UNIT 15: J. N. MOHANTY: CONCEPT OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Unit Structure

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15.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- explain Mohanty's view on knowledge
- discuss Mohanty's examination of consciousness and cognition as they are found in Indian epistemology
- discuss his views on different sources of knowledge
- explain his view on Indian theories of error

15.2 INTRODUCTION

Jitendra Nath Mohanty is one of the most influential philosophers belonging to the 21st century India who have significant contributions to both western philosophy and Indian philosophy. His scholarly works

include twenty books and numerous journal articles on different areas of Philosophy especially epistemology, logic and phenomenology. He is one of the pioneers in the study of the link between Indian philosophy and phenomenology. He attempts to look back at the Indian philosophical schools from the phenomenological point of view which consequently paves the way for a meaningful dialogue between Indian and Western traditions. The present unit primarily covers Mohanty's interpretation of Indian epistemology.

15.3 MOHANTY ON KNOWLEDGE

Mohanty is of the opinion that the mere consciousness of an object is not knowledge of that object. There is a mode of consciousness which one may call 'thinking of' which is not yet knowing. For example, one may think of unicorns without knowing any.Knowing in the fully developed sense implies understanding. One cannot be said to know that S is P if one does not understand what is meant by 'S is P'. On the otherhand, merely to understand the meaning of a sentence is not thereby to know anything excepting that it means such and such which is rather a degenerate sense of 'knowing'. Considering these distinctions, one may want to say that a fully developed knowledge involves:

- Consciousness of something
- Understanding of the senses of the words and the sentence in which the cognitive state is expressed,
- A truth-claim to the effect that the thing is as it is thought to be.

In addition, the knowledge must be of some specific cognitive sort; for example, it must be either perceptual or inferential.

15.4 MOHANTY ON INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

Mohanty has undergone a detailed examination of Indian epistemology. In his book entitled "Classical Indian Philosophy", Mohanty has examined Indian epistemology from the sutra period through the seventieth century Navya-Nyaya. Mohanty has started his discussion on

Indian epistemology by taking into consideration the key Sanskrit terms used to denote knowledge. According to him, in the earlier philosophical discourse especially in the Upanisads, the Sankrit terms cit and jnana were used both of which are often rendered as 'knowledge' or cognition.Since cognitions may be either true or false and since only cognitions should be called knowledge so the Sanskrit term for knowledge is not jnana, but pramajnana or simply prama. Aprama stands for all cognitions that are not true.Mohanty has pointed out that whether cit or consciousness and jnana or cognition are the same or not is an open question; in some theories such as the Vedanta, they are different whereas in some others such as the Nyaya, they are same.

Mohanty has brought our attention to the fundamental questions which were being asked in Indian epistemological counterpart whose answers involve debates among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The very first question as Mohanty has pointed out is—what is the ontological nature of consciousness? Regarding this question, Mohanty has said that there are alternatives stating that consciousness is either a quality of the self to which it belongs, or it is an act of the self, or it is a substance that is identical with the self. With regard to the first alternative, there are two variations as according to one consciousness is as essential quality of the self whereas according to the other, the same is an accidental quality of the self. The third alternative, that is, the self is consciousness allows for various interpretations. According to Mohanty, the chief among them are the views given by the Samkhya-Vedanta view and the Vijnanavadin view. The Sankhya-Vedanta view is that both self and consciousness are eternal and unchanging and in the long run they are identical. On the otherhand, the Vijnanavadin's view is that the self is a succession of cognitive events of various kinds, supported by a deep-lying storehouse consciousness in which the perishing cognitions deposit their traces.Mohanty has stated that there is a problem for those who considers consciousness to bean essential property of the self and also for those who identify the self with

consciousness as they had to advance a suitable account of states of deep sleep and swoon when one appears to lose all consciousness whatsoever.

The second question as has been pointed out by Mohanty is that—how is cognition itself cognized? Mohanty has pointed out the various answers to this question available in Indian philosophical counterpart. He has maintained that the spiritualistic philosophies —— the Sankhya-Yoga, the Vedanta and the Buddhists—regard consciousness as self shining while the logical philosophies—the Nyaya-Vaisesika—regard it as an objective property of the self, not capable of showing itself without being the object of another conscious state.

