UNIT 14: W. K. WIMSATT AND M. C. BEARDSLEY: "THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY" (1946) & "THE AFFECTIVE FALLACY" (1949)

UNIT STRUCTURE:

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14.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to

- discuss the importance of new critical formulations of critics like Wimsatt and Beardsley
- explain the contextual significance of the two texts "The Intentional Fallacy" & "The Affective Fallacy"
- explain the different aspects of "The Intentional Fallacy" & "The Affective Fallacy" as two seminal texts in New Criticism
- discuss the importance of Wimsatt and Beardsley among the New Critics whose critical views changed the course of modern criticism in the 20th century

14.2 INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces you to two important New Critical texts namely—"The Intentional Fallacy" (1946) and "The Affective Fallacy" (1949), co-authored by William Kurtz Wimsatt Jr. (1907-1975) and Monroe C. Beardsley (1915-1985). These two essays are important position papers in 20th century



A ***fallacy*** is the use of invalid or otherwise faulty reasoning.

criticism. Neither of them presents an argument that is wholly original, but each codifies a crucial tenet of the Anglo American New Critical orthodoxy. In "The Intentional Fallacy" Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that we cannot use the author's intention to judge a literary work, because the work is a public utterance, not a private one that depends for its meaning on the intent or design of its author. In the later piece, "The Affective Fallacy", Wimsatt and Beardsley emphasise that the meaning of a literary work is not equivalent to its effects, especially its emotional impact, on the reader. This unit introduces you to the New Critical school of thought, but the main thrust will be on Wimsatt and Beardsley's formalist view that critical analysis must centre on the text itself and a critic is to examine the linguistic structure and the aesthetic unity of the text as an autonomous object.

14.3 W. K. WIMSATT AND M. C. BEARDSLEY: THE NEW CRITICS

W. K. Wimsatt (1907-1975) was an American literary critic and theorist. Born in Washington D C, he later attended Georgetown University, and then Yale University from which he received his Ph.D. In 1939, he became a member of Yale's English department, and soon won wide acclaim for his work in eighteenth-century studies. His books in that field include *The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson* (I941) and *Philosophic Wards: A Study of Style and Meaning in the "Rambler" and "Dictionary" of Samuel Johnson* (1948). However, he is best known for his literary theory and criticism, notably *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (1954), *Hateful Contraries: Studies in Literature and Criticism* (I965), *Day of the Leopards: Essays in Defense of the Poem* (1976), and with Cleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism: A Short History* (1957). Written as a series of independent essays between 1941 and 1952, *Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* was finally published as a cohesive work in 1954. Probably his most influential work, *Verbal Icon* contains two of Wimsatt's most important essays, "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy" co-authored with Monroe Beardsley.

Paul de Man in *Blindness and Insight* offers a significant critique of Wimsatt's texts, taken as an example of the understanding of the notion of 'autonomy' in New Criticism. While his *Hateful Contraries: Studies in Literature and Criticism* (1965) is concerned with the influence of what he calls "Amateur Criticism". This book was written as a way to "distinguish what [he] consider[s] an inevitable and proper literary interest in the contraries" Through studies of works by T. S. Eliot as well as discussions of topics such as "The Augustan Mode in English Poetry" and "The Criticism of Comedy", Wimsatt attempted to add to the efforts to justify and improve literary criticism. *Literary Criticism: A Short History* (1957) was written along with Cleanth Brooks. It was intended as "a history of ideas about verbal art and about its elucidation and criticism." Both attempted to contribute to the "intelligibility in the history of literary argument" which, they state, is a necessary part of any historical literary studies.

In this context, let us also have a brief look at M. C. Beardsley (1915-1985). Beardsley was an American philosopher of art. A native of Connecticut, he received his *BA* and PhD from Yale University, and held a position in the Philosophy department there before entering Mount Holyoke College in 1944. He later taught at Swarthmore College and at Temple University, focusing on literary criticism and aesthetics. His work in aesthetics is best known for its championing of the instrumentalist theory of art and the concept of aesthetic experience. Beardsley was elected president of the American Society for Aesthetics in 1956. He also wrote an introductory text on aesthetics and edited a well-regarded survey anthology of philosophy. Among literary critics, Beardsley is known for two essays written with W.K. Wimsatt, "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy", both key texts of New Criticism. His other works include—*Practical Logic* (1950), *Aesthetics* (1958), and *Aesthetics: A Short History* (1966). He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1976.

