UNIT-7: KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

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7.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the tripartite theory,
- discuss the concept of knowledge as justified true belief,
- illustrate the kinds of justification,
- describe the concept of lightweight knowledge,
- analyse the gettier problem,
- analyse the concept of doing without justification.

7.2. INTRODUCTION

The problem of knowledge is the corner stone of all philosophical investigations. Central questions to which epistemologists try to provide answers include- 'what is knowledge?', 'what is the distinction between knowledge and belief?', 'which beliefs are justified and which are not?', 'is knowledge necessarily true?' questions like these are at the heart of epistemology. But recent epistemology spreads like all philosophical enquiries and its boundaries are fuzzy.

For any person, there are some things they know, and some things they don't. What exactly is the difference? What does it take to know something? It's not enough just to believe it—we don't know the things we're wrong about. Knowledge seems to be more like a way of getting at the truth. The analysis of knowledge concerns the attempt to articulate in what exactly this kind of "getting at the truth" consists.

More particularly, the project of analyzing knowledge is to state conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge, thoroughly answering the question, what does it take to know something? By "propositional knowledge", we mean knowledge of a proposition—for example, if Susan knows that Alyssa is a musician, she has knowledge of the proposition that Alyssa is a musician. Propositional knowledge should be distinguished from knowledge of "acquaintance", as obtains when Susan knows Alyssa. The relation between propositional knowledge and the knowledge at issue in other "knowledge" locutions in English, such as knowledge-where ("Susan knows where she is") and especially knowledge-how ("Susan knows how to ride a bicycle") is subject to some debate.

The propositional knowledge that is the analysandum of the analysis of knowledge literature is paradigmatically expressed in English by sentences of the form "*S* knows that *p*", where "*S*" refers to the knowing subject, and "*p*" to the proposition that is known. A proposed analysis

consists of a statement of the following form: *S* knows that *p* if and only if *j*, where *j* indicates the analysans: paradigmatically, a list of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for *S* to have knowledge that *p*.

The attempt to analyze knowledge has received a considerable amount of attention from epistemologists, particularly in the late 20th Century, but no analysis has been widely accepted. Some contemporary epistemologists reject the assumption that knowledge is susceptible to analysis.

7.3 THE TRIPARTITE THEORY

The tripartite definition of knowledge only applies to propositional knowledge, knowing 'that p'. Some philosophers argue that a complete analysis of a concept, such as propositional knowledge, ought to state conditions that are together 'equivalent' to knowledge. In other words, if someone knows some proposition, they should exactly fulfill those conditions which the analysis of knowledge states. The 'justified true belief' theory of knowledge is like this. It claims that to know that p involves exactly these three things:

1. The proposition p is true;
2. You believe that p;
3. Your belief that p is justified.

It claims these are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. The justified true belief theory of knowledge claims that if all the three conditions it lists are satisfied- if p is true, and you believe that p, and your belief is justified-then you know that p. you don't need anything else for knowledge; the three conditions, together, are sufficient.



LET US KNOW

The justified true belief theory of knowledge claims that if all the three conditions it lists are satisfied- if p is true, and you believe that p, and your belief is justified-then you know that p. you don't need anything else for knowledge; the three conditions, together, are sufficient.

7.4. KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

There are three components to the traditional ("tripartite") analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:

S knows that *p* if

i. *p* is true;

ii. *S* believes that *p*;

iii. *S* is justified in believing that *p*.

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the "JTB" analysis, for "justified true belief".

Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century.



LET US KNOW

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the "JTB" analysis, for "justified true belief".



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.1. Where does the tripartite definition of knowledge apply?

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Q.2. What is the 'justified true belief' theory of knowledge?

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Q.3. What do you mean by the tripartite analysis of knowledge?

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ACTIVITY: 7.1

Briefly explain the tripartite analysis of knowledge.

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7.4.1. THE TRUTH CONDITION

Most epistemologists have found it overwhelmingly plausible that what is false cannot be known. For example, Hillary Clinton did not win the 2016 US Presidential election. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true.

Sometimes when people are very confident of something that turns out to be wrong, we use the word "knows" to describe their situation. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Speaking loosely, one might even say that many people "knew" that Clinton would win the election-until

she lost. Hazlett (2010) argues on the basis of data like this that "knows" is not a factive verb. Hazlett's diagnosis is deeply controversial; most epistemologists will treat sentences like "I knew that Clinton was going to win" as a kind of exaggeration-as not literally true.

Something's truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can be known, we're not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access the truth. As we'll see, the other conditions have important roles to play here. Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth-to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact.

