UNIT 5: PERSONAL IDENTITY

UNIT STRUCTURE

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5.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit you will be able to

- explain the Bodily criterion
- describe Memory criterion
- discuss Jean Paul Sartre's viewpoint on Self-identity
- write a critical appreciation on Self-identity

5.2 INTRODUCTION

The problem of personal identity is a philosophical enquiry of re-identifications of persons. Some philosophers have said that we are never concerned with this problem because sameness and changes are themselves incompatible, while some others opine that sameness and changes are compatible. In this regard philosophers accept two criteria of personal identity in order to explore the mystery of personal identity. They are : i) Bodily identity and ii) Memory identity. Now, we will discuss the above two criteria one by one in order to discuss the problem.

5.3 BODILY CRITERION

Bodily criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of bodily identity. In an article on Spiritualism, F.H. Bradley argues that bodily identity is a necessary criterion for self-identity. The necessity of identifying self by their bodies has been urged by B.A.O Williums in Personal Identity and Individuation. Like Bradley Williums argues that "Bodily identity is always a necessary condition of personal identity". But A.J. Ayer holds that personal identity cannot be defined in terms of bodily identity. The self or person is not the same as the body even if the identity of the self rests on the identity of the body. The body is our means of identification, but is not the identity that is identified in case of personal identity.

There are some philosophers like Strawson and Ayer, who are directly or indirectly agreed with the criterion of bodily identity. According to Strawson, the concept of personal identity is "of relatively minor significance." He discusses this concept in the light of the thesis that the concept of person alone is primitive. He points out that we can identify a person by his corporeal characteristics as well as his other characteristics. He denies the primary existence of the particular consciousness and avoids the claim of body as the criterion of personal identity.

Like Strawson, Ayer also discusses the concept of personal identity in a different style. He does not accept the problem of personal identity. Ayer does not accept the view that there can be perceptions independent of any physical body. There is no principle by which independent perceptions can be identified or grouped together. Memory is related to the bundles of experiences. But this is open to the charge of circularity because memory implies the thinking of an event as well as an experience of one's own.

The view that personal identity depends upon the identity of the body is open to the subject of criticism because the bodily criterion seems to be non-functional in case of disembodied existence. Ayer thinks that Strawson was misled by the 'picture of a heap of experiences' which have to be assigned to their respective owners. But this picture is not correct

because the question - are experiences dependent upon a particular body?- cannot be raised in the context of personal identity. Experiences of a person cannot be counted unless by reference to the persons.

Ayer holds that persons are identified in terms of their bodies. An experience denotes one's own body which is a necessary condition of the occurrences of experiences. There is no question of the occurrence of experiences when one's body does not exist. That is why Ayer's view is that a person's body is immediately necessary for experience. But it cannot be stated that my experiences are dependent on the state or behaviour of another person. However, one's experiences can affect other perceptions. In order to be influenced by another's behaviour, one must observe other behaviour, which is considered necessary for my having experience. Ayer comes to the conclusion that his theory about the identity of the person in terms of the body is immediately necessitated by the states of the body of the person. Ayer does not want to hold the physicalistc thesis that persons are bodies. Nor does he hold that mental phenomena are physical phenomena. He recognizes a separate identity and existence of mental phenomena, but not independent of the body. Similarly, he recognizes that memory plays a part in the identity of a person but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion or condition. It cannot independently be the criterion of personal identity without the identity of the body.

Bernard Williams', Terence Penelhumand and others also advocate the view that personal identity consists in the identity of the body. Ayer's thesis on the bodily identity rules out any possibility of disembodied existence or person. However, from the religious point of view disembodied existence or life after death is accepted. In this context, Anthony Flew maintains: "a disembodied person is no more a special sort of person than is an imaginary person and disembodiment is no more a possible state of a person than is non-existence." (Flew, A: Can a man witness His own funeral?" in Blackstone, W.T.(ed.) Meaning and Existence (p.614)

Sydney Shoemaker views that memory is a criterion, but this does

not mean that it is a logically necessary and logically sufficient criterion for personal identity. Memory criteria cannot be used independently without presuming a stable relation between bodily identity and links of memory. That is why, the bodily identity is fundamental.