14.4 READING THE TEXTS

The following shall help you to understand the texts better.

"The Intentional Fallacy" (1946)

Wimsatt and Beardsley begin the essay with a discussion of the author's "intention" upon the critic's judgment, which, they claim, had been challenged in a number of recent discussions, notably in the debate entitled *The Personal Heresy,* between Professors Lewis and Tillyard, as well as in periodical essays like the "Symposiums" of 1940 in the *Southern* and *Kenyan Reviews.* They refer to their own discussion of "Intention" for a *Dictionary* of literary criticism in which they raised the issue but were unable to pursue its implications at any length. They argued that the **"design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art,** and it seemed to them that this is a principle which goes deep into some differences in the history of critical attitudes. It is a principle entailing many specific truths about inspiration, authenticity, biography, literary history and scholarship, and about some trends of contemporary poetry, especially its allusiveness. There is hardly a problem of literary criticism in which the critic's approach will not be qualified by his view of "intention". Then, they proceed to explain what they think of Intention. They write that the term corresponds to **what is intended** in a formula, which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance. In order to judge the poet's performance, one must know what he intended. Therefore, intention is the design or plan in the author's mind. It is connected with the author's attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write.

Then they provide a series of certain important propositions, which hold tremendous significance in the discussions of New Criticism. Some of them are as the following.

1. A poem does not come into existence by accident. Although Professor Stoll would like to remark that, it comes out of a head, not out of a hat, yet to insist on the designing intellect, as a *cause* of a poem is not to grant the design or intention as a standard.
2. One must ask how a critic expects to get an answer to the question about 'intention'. How is he to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And, if the poet did not succeed then the poem is not

adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem—for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem.

3. Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. It is only because an artefact works when we can infer the intention of an artificer. "A poem should not mean but be." A poem can *be* only through its *meaning* since its medium is words-yet it *is,* simply *is,* in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant. Poetry is a feat of style by which a complex of meaning is handled all at once. Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful, if and only if we correctly infer the intention. They are more abstract than poetry.
4. The meaning of a poem may certainly be a personal one, in the sense that a poem expresses a personality or state of soul rather than a physical object like an apple. However, even a short lyric poem is dramatic, the response of a speaker to a situation. We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic *speaker,* and the author is implied only by a 'biographical act of inference.

They again refer to Professor Stoll who had asked if the critic is not a judge who does not explore his own consciousness but determines the author's meaning or intention. Therefore, the poem is not the critic's own property. Contradicting such a remark made by Stoll, they argue that the poem is neither of the critic's own nor of the author's. It is detached from the author at birth. For example, the poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language under the peculiar possession of the public. Then they mention I. A. Richards and Rene Wellek and what they had to say about a poet. I. A. Richards called the poem *"a* class of experiences which do not differ in any character more than a certain amount…from a standard experience". Professor Wellek on the other hand, objected to Richards and preferred to call the poem "a system of norms," "extracted from every individual experience." However, in doing that, he was never wishing to make the poet (outside the poem) an authority.

What Wimsatt and Beardsley are opposing here is what they tend to call a Romantic intentional fallacy: the Romantic idea, expressed in ancient

