theory, it is the resemblance or similarity that brings the things in a particular group.
- Hobbes' milder nominalism asserts that a group of particulars resemble each other in being called by the same name and that each of these particulars is called by the same name as the rest because it resembles the rest in some other way besides merely being called by the same name.
- Hume, through his Disposition or Propensity theory, tries to prove that we can form universal without discovering the common characteristic or characteristics, and simply by noting resemblances where there are no identical common qualities.



14.5 FURTHER READING

1) Aaron, R. I. (1952): *The Theory of Universals*: Oxford.

2) Hume, D. (1967): *A Treatise of Human Nature*: Ed. by L. A. Oxford:Selby-Bigge:

3) Sarma, Dr. Ramala (2013): *Theory of Universals*: Guwahati: N. L. Publications:.

4) Woozley, A. D. (1982): *Theory of Knowledge*: New Delhi: B. I. Publications:.



14.6 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q no 1: a) False b) True c) True

Ans to Q no 2: Nominalism is a theory that defines universal in terms of resemblance or similarity such that the particulars are required only to resemble each other in being called by the same name. Hence this theory is also called the resemblance or similarity theory.

Ans to Q no 3: A word is type when it has the same meaning in all its occurrences.

Ans to Q no 4: A word is token when it refers to its particular occurrence.

Ans to Q no 5: Hobbes' nominalism is a milder one which asserts that a group of particulars resemble each other in being called by the same name and that each of these particulars is called by the same name as the rest because it resembles the rest in some other way besides merely being called by the same name.

Ans to Q no 6: a) True b) True c) True

Ans to Q no 7: For both Hume and Berkeley assertion that universals or general ideas are nothing but particular attached to a certain word.

Ans to Q no 8: According to Hume, universals or general ideas are nothing but particular attached to a certain word which assigns them a more extensive signification and makes them remember in cases of other individuals similar to them. He holds that corresponding to every general word there must be a particular mental idea.

Ans to Q no 9: Hume's Disposition or Propensity theory may be regarded as a tool to protest against the view that there is always a conscious selection of common qualities followed by the formation of a universal before the use of general words. We can generalise without discovering the common characteristic or characteristics, and simply by noting resemblances where there are no identical common qualities.



14.7 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Objective questions

Q1: Is Hume a nominalist?

Q2: Who is associated with the theory of Ockham's Razor?

Q3: Name some supporters of Nominalism.

Q4: What is the Buddhist theory of universal known as?

Q5: Give an example to illustrate 'type' and 'token'.

Q6: Which theories did Hume formulate to articulate his view of universals?

B. Short questions

Q1: Write short notes on Nominalism.

Q2: What is Ockham's Razor?

Q3: Why is Nominalism is called Resemblance or Similarity theory?

Q4: What is the difference between Hobbes Nominalism and Buddhist Nominalism?

Q5: Write briefly on the analogies which Hume used to illustrate Disposition or Propensity theory.

Q6: **'A** particular idea becomes general by being added to a general term.' What are the arguments put forward by Hume in support of this view?

C. Long questions

Q1: Hobbes Nominalism is a milder Nominalism. Elucidate the statement.

Q2: Give an account of Hume's theory of universals. How does he differ from Berkeley?

Q3: Explain critically Resemblance or Similarity theory of universals.

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UNIT 15: APPEARANCE AND REALITY: BRADLEY

UNIT STRUCTURES

15.1 Learning Objectives

15.2 Introduction

15.3 Bradley's Concept of Reality

15.4 Criteria of Reality

15.5 Reality is one

15.6 Reality is individual

15.7 Knowledge of the Reality

15.8 Bradley's Concept of Appearance

15.9 Relation between Appearance and Reality

15.10 Degrees of Truth and Reality

15.11 Conclusion

15.12 Let us Sum Up

15.13 Further Reading

15.14 Answer to check your Progress

15.15 Model Questions

15.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will be able to

- describe what is Bradley's Concept of Reality
- define the criteria of Reality
- explain that Reality is one
- explain that Reality is individual
- discuss that whether Knowledge of the Reality is possible
- explain that Bradley's Concept of Appearance
- discuss the relation between appearance and reality
- explain the Degrees of Truth and Reality

15.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit will introduce to you the Problem of Appearance and Reality and will also know how it plays a vital issue in metaphysics. The contrast

between appearance and reality, however, is by no means peculiar to metaphysics. In everyday life people distinguish between the real size of the Sun and its apparent size, or again between the real colour of an object (when seen in standard conditions) and its apparent colour (nonstandard conditions). A cloud appears to consist of some white, fleecy substance, although in reality it is a concentration of drops of water.