The third and the fourth questions are—is consciousness intentional or not? And does a cognition has its own form or is it formless? With regard to these two questions, Mohanty points out, there are the following responses:

- According to Advaita Vedanta, consciousness is intrinsically non-intentional and formless. They are superimposed upon consciousness.
- The Nyay-vaisesika view is that consciousness is formless, but intrinsically intentional. As such the object is not a form or content of consciousness, but outside of it towards which consciousness is directed.
- According to the Vijnanavadins, consciousness is intentional in the sense that an act-content distinction is internal to it. The Sautrantikas not only accept the internal act-content distinction, but also admit an external object.

15.4.1 Prama Or True Cognition

In Indian epistemological counterpart, cognition is classified into Prama or true cognition and aprama or false cognition. Prama refers to that cognition which is true or possessing the property called pramanya while aprama is that cognition which is false or does not possess the property.

Mohanty is in search of the meaning of pramanya in Indian philosophy. He has pointed out that there are three views with regard to pramanya in Indian philosophy. The first view has been given by the Nyaya. This view takes pramanya to mean yatharthya or the property of being like the object. The second view advanced by the Buddhists is that truth is the property of causing successful practical response. The third view has been given by the Advaita Vedantins. The Advaita Vedantins reject both the Nyaya and Buddhist view. For them, there is no generalized positive criterion of truth. We can define truth only negatively—a cognition is true if and only if it is not contradicted by subsequent experience.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.1 State whether the following statements are True or False:

a) Mohanty is of the opinion that the mere consciousness of an object is not knowledge. (True/False)

b) Prama stands for false cognition in Indian philosophy. (True/ False)

c) With regard to the ontological nature of consciousness, the Sankhya-Vedanta view is that self and consciousness are identical. (True/False)

d) According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, consciousness is intrinsically non-intentional and formless. (True/False)

Q.2 What are the questions with regard to consciousness that can be found in Indian epistemology according to Mohanty?

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Q.3 How is pramanya defined in Indian epistemology according to Mohanty?

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15.4.2 Pramanas Or Sources Of True Cognition

Regarding pramana, Mohanty has pointed out that pramana is the way through which true cognition or prama can be attained. In the Indian epistemological counterpart, pramana is that by which true cognition is arrived at and as such it may be taken to be a cause of or a means for attaining true cognition. Mohanty has pointed out that Indian epistemology has this peculiar feature that the causal meaning of pramana is also taken to imply a legitimizing sense so that a cognition is true in case it is brought about in the right sort of way, that is, caused by a pramana. In Indian epistemology, a classification of prama is also a classification of the causes of prama. The recognized pramanas are-perception (pratyaksa), inference(anumana), verbal testimony (sabda), comparison (upamana), postulation (arthapatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).

15.4.2.1 Perception (Pratyaksa)

With regard to perception, Mohanty has pointed out that there are two types of definition of perception in Indian epistemology. First, the definition is given in terms of how perceptual cognition is cognized and second, the definition is given in terms of the nature of cognition.Perception is defined in

terms of how the cognition is caused by the Nyaya. According to the Nyaya, perceptual cognition is that cognition that is caused by the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects. Later Naiyayikas advance a negative definition of perception according to which perception is that cognition that is not caused by another cognition. As such it excludes inference, memory and verbal knowledge.

Mohanty has pointed out that there are three kinds of the definitions of perception that are given in terms of the nature of cognition. The first and probably the earliest is given by the Buddhist logician Dignag. He has defined perception as that cognition which is free from any concept. Dharmakirti added to this the clause “which is unerring” in order to indicate that in pure sensation we are in touch with ultimate reality.

The second way of defining perception in terms of its cognitive features is to be found in the Jaina system of Indian philosophy.Defining perception in terms of its vividness, the Jainas have maintained that perception manifests its object with clarity and distinctness and manifests it as a substance and also in its mode. It is also conceptual in as much as it manifests universal features of objects.

The third way of defining perception is given by Advaita Vedantins. Advaita Vedanta has defined perception in terms of immediacy. Perception is immediate. What is immediately apprehended is consciousness and consciousness as such is perception.

15.4.2.2 Inference (Anumana)

Next to perception, the pramana accepted is inference which refers to a cognition that follows upon some other cognition or cognitions. All Indian philosophers, except the materialist Carvaka, recognize inference as a valid source of knowledge. Mohanty has pointed out that inference gives rise to logical

theories or rules of evidence and the structure of a good argument. Gautama's Nyayasutra and Dignaga's Hetucakra are indispensable guides in this regard.