7.4.2. THE BELIEF CONDITION

The belief condition is only slightly more controversial than the truth condition. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. "Belief" in the context of the JTB theory means full belief, or outright belief. In a weak sense, one might "believe" something by virtue of being pretty confident that it's probably true-in this weak sense, someone who considered Clinton the favourite to win the election, even while recognizing a nontrivial possibility of her losing, might be said to have "believed" that Clinton would win. Outright belief is stronger. To believe outright that p, it isn't enough to have a pretty high confidence in p; it is something closer to a commitment or a being sure.

Although initially it might seem obvious that knowing that p requires believing that p, a few philosophers have argued that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. He says: "I don't believe it". Critics of

the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down (he sees that it has), but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. The standard response is that Walter's avowal of disbelief is not literally true; what Walter wishes to convey by saying "I don't believe it" is not that he really does not believe that his house has burned down, but rather that he finds it hard to come to terms with what he sees. If he genuinely didn't believe it, some of his subsequent actions, such as phoning his insurance company, would be rather mysterious.

A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford (1966). Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: "When did Queen Elizabeth die?" Albert doesn't think he knows, but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correct answers to many other questions to which he didn't think he knew the answer. Let us focus on Albert's answer to the question about Elizabeth:

- (E)Elizabeth died in 1603.

Radford makes the following two claims about this example:

a. Albert does not believe (E).
b. Albert knows (E).

Radford's intuitions about cases like these do not seem to be idiosyncratic; Myers-Schutz&Schwitzgebel (2013) find evidence suggesting that many ordinary speakers tend to react in the way Radford suggests. In support of (a), Radford emphasizes that Albert thinks he doesn't know the answer to the question. He doesn't trust his answer because he takes it to be a mere guess. In support of (b), Radford argues that Albert's answer is not at all just a lucky guess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts.

Since he takes (a) and (b) to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of (a) and (b) might be resisted. One

might deny (a), arguing that Albert does have a tacit belief that (E),even though it's not one that he thinks amounts to knowledge. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer (2013) take this route. Alternatively, one might deny (b), arguing that Albert's correct answer is not an expression of knowledge, perhaps because, given his subjective position, he does not have justification for believing (E). The justification condition is the topic of the next section.

7.4.3 THE JUSTIFICATION CONDITION

Why is this third condition necessary? Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes-on no particular basis-that it will land tails. If by chance the coin does land tails, then William's belief was true; but a lucky guess such as this one is no knowledge. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: it must be justified.

Socrates articulates the need for something like a justification condition in Plato's Theaetetus, when he points out that "true opinion" is in general insufficient for knowledge. For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge.

LET US KNOW



The truth condition, the belief condition and the justification condition are the three necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. This is known as the tripartite analysis of knowledge



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.4. What are the three necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?

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Q.5. Why is the justification condition necessary for knowledge?

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ACTIVITY 7.2

Elaborate briefly about the truth, belief and justification conditions of knowledge.

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7.5. APPROACHES TO JUSTIFICATION

There is considerable disagreement among epistemologists concerning what the relevant sort of justification here consists in. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. According to one common such sense of "internal", only those features of a subject's experience which are directly or introspectively available count as "internal"-call this "access internalism". According to another, only intrinsic states of the subject are "internal"-call this "state internalism".

Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. They have it that S's belief that p is justified if and only if believing that p is the attitude towards p that best fits S's evidence, where the latter is understood to depend only on S's internal mental states. Conee and Feldman call their view "evidentialism", and characterize this as the thesis that justification is wholly a matter of the subject's evidence. Given their (not unsubstantial) assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.

7.6. KINDS OF JUSTIFICATION

It is worth noting that one might distinguish between two importantly different notions of justification, standardly referred to as "propositional justification" and "doxastic justification". Unlike that between internalist and externalist approaches to justification, the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification does not represent a conflict to be resolved; it is a distinction between two distinct properties that are called "justification". Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. One common way of relating the two is to suggest that propositional justification is the more fundamental, and that doxastic justification is a matter of a subject's having a belief that is appropriately responsive to or based on their propositional justification.

The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since forming beliefs on the basis of superstition is not

an epistemically appropriate way of forming beliefs, Ingrid's belief is not doxastically justified; nevertheless, she does have good reason to believe as she does, so she does have propositional justification for the proposition that the neighborhood is dangerous.

Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification.



LET US KNOW

There are two kinds of justification: propositional justification and doxastic justification.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.6. What are the two kinds of justification?

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Q.7. What do you mean by propositional justification?

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Q.8. What is doxastic justification?

