UNIT-8: BELIEF CONDITION

UNIT STRUCTURE

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8.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain the concept of knowing,
- explain the concept of believing,
- discuss the traditional development of knowledge and belief,
- explain the differences between knowledge and belief,
- explain the relation between knowledge and belief.

8.2. INTRODUCTION

There are different types of knowledge (I know Oxford well), ability knowledge (I know how to ride a bike), and propositional knowledge (I know that eagles are birds). The first two types of knowledge are very interesting, but we are concerned only with the third, what it is to know some proposition, 'p'.

We intuitively make a distinction between belief and knowledge. People can believe propositions that aren't true; but if you know that p, then p must be true. You can't know something false; if it is false, then you don't know it. You have made a mistake, believing it to be true when it is not. For example, if you claim that flamingos are grey, and you think you know this, you are mistaken. If flamingos are not grey, but pink, then you can't know they are grey. Of course, you believe that they are grey; that is the difference- beliefs can be false.

There is another distinction between beliefs and knowledge. People can believe propositions for all sorts of reasons. They can have true beliefs without having any evidence or justification for their beliefs. For example, someone on a jury might think that the person on trial is guilty just from the way they dress. Their belief, that the person is guilty, might be true; but how someone dresses isn't evidence for whether they are a criminal. So, belief can be accidentally true, relative to the evidence the person has; if it is, it isn't knowledge.

Someone can hold a belief that is, in fact, true, even when they have evidence to suggest it is false. For example, there is a lot of evidence that astrology does not make accurate predictions, and my horoscope has often been wrong. Suppose on one occasion, I read my horoscope and believe a prediction, although I know there is evidence against thinking it is right. Then this prediction turns out true. Did I know it was right? It looks more like my belief is irrational. I had no reason, no evidence, and no justification, for believing that prediction was true. Knowledge, then, needs some kind of support, some reason for thinking that the proposition believed is true. Knowledge needs to be justified.

The notion of knowledge is intimately tied up with the notion of belief. The relation between knowledge and belief is of great importance. Both the two terms 'knowledge' and 'belief' have their various meanings and uses. 'Is belief completely different from knowledge?', 'does knowledge entail belief?' these are some important epistemological questions. All these

issues are observed in the contemporary philosophical development in this study.

For no less than three decades the problem of the analysis of knowledge and belief has haunted the minds of the epistemologists. Even in times as early as ancient Greek thinkers, philosophers were seen engaged in this problem.

How we know and what we know is a long cherished hope of philosophy. The philosophers of all ages have been seeking answers of these eternal riddles. The rapid growth of epistemology during the last few decades emerges of so many new concepts in the field, cannot but rouse one's curiosity to enter into this unique area of knowing 'how to know'. It has occupied a major interest in contemporary epistemology. Before we ask what we know and how we know it, we should ask what we mean by knowing. Again to answer the question 'what is knowing' is not of course a considerable epistemological ones, but it is a necessary preliminary to do so.

LET US KNOW



The notion of knowledge is intimately tied up with the notion of belief. We intuitively make a distinction between belief and knowledge. People can believe propositions that aren't true; but if you know that p, then p must be true. You can't know something false; if it is false, then you don't know it.

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS



Q.1. What is the other notion that the notion of knowledge is intimately tied up?

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Q.2. What is the difference between knowledge and belief?

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ACTIVITY 8.1

Briefly explain the concept of knowledge and belief.

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8.3. KNOWING

8.3.1. Knowing in everyday life:

The meaning of the word 'knowledge' seems very clear and that's why the concept of knowledge needs no more detailed, careful elucidation. For example, the proposition 'I know something' is similar to 'I see something' or 'I hear something'. But sometimes circumstances may arise where an exact definition of the word 'know' becomes necessary and in such situations the basic task of epistemology will be to draw a definition of the word 'know'.

8.4.2. Knowing that and knowing how:

Contemporary philosophersuse the phrase 'knowing that' to solve different problems about the nature of knowledge.

