UNIT4: PERCEPTION

UNIT STRUCTURE

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4.1: LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will be able to:

- explain the concept of perception.
- discuss the nature of perception.
- explain various theories of perception.
- analyse Indian views of perception.
- discuss two views of perception.

4.2: INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss about perception according to western and Indian perspective. It also deals with various theories of perception. Generally, perception is defined as the apprehension of the world through the senses, or the general exercise of it, or particular cases of its exercise. Again, perception may be defined as a process by which individuals organize and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their

environment. Perception is a subjective process; therefore, different people may perceive the same environment differently. It is based on what particular aspects of the situation they choose to selectively absorb, how they organize this information and the manner in which they interpret it to obtain a grasp of the situation.

4.3: NATURE OF PERCEPTION

Perception is a central issue in epistemology, the theory of knowledge. At root, all our empirical knowledge is grounded in how we see, hear, touch, smell and taste the world around us. Or, we can say that perception is that process by which using our five senses, we acquire information about the world. There are four elements in perception. They are- (i) the perceiver, (ii) the object, (iii) the sensory experience and (iv) the relation between the object and the subject commonly taken to be a causal relation by which the object produces the sensory experience in the perceiver. To see the field is apparently to have a certain sensory experience as a result of the impact of the field on our vision.

There are three quite different ways to speak of perception. Each corresponds to a different way of perceptually responding to experience. We often speak simply of what people perceive, for instance see. We also speak of what they perceive the object to be, and we commonly talk of facts they know through perception, such as the grass is long. Hence, I see, perceive the green field. Secondly, speaking in a less familiar way, I see it to be a rectangular. Thus, I might say that I know it looks different from that hill, but from the air one can see it to be perfectly rectangular. Thirdly, I see that it is rectangular. Perception is common to all three cases, seeing which is a paradigm case of perception, is central in all of them. These cases represent three modes of perception. They are- perception of the simplest kind, such as seeing, occurs in all three. But especially because of their relation to knowledge and justified belief they are significantly different.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What do you mean by perception?

Q 2: What are the elements of perception?

Q 3: There are four elements of perception (true/false).

4.4: DIFFERENT THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

There are mainly three theories of perception- direct realism, indirect realism and idealism. Philosophers of perception are divided into realists and idealists. Realists claim that what we perceive are physical objects only, which exist independent of our mind and of our perception. On the other hand idealists argue that we perceive only mental things or ideas of some kind.

4.4.1: Direct Realism

Direct realism is the natural starting point for theories of perception. It is common sense to say that we perceive physical objects and these exists independently of our minds. 'Physical objects' include tables, books, our own bodies, plants, mountains. According to direct realism, what we perceive through our senses are just these very things, physical objects, together with their various properties. For example, when I perceive my desk, I perceive its size, shape, colour, smell and texture. So, direct realism claims that what we perceive are mind-independentphysical objects and their properties. But Russell in his book, 'The Problems of Philosophy' argues that there are variations in our perceptual experience, for the properties of texture and shape. The table might be smooth to touch, but at a microscopic level there are all kinds of bumps and dips- so should we say that when we touch the table, the smoothness we feel is a property of the table? And the shape that something appears to have, liked its colour, varies with the angle

from which you view it. A rectangular table, from every angle except 90 degrees, does not look perfectly rectangular. All this perceptual variation causes a real problem for the direct realists. The direct realists say I perceive physical object and their properties, in this case the desk, 'directly', as they are. Now we need a name for talking about what we are immediately aware of in perception, e.g. the colour and shape of the desk as I see it now. Russell calls these sense-data. When I look at the desk, I have a sensation- I am aware of something. The content of my sensation –what I am immediately aware of is sense-data. But direct realism claims that what we perceive are physical objects but not sense data. Even it does not have to claim that all their properties, as we perceive them are mind –independent.