Bernard Williams' in his Personal identity and Individuation deals with this view prior to Shoemaker in a different but convincing style. His example is that of a Charles who claims to remember the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes. Williams in this regard opines that if it is possible then Charles should undergo the changes (described) like the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes. Similarly, it is also conceivable that Charles' Brother, Robert should undergo exactly the similar changes. And both should claim to remember the actions and experiences of Guy Fawkes to be their own actions and experiences. But, the point is that they cannot be both Guy Fawkes. And if it is possible then Guy Fawkes would be in two places at once, which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both identical with Guy Fawkes, they would be identical with each other, which is also absurd." (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1956-57)

Materialism is a term which refers to a philosophy in which value is ascribed to physical objects rather than to moral or aesthetic qualities. This theory of personal identity is used particularly in two areas. They are i) The philosophy of mind, ii) and Marxist philosophy. The first one holds that matter alone exists and mind and matter can be explained in terms of changes in matter. And the second one refers to the mechanism which generates social change. The strict sense of materialism holds that the mind is regulated completely by the physical activities or functions of the brain. In this context different viewpoints from different groups of philosophers are found in this regard. The first group, which is formed by materialists like David Armstrong, advocates that the mind is regulated fully by the physical functions of the brain. Besides they hold that all the human sciences can be reduced to physics.

The second group of philosophers, who follow the viewpoints of

Brentano, claim that there is a difference between two types of functions of the mind. The first one involves the processing of information, which is subject to the laws of nature, while the other involves the intentionality, which is free from some of the restrictions imposed by physical laws.

Some philosophers view that the body criterion is not the criterion at all because there are some occasions in which we find human bodies that are not persons. As for example a man in a state of comma is biologically alive but incapable any bodily or mental function.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What are the two critera of personal identity?

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Q 2: Name the two philosophers who advocate the criterion of bodily identity.

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Q 3: What is the view of materialism in case of personal identity? (Answer in about 20 words)

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Q 4: State whether the following statements are True or False:

a) Bodily criterion is the only criterion for self identity. (True/ False)

b) Bernard Williums advocates the bodily criterion. (True/ False)

c) Aristotle advocates bodily criteria in personal identity.(True/False)

Q 5: What are two specific areas of materialism?

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Q 6: What do you mean by strict sense of materialism in case of personal identity?(Answer in about 20 words)

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ACTIVITY: 3.1

Q1: Do you agree to the view that bodily criterion is the sole criterion of personal identity? Discuss

Ans: .....

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5.4 MEMORY CRITERION

It is admitted that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. It has been suggested that memory is a criterion of self-identity. One knows that he is the same person who has witnessed, endured, felt, so and so without knowing about his body. So, when someone does not apply the bodily criterion, he must apply some other criterion which could only be memory.

Locke says that it is the consciousness that constitutes personal identity. He argues that only by consciousness we can identify ourselves. It is this consciousness which indicates different senses and perceptions, and thoughts and desires at any time, that belongs to one self and accounts for the sameness of the self at different times.

Locke clearly states that the existence of a spiritual substance or soul does not determine the personal identity because if there were soul substances, then, presumably, the substance can be re-incarnated. As for instance, Let us presume that A may have the soul of Socrates but he has no consciousness of any of the Socrates' action or thought; then Locke argues that he is not the same person as Socrates.

There is circularity reasoning associated with Locke's view that memory is the sole criterion. The circularity reasoning has been pointed out by Butler for the first time. Butler rejected Locke's view that memory can be recognized as the sole criterion on the ground that consciousness of a personal identity presupposes personal identity. This is the circularity objection.