Discussing Naiyayika's psychological account of inference, Mohanty notes its correspondence to the logical sequence as he claims that the logical structure represents not how we infer, but how as a matter of fact, we do infer.

Mohanty has pointed out that the problem of induction also is discussed by the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas alike. Their question is—how is the universal concomitance between the mark and the inferred property, technically called vyapti, ascertained? According to Mohanty, there are three sorts of responses with regard to the ascertainment of Vyapti. First response is of the materialists who hold that the universal relation cannot be determined as there being always room for doubt about the unobserved cases. The Buddhists especially Dharmakirti's response is metaphysical as he says that we can determine the universal relation only if we can determine either the relation of essential identity or the relation of cause and effect between the two terms. But this gives rise to another question—how are these relations to be ascertained? If by observation, then we resort to the third response given by the Naiyayikas. According to this response, we ascertain the relation of universal concomitance between x and y by perceiving that in all cases the presence of x is accompanied by the presence of y and not perceiving any contrary instance.

15.4.2.3 Verbal Testimony (Sabda)

Except, the Lokayatas, the Buddhists and the Vaisesikas, all other schools of Indian philosophy, recognize sabda or verbal testimony as a pramana. Sabda refers to the utterance of sentences by competent speakers. In Indian epistemological counterpart, Mohanty asserts, there are three sorts of conditions

that must be fulfilled so that upon hearing an utterance, one may be able to make a justified claim that one knows that something is the case. The conditions are—utterer conditions, linguistic conditions and understanding conditions.

The utterer conditions include—

- The hearer must be in the presence of the utterer when he makes the utterance
- The utterer must have intellectual competence, that is, he must know what he is talking about and moral competence, that is, he must be sincere and thankful.

The linguistic conditions include—

- Contiguity: the utterances of words must follow each other in close temporal succession
- Syntactic intention: utterance of a word must be followed by one from a suitable syntactical category such that the two convey a unified meaning.
- Semantic appropriateness: the succeeding word must not only be syntactically appropriate, but also semantically appropriate.

The understanding conditions include—

- The hearer must understand the meanings of the competent words
- He must recognize the syntactical and semantic appropriateness
- He must be able to disambiguate a sentence, when necessary, by identifying the intention of the speaker.

Mohanty has pointed out that along with the discussion of sabda or verbal testimony, Indian philosophers bring the problem of meaning—word meaning and sentential meaning. With regard to word meaning, Mohanty asserts, there are an array of views—the Miamamsa view that words designate universals. For example, the word ‘cow’ means ‘cowness’; the Nyaya view that words mean neither bare particulars nor universals, but particulars as qualified by universals; the Buddhists view that words mean exclusion or apoha. With regard to the meaning of

sentences, there are two questions—does the meaning consist only in the facts they sate or does it consist in some relevance to possible action that they invoke the audience to undertake? The second and the most important question is—which is prior, word meaning or sentence meaning and according to Mohanty, this question is central to philosophy of language. According to the Nyaya and Kumarila, word meaning is prior and sentential meanings are to be constructed out of word meanings. On the otherhand, the Prabhakara school accorded priority to sentential meaning.

15.4.2.4 Comparison (Upamana), Non-Perception (Anupalabdhi), Postulation (Arthapatti)

Upamana or comparison is the knowledge of similarity—at first verbal, then perceptual and finally memory—which is the cause of the cognition and so is the upamana as a pramana. Anupalabdhi is the way of apprehending the absence of an object. Arthapatti refers to the postulation of an unperceived fact in order to explain given fact. Mohanty has pointed out that there are several other candidates for recognition as pramanas such as memory, sambhava or inclusion and aitihya or tradition. Sambhava includes such cognitions as “the number one hundred includes the number fifty”. Attempts are there in indian epistemology to reduce such cognition to inference. Knowledge derived from tradition is often reduced to sabda or verbal testimony. A similar negative attitude, Mohanty asserts, is more often than not exhibited towards memory. Except Jainism, memory is excluded on the ground that it is not an independent pramana, it always referring back to prior experience. Another criticism against memory is that it cognizes by repeating what is already known.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.4 There are ——types of definition of perception in Indian epistemology

a. Two b. Four

c. Six d. Nine

Q.5 "Perception is that cognition which is free from any concept". Whose definition is this

a. Nyaya

b. Advaita Vedanta

c. Dignag

d. Dharmakirti

Q.6 What are the conditions found in Indian epistemology with regard to sabda according to Mohanty?