The appearance/reality distinction challenges direct realism in cases of illusions and hallucinations. Illusions first: if you half- submerge a straight stick in a glass of water, it looks crooked, but it is not. We see a crooked stick, but the stick is not crooked. However, just from what you experience, you cannot tell whether you are seeing an illusion or not. Someone who does not know about the crooked stick illusion thinks they are seeing a crooked stick. Direct realism replies that when the stick in water looks crooked, there is nothing that is crooked; is wrong. Instead, the stick has the property of looking crooked when half-submerged in water. There is a difference between the property 'being straight' and the property 'looking straight'. Usually, of course, something looks straight when it is straight. But the two properties can come part, and something can look crooked when it is straight. So, sometimes we perceive the 'looks' properties of physical objects, sometimes we experience the properties they have that do not relate to how they are perceived. In both cases, we directly perceive physical objects and their properties.

We can experience perceptual hallucinations- not just visual ones, but auditory and olfactory hallucinations as well. In a hallucination, we perceive something having some property F. When we perceive it, then there is something that has this property. We cannot perceive a physical object at all, therefore what we perceive must be mental- sense data.

Hallucinations can be experiences that are 'subjectively indistinguishable' from veridical perceptions. Thus we see the same thing namely sense-data in hallucinations and therefore, in all cases we see sense-data, and not physical objects, immediately.

The main points of direct realism are-

- Direct realism claims that physical objects exist independently of our minds and of our perceptions of them.
- It again claims that when we perceive physical objects, we perceive them 'directly'.
- The argument from perceptual variation points out that different people perceived the same physical object differently. Therefore, what each person perceives is how the object appears to them.
- The arguments from illusion and hallucination claim that in illusions and hallucinations, we see something, but we do not see the physical world as it is. What we see are sense-data.
- Direct realism note that when we describe what we perceive, we use physical object concepts. This shows that perception seems to be perception of physical objects. To deny this is therefore very counter-intuitive.

4.4.2: Indirect Realism

Indirect realism claims that we perceive physical objects which are mind- independent, but we perceive sense-data immediately and physical objects indirectly. According to indirect realism, there are many perceptual experiences in which what we experience is not the properties of physical objects. When we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property. In such cases, given that what we perceive is not the way the world is, what we perceive are sense-data. Therefore, we always perceive sense-data. Russell defines sense-data as

sense-data are mental things which are the way we perceive them to be. Sense-data only exist while they are being experienced. An experience must be experienced by someone to exist at all. Physical objects can exist when no one experiences them. Even sense-data are 'private'. No one else can experience your sense-data. The key points of indirect realism are –

- Indirect realism claims that when we perceive something having the property F, then there is something that has this property. If it is not the physical object, it must be something mental-sense-data that we perceive.Sense-data are private; they only exist while they are being experienced, and they are exactly as they seem. Physical objects are public, exist when not being perceived, and can be different from how they appear.

- Indirect realism faces an objection that if all we experience are sense-data, how do we know what causes them? How do we know physical objects exist at all?

- Russell argues that we cannot prove that physical objects exist, but this claim is the best explanation for our experience.

- Locke argues that physical objects exist from the fact that we cannot choose what to perceive, and from the fact that information from one sense coheres with information from another.

- We can object that indirect realism entails that our belief in physical objects remains a hypothesis, which leaves the belief open to skepticism.

- Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities. Locke's primary qualities are extension, shape, motion, number and solidity. Secondary qualities are colours, sounds, tastes, smells and hot/cold.

- Locke is not consistent in how he understands the distinction. He defines primary qualities as properties that objects have in themselves and are inseparable from them. He first says secondary qualities are 'nothing

but' properties that objects have that produce sensations in us i.e. they are relational properties of objects. But later, he talks of secondary qualities as subjective and existing in the perceiving mind – a view supported by Russell and Berkeley.

- Locke argues that sense-data resemble the world in respect to primary qualities but not secondary qualities.
- Following Locke, indirect realists can argue that the world has only primary qualities in itself, but we perceive it as having secondary qualities. This is another way in which what we perceive is different from how the world is 'in itself'.
- Berkeley argues that the argument from perceptual variation applies as much to primary qualities as to secondary qualities. Therefore, primary qualities are mind –dependent as well.
- He also argues that sense-data do not, and cannot resemble mind-independent physical objects.
- Russell argues with many of Berkeley's criticisms, but argues that sense-data can still represent physical objects. The relations between physical objects in space and time and various types of similarity correspond to relations between sense-data in these same respects.
- But Russell's theory assumes that mind –independent physical objects can cause mind-dependent perceptual experiences. How this is so remains a philosophical puzzle.