Descartes holds that the concept of person is both extended and thinking. As a thinking being he is unextended and from the bodily point of view he is extended. And therefore, to Descartes, mind and body are separable. Locke accepts Descartes' point of view in case of a thing, which is found itself in a body. According to him, a person is 'a thinking reasoning, and reflective being' to consider himself to be the same thing in different places and times. Like Descartes, he did not deduce the view that mind and body were inseparable. The main intention of Locke is to deduce the criteria for determining the continued identity of a person over time in case of personal identity.

Locke introduced the concept of criteria in order to identify a person. Unlike Descartes he distinguished between the person, what he was and the criteria which is needed to re-identify the person. Locke in this regard put forward two types of questions, what is a person? And how do we identify a person? Locke holds that a person stands for " a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."(1690, II, Chap, 27, Section 9) Although this definition of a person refers to intrinsic property of the person without requirement of criteria to identify a person, yet he is concerned with

the second question that is how do we identify a person as the same person on different occasions? Locke addresses this question in his book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding with these words 'For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only,……..' Through this saying Locke holds that the continuity of consciousness determines the continuing identity of a person. Locke completes the sentence by stating "whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances." (1690- Chap.27, Sec 10)

Descartes, Hume and Kant uphold consciousness as the sole key to personal identity. Most modern philosophers and psychologists would argue that you cannot have a concept of 'who you are' unless you are also sometimes self-conscious. Conversely, you cannot even be self-conscious unless you have some sense of identity. The two concepts are so interrelated that one cannot be separated from the other. Many philosophers have argued that not only self-consciousness is crucial in order to know one's own individuality but it is also crucial for establishing that one is an enduring self that is the same person ever time. Descartes is an example who holds the criteria of self-consciousness in order to identify a self. Regarding the question of what am I? Descartes replies that I am a thing with desires, who perceives light and noise and feels heat. Descartes concept of self is of thought or consciousness which is considered a human essence. Generally each person possesses it and by which each person identifies himself or herself. Descartes, by his concept of doubt, wants to show that the concept of body is not important in case of personal identity. Therefore, he concludes that it is not my body that provides me with an identity; rather he claims that the concept of self provides me with an identity. It follows from this that the particular aspects of my self- whether I am male or female, black or white, tall or short, handsome or ugly, strong or weak are associated with my body only and in fact these cannot be essential to my identity. "My self-identity is in my mind, thinking, doubting, feeling, perceiving, imagining, and describing. I am, essentially a "thing that thinks." (Descartes')

Descartes in Mediations VI mentions that self identity depends on consciousness. Our identity does not depend on our body, which remains the same, and so human identity is different from the identity of anything else in the world.

Like Descartes, John Locke also holds that self- consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes, he views that self-identity does not depend on our remaining the same thinking substance that is the soul. Because, to Locke, in course of our life our soul might be replaced with new souls just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. The tree remains the same tree because the same life is present in spite of changes in its physical structure. And what makes a person the same person is that the same consciousness and memories are present. Therefore, Locke differs from Descartes' in distinguishing between the soul and consciousness. It is our consciousness that we call our 'self'.

Although Locke's theory has some advantage over Descartes' personal identity in terms of consciousness without requirement of a persisting immaterial soul, still it has some difficulties. Although we can remember our past experiences, still there is every possibility of forgetting our own experiences. So, the question is, can we remember everything that has ever happened to us? It is not possible for a human being to remember everything that had happened in life. Even a person who has a very good memory does not remember being born, learning to walk or what he had for breakfast on June 3, 2001. Can anybody claim that he remembers everything that had happened in life earlier? That is why, the memory criterion is not a satisfactory criterion in case of personal identity.