It seems that there are at least two components in the metaphysical conception of reality. One characteristic, which has been illustrated by Plato, is that reality is genuine as opposed to deceptive. The ultimate realities that the metaphysician seeks to know are precisely things as they are—simple and not variegated, exempt from change and therefore stable objects of knowledge. Second, and perhaps most important, reality for the metaphysician is intelligible as opposed to opaque. Appearances are not only deceptive and derivative; they also make no sense when taken at their own level.

15.3 BRADLEY'S CONCEPT OF REALITY

The concept of Bradley's Absolute or Reality may be summarized in few lines which run as follows:-The ultimate reality is a self-consistent whole. It includes in itself all differences and forms in an inclusive harmony. The perplexing diversity of the phenomenal world must be brought into unity and made self-consistent. The content of reality is nothing but sentient experience. Thought, feeling, volition are the only materials of existence. The finite minds should be in a position to give a general outline of the nature of the Absolute, but the detailed description of the Absolute is impossible.

15.4 CRITERIA OF REALITY

Our ordinary experience has made us familiar with the distinction between what really is or exists and what merely appears to be. We recognise that things are not always what they seem to be, what appears to us is not real, and 'what really is' does not appear to be so always. If there is a distinction between things as they really are and things as they

appear, then there must be some universal criterion which makes the distinction between them.

The first criterion of Reality is that it is infallible. We cannot doubt its validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought. What is real is not self-contradictory and what is self-contradictory is not real.As according to Bradley, ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that, either in endeavoring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity.

Bradley arrives at the absolute standard of reality by a dialectical examination of all the notions commonly accepted as valid. He examines all the categories such as primary and secondary qualities, substantive and objective, relation and quality, space and time, motion and change, causation and activity with which our intellect or thought interprets the world, and finds them all self-contradictory. So, Bradley condemns all the contradictory notions as appearances because reality is such that it does not contradict itself. The reform on-contradictions must be the criterion of reality. Non-contradiction also means consistency. Reality is not only self-consistent; it must be self-subsistent. So the self-consistency of reality demands that all appearance must belong to reality. The character of the realist opposes everything phenomenal in a harmonious form.

As reality is free from contradiction, both internal and external, it is one all-inclusive systematic whole. Reality then is known to be a connected and self-consistent or internally coherent system. But which matter has composed this system?According to Bradley , all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. According to Bradley, the distinction between subject and object is a product of intellectual abstraction. If we go back to immediate experience we donot find these fragments. Immediate experience is fully unified and contains no break or relations, but it is not undiversified. Bradley calls this experience as sentient experience.

15.5 REALITY IS ONE

For Bradley Reality is one organic whole. It expresses itself immediately in all its appearances.All appearance must belong to reality. The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form. For Bradley, Reality is above all relations, whether external or internal. However Bradley does not take Reality to be personal. Reality, according to him, is both supra-relational and supra personal.

The Reality for Bradley must be one. If reality is to be free from contradictions and conflicts then there cannot be many independent reals. For him, that Reality is one is more a matter of conviction than are as one out belief or knowledge. Reality must satisfy the intellect. Plurality and external relations between independent reals are self-contradictory. So it cannot satisfy the intellect.

Bradley says that it is not wrong to accept the plurality of facts of daily life. It is necessary for practical convenience. The objects of the earth are really appearances of reality. The appearances of the daily life are not unreal, but they are partially real. Reality is unintelligible without appearances.

15.6 REALITY IS INDIVIDUAL

Reality is one in the sense of being an individual self-contained of experience. For Bradley, Absolute is the only real individual and finite beings are the adjectives of the real. In the Absolute no appearance can be lost, but finite selves must blend and undergo complete transformation. But Bradley says that how the finites blend in the Absolute, it is in explicable.

15.7 KNOWLEDGE OF THE REALITY

Our knowledge is in essence relational and discursive. So, according to Bradley, to fully realize the existence of the absolute is for finite beings impossible. Kant rejected the things-in-themselves as unknown and unknowable. so his concept leads him to agnosticism, as he states that we know that noumena or things-in- themselves exist, but we do not know

what they are. Against this Kantian argument, Bradley says that if reality were not a subject of knowledge we could not know that such a thing even existed. our knowledge of the absolute is limited. But this is not good ground for our declining to entertain it. Mere thinking, by its nature relational, and does not give us the complete knowledge of reality. Thought yields a dissection of experience. In order to transcend its relational form, thought commits suicide. In anything real for Bradley there are two aspects: an existence and content, a 'that' and a 'what' and these two are inseparable. Thought cannot join these two aspects and therefore is unable to arrive at its goal. But thought as an ideal implies separations of content and consciousness but these two aspects are inseparable in reality. So thought in its very nature is inadequate to give us knowledge of reality. Thought is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide.