4.4.3: Berkeley's Idealism

Berkeley rejects the existence of physical objects, as they are usually thought of, namely mind-independent. He claims that reality is dependent on minds. The ordinary objects of perception –tables, chairs, and trees and so on- must be perceived in order to exist. The only things that exist are

minds and what minds perceive. The claim that nothing exists that is independent of mind is idealism. The key points of Berkeley's idealism are-

- Idealism claims that all that exists are minds and ideas. What we think of as physical objects are, in fact, bundles of ideas.
- Everything we perceive is either a primary or a secondary quality. We do not perceive anything in addition to these. Since both are mind-independent, everything we perceive is mind-dependent.
- Berkeley argues that the idea of a world with just primary qualities makes no sense, e.g. something that has size and shape must also have colour. Locke argues that something that has size and shape must also have solidity, a primary quality, so a world of just primary qualities does make sense.
- The idea of mind-independent objects does not make sense: if we argue that we need a 'material substratum' in which qualities exist, we have no conception of this independent of its qualities.
- Idealism solves the objection to indirect realism that we cannot know how the world is. In experiencing ideas, we are experiencing the world.
- Berkeley's master argument claims that we cannot conceive of anything existing independent of all minds.
- When we think of such a thing, our thinking of it makes it not mind-independent. We can object that Berkeley confused thought with what a thought is about.
- If physical objects are no more than their primary and secondary qualities, and these are ideas, then we cannot say that physical objects cause our perceptions, because ideas are passive. Therefore, what causes our perceptions must be a mind, not matter.

- We can distinguish between what I imagine and what I perceive by the fact that the latter are not voluntary and they are part of a coherent order of nature. So, what I perceive must originate in another mind.

- Illusions are misleading not because we misperceive, but because we make false inferences about what we would perceive. To mark the fact that the perception is not 'normal', we say that what we see 'looks' a certain way rather than 'is' a certain way.

- Idealism can mark off hallucinations from perception as less clear and not connected coherently with the rest of our perceptual experience.

- Berkeley explains scientific investigation as discovering not the real nature of physical objects, but connections between our ideas. It does not discover causal connections, but regularities.

- We can object that idealism entails that no two people ever perceive the same thing, since each perceives the ideas in their own mind. Berkeley responds that we perceive similar things, and these are copies of the one idea in God's mind.

- We can object that I do not know that any other minds exist. Berkeley argues that we can reason that the ideas I perceive originate in the mind of God, and that my experience contains evidence that there are also other minds like mine.

- How can what I perceive exist in God's mind? Berkeley explains that I perceive copies of ideas that exist eternally in God's understanding when God wills me to do so.

4.4.4: Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism is best thought of as a secular idealism. Like idealism, it holds that objects are dependent upon our perceptions of them. Unlike idealism, however it is not committed to the existence of a God who constantly perceives everything. Idealism holds that objects exist only in

so far as they are perceived. Therefore, it faces the dual problem of explaining what happens to objects when we cease to perceive them, and why different people's experiences are consistent. To solve both of these problems, idealism invokes God. Phenomenalism differs from idealism in that it holds that objects exist insofar either as they are perceived or as it is possible to perceive them. Thus, phenomenalism is a weaker theory than idealism. Whereas, idealists committed to the idea that an object that is not perceived are not exist. Phenomenalists can allow that such objects exist in so far as it is possible to perceive them. Therefore, they have no need to invoke God to explain objects disappearing and reappearing when people cease and recommence perceiving them, as the idealists do.

George Berkeley argued from a variety of angles that sense-data is indeed what a perceptible object is. This view is a version of what is often called phenomenalism, since it constructs external objects out of phenomena, which, in this use of term, are equivalent to sense-data. The view is also considered a kind of idealism, since it construes physical objects as ideal, in the sense of being composed of 'ideas' rather than material stuff that would exist even if there were no minds and no ideas.