Gilbert Ryle talks about certain distinctions between knowing how and knowing that. 'Knowing that' is propositional but 'knowing how' is not propositional. When we say he knows how to swim we mean that he is capable of swimming when occasions demand. Even when he is sleeping, we can credit him with this ability. In the same way when we say that someone knows how to play chess, we more often refer to the individual's ability or skill to perform those acts that indicate his ability to recite rules for these activities. The abilities do not consist in any act of thinking as this reason knowing how is not propositional.

Here Ryle lays emphasis on the value of knowing how much more than that of knowing that.But Ryle's view breaks down when we take into

consideration the fact that knowing how requires the necessary presences of 'knowing something' which is associated with ;how to do'. Knowing how to drive a car means both to know that there are rules of driving and to be able to drive a car means both to know that there are rules of driving and to be able to drive the car. In this sense, 'knowing how' presupposes 'knowing that'. The propositional content of knowledge is expressed through knowing that and it creates a number of problems.

LET US KNOW



Gilbert Ryle says that there are certain distinctions between knowing how and knowing that. 'Knowing that' is propositional but 'knowing how' is not propositional.

8.4. BELIEVING

8.4.1. Some aspects of belief:

There are certain characteristics of belief. The concept of belief is very central to epistemology because the ground level epistemological concepts of 'truth', 'falsity', and 'justification' are applied primarily to beliefs.

Belief may be characterized as stronger than mere ungrounded opinion but weaker than full knowledge. For, Descartes, belief is an active state of mind in which assent to some proposition is granted or withheld, or for Hume, it is a passive state that occurs or fails to occur in respect of some propositions. The objects of belief are propositions.

The belief states themselves possess a sentential structure, that they are maps in some literal sense. According to P.F. Ramsey, a belief is viewed as "a map of neighbouring space by which we steer." Ramsey attributes two characteristics to the belief- it is a map and it is something by which we steer. He shows that unlike entertaining propositions, beliefs are action guiding.

Armstrong mentions another state of belief in which 'A's believing that is a matter of A's being in a certain continuing state, a state which endures for the whole time that A holds the belief. In the case of beliefs which are acquired, this view thinks of A's belief that P as a matter of A's mind being imprinted or stamped in a certain way.

Donald Davidson views that belief, like meaning, is indeterminate. According to him, it makes no sense, to talk of beliefs or meanings independently of a particular linguistic context. In case of beliefs, yet believing appears not to be voluntary. Descartes writes that believing depends on some prior act of will. In 'Meditation' IV, he says that, 'when something is proposed to us by the 'intellect' we are free either to affirm or deny something. Bernard Williams holds that it is doubtful that believing essentially involves willing; believing is necessary non-voluntary.

Gilbert Ryle considers beliefs as 'tendencies' to say and do various things. Ryle argues that mental states like belief are not causes of 'behaviour, on the other hand they are dispositional states triggered causality.

In our philosophical tradition, we can see various ways of conceiving of beliefs. Armstrong puts forward three ways of conceiving of beliefs like, (a) beliefs are conscious occurrences in the mind of believers, (b) beliefs are believer's disposition and, (c) beliefs are states of the mind of the believers.

8.3.2 Believing that: According to A.D. Woozley belief s is always belief-that. There is no belief corresponding to acquaintance. An object of one's believing is something that is true or false.

One's believing a proposition contrasts with one's believing a proposition with regard to an object. In the first case, the object is just a proposition and this kind of believing is 'de dicto'. In the second case, the object is not merely propositional or conceptual and here believing involves an 'aboutness relation' to an object, that is not found in 'de dicto' believing. But believing 'de re' is related also to a propositional object where the 'object'

is denotatively defined through a referential aboutness relation. So, both the 'de re' and 'de dicto' believing have propositional objects that are either true or false. So, belief is an attitude one can have towards a proposition.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.3. What is the distinction between knowing that and knowing how?

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Q.4. Who has differentiated between knowing that and knowing how?

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Q.5. What does Ryle consider belief to be?

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ACTIVITY 8.2

Briefly explain the difference between knowing that and knowing how.

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8.5. TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF:

In our everyday life, we think that knowledge has a relation with other concepts like belief and opinion. Sometimes the two terms 'knowledge' and 'belief' are used interchangeably as there is no radical difference between knowing and believing. But if we look into the general agreement then we can see that what we know can only be true whereas what we

believe may be true or may not be true. It implies that the disjunction either true or false does not apply to what we know whereas it can be applied to what we believe.