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7.7. LIGHTWEIGHT KNOWLEDGE

Some epistemologists have suggested that there may be multiple senses of the term "knowledge", and that not all of them require all three elements of the tripartite theory of knowledge. For example, some have

argued that there is, in addition to the sense of "knowledge" gestured at above, another, weak sense of "knowledge", that requires only true belief (see for example Hawthorne 2002 and Goldman & Olsson 2009; the latter contains additional relevant references). This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p, or wonder which of a group of people know that p, often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne points out, one might ask how many students know that Vienna is the capital of Austria; the correct answer, one might think, just is the number of students who offer "Vienna" as the answer to the corresponding question, irrespective of whether their beliefs are justified. Similarly, if you are planning a surprise party for Eugene and ask whether he knows about it, "yes" may be an appropriate answer merely on the grounds that Eugene believes that you are planning a party.

One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. A theorist might, for instance, deny that sentences like "Eugene knows that you are planning a party" or "eighteen students know that Vienna is the capital of Austria" are literally true in the envisaged situations, explaining away their apparent felicity as loose talk or hyperbole.

Even among those epistemologists who think that there is a lightweight sense of "knows" that does not require justification, most typically admit that there is also a stronger sense which does, and that it is this stronger state that is the main target of epistemological theorizing about knowledge. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one.

7.8. THE GETTIER PROBLEM

For some time, the justified true belief (JTB) account was widely agreed to capture the nature of knowledge. However, in 1963, Edmund

Gettier published a short but widely influential article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier provided two examples in which someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true.

Consider an example. Suppose that the clock on campus (which keeps accurate time and is well maintained) stopped working at 11:56pm last night, and has yet to be repaired. On my way to my noon class, exactly twelve hours later, I glance at the clock and form the belief that the time is 11:56. My belief is true, of course, since the time is indeed 11:56. And my belief is justified, as I have no reason to doubt that the clock is working, and I cannot be blamed for basing beliefs about the time on what the clock says. Nonetheless, it seems evident that I do not know that the time is 11:56. After all, if I had walked past the clock a bit earlier or a bit later, I would have ended up with a false belief rather than a true one.

This example and others like it, while perhaps somewhat far-fetched, seem to show that it is possible for justified true belief to fail to constitute knowledge. To put it another way, the justification condition was meant to ensure that knowledge was based on solid evidence rather than on luck or misinformation, but Gettier-type examples seem to show that justified true belief can still involve luck and thus fall short of knowledge. This problem is referred to as "the Gettier problem." To solve this problem, we must either show that all instances of justified true belief do indeed constitute knowledge, or alternatively refine our analysis of knowledge.

Edmund Gettier in 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true.

In honour of his contribution to the literature, cases like these have come to be known as "Gettier cases". Since they appear to refute the JTB

analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: how must the analysis of knowledge be modified to accommodate Gettier cases? This is what is commonly referred to as the "Gettier problem".

Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge.

Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. This was attempted by Roderick Chisholm. The other is to amend the JTB analysis with a suitable fourth condition, a condition that succeeds in preventing justified true belief from being "gettiered". Thus amended, the JTB analysis becomes a JTB+X account of knowledge, where the "X" stands for the needed fourth condition.

Let us consider an instance of this attempt to articulate a "degettiering" condition.

LET US KNOW



Edmund Gettier in 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true.

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS



Q.9. What is known as 'Gettier problem'?

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ACTIVITY 7.3



Discuss in short about 'Gettier problem' in theory of knowledge?

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7.8.1. THE NO-FALSE-BELIEF CONDITION

We might think that there is a simple and straightforward solution to the Gettier problem. Note that my reasoning was tacitly based on my belief that the clock is working properly, and that this belief is false. This seems to explain what has gone wrong in this example. Accordingly, we might revise our analysis of knowledge by insisting that to constitute knowledge; a belief must be true and justified and must be formed without relying on any false beliefs. In other words, we might say, justification, truth, and belief are all necessary for knowledge, but they are not jointly sufficient for knowledge; there is a fourth condition - namely, that no false beliefs be essentially involved in the reasoning that led to the belief - which is also necessary.

Unfortunately, this will not suffice; we can modify the example so that my belief is justified and true, and is not based on any false beliefs, but still falls short of knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that I do not have any beliefs about the clock's current state, but merely the more general belief that the clock usually is in working order. This belief, which is true, would suffice to justify my belief that the time is now 11:56; of course, it still seems evident that I do not know the time.