Using the adverbial theory of sensory experience, one might also formulate an adverbial phenomenalism, which constructs physical objects out of sensory experience alone and says that to see a green field is to experience "green-fieldly " in a certain vivid and stable way. On this phenomenalist view, perception can occur without even sense-data; it requires only perceivers and their properties. Whereas the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism: it says that perceptual objects are directly perceived, but it denies that they are real in the sense that they are mind-independent and can exist apart from perceivers. This is not to say they are not perceptually real-real items in sensory experience. Then, phenomenalism does not deny that physical objects exist in the sense that they are both stable elements of our experience and governed by causal laws, such as those of physics. What

phenomenalism denies is that physical objects are real in the classical sense, implying that their existence is independent of our experience. A phenomenalist need not to be a theist, however, to offer an account of the stability of external objects and their lawful behavior. However, a phenomenalist can be more radical and take objects not to have any kind of existence when unperceived. They are born and die with the experiences in which they appear.

Unlike the sense-datum theory of perception, phenomenalism is only occasionally defended by cotemporary philosophers. Moreover, compared with the sense-datum theory, it is more economical and in that way simpler. As a theory of perception, phenomenalism has fewer objects to analyze and interrelate than do the other theories we have discussed. In addition, it appears to bridge the most important gap between sensory experience and perception of objects; since the objects are internal and directly experienced.

Then, it is difficult to provide an overall philosophical account of just what seeing, or perception in general, is; and while all the theories we have discussed can help in answering the questions just posed, none does so in such a simple and decisive way to leave all its competitors without some plausibility. Still, in exploring those theories we have seen many important points about perception. It is a kind of causal relation. Even its least complex and apparently most basic mode, simple perceiving requires, in addition to the perceiver, both an object of perception and a sensory experience that in some way corresponds to that object and records, if only imagistically , an indefinite and possibly quite extensive amount of information about the object.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is perception?

Q 2: What are the four elements of perception?

Q 3: How many theories are there regarding perception?

Q 4: What is perception according to direct realism?

Q 5: Define sense-data.

State two main points of indirect realism.

Q 7: Fill in the blanks:

(i) Idealism is propounded by ……..

(ii) Idealism states that everything we perceive is either a …….. or a …… secondary quality.

Q 8: What is phenomenalistic view of perception?

4.5: INDIAN CONCEPT OF PERCEPTION

In Indian philosophy, perception is accepted as a direct source of knowledge of reality. In perception we are face to face with reality. All the philosophical schools call it to be the basic and fundamental source of knowledge. As per literal meaning, "perception" is the pratyaksa. Perception is called pratyaksa because it takes place through the relation to the senses. They are – eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin, these five sense organs have an important role in the theory of perception. In Layman's language, perception is called the direct knowledge of the objective world. The process of perception is as follows: first of all the self comes into contact with the mind, then the mind comes in contact with the senses and the senses in their turn come in contact with their objects, when the mind undergoes a modification through these contacts, then perception follows. All the schools of Indian thought have taken perception or pratyaksa as a source of valid knowledge. In fact; the first source of valid knowledge, recognized by all

Indian philosophers in general is 'perception'. Perception is caused by sense-object contact and is not caused by any antecedent knowledge.

Definitions of perception:

Perceptual knowledge is the apprehension of the unique particular object and is given directly through the senses. Perception has been universally accepted as the primary source of valid knowledge by all the orthodox schools of Indian thought i.e. Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta. It could be defined as an immediate knowledge of a present object by the use of sense organ contact. Different schools of Indian Philosophy have defined Perception in different ways.

It is generally defined in the early Nyaya-Vaisesika, as adefinite and true cognition of objects produced by sense object contact. Ganesha defines perception as direct apprehension. Gautama defines sense perception as that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense organ with its object in expressible words, unerring and well defined. Vaisesika says that perception enables us to apprehend substance, qualities and action. Gautama definition sets four conditions necessary for a judgment to be a true perceptual judgment. 1. A judgment is perceptual and true only if it is produced from contact between sense organ and an object. 2. It is not verbal. 3. It does not wander; and 4. It is definite. Samkhyadefines perception as the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense. Kapila views "perception as a cognition takes the form of an object being related to it." KesvaMisra in his 'TarkaBhasa' defines Perception as the source of valid immediate knowledge; and immediate knowledge is that which is brought about by sense object contact. Prasatpada defines Perception as the cognition that depends on sense organs. Yoga, which is an allied system of Samkhya philosophy also recognizes, Perception as an independent source of knowledge. Visvanatha also defined Perception as direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. Prabhakara, of Mimamsa School defines perception as direct apprehension, which relates to an object, the self and cognition.