The discussion of distinguishing knowledge from belief was started by Plato. In 'Meno' and 'Phaedo', plato distinguishes between knowledge and belief with the help of the theory of recollection. It is either assumed or perhaps argued that we do have knowledge and knowledge is distinct from certain other cognitive states particularly from belief and opinion. In the 'Phaedo', Plato holds the view that knowledge and belief should be distinguished both by their objects and by their different faculties employed. What is known is unchanging and cannot be otherwise; what is believed is, by contrast, in flux and allows of contradictory possibilities.

In 'Republic' Plato shows that particular objects are copies or images of the forms. Knowledge is distinguished from belief by reference to their different objects and true knowledge. In the elaborate analogies of the sun, the Divided Line, and the cave, Plato distinguishes knowledge from belief from the point of view of difference between forms and particulars and also in terms of a hierarchically organized systematic body of knowledge.

Kant, in his 'Critique of Pure reason' draws a distinction between knowledge, belief and opinion. He writes, "The holding of something to be true or the subjective validity of the judgment in its relation to the conviction has the following three degrees:opining, believing and knowledge. Opining of such holding of a judgment as it consciously not only objectively, but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time taken as being objectively insufficient we have what is termed believing. Lastly, when the holding of something to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge. This subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) the objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for everyone)."

In Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues that we can have no knowledge of the properties of the soul, the outer limits and inmost nature

of the cosmos, on the existence of God. Here, Kant states that 'knowledge' transcending possible experience is not knowledge but only matters of faith or speculation.



LET US KNOW

The discussion of distinguishing knowledge from belief was started by Plato.

8.6. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF:

There is a view that the concept of 'knowledge' is completely different from that of the concept of 'belief'. Beliefs certainly have some affinity with knowledge though there is a wide difference also.

Plato in his 'Republic' distinguishes knowledge from belief on the basis of their respective objects. Plato's view is not only important but also very significant in the analysis of knowledge. He keeps knowledge, thought and intelligible objects on the one hand and beliefs, sense and sensible objects on the other.

Russell makes a distinction between knowledge and belief by arguing that knowledge has facts for its objects and knowledge is a relation between two genuine objects: the knower and the fact known. But there may not be anything like fact as is believed by the believer. In the case of belief, believe is personally involved and so beliefs are subjective. On the other hand, knowledge is not a personal affair.

Though knowing and believing are cognitive activities yet the two terms are different in nature. The verb 'know' is not a proper psychological verb. So, no empirical science like psychology or grammar can study the logical or the paralinguistic behaviours of 'know', which is a philosophical one.

The adjectives like true, false, justified, unjustified are applicable only to belief. But they can never be applied to knowledge. Even we cannot meaningfully express 'true knowledge' as it is tautologous in nature. It is possible that justified and unjustified belief can be true by chance, but 'knowledge' can never be true by chance. The role which chance necessarily plays to make a belief justified or unjustified- true has to be cancelled in knowledge.

Chisholm said that if a man knows that a proposition is true, then he is justified in believing that there is no truth that could disturb the case that he has for that proposition. Ayer, too, said "knowledge implies having the right to be sure." Chisholm remarks that a man can be said to believe firmly on reluctantly or hesitatingly. Chisholm claims an important distinction between knowledge and belief by saying that "we often speak of what a man ought to know but seldom, if ever, of what a man ought to believe." S. Bhattacharyya views this situation in the way that one cannot know the faults but, one can only fail to know the right thing. The 'believer', on the contrary, can believe what is false and he can also fail to believe what is true. So, both 'error of commission' and 'error of omission' are possible in the state of belief. 'Because of this freedom in believing, we have the appeal "Believe me when I say that P, which would have been impossible if we were not free to a great extent in believing. Thus we find that so far as freedom is concerned, there is much of it in believing, and little of it in knowing." The process of knowing is radically different from the process of belief. "There are ways of knowing but there are no ways of believing." This explains why beliefs are subjective even when they are rational.