Our memories are not always accurate. Sometimes we remember things that have never happened. As for instance, we do remember that this book was in the hand of my friend, but unfortunately this book was in my almirah when I opened it. So, in this case the memory criterion sometimes deceives us. Again, we can speak of deluded and deranged memories. Here, these types of memories fail to play a key role as a criterion of personal

identity. They are not considered genuine memories; rather they are considered apparent memories which guarantee self-identity. In this case we must find a way to distinguish between cases in which a memory is genuine and those in which it is not. If we were able to do it, then the memory criterion is to be circular. Again, in case of distinguishing the genuine from apparent memories, we search for the existence of a persisting, self-identical person. It raises the question: whether the self-identity can be explained through memory criterion. (It raises the question: was it not for the fact that the concept of self-identity is probably what we trying to explain?) So, we cannot use the concept of memory to explain self-identity. Here, it seems that in stead of explaining the concept of self identity through memory criterion, we use the concept of self identity to explain memory. That is why if we reflect on the nature of genuine memory, we can say that Locke was putting the cart before the horse, that is, he was explaining the memory criterion through the personal identity.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.7: State the names of two philosophers who advocate the memory criterion for self-identity.

Ans:.....

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Q.8: Write Locke's view on memory criterion. (Answer in about 40 words)

Ans: .....

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Q.9: What is the circularity objection raised by Butler against Locke? (Answer in about 40 words)

Ans:.....

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Q.10: What is the difference between Locke and Descartes in case of personal identity? (Answer in about 85 words)

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Q. 11: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) To Hume, Personal identity is nothing but fictitious identity. (True/ False)

b) Hume defines man as nothing but the bundle of perception or experiences. (True/ False)

c) Descartes in his book Meditations VI holds that self identity depends upon consciousness. (True/False)

Q 12: Explain one of the difficulties of memory criterion. (Answer in about 100 words)

Ans:.....

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Q 13: State whether the following statements are True or False

a) Aristotle did not believe in memory criterion. (True/False)

b) According to Hume, "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception." (True/False)

c) Memory criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. (True/False)

d) The circularity objection is associated with Locke in case of Personal identity. (True/False)



ACTIVITY: 5.2

Q1: Do you support that memory is the sole criterion? If it is so, discuss.

Ans: .....

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5.5 JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S VIEWPOINT ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

One of the most powerful schools of contemporary thought is existentialism. It views that self-identity is a matter of individual choice. Jean Paul Sartre, a French Philosopher, is one of the serious advocates of existentialism. According to Sartre, there are no set standards for self-identity, either for individual or for people in general. Existence is prior to essence. Man is responsible for what he is. And when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that is he is also responsible for all men. The question that can be asked regarding the self identity is- is self identity a matter of choice? According to the existentialist, a person chooses as to which facts are to be considered as existential. Are the facts alone ever sufficient to determine our identity? According to Sartre, it is not possible, which he adapted from the German existentialist Martin Heidegger. The facts that are true of a person are always only indicative of what a person has been and has done so far. In case of judging personal identity or self identity we must always consider more than the facts that are true of him or her. It indicates that we must also consider their projections into the future, their ambitions, planes, intentions, hopes and fantasies. Sartre calls these considerations a person's transcendence. This way of viewing the person makes the question of self-

identity complex and irresolvable. For example, we can consider Sartre's example of bad faith in his important work Being and Nothingness.

Bad faith implies the denial of oneself. This can happen in two different ways- either you can refuse to accept the facts and actions as relevant to your self identity or you can go too far in the opposite direction believing that your actions conclusively and unalterably establish your identity as a coward. In case of Bad faith, he points out an example: a homosexual frequently has an intolerable feeling of guilt, and his whole existence is determined in relation to this feeling. One will readily see that he is in bad faith. Sartre tells us, "One is what one is not, and one is not what one is." The homosexual in Sartre's example is a homosexual to the extent that all his past actions and desires are those of a homosexual. He falls into bad faith by refusing to accept his past actions as a homosexual. However, at the same time, there is a genuine sense in which he is not homosexual. Because, in the future he may radically alter his life style which totally denies that he was a homosexual in the past. As long as a person is alive, he or she is identified by intentions, plans, dreams, and hopes. Therefore, the problem of deciding "who I am" makes the issue of personal identity dramatic and more complicated.

5.6 CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Sydney Shoemaker has argued that it is a logical truth that memory claims are usually true, not an inductive one.

A) If someone frequently said that he remembered the events which did not occur then we would conclude that he did not know how to use the word 'remember.'