Jaimini explains "perception as a cognition produced in the self by the sense object contact along with this, he adds that it apprehends only existing and does not apprehend super-sensuous moral. Perception, according to Pramana-candrika, is the means to the apprehension of that which is comparatively proximate and is non-mediated. Kumarila discusses the nature of direct knowledge is that knowledge obtained by a person, which is the result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects. Advaita-Vedanta defines perception as 'perceptual knowledge is awareness of external objects'. Perception as a Pramana, is the unique cause of valid knowledge. In the real, sense organs constitute the Karana or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. We can attribute Perception activity to our organs. This source of knowledge is more concerned with empirical world as held by Sankara. The true perception is defined as immediate and timeless knowledge. It provides us the direct consciousness of objects obtained generally through the exercise of the senses. Identification of the subject and object consciousness by chitta adopting the form of the external object is Perception. According to Vedanta the subject and the object become identical, in Perception because both are the same consciousness.

Besides the orthodox schools, Charvaka, the school of materialism has also accepts perception as a source of knowledge. According to it, perception is the only means of valid knowledge. A general proposition may be true in perceived cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases.

Different Kinds Of Perception

Many philosophers have analyzed perception in various ways. It has two distinctions, ordinary and extra-ordinary. In ordinary perception, knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extra ordinary perception provides immediate knowledge even without the senses. When the contact between the senses and the object is ordinary, we have ordinary perception, but in case of extra ordinary perception, the

contact between the object and the senses is not usual. Again, ordinary perception has been divided into three classes. They are –(i) Indeterminate perception, (ii)determinate perception and (iii) recognition.

The Naiyayikasrecognized two modes of perception, nirvikalpaka or indeterminate and savikalpaka or determinate. Nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception is the bare perception of a thing along with its generic and specific qualities but without any judgment about it as this or that thing. And savikalpaka is the determinate perception of a thing along with the predicative judgment about it as this or that. It necessarily presupposed a nirvikalpaka or bare perception of the object without explicit recognition or characterization. Again, perception is classified into ordinary and extra-ordinary. In the former, the sense came into contact with the object in the usual or normal way. In the extra-ordinary perception, the sense-object contact is extraordinary. Ordinary perception is of two kinds-internal and external. In internal perception, the mind which is the internal organ comes into contact with the physical states and the processes like cognition, affection, desire, pain, pleasure etc. external perception takes place when five external organs of senses comes into contact with the external objects. It is of five kinds-visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory and olfactory. Extra-ordinary perception is of three kind again, samanyalaksana, jnanalaksana and yogaja. Samanyalaksana perception is the perception of the universals. Whenever we perceive a particular 'cow' we first perceive the 'universal cowness' inhering in it. Jnanalaksana perception is the complicated perception through association. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation. And the yogaja perception is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present and future, possessed by the Yogins through the power of meditation.

Samkhya explanation of determinate perception is different from the Nyaya school, Samkhya states that the former is a vague awareness which latter becomes clear and distinct through analysis, synthesis and

interpretation. Through indeterminate perception we express our perceptual experience in the form of a judgment-'this is something'. Samkhya refer to indeterminate perception as the immediate pure and simple cognition of an object. At the state of determinate perception, there is analysis as well as synthesis of an object. Both Kumarila and Prabhakara admit two stages in perception –indeterminate and determinate. Determinate perception is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object- intercourse added by subconscious impressions. Kumarila recognizes the validity of determinate and indeterminate perception both. Advaita states savikalpaka seems to consist in our seeing an object, and then declaring that it is this or that; simply accepting a thing such as it is without any previous idea of it, such as when we awake from sleep ,see a tiger, and that once run away. Advaitins accept that determinate perception does not give knowledge of reality. They recognized that indeterminate perception is the only valid perception.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 8: State Nyaya-vaisesika definition of perception.