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15.4.3 Theories Of Error (Khyativada)

Mohanty has pointed out that Indian philosophers were pre-occupied principally with perceptual error or rather with non-veridical perception. Every school of philosophy developed its own theory of error made to fit its epistemology and metaphysics. In this regard, Mohanty wants to draw our attention to two things. For him, it is easy for a realist to produce a theory of truth since he believes in the mind-independent existence and nature of the objects of cognition, but a theory of error is difficult to give in as

much as in the latter case either the existence of the object of cognition or its nature or both do not seem to be mind-independent. On the otherhand, for an idealist, a theory of error is easy to produce since the object of erroneous cognition looks like being mind-dependent while a theory of truth has to depart from a common notion of correspondence.

While taking up the Indian theories of error, Mohanty has summarized the materialist, idealist and realist approaches to the rope-snake illusion and has suggested three criteria that have to be accounted for by the theories. First, each theory has to appropriate the fact that the non-veridical perception of a snake and the veridical perception of a snake are exactly alike to begin with; second, the theory must be able to take into account the fact of correction of the illusion, with which the non-veridical perception first is recognized to be non-veridical. Third, the theory must also be able to include a reflective interpretation of the entire experience as it arises, unfolds, gets transformed, then is rejected, but still is recalled and marveled at. Mohanty goes on to enquire whether all these aspects can be taken care of by any theory. The theories of error are:

i. That what is being perceived, the illusory snake is really non-existent. This theory is called asatkhyativada upheld by the Carvakas. With reard to this theory, Mohanty observes that a non-existent thing like a round square cannot be perceptually presented. Correction of the illusion does not attest to the object's non-existence, but only to its not being real.

ii. That it is really a mental state that is projected outside the illusory snake, being a mental image. This theory is called atmakhyativada upheld by the yoacara Buddhists. In the context of this theory, Mohanty says that one needs an explanation of how a mental entity can be perceived to be out there and to say that it is somehow projected is not to remove that puzzlement.

Moreover, correction does not testify to the object's status as a mental entity.

iii. That what is being perceived by itself is real, error consisting in mistaking a part for the whole. This theory is called satkhyativada upheld by Ramanuja's Vedanta. With regard to this theory, Mohanty's observation is that it misses the nature of hallucination, not to speak for non-veridical perception, which is not merely supplemented by more knowledge, but totally negated.


iv. That the supposed erroneous cognition really consists of two different cognitions, a perception and a memory—each by itself is true, there being no erroneous cognition over and above a failure to distinguish between the two. This theory is called akhyativada upheld by Prabhakara Mimamsa. Mohanty has pointed out that the problem with this theory is that it gives no good account for why and how one fails to distinguish between a perception and a memory.

v. That as in the previous one, of the two component cognitions, the object of one, namely this, is taken to be the snake which is the object of the other, the memory. This theory is called viparitakhyativada upheld by kumarila Mimamsa. With regard to this theory, Mohanty has observed that it has to explain how a memory image could be identified with a percept.

vi. That the snake perceived under illusion is a real snake, only it is elsewhere, not here in front of the perceiver, but is presented through an extraordinary causal process that is mediated by remembrance of past perception of that object. This theory is called anyathakhyativada upheld by the Nyaya. Regarding this theory, Mohanty says that it has to give a credible account of how after all a snake which is not present before me can be perceived to be here and now; the putative mechanism of extra-ordinary perception itself is in need of credible explanation.

vii. That the non-veridical perception is as much a unified cognition as is the veridical, only its object (the snake) is neither existent

since it is negated by the knowledge of the rope, nor non-existent since it is perceptually presented and so is indescribable as being either. This theory is called anirvacaniyakhyativada upheld by Sankara Vedanta. With regard to this theory, Mohanty asserts that the Advaita Vedanat theory claims to be taking into account all aspects of the situation, but pays the price of adding a new ontological category—that which is indescribable either as existent or as non-existent, otherwise called 'false'. A definition of false is this: a thing is false if it is negated in the very same locus where it was perceived. The causal problem of such an entity remains a problem.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q.7 Indian philosophers were pre-occupied principally with perceptual error or rather with non-veridical perception. (True/False)

Q.8 Explain Mohanty's observation on Indian theories of error.