By committing suicide thought can transcend the dualism of content and existence and then only the knowledge of absolute is possible. But if thought ceased to be relational then it would cease to be thought. Thus thought by its very nature fails to grasp the reality. Bradley therefore reaches the conclusion that by transcending its relational form i.e. by committing suicide thought can grasp the supra-relational whole. Suicide of thought means the transcendence of its inherent dualism between 'that' and' what, 'when thought attains immediacy of feeling as a harmonious whole, it would be transformed into a supra-relational immediate experience and it would cease to be thought.

15.8 BRADLEY ON APPEARANCE

F.H. Bradley maintains that there is no unity in phenomena; space, time, motion, change are self -contradictory. Appearance belongs to reality. For him, reality is a self -consistent whole embracing all differences in an inclusive harmony. The absolute is a harmonious system. Truth and life, beauty and goodness are revelation of the absolute. Appearances are part of absolute. In Metaphysics Bradley held that many phenomena considered real, such as space and time, are only appearances.

According to Bradley the universe is full of puzzling contradictions.It is not reality, but a mere appearance of reality. Bradley starts from the principle of contradiction as the supreme criterion of every reality, applies it to all scientific concepts and intellectual categories-substance, quality, relation, space, time, motion, change, causality, force, activity- which involve contradiction from his point of view, and are, therefore, appearances of incomplete realities.

Let us consider the relation between substance and qualities. Substance is not identical with any of its qualities; nor is it an aggregate of all of them. If sugar were identical with sweetness, it could not be hard at the same time, because sweetness would then be identical with hardness. Nor can sugar be something other than its qualities. Substance is neither an aggregate of its qualities anything different from them.

Substance, then, is a link connecting its qualities with one another. Or, it is a name for qualities in relation. But this also raises difficulties. How is one quality related to another? Neither of them is identical with the other or with relation to the other.

Quality does not exist apart from relations, but relations can exist only between qualitative terms. Thus, on the one hand, quality is the result of relations, since difference in qualities cannot exist apart from the process of distinction; on the other, relations are ultimately forms of quality. Thus substance and quality are self- contradictory, and are therefore appearances.

Again, a relation, taken by itself, is nothing. Nor can it be identified with the things related. A is related to B. A relation or R is necessary to relate A to B, then R, being third entity, requires another relation or R1 to relate it to A, another relation or R2 to relate it to B. Again, R1, being a distinct entity, requires another relation or R3 to relate it to A, and so on to infinity. Thus relation is self-contradictory, and is, therefore, an appearance.

In the same manner Bradley shows that space, time, movement, activity, causality, etc., are self-contradictory, and that therefore they are appearances. The intellectual categories and scientific concepts are then mere appearances which are harmonized and transfigured in an integral harmonious system.

Even the concept of self is self-contradictory, and, consequently, an appearance, because it involves discord between self and not-self, which can never be resolved. Thus, nature and self are appearances. Appearances are incomplete realities, and not mere non-entities. There is no truth which is entirely true, just as there is no error which is entirely false. Error is partial truth. Appearance is incomplete reality. All appearances are real in some way or other, and to some extent, and they are rightly arranged, transformed, supplemented, and merged in the absolute, a harmonious whole of experience.

15.9 RELATION BETWEEN APPEARANCE AND REALITY

There are two things about appearances, in relation to reality. First all appearances, from lowest to the highest, have to be given place in reality. Secondly, when they are so housed, their distinctiveness is lost and merged.

Bradley's view about the relation between appearance and reality can be understood only in the context of his doctrine of degrees of reality.Bradley regarded all finites are appearance of reality. But all finites are not equally imperfect. Some are more harmonious and more real. In contrast some are less harmonious and less real.

15.10 DEGREES OF TRUTH AND REALITY

Bradley believes that the Absolute is one all-comprehending reality. He reconciles the existence of this ultimate Reality with everything finite that exists by his doctrine of Degrees of Truth and Reality. Bradley considers all finites as appearance of reality. The apparent plurality of the world is constituent elements of the Absolute. We should clearly not that according to Bradley, Reality has no degrees. He says that the Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection. Such predicates belong to, and have a meaning only in the world of appearance.

The perfect Absolute is unmoving. Appearances are conditioned by change, movement and are the reform imperfect. So the doctrine of degrees

of reality has a meaning and applicability only in the realm of appearance. The Absolute is present among the finite appearances indifferent degrees. Appearances can be arranged in an ascending scale from lower to higher position. Lower elements are less real compared to the higher. Nothing is absolutely real or false, because Absolute is all-inclusive. So reality is a matter of degree, in respect of finite appearances.