According to Ryle, 'know' and 'believe' are dispositional verbs but the verb 'know' is named as a capacity verb of a special sort whereas 'believe' is a tendency verb. For example, the verb 'know' truly signifies something which is a success verb but the verb 'believe' signifies nothing of this sort. Beliefs can be blind and obsessing.

S. Bhattacharyya also elucidates a distinction between knowledge and belief. A belief falls sort of knowledge not merely because the propositions which serve as its evidence are of doubtful truth value, but also because the connection between evidence and belief is loose. He says, "When we are able to tighten up this connection…….by removing logical gaps…….by statistically established laws, then we have knowledge."

LET US KNOW



The adjectives like true, false, justified, unjustified are applicable only to belief. But they can never be applied to knowledge.

All these striking differences between knowledge and belief move us to account the probable and possible relation of belief with knowledge.

8.7. RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF:

From the above discussion it has been seen that there are differences between knowledge and belief. But the view that knowledge excludes belief is however questionable. Several epistemologists put arguments against all versions of the thesis that knowledge requires belief like attitude towards the known. But the view knowledge excludes belief is however questionable. Though some thinkers claim that the attempts to define knowledge in terms of belief have failed to gain general acceptance, yet different versions of incompatibilism between knowledge and belief play an important role in the analysis of knowledge.

The incompatibility thesis is traced to Plato in view of his claim that knowledge is infallible. In the Republic, he says that knowledge differs from belief in respect of its objects or aims. But, many thinkers do not agree with Plato in so far as the objective differences between knowledge and belief are concerned. Plato's version in the Republic is entitled as the 'object theory' by Danto. According to Plato, the objects of knowledge are forms

and ideas whereas the contingent empirical truths are the objects of belief. Knowledge and belief are two separate mental faculties. However, Plato's distinction of knowledge and belief, on the basis of their objects, cannot be entertained in epistemological consideration too, because in this case genuine knowledge of the sensible world is impossible forever.

Again, Plato's view seems to be inconsistent with our common practice of assuming that knowledge and belief or concerned with the same thing. Woozley argues that "we may distinguish necessary from contingent or empirical truth, but we have no right to say that the later cannot be objects of knowledge."

Another incompatibility version is found in the theory of Cook Wilson and Prichard. According to them, knowledge and belief are alternative mental states. Cook Wilson holds that beliefs are not knowledge. He maintains that knowing being the presupposition of all enquiries, 'we cannot make knowing itself a subject if enquiring in the sense of asking what knowing is'. No definition can be given of knowledge; it is the apprehension of fact. Opinion differs from knowledge; it (opinion) can never be called apprehension. The ground of opinion is insufficient evidence for which it is fallible. Cook Wilson tries to show some light upon this difference by showing the relation of knowing to thinking. He holds that the function of opinion is called thinking whereas knowledge is judging or deciding. In knowledge case we judge or decide that A is B, but opinion is not a decision or judgements where we are conscious of the insufficiency of evidence. Thus, Cook Wilson shows that the mental situation of knowing is somewhat different from the mental situation of believing.

Prichard defends the incompatibility thesis and tries to equate knowledge with certainty. Believing involves uncertainty and it rules out the possibility of knowing. Knowing is absolutely different from believing or being convinced. The difference is described as being a difference 'in kind' and not simply a difference 'in degree'. When we know, we know that we are knowing and nothing can exist which is incompatible with the truth of that

proposition. Again, Prichard claims that if we reflect we cannot mistake belief for knowing. Malcolm comments that, 'Prichard is using the 'strong sense' of 'know' and this sense of 'know' is very important and useful.

To Prichard, knowing something is a special state of mind which is infallible. Of course, there are arguments against Cook Wilson's and Prichard's views. Knowing cannot be accepted as some sort of 'experience or mental state; the verb to know neither denotes an act or activity nor denote some unique infallible state of mind. Their theory unduly restricts the sphere of knowledge. We cannot agree with them that belief is a totally unreasonable state of mind. Conscious beliefs clearly involve some level of confidence which is not discussed by them. They hold that there is a sharp distinction between believing and thinking, and they call them as 'thinking without question' or 'being under the impression'.