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15.5 LET US SUM UP

- Jitendra Nath Mohanty is one of the most influential philosophers belonging to the 21st century India who have significant contributions to both western philosophy and Indian philosophy.
- Mohanty is of the opinion that the mere consciousness of an object is not knowledge of that object. Knowing in the fully developed sense implies understanding.
- Mohanty has undergone a detailed examination of Indian epistemology. In his book entitled “Classical Indian Philosophy”, Mohanty has examined Indian epistemology from the sutra period through the seventieth century Navya-Nyaya.
- Mohanty has brought our attention to the fundamental questions which were being asked in Indian epistemological counterpart whose answers involve debates among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The questions are:
  i. What is the ontological nature of consciousness?
  ii. How is cognition itself cognized?
  iii. Is cit intentional or not?
  iv. Does a cognition have its own form or is it formless?
- In Indian epistemological counterpart, cognition is classified into Prama or true cognition and aprama or false cognition. Prama refers to that cognition which is true or possessing the property called pramanya while aprama is that cognition which is false or does not possess the property. Mohanty is in search of the meaning of pramanya in Indian philosophy. He has pointed out that there are three views with regard to pramanya in Indian philosophy given by Nyaya, Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta.
- With regard to perception, Mohanty has pointed out that there are two types of definition of perception in Indian epistemology. First, the definition is given in terms of how perceptual cognition is

cognized and second, the definition is given in terms of the nature of cognition.

- Mohanty has pointed out that inference gives rise to logical theories or rules of evidence and the structure of a good argument. Discussing Naiyayika's psychological account of inference, Mohanty notes its correspondence to the logical sequence as he claims that the logical structure represents not how we infer, but how as a matter of fact, we do infer. Mohanty has pointed out that the problem of induction also is discussed by the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas alike. Their question is—how is the universal concomitance between the mark and the inferred property, technically called vyapti, ascertained? According to Mohanty, there are three sorts of responses with regard to the ascertainment of Vyapti.
- Mohanty has pointed out that Indian philosophers were pre-occupied principally with perceptual error or rather with non-veridical perception. Every school of philosophy developed its own theory of error made to fit its epistemology and metaphysics.



15.6 FURTHER READING

1. Mohanty, J.N. (1992). *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
2. Mohanty, J.N. (2000).*Classical Indian Philosophy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford.



15.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answer to Q No 1: a. True b. False c. True d. False

Answer to Q No 2: i) What is the ontological nature of consciousness?

ii) How is cognition itself cognized?

iii) Is cit intentional or not?

iv) Does a cognition have its own form or is it formless?

Answer to Q No. 3: In Indian epistemological counterpart, cognition is classified into Prama or true cognition and aprama or false cognition. Prama refers to that cognition which is true or possessing the property called pramanya while aprama is that cognition which is false or does not possess the property. Mohanty is in search of the meaning of pramanya in Indian philosophy. He has pointed out that there are three views with regard to pramanya in Indian philosophy. The first view has been given by the Nyaya. This view takes pramanya to mean yatharthya or the property of being like the object. The second view advanced by the Buddhists is that truth is the property of causing successful practical response. The third view has been given by the Advaita Vedantins. The Advaita Vedantins reject both the Nyaya and Buddhist view. For them, there is no generalized positive criterion of truth. We can define truth only negatively—a cognition is true if and only if it is not contradicted by subsequent experience.

Answer to Q No. 4: a). two

Answer to Q No. 5: c) Dignag

Answer to Q No. 6: In Indian epistemological counterpart, Mohanty asserts, there are three sorts of conditions that must be fulfilled so that upon hearing an utterance, one may be able to make a justified claim that one knows that something is the case. The conditions are—utterer conditions, linguistic conditions and understanding conditions.

The utterer conditions include—

- The hearer must be in the presence of the utterer when he makes the utterance
- The utterer must have intellectual competence, that is, he must know what he is talking about and moral competence, that is, he must be sincere and thankful.

The linguistic conditions include—

- Contiguity: the utterances of words must follow each other in close temporal succession
- Syntactic intention: utterance of a word must be followed by one from a suitable syntactical category such that the two convey a unified meaning.
- Semantic appropriateness: the succeeding word must not only be syntactically appropriate, but also semantically appropriate.