7.8.2. THE NO-DEFEATERS CONDITION

However, the no-false-belief condition does not seem to be completely misguided; perhaps we can add some other condition to justification and truth to yield a correct characterization of knowledge. Note

that, even if I didn't actively form the belief that the clock is currently working properly, it seems to be implicit in my reasoning, and the fact that it is false is surely relevant to the problem. After all, if I were asked, at the time that I looked at the clock, whether it is working properly, I would have said that it is. Conversely, if I believed that the clock wasn't working properly, I wouldn't be justified in forming a belief about the time based on what the clock says.

In other words, the proposition that the clock is working properly right now meets the following conditions: it is a false proposition, I do not realize that it is a false proposition, and if I had realized that it is a false proposition, my justification for my belief that it is 11:56 would have been undercut or defeated. If we call propositions such as this "defeaters," then we can say that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified, and there must not be any defeaters to the justification of that belief. Many epistemologists believe this analysis to be correct.

7.9. DOING WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION?

As we have seen, one motivation for including a justification condition in an analysis of knowledge was to prevent lucky guesses from counting as knowledge. However, the Gettier problem shows that including a justification condition does not rule out all epistemically problematic instances of luck. Consequently, some epistemologists have suggested that positing a justification condition on knowledge was a false move; perhaps it is some other condition that ought to be included along with truth and belief as components of knowledge. This kind of strategy was advanced by a number of authors from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, although there has been relatively little discussion of it.

7.9.1. RELIABILIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

One candidate property for such a state is reliability. Part of what is problematic about lucky guesses is precisely that they are so lucky: such guesses are formed in a way such that it is unlikely that they should turn out true. According to a certain form of knowledge reliabilism, it is unreliability,

not lack of justification, which prevents such beliefs from amounting to knowledge. Reliabilist theories of knowledge incorporate this idea into a reliability condition on knowledge. Here is an example of such a view:

Simple K-Reliabilism:
S knows that piff

a. p is true;
b. S believes that p;
c. S's belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process.

Simple K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the traditional tripartite theory with a reliability clause. As we have seen, reliabilists about justification think that justification for a belief consists in a genesis in a reliable cognitive process. Given this view, Simple K-Reliabilism and the JTB theory are equivalent. However, the present proposal is silent on justification. Goldman 1979 is the seminal defense of reliabilism about justification; reliabilism is extended to knowledge in Goldman 1986. See Goldman 2011 for a survey of reliabilism in general.

In the following passage, Fred Dretske articulates how an approach like K-reliabilism might be motivated:

Those who think knowledge requires something other than, or at least more than, reliably produced true belief, something (usually) in the way of justification for the belief that one's reliably produced beliefs are being reliably produced, have, it seems to me, an obligation to say what benefits this justification is supposed to confer…. Who needs it, and why? If an animal inherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating mechanism, and it also inherits a disposition, everything being equal, to act on the basis of the beliefs so generated, what additional benefits isconferred by a justification that the beliefs are being produced in some reliable way? If there are no additional benefits, what good is this justification? Why should we insist that no one can have knowledge without it?

According to Dretske, reliable cognitive processes convey information, and thus endow not only humans, but (nonhuman) animals as well, with knowledge. He writes:

I wanted a characterization that would at least allow for the possibility that animals (a frog, rat, ape, or my dog) could know things without my having to suppose them capable of the more sophisticated intellectual operations involved in traditional analyses of knowledge.

It does seem odd to think of frogs, rats, or dogs as having justified or unjustified beliefs. Yet attributing knowledge to animals is certainly in accord with our ordinary practice of using the word "knowledge". So if, with Dretske, we want an account of knowledge that includes animals among the knowing subjects, we might want to abandon the traditional JTB account in favor of something like K-reliabilism.

7.9.2. CAUSAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE:

Rather than modifying the JTB account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition, some epistemologists see the Gettier problem as reason to seek a substantially different alternative. We have noted that knowledge should not involve luck, and that Gettier-type examples are those in which luck plays some role in the formation of a justified true belief. In typical instances of knowledge, the factors responsible for the justification of a belief are also responsible for its truth. For example, when the clock is working properly, my belief is both true and justified because it's based on the clock, which accurately displays the time. But one feature that all Gettier-type examples have in common is the lack of a clear connection between the truth and the justification of the belief in question. For example, my belief that the time is 11:56 is justified because it's based on the clock, but it's true because I happened to walk by at just the right moment. So, we might insist that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified, and its truth and justification must be connected somehow.