B) A child learns language only through the word 'remember.'

C) Memory is not criterion. The criterion is qualitative similarity between the body I now see and the body I now remember

Memory merely supplies one half of the material in terms of re-identifying of persons.

According to Hume, personal identity is nothing but fictitious identity. It is fictitious because the memory criterion and the bodily identity are irrelevant. Hume realized that certain basic notions are contained in Locke's view of personal identity. But against the view of Locke, he opines that there is nothing immaterial substance as claimed by Locke. Hume defines man as nothing but a bundle of perceptions or experiences.

It can be viewed that both are ineluctable components of our concept of a person. The bodily criterion is fundamental but the memory criterion is indispensible because of the basic epistemological status of memory itself. But the important result is that it is absurd to consider memory as the sole criterion of identity. Again, it is absurd to regard that bodily criterion fares better than memory criterion. In this context Shoemaker's view is important: "Just as the memory criterion is dependent upon the bodily criterion, so also the bodily criterion is dependent upon the mental criterion." The bodily criterion is more extensive than memory criterion. The bodily criterion is more varied. There are more ways in which we can determine whether a person is physically same or not. As for instance, blood tests, finger points, photographs, the testimony of witness are the ways of re-identifying of persons.

It is the empirical self that identifies individual persons. The transcendental self makes human consciousness possible. What is it that makes one "the same person from moment to moment and year to year? The sptio-temporal continuity of the body would seem to be a part of the answer. But philosophers since Descartes have seen quite clear that this is never enough, so, he puts the view that self-consciousness provides the key to self identity. But this has not solved the problem. As for instance, Jones has an emergency brain operation. His own brain is removed and replaced by the brain of Brown. "Jones" still looks like Jones, still carries the same driver's license and lives in the same house, but all of his memories and personality traits are those of Brown. Is he still Jones? Or is he Brown in Jones' body? Suppose you had been Brown, could you claim to be still alive in Jones' Body? This example beautifully shows that neither bodily

identity nor memory identity can be the sole criteria for personal identity. It indicates that both are equally important in case of identification of a person. As we enquire after a person involving the issue of personal identity, so, re-identification of a person directs that both memory and bodily identity are equally important. That is why, the discussion of this issue by taking the criteria of one without the other would be incomplete or mere discussion only.

Modern theories of personal identity advocate the notion of memory, self consciousness or psychological continuity. But, it is worth mentioning that Aristotle did not believe this criterion like Descartes and Locke did. According to Aristotle, self-identity was essentially bodily identity without any particular reference to self-awareness.

Hume does not accept Locke's and Descartes' view of self-identity. He holds that any idea must be derived from an impression. Hume argues that when we are self-conscious it means that we are only aware of feeling, thoughts, and perceptions. But, we do not have an impression of the self or a thinking substance. According to Hume, "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception." He concludes that the idea of self is simply only a fiction. We are never aware of any enduring self. Again, we are never justified in claiming that we are the same person we were a year or a minute ago. According to Hume, the concept of identity to things and persons arises due to spatio-temporal continuity of things. As for instance, the tree is in the same place at different times. People, however, have the troublesome habit of moving around, going to Europe for the summar or college for the semester. We can still see the continuity of his or her movement. The same person receives postcards from appropriate places at the appropriate times. Therefore, we conclude that it is the same person. In addition to spatio-temporal continuity we ordinarily rely on resemblance as a criterion of identity. We tolerate small changes, a hair cut or a new scar, perhaps even a lost leg or a bit of plastic surgery. As long as there is a strong resemblance between two individuals, we think of them as the same. Hume, however, argues that spatio-temporal

continuity and resemblance do not in fact guarantee identity.