times by Longinus and more recently, by figures such as the great German writer Goethe and the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, that a poem echoes the soul of its author, that it embodies his intentions or psychological circumstances. The most influential recent statement of intentionalism, according to the authors of this essay, is I. A. Richards' fourfold characterisation of meaning as "sense," "feeling," "tone," and "intention." The passwords of the intentional school are Romantic words such as "spontaneity," "sincerity," "authenticity," and "originality." These need to be replaced, say the authors, with terms of analysis such as "integrity," "relevance," "unity," and "function". Like Ransom, Wimsatt and Beardsley are concerned to exclude from criticism certain related studies such as author psychology, biography, and history. They in fact make a distinction between "internal" and "external" evidence for the meaning of a poem. Internal evidence is public, is internal to the poem itself, and is discovered through the poem's semantics, syntax, and the knowledge of how these operate within the larger context of language and culture. External evidence is private or idiosyncratic: it is evidence gleaned from outside the poem, and may include diaries, journals, letters, and reported conversations. Wimsatt and Beardsley acknowledge that there may be a third kind of evidence, which is "intermediate": evidence about an author's character, or semi-private meanings attached to words and concepts by the author and his circle.

The arguments of this essay are subject to many of the same criticisms that have been levelled against the writers' positions in "The Intentional Fallacy". Perhaps, the most fundamental objection is the impossibility and artificiality of treating literature as a self-contained object which is not somehow realised in its performance, in interaction with readers who legitimately bring to the texts their own cultural backgrounds, interests, and assumptions. Moreover, the insistence that the text is an isolated object in itself effectively represents a philosophical regression to a world conceived as composed of separate and independent objects; despite its persistence on many levels of ideology and politics. It is a view that has been discredited by many thinkers, from Hegel and Marx, through Bergson, Sartre, and Derrida.



LET US KNOW

"The Intentional Fallacy" is a powerful polemic, but somewhat confusing as critics have pointed out. How convincing, for example, is the distinction that an author draws between the inside and the outside of a text? They insist that a poem is a public utterance and hence cannot depend for its success on personal or private knowledge about the author, whether deliberately revealed or unearthed by literary historians and biographers. However, one could reply that what an author says and the information that a scholar brings forward are public as well. As is common with many key New Critical precepts, the concept of "the intentional fallacy" is pedagogical. A teacher and class can concentrate on the text at hand without feeling that the students' interpretive work needs the support of information about the author and the· historical period when the text was composed.

"Affective Fallacy" (1949)

As used by Wimsatt and Beardsley (*The Verbal Icon*, 1954), this term connotes 'a confusion between the poem and its result (what it is and what it does)'. Judgment of a literary text should not rest upon the effect it has on the readers. 'Affective fallacy' is thus a confusion between a poem and its "effect" on readers. A text, however emotive its context might be, must nevertheless be judged as a text, or a self-sufficient entity. It must be seen as a system of language. Therefore, evaluating a work of art in terms of its results in the mind of the readers is supposed to be a critical error. Eliot's "objective correlative" predates this principle. According to it, emotions are externalised into a poem not as emotions but in the form of some events and situation, specific to the emotion, because judging a poem from emotion results in impressionism.

Affective Fallacy is an answer to the idea of Impressionistic criticism, which is based on the idea that the reader's response to a poem is the ultimate indication of its value. It is the antithesis of affective criticism, which is the practice of evaluating the effect that a literary work has on its reader

or audience. Therefore, Wimsatt used the term to refer to all forms of criticism that understood a text's effect upon the reader to be the primary route to analysing the importance and success of that text. For Wimsatt, the fallacy led to a number of potential errors, most of them related to emotional relativism. According to Wimsatt, a view of literature based on its putative emotional effects will always be vulnerable to mystification and subjectivity, and he points out that the belletristic tradition exemplified by critics such as Arthur Quiller Couch and George Saintsbury as an instance of a type of criticism that relies on subjective impressions and is thus unrepeatable and unreliable. For Wimsatt such impressionistic approaches pose both practical and theoretical problems. In practical terms, it makes reliable comparisons of different critics difficult, if not irrelevant.

Affective Fallacy was controversial and although influential, it was never accepted wholly by a great number of critics. For example, the New Historicist critics repudiated the New Critical rejection of historical context. Similarly, reader-response criticism denied that a text could have a quantifiable significance outside its being read and experienced by particular readers at particular moments. These critics rejected the idea of text as icon, focusing instead on the ramifications of the interaction between text and reader.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What do you understand by the expression "Intentional Fallacy"? What is the main objection against "Intentional Fallacy"?