Q 9: Is the theory of perception accepted by all the schools of Indian philosophy?



4.6: LET US SUM UP

- Perception is that process by which using our five senses, we acquire information about the world. There are four elements in perception. They are- (i) the perceiver, (ii) the object, (iii) the sensory experience and (iv) the relation between the object and the subject commonly taken to be a causal relation by which the object produces the sensory experience in the perceiver.

- There are mainly three theories of perception- direct realism, indirect realism and idealism. Philosophers of perception are divided into realists and idealists. Realists claim that what we perceive are physical objects only, which exist independent of our mind and of our perception. On the other hand idealists argue that we perceive only mental things or ideas of some kind.

- Phenomenalism is best thought of as a secular idealism. Like idealism, it holds that objects are dependent upon our perceptions of them.

- According to Indian philosophy, perception is accepted as a direct source of knowledge of reality. In perception we are face to face with reality. All the philosophical schools call it to be the basic and fundamental source of knowledge. As per literal meaning, "perception" is the pratyaksa. Perception is called pratyaksa because it takes place through the relation to the senses.

4.7: FURTHER READINGS

1) Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1888
2) Russell, Bertrand: The Problem of Philosophy, London, 1912.
3) O'Connor, D.J., and Carr: Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 1982.
4) Chisholm, R: Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, 1966.
5) Sharma, C.D: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, MotilalBanarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1976.
6) Chatterjee, S.C: The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, Calcutta, 1978.

4.8: ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: By perception we generally mean an apprehension of the world through the senses, or the general exercise of it, or particular cases of its exercise. Again it may be defined as a process by which individuals organize and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment.

Ans to Q No 2: There are four elements of perception. They are (i) the perceiver, (ii) the object, (iii) the sensory experience and, (iv) therelation between the object and the subject commonly taken to be a causal relation.

Ans to Q No 3: Four theories.

Ans to Q No 4: Indirect realism, as a theory of perception holds that, we perceive physical objects, and these exist independently of our minds. According to it, what we perceive through our senses are physical objects, together with their various properties. For example- when I perceive my desk, I perceive its size, shape, colour, smell and texture.

Ans to Q No 5: Russell defines sense-data as are mental things which are the way we perceive them to be. Sense-data only exist when they are being experienced. Again Russell says that sense-data are private.

Ans to Q No 6: Two main points of indirect realism are-

(a) indirect realism claims that when we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property. If it is not the physical object, it must be something mental- sense-data that we perceive.

(b) However, we cannot tell the difference between illusory and veridical perception. Therefore, we perceive the same thing. Since we are perceiving sense-data in case of illusion, we should infer that we always perceive sense-data.

Ans to Q No 7:

(i) George Berkeley.
(ii) Primary, secondary.

Ans to Q No 8. Phenomenalistic view of perception is that, according to this view, perceptual objects are directly perceived, but it denies that they are real in the sense that they are mind-independent and can exist apart from perceivers.

Ans to Q No 9: Nyaya-vaisesika definition of perception is as follows: Gautama defines perception as "non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well-defined." Vishvanatha has defined perception as 'direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition.'

Ans to Q No 10: Yes, almost all the schools of Indian philosophy have accepted the theory of perception as a source of knowledge. Rather, Charvaka, the school of materialism holds that perception is the only means of valid knowledge.



4.9: MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very short questions

Q 1: What is the general meaning of perception?
Q 2: How many elements are there in perception?
Q 3: What is nature of sense-data?
Q 4: Is perception accepted by Materialistic school?

B. Short questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Write short notes on (a) direct realism, (b) idealism.
Q 2: What is perception according to indirect realism? Discuss.
Q 3: State briefly Nyaya-vaisesika view of perception.
Q 4: How does Mimamsa School defines perception?

C. Long questions ((Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What are the theories of perception in Western Philosophy? Describe.
Q 2: State the key points of idealism as a theory of perception.
Q 3: Why Phenomenalism is regarded as a theory of perception?
Q 4: Discuss Indian view of perception.

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