Kant holds the view that the self is not the bundle of our experiences. It is rather the transcendental thread that holds them together and is as real as any experience. Kant agrees with Hume in the sense that the enduring self is not an object of experience. Kant agrees with Descartes in some respects. Descartes thought that we had to be self conscious all the time, but Kant points out that it is only necessary for the " the 'I think' to be able to accompany all experiences." It is not necessary to be always conscious of ourselves but only to be, at any point in our experience, capable of becoming self conscious. According to Descartes, this is not possible because to exist as a human being is to exist self-consciously. But in this regard Kant holds that to exist as a human being is 'to be able" to be self- conscious. Kant objects to Descartes' view that the thinking self is a thinking thing. Kant disregards this view that the self is not in our experience but rather behind it and responsible for it. He says that the self must be thought of as an activity. This is the modified view of Kant which was earlier found in Plato, in Christianity, and also in modern thought. The soul is simply self-conceived of as a thing, an enduring thing that can survive after the death of the body. By saying that the self is an activity Kant undermines the traditional concept of soul.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 14: What is bad faith, according to Sartre?(Answer in about 90 words)

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Q15: What is Sartre's view on Personal identity? (Answer in about 70 words)

Ans: .....

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ACTIVITY: 5.3

Are memory and bodily criterion equally important in the discussion of personal identity? What do you think? Discuss

Ans: .....

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5.7 LET US SUM UP

- Generally philosophers accept two criteria in case of re-identification of a person. They are: Bodily criterion and memory criterion.
- Bernard Williams, Terence Penelhumand and others advocate the view that personal identity consists in the identity of the body.
- Shoemaker opines that memory is a criterion, but this does not mean that it is a logically necessary and logically sufficient criterion for personal identity. Memory criteria cannot be used independently without presuming a stable relation between bodily identity and links of memory. That is why, the bodily identity is fundamental.
- Locke introduced the concept of criteria in order to identify a person. Unlike Descartes he distinguished between the person, what he was, and the criteria which is needed to re-identify the person.
- Descartes in Meditations VI mentions that self identity depends on consciousness. Our identity does not depend on our body, which remains the same, and so human identity is different from the identity of anything else in the world.

- Like Descartes, John Locke holds that self-consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes he views that self-identity does not depend on our remaining the same thinking substance that is the soul. According to Locke, our soul might be replaced with new souls in course of our life just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. The tree remains the same tree because the same life is present in spite of changes in its physical strucrure.

- Bodily criterion asserts that self-identity can be defined in terms of bodily identity. In an article on Spiritualism, F.H. Bradley argues that bodily identity is a necessary criterion for self-identity. The necessity of identifying self by their bodies has ben urged by B.A.O Williams in Personal identity and Individuation. Like Bradley, Williams argues that bodily identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.

- A.J. Ayer holds that personal identity cannot be defined in terms of bodily identity. The self or person is not the same as the body even if the identity of the self rests on the identity of the body. The body is our means of identification, but is not that, that is identified in case of personal identity.

- Memory criterion holds that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory. One knows that he is the same person who witnessed, endured, felt so and so without knowing about his body. So, when the body criterion does not function, he must apply the memory criterion.

- The circularity reasoning is associated with Locke's view that memory is the sole criterion. It has been pointed out by Butler for the first time. He rejected Locke's view that memory can be recognized as the sole criterion on the ground that consciousness of a personal identity presupposes personal identity. This is the circularity objection.

- Both body and memory criterions are ineluctable components of our concept of a person. It is absurd to consider memory as the sole criterion of identity. Again, it is absurd to regard that bodily criterion fares better

than memory criterion. In this sense Shoemaker's view is important: "Just as the memory criterion is dependent upon the bodily identity, so also the bodily criterion dependent upon the mental criterion."

- Existentialism views that self-identity is a matter of individual choice. One of the serious advocates of existentialism is Jean Paul Sartre, who views that there are no specific standards for self identity either for individual or for people in general. In case of judging personal identity, he holds that we must consider people's projections into the future, ambitions, planes, intentions, hopes and fantasies.

- Bad faith implies the denial of one's own identity in the context of past behaviour of a man in comparison to the present status of the person.