Q 2: Do you agree that "Affective Fallacy" is significant as a critical essay?

14.5 IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

The following are the important concepts available in the texts we are discussing in these units.

Intentionality:

"The Intentional Fallacy" by W. K. Wimsatt Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley is a foundational text of New Criticism, which states that 'intention' should not be brought to bear upon the analysis of the literary text. The authors state,

"intention, as we shall use the term, corresponds to what he intended in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance…In order to judge the poem's performance, we must know what he intended. Intention is designed or planned in the author's mind. Intention has obvious affinities for the author's attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write."

Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that knowledge of an author's original intention is neither integral to, nor essential in the critical analysis of a work. One can interpret a text without any reference to 'authorial intention'. Their claim here is two-fold:

- Authorial intentions are not available in the text.
- Notion of authorial intention dismantles the integrity of a literary work.

However, 'intention' cannot be so easily dispensed with. Have the authors completely denied the very notion of "authorial intention"? We must know that they distinguished between the intention realised in the text and that, which is supposed to exist prior to the existence of the text. When intention is realized, it is useless to consult the author because "Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle". Again, 'intention' cannot be the standard for critical evaluation of a text. Meaning can be deciphered only through a 'close' analysis of the text, attending to its linguistic as well as rhetorical components. Of course, not all meanings can be said to be free from authorial intention. In conversation, for instance, what the speaker intends prior to his utterance is crucial to meaning of the utterance. Literary meaning resists such dependence on the psychology of the author. "The Intentional Fallacy" also contends that a text can have meanings unacknowledged by the author. Hence, the author cannot be a guide to interpretation of a text because interpretation must be justified textually. There is both external and internal evidence for a work's meaning. Internal evidence can be found in "the semantics and syntax of a poem, through

our habitual knowledge of the language, through grammars, diction, and all the literature which is the source of dictionaries, in general through all that makes a language and culture". External evidence is private, and not part of the work and it comes from journals, letters, conversation etc. However, Wimsatt and Beardsley could not sharply demarcate these two kinds of evidence, because the author's expressed meaning and intention can get incorporated into the text through its linguistic texture.

Intentional Fallacy:

It signifies what is claimed to be the error in interpreting and evaluating a literary work by reference to evidence outside the text itself. Wimsatt and Beardsley asserted that an author's intended aims and meanings in writing a literary work—whether these are asserted by the author or merely inferred from our knowledge of the author's life and opinions—are irrelevant to the literary critic, because the meaning, structure, and value of a text are inherent within the finished, freestanding, and public work of literature itself. Reference to the author's supposed purposes, or else to the author's personal situation and state of mind in writing a text, is held to be a harmful mistake, because it diverts our attention to such "external" matters as the author's biography, or psychological condition, or creative process, which we substitute for the proper critical concern with the "internal" constitution and inherent value of the literary product. This claim, which was central in the *New Criticism,* has been strenuously debated, and was reformulated by both of its original proponents.

Affective Fallacy:

W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley defined Affective Fallacy as the error of evaluating a poem by its effects—especially its emotional effects—upon the reader. As a result of this fallacy "the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear," so that criticism "ends in impressionism and relativism." The two critics wrote in direct reaction to the view of I. A. Richards, in his influential *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1923), that the value of a poem can be measured by the psychological responses it incites in its readers. Beardsley has since modified the earlier claim by the admission that "it does not appear that critical evaluation can

be done at all except in relation to certain types of effect that aesthetic objects have upon their perceivers." So modified, the doctrine becomes a claim for *objective criticism,* in which the critic, instead of describing the effects of a work, focuses on the features, devices, and form of the work by which such effects are achieved. An extreme reaction against the doctrine of the affective fallacy was manifested during the 1970s in the development of Reader-Response criticism.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 3: How is the term 'intention' used in New Criticism?

Q 4: What is meant by the term 'intentional fallacy'?

Q 5: Briefly explain the main idea behind what is called 'Affective Fallacy.'