The understanding conditions include—

- The hearer must understand the meanings of the competent words
- He must recognize the syntactical and semantic appropriateness
- He must be able to disambiguate a sentence, when necessary, by identifying the intention of the speaker.

Answer to Q No 7: True

Answer to Q No 8: While taking up the Indian theories of error, Mohanty has summarized the materialist, idealist and realist approaches to the rope-snake illusion and has suggested three criteria that have to be accounted for by the theories. First, each theory has to appropriate the fact that the non-veridical perception of a snake and the veridical perception of a snake are exactly alike to begin with; second, the theory must be able to take into account the fact of correction of the illusion, with which the non-veridical perception first is recognized to be non-veridical. Third, the theory must also be able to include a reflective interpretation of the entire experience as it arises, unfolds, gets transformed, then is rejected, but still is recalled and marveled at. Mohanty goes on to enquire whether all these aspects can be taken care of by any theory. The theories of error are:

i. That what is being perceived, the illusory snake is really non-existent. This theory is called asatkhyativada upheld by the

Carvakas. With reard to this theory, Mohanty observes that a non-existent thing like a round square cannot be perceptually presented. Correction of the illusion does not attest to the object's non-existence, but only to its not being real.

ii. That it is really a mental state that is projected outside the illusory snake, being a mental image. This theory is called atmakhyativada upheld by the yoacara Buddhists. In the context of this theory, Mohanty says that one needs an explanation of how a mental entity can be perceived to be out there and to say that it is somehow projected is not to remove that puzzlement. Moreover, correction does not testify to the object's status as a mental entity.

iii. That what is being perceived by itself is real, error consisting in mistaking a part for the whole. This theory is called satkhyativada upheld by Ramanuja's Vedanta. With regard to this theory, Mohanty's observation is that it misses the nature of hallucination, not to speak for non-veridical perception, which is not merely supplemented by more knowledge, but totally negated.

iv. That the supposed erroneous cognition really consists of two different cognitions, a perception and a memory—each by itself is true, there being no erroneous cognition over and above a failure to distinguish between the two. This theory is called akhyativada upheld by Prabhakara Mimamsa. Mohanty has pointed out that the problem with this theory is that it gives no good account for why and how one fails to distinguish between a perception and a memory.

v. That as in the previous one, of the two component cognitions, the object of one, namely this, is taken to be the snake which is the object of the other, the memory. This theory is called viparitakhyativada upheld by kumarila Mimamsa. With regard to this theory, Mohanty has observed that it has to explain how a memory image could be identified with a percept.

vi. That the snake perceived under illusion is a real snake, only it is elsewhere, not here in front of the perceiver, but is presented through an extraordinary causal process that is mediated by remembrance of past perception of that object. This theory is called anyathakhyativada upheld by the Nyaya. Regarding this theory, Mohanty says that it has to give a credible account of how after all a snake which is not present before me can be perceived to be here and now; the putative mechanism of extra-ordinary perception itself is in need of credible explanation.

vii) That the non-veridical perception is as much a unified cognition as is the veridical, only its object (the snake) is neither existent since it is negated by the knowledge of the rope, nor non-existent since it is perceptually presented and so is indescribable as being either. This theory is called anirvacaniyakhyativada upheld by Sankara Vedanta. With regard to this theory, Mohanty asserts that the Advaita Vedanat theory claims to be taking into account all aspects of the situation, but pays the price of adding a new ontological category—that which is indescribable either as existent or as non-existent, otherwise called 'false'.



15.8 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very Short Questions

Q.1: What is the name of Mohanty's book where he has undergone a detailed examination of Indian epistemology?

Q. 2: What are the Sanskrit terms used for knowledge or cognition in the upanisads?

Q. 3: How many views are there with regard to the ontological nature of consciousness according to Mohanty?

Q. 4: Prama means true/false cognition.

Q. 5: How many pramanas are accepted in Indian epistemology?

B) Short Questions (Answer each question in about 100- 150 words)

Q. 1: What is Mohanty's view on Knowledge?

Q. 2: How is pramanya defined in Indian epistemology according to Mohanty?

Q. 3: How is perception defined in Indian epistemology according to Mohanty?

Q. 4: What are the criteria given by Mohanty that have to be accounted for by the theories of error?

C) Long questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q. 1: Give an account of Mohanty's view on Indian epistemology.

Q.2: Explain Mohanty's observation of Indian theories of error.

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