Philosophers like Ayer argues that there is no infallible state called 'state of knowledge'. He says, "…..there cannot be a mental state which, being as it were directed towards a fact, is such that it guarantees that the fact is so." thus, unlike Cook Wilson and Prichard, Ayer remarks that knowledge is not a distinctive state of mind so far as the mental condition is concerned, between a person who believes and a person who knows.

According to Austin, there is an incompatibility between the utterance 'I know' and 'I believe'. The former is a performative utterance and the latter is a descriptive utterance. In case of 'I know', I give my words whereas with 'I believe' I refrain from giving my word. Austin sys, "when I say 'I know', I give others my word.' I give others my authority for saying that S is P."

Austin's version of incompatibilism between the utterance 'I know' and 'I believe' is however questionable. Austin himself abandons this distinction in his later works. He holds that whenever we utter a certain sentence, we utter it with a certain meaning and the utterance has a certain force. Again, he maintains that one of the conditions of one's uttering "I know that P" is that one must be sure of P.

Harrison shows that Austin's view that 'I know' is similar to 'I promise' is misleading. 'I know' differs from 'I promise'. One of the most important differences is that someone saying 'I promise ……' is thereby promising, whereas someone saying 'I know …..' is not thereby knowing but simply claiming that he knows". Again, someone may utter 'I know' without giving any word and it is possible to utter 'I know' and yet not to know. We cannot accept that 'I believe' is not a performative utterance because the utterance 'I believe' may also be able to perform something by its means.

Lehrer considers belief as a necessary condition among other conditions of knowledge. Further he claims that 'if a person does not believe that p, then he does not know that p; and equivalently, but less negatively, if a person knows that p than he believes that p. it proves that if s knows that p, then s believes that p'. He points out that in a perfect case of believing or knowing that p, a man must be convinced of the truth of p. if, the conviction that p is lacking then, those cases are neither believing nor knowing. Lehrer said "belief is more like a habit than an action……. A person may decide whether or not to perform an action. Acceptance, unlike belief is a matter of choice." Hence, acceptance of belief is very important for knowledge.

Therefore, whether knowledge entails true belief or is radically different from belief are the foremost epistemological questions. It is also viewed that in approaching these questions, the study of epistemology reflects a growing controversy. In spite of all, we must remain aware that there is a profound difference between knowledge and belief in their logical behaviours. Is s knows that p, p entails truth and if s believes that p, p does not entail truth. So, we have reached the position that knowledge is infallible. Plato, in the Theatetus showed the right instinct that the attempt to define knowledge in terms of belief is not satisfactory; knowledge is neither true opinion nor true belief. Here lies the question, 'is knowledge justified true belief?



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.6. Who has started the distinction between knowledge and belief?

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Q.7. In which book Kant distinguished between knowledge, belief and opinion?

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Q.8. On what basis Plato distinguished between knowledge and belief?

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Q.9. What kinds of adjectives can be applied to belief?

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Q.10. What is the necessary condition among other conditions of knowledge according to Lehrer?

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ACTIVITY 8.3

Briefly explain the difference between knowledge and belief.

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Briefly explain the relation between knowledge and belief.

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8.8. LET US SUM UP

- We intuitively make a distinction between belief and knowledge. People can believe propositions that aren't true; but if you know that p, then p must be true. You can't know something false; if it is false, then you don't know it. You have made a mistake, believing it to be true when it is not.

- There is another distinction between beliefs and knowledge. People can believe propositions for all sorts of reasons. They can have true beliefs without having any evidence or justification for their beliefs.

- The notion of knowledge is intimately tied up with the notion of belief. The relation between knowledge and belief is of great importance. Both the two terms 'knowledge' and 'belief' have their various meanings and uses.

- Gilbert Ryle says that there are certain distinctions between knowing how and knowing that. 'Knowing that' is propositional but 'knowing how' is not propositional.

- The concept of belief is very central to epistemology because the ground level epistemological concepts of 'truth', 'falsity', and 'justification' are applied primarily to beliefs and only derivatively to knowledge. Belief may be characterized as stronger than mere ungrounded opinion but weaker than full knowledge.