5.8 FURTHER READING

1. Solomon, C. Robert. (2008). Introducing Philosophy. New York. Oxford University Press
2. Roberts, Francis. (2003). The Philosophy Workbook. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press
3. Hospers, John. (1971). An introduction to Philosophical Analysis. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private limited
4. Goswami, Sauravpran. The Strawsonian Concept of Person. Guwahti. Anwesha Book House

5.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q 1: Bodily and memory criterion

Ans to Q No 2: Bernard Williums, Terence Penelhumand

Ans to Q No 3: It holds that matter alone exists and mind and matter can be explained in terms of changes in matter.

Ans to Q No 4: a) True b)True c) True

Ans to Q No 5: a)The philosophy of mind and the Marxist philosophy

Ans to Q No 6: The strict sense of materialism holds that the mind is regulated fully by the physical activities or functions of the brain.

Ans to Q No 7: Locke, Descartes

Ans to Q No 8: Locke holds that we can identify ourselves by consciousness. Our consciousness indicates different senses and perceptions and thoughts and desires which belong to a person and which shows the sameness of the self at different times.

Ans to Q No 9: The circularity objection has been raised by Butler against the memory criterion of Locke in self-identity, who holds that memory is the sole criterion to re-identify the self. Butler relies on this view on the ground that consciousness pre-supposes the self-identity.

Ans to Q No 10: Like Descartes John Locke holds that self-consciousness is the sole key to self-identity. Unlike Descartes, he views that self-identity does not depend on our thinking Substance, that is the soul. Locke in this regard views that in course of our life our soul might be replaced with new souls just as in the course of a tree's growth its cells are replaced with new cells. Therefore, Locke differs from Descartes in distinguishing between soul and consciousness. It is our consciousness that we call our 'self'.

And to Q No 11: a) True b) True c) True
d) True e) True

Ans to Q No 12: Locke's theory is not free from difficulties. Although we can remember our past experiences, still there is every possibility of forgetting our own experiences. Therefore, the question is, can we remember everything that has ever happened to us? It is not possible for a human being to remember everything that has ever happened in life. Even a person who has a good memory does not remember being born, learning to walk or what he had breakfast on June 3, 2001. That is why, the memory criterion is not a satisfactory criterion in case of personal identity.

Ans to Q No 13: a) True b) True c) True
d) True e) True

Ans to Q No 14: Bad faith implies the denial of one's own identity by refusing to accept the past occurrences in life. Sartre says "One is what one is not, and one is not what one is." Sartre takes the example of a

homosexual to explain the concept of bad faith. A person is homosexual to the extent that all his past actions and desires are those of a homosexual. He falls into bad faith by refusing to see that his past actions point to his having a self-identity as a homosexual.

Ans to Q No 15: Sartre views that there are no set standards for self-identity either for individual or for people in general. Sartre holds that it is not possible to derive our identity from the facts alone. This view was adapted by him from Martin-Heidegger. Apart from the facts in judging a person's identity we must also consider a person's projections into the future, his ambitions, plans, intentions, hopes and fantasies.



5.10 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very short Questions

Q1: What are the criteria of personal identity?

Q2: Who are the advocates of bodily criterion?

Q3: What do you mean by bodily criterion?

Q4: State three philosophers' names who advocate memory criterion.

Q5: What is memory criterion?

Q6: What is bad faith?

B. Short Questions (Write in about 100-150 words)

Q1: Briefly comment on memory criterion.

Q2: What is bodily criterion? Discuss briefly.

Q3: Discuss briefly Sartre's concept of bad faith.

Q4: Briefly comment on Locke's personal identity.

C. Long Questions (Write in about 300-500 words)

Q1: Descartes' view of memory criterion

Q2: Bodily criterion

Q3: Bad faith

Q4: Sartre's exposition on personal identity

Q5: Locke's view on personal identity

D. Long Questions (Answer each question in about 300-500 words)

Q1: What is memory criterion? Discuss

Q2: Explain the bodily criterion.

Q3: Do you find any defects of memory criterion. Explain

Q4: Do you accept the view that bodily criterion is more satisfactory than the memory criterion? Explain

Q5: What are the defects involved in memory criterion? Discuss.

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