This notion of a connection between the truth and the justification of a belief turns out to be difficult to formulate precisely, but causal accounts of knowledge seek to capture the spirit of this proposal by more significantly altering the analysis of knowledge. Such accounts maintain that in order for someone to know a proposition, there must be a causal connection between his belief in that proposition and the fact that the proposition encapsulates. This retains the truth condition, since a proposition must be true in order for it to encapsulate a fact. However, it appears to be incompatible with fallibilism, since it does not allow for the possibility that a belief be justified yet false. (Strictly speaking, causal accounts of knowledge make no reference to justification, although we might attempt to reformulate fallibilism in somewhat modified terms in order to state this observation.)

While causal accounts of knowledge are no longer thought to be correct, they have engendered reliabilist theories of knowledge.

Another move in a similar spirit to K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the JTB theory with a condition requiring a causal connection between the belief and the fact believed; this is the approach of Goldman. Goldman's own causal theory is a sophisticated one; we will not engage with its details here.

Simple Causal Theory of Knowledge:
S knows that p if

a. p is true;
b. S believes that p;
c. S's belief that p is caused by the fact that p.

Do approaches like Simple K-Reliabilism or the Simple Causal Theory fare any better than the JTB theory with respect to Gettier cases? Many of the standard counterexamples to the JTB theory appear to refute these views as well. Consider again the case of the barn facades. Henry sees a real barn, and that's why he believes there is a barn nearby. This belief is formed by perceptual processes, which are by-and-large reliable:

only rarely do they lead him into false beliefs. So it looks like the case meets the conditions of Simple K-Reliabilism just as much as it does those of the JTB theory. It is also a counterexample to the causal theory, since the real barn Henry perceives is causally responsible for his belief. There is reason to doubt, therefore, that shifting from justification to a condition like reliability will escape the Gettier problem. Gettier cases seem to pose as much of a problem for K-reliabilism and causal theories as for the JTB account. Neither theory, unless amended with a clever "degettiering" clause, succeeds in stating sufficient conditions for knowledge.



7.10. LET US SUM UP

- The justified true belief theory of knowledge claims that if all the three conditions it lists are satisfied- if p is true, and you believe that p, and your belief is justified-then you know that p.
- There are three components to the traditional ("tripartite") analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the "JTB" analysis, for "justified true belief".
- The justification condition is necessary to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly.
- There are two approaches to justification of knowledge: evidentialism approach and reliabilists approach.
- There are two kinds of justification: propositional justification and doxastic justification.
- Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. One common way of relating the two is to suggest that propositional justification is the more

fundamental, and that doxastic justification is a matter of a subject's having a belief that is appropriately responsive to or based on their propositional justification.

- In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but widely influential article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier provided two examples in which someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true.



7.11. FURTHER READINGS

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7.12. ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans. to question no 1. The tripartite definition of knowledge only applies to propositional knowledge, knowing 'that p'.

Ans.to question no 2. The justified true belief theory of knowledge claims that if all the three conditions it lists are satisfied- if p is true, and you believe that p, and your belief is justified-then you know that p.

Ans to question no 3. The tripartite analysis of knowledge implies truth, belief and justification as three necessary as well as sufficient conditions of knowledge.

Ans to question no 4. The three necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge are truth, belief and justification.

Ans to question no 5. The justification condition is necessary to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly.

Ans to question no 6. There are two kinds of justification: propositional justification and doxastic justification.

Ans to question no 7. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition.

Ans to question no 8. Doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. Doxastic justification is a matter of a subject's having a belief that is appropriately responsive to or based on their propositional justification.

Ans to question no 9. According to Gettier someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true. This is known as 'Gettier problem'.



7.13. MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very short questions

Q 1: Where does the tripartite definition of knowledge apply?

Q 2: What do you mean by the tripartite analysis of knowledge?

Q 3: What is the 'justified true belief' theory of knowledge??

Q 4: What are the three necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?

Q 5: What do you mean by propositional justification?

Q 6: What is 'Gettier problem'?

B) Short questions (answer each question in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: What does tripartite definition of knowledge mean?

Q 2: What is truth condition?

Q 3: What is justification condition for knowledge?

Q 4: What do you mean by doxastic justification?

Q 5: Why is justification necessary for knowledge?

C) Short notes (answer each question in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: The tripartite analysis of knowledge

Q 2: The truth condition

Q 3: Kinds of justification

Q 4: Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge

Q 5: Causal theories of knowledge

Q 6: Gettier problem

D) Long questions (answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q.1. Elaborately discuss about tripartite definition of knowledge.

Q.2. Discuss about the role of belief condition in knowledge.

Q.3. What do you mean by 'Gettier problem'. Discuss its importance in the domain of knowledge.

Q.4. Explain about the different types of justification in knowledge.

Q.5. What are the two kinds of alternatives or approaches in place of justification condition for knowledge . Discuss them.

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