- In our everyday life, we think that knowledge has a relation with other concepts like belief and opinion because these notions are frequently grouped together under the heading of the term 'cognitive activities'. Sometimes the two terms 'knowledge' and 'belief' are used interchangeably as there is no radical difference between knowing and believing. But if we look into the general agreement then we can see that what we know can only be true whereas what we believe may be true or may not be true. It implies that the disjunction either true or false does not apply to what you know but does apply to what we believe.

- The discussion of distinguishing knowledge from belief was started by Plato. In 'Meno' and 'Phaedo', Plato distinguishes between knowledge and belief with the help of the theory of recollection. It is either assumed or perhaps argued that we do have knowledge and knowledge is distinct from certain other cognitive states particularly from belief and opinion. In the 'Phaedo', Plato holds the view that knowledge and belief should be distinguished both by their objects and by their different faculties employed. What is known is unchanging and cannot be otherwise; what is believed is, by contrast, in flux and allows of contradictory possibilities.

- The adjectives like true, false, justified, unjustified are applicable only to belief. But they can never be applied to knowledge. Even we cannot meaningfully express 'true knowledge' as it is tautologous in nature. It is possible that justified and unjustified belief can be true by chance, but 'knowledge' can never be true by chance. The role which chance necessarily plays to make a belief justified or unjustified- true has to be cancelled in knowledge.

8.9. FURTHER READINGS

1) Armstrong, D.M., "Belief Truth and Knowledge", Cambridge, 1973.
2) Ayer, A.J., "The Problem of Knowledge", McMillan, 1956.
3) Griffiths, A. Phillips (ed.) "Knowledge and Belief", London, Oxford University Press, 1967.
4) Lehrer, K., "Theory of knowledge", London, 1990.
5) Wilson, Cook, "Knowledge and Belief", Griffiths.
6) Woozley, A.D. "Theory of Knowledge", B.I. Publication, 1982.

8.10. ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans to Q No.1. The notion of knowledge is intimately tied up with the notion of belief.

Ans to Q No.2. People can believe propositions that aren't true; but if you know that p, then p must be true.

Ans to Q No .3. 'Knowing that' is propositional but 'knowing how' is not propositional.

Ans to Q No.4. Gilbert Ryle talks about certain distinctions between knowing how and knowing that.

Ans to Q No.5. Gilbert Ryle considers beliefs as 'tendencies' to say and do various things

Ans to Q No.6. The discussion of distinguishing knowledge from belief was started by Plato.

Ans to Q No.7. Kant, in his 'Critique of Pure reason' draws a distinction between knowledge, belief and opinion.

Ans to Q No.8. Plato in his 'Republic' distinguishes knowledge from belief on the basis of their respective objects.

Ans to Q No.9. The adjectives like true, false, justified, unjustified are applicable only to belief.

Ans to Q No 10. Lehrer considers belief as a necessary condition among other conditions of knowledge.

8.11. MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very short questions

Q 1: What is the other notion that the notion of knowledge is intimately tied up?

Q 2: What is the difference between knowledge and belief?

Q 3: What is the distinction between knowing that and knowing how?

Q 4: Who has differentiated between knowing that and knowing how?

Q 5: What does Ryle consider belief to be?

Q 6: Who has started the distinction between knowledge and belief?

Q 7: In which book Kant distinguished between knowledge, belief and opinion?

Q 8: On what basis Plato distinguished between knowledge and belief?

Q 9: What kinds of adjectives can be applied to belief?

Q 10: What is the necessary condition among other conditions of knowledge according to Lehrer?

B) Short questions (answer each question in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: How many types of knowledge are there?

Q 2: Mention one difference between belief and knowledge?

Q 3: What is 'knowing how' knowledge?

Q 4: What is 'knowing that' knowledge?

Q 5: In which books and how Plato discussed about the distinction between belief and knowledge?

C) Short notes (answer each question in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Difference between knowledge and belief

Q 2: Knowing how and knowing that

Q 3: Relation between knowledge and belief

D) Long questions (answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q.1. Elaborately discuss about Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowing that and knowing how.

Q.2. Discuss about the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato.

Q.3. Discuss in general about the distinction between knowledge and belief.

Q.4. Is there any relation between knowledge and belief? If yes, then elaborate the relation between knowledge and belief.

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