The concept of degrees of reality is related to the concept of degrees of truth. Bradley denies the absolute truth and absolute falsity. The false judgement means that it is incapable of giving a complete picture of reality. On the other hand every judgement is true because all refer to reality. So every judgement is both partially true and partially false.

Bradley says that of two given appearances the one wider, or more harmonious, is more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all-containing, individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in otherwords, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The truth and the fact, which, to be converted in to the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth. To possess more the character of reality, and to contain within one self a greater amount of the real, are two expressions for the same thing.

The implication of the doctrine of degrees of reality is that, there is no absolute difference between appearance and reality. The difference is that in reality there is total harmony. But in appearance this total harmony is not to be found.Secondly, reality is a single all- inclusive individuality. But appearance is not single all -inclusive individuality. Appearance belongs to reality.

15.11 CONCLUSION

But Bradley's view of appearance and reality is not completely satisfactory. Bradley said that appearance is neither real nor unreal. But at the same time, he put appearance inside reality.Again appearances do not persist in reality as they are but as transformed and transmuted. After transmutation an appearance cannot retain its individual identity. It is therefore unintelligible how we can measure the degrees of reality of transmuted appearances.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is the absolute criterion of reality?

Q 2: What is the criterion of appearance?

Q 3: What is the content ofreality?

Q 4: How many realities are there according to Bradley?

Q 5: Is reality unknown and unknowable?

Q 6: Where appearances belong?

Q 7: Is there absolute difference between appearance and reality?



15.12 LET US SUM UP

- The Problem of Appearance and Reality plays a vital issue in metaphysics.
- The ultimate reality is a self-consistent whole. It includes in itself all differences and forms in an inclusive harmony.
- The perplexing diversity of the phenomenal world must be brought in to unity and made self-consistent.
- The content of reality is nothing but sentient experience. Thought, feeling, volition are the only material so existence.
- The finite minds should be in a position to give a general outline of the nature of the Absolute, but the detailed description of the Absolute is impossible.
- There is a distinction between things as they really are and things as they appear, and then there must be some universal criterion which makes the distinction between them.
- As according to Bradley, ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion.
- According to Bradley, all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling.

- Bradley examines all the categories such as primary and secondary qualities, substantive and objective, relation and quality, space and time, motion and change, causation and activity with which our intellect or thought interprets the world,and find sthemallself-contradictory.
- For Bradley reality is one organic whole. It expresses itself immediately in all its appearances. All appearance must belong to reality.
- The Reality for Bradley must be one. If reality is to be free from contradictions and conflicts then there cannot be many independent reals.
- According to Bradley, to fully realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. But reality cannot be considered as unknowable.
- According to Bradley the universe is full of puzzling contradictions. It is not reality, but a mere appearance of reality.
- Bradley considers all finites as appearance of reality.
- There are degrees of reality in relation to appearances.Bradley says that of two given appearances the one wider, or more harmonious, is more real.
- The implication of the doctrine of degrees of reality is that, there is no absolute difference between appearance and reality. The difference is that in reality there is total harmony. But in appearance this total harmony is not to be found.



15.13 FURTHER READING

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15.14 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q 1: Non-contradictory is the absolute criterion of reality.

Ans to Q 2: Contradictory is the criteria of appearance.

Ans to Q 3: The content of reality is nothing but sentient experience.

Ans to Q 4: The Reality for Bradley must be one

Ans to Q 5: According to Bradley, to fully realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. But reality cannot be considered as unknowable.

Ans to Q 6: All appearance must belong to reality.

Ans to Q 7: There is no absolute difference between appearance and reality.



15.15 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1**:** Is there difference between 'that' and 'what' in immediate experience?

Q 2: Is time an appearance, according to Bradley?

Q 3: Are relations external or internal according to Bradley?

Q 4: Is space an appearance, according to Bradley?

Q 5: Is self real according to Bradley?

B. Short Questions: (Write in about 150 words)

Q 1: What is Reality according to Bradley?

Q 2: What is appearance according to Bradley?

Q 3: How appearance related to Reality According to Bradley?

Q 4: What is meant by 'degrees of Reality'?

C. Long Questions: (Write in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: **W**hat does Bradley mean by reality? How are appearance related to reality? Discuss Bradley's view.

Q 2: Explain Bradley's view of appearance broadly.

Q 3: Explain Bradley's view of Doctrine of Degrees of Reality.

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