14.6 WIMSATT AND BEARDSLEY AS NEW CRITICS

It has been stated already that in their critique of intention, Wimsatt and Beardsley aimed at the Romantic idea of poetry as the expression of a writer's soul or personality. Influenced by T. S. Eliot, as well as by New Critics such as—John Crowe Ransom, Brooks, and others. Wimsatt and Beardsley sought to define poetry as an impersonal art by stating 'what matters is the text itself'. They also challenge literary historians who mistakenly believe that when evaluating a poem, one must know its biographical and historical origins. For Wimsatt and Beardsley, one must attend only to the organization of the words on the page and the coherence that the words do or do not possess. They affirm that, "the poem itself is what the poet is trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem."

During the late 1960s and 1970s, a new movement in criticism, backed by Reader-Response theory, drew on the insights about the reading process that Richards and others had advanced or implied in formulating their text-cantered approaches. One of its most important members, Stanley

Fish in his essay "Literature in the Reader" (I970), explicitly invoked Wimsatt and Beardsley's arguments. For Fish, criticism should be concerned with the "analysis of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time." Other critics and theorists during this same period challenged and complicated Wimsatt and Beardsley's rejection of the author. For example, Michel Foucault and Stephen Greenblatt are too opposed to the Romantic conception of the author as were Wimsatt and Beardsley. However, they re-imagined and reconfigured the author to be a focal point for literary investigation and analysis. Thus, in "What Is an Author?" (1969), Foucault considers not the author as such but rather the historical "author-function," a "mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society." For Wimsatt and Beardsley, and for those they influenced, this position takes us too far from the specific text, the self-contained poem. Studying literature in a disciplined way means directly examining literary artefacts, not authors or readers or social contexts.

There are many possible objections to Wimsatt and Beardsley's argument. To begin with, it presupposes that we can treat the poem as an isolated artefact, torn from all of its contexts, including the circumstances of its reading or reception. Clearly, the distinction between internal and external evidence cannot be absolute and will vary according to the reader's knowledge and literary education. Moreover, many interpretative disputes arise not from questions of content but rather from questions of form and tone. For example, Horace's famous "Ode to Pyrrha" could be translated in a tone of polite urbanity or one of crude sarcasm. Broad considerations of the intention behind the poem may legitimately help us clarify such issues. Many poems, such as satires or mock-heroic poems, presuppose a reader's prior acquaintance with certain literary traditions and conventions: it is important to acknowledge, for example, that Pope's *The Rape of the Lock* is intended to employ epic conventions for the purpose of satire. Recourse to intention can yield necessary insight into the relations between form and content, as well as relations between an artist and his audience. Moreover, given that the same statement made by different speakers in differing contexts could have vastly divergent meanings, it seems implausible

to attribute autonomy to any statement or group of words, whether embodied in poetic language or not.

Wimsatt and Beardsley's later essay "The Affective Fallacy" is motivated by the same presupposition, namely, that literature or poetry is an autonomous object, independent not only of author psychology, biography, and history but also of the reader or audience that consumes it. The word "affection" is used by philosophers to refer to emotion, mental state, or disposition. Hence, the "affective fallacy" occurs, according to Wimsatt and Beardsley, when we attempt to explicate or interpret a poem through recourse to the emotions or mental state produced in the reader or hearer.

As these authors put it, just as the intentional fallacy "is a confusion between the poem and its origins," so the affective fallacy "is a confusion between the poem and its *results* (what it *is* and what it *does*)." Again, part of their problem with using the reader's response as a criterion of interpretation is that it makes criticism a subjective rather than objective activity, a discourse about the subject (the reader) rather than the object (the text). An affective reading of a poem "begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism. The outcome of the Fallacy, the Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear."



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 6: Why did Wimsatt and Beardsley challenge the literary historians?

Q 7: How did a Neo-historicist like Stanley Fish react to the ideas of Wimsatt and Beardsley?

Q 8: What are some of the objections to the arguments provided by Wimsatt and Beardsley?



14.7 LET US SUM UP

By this time, you must have understood that "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy" are very important documents in the theory and

practice of New Criticism, the dominant mode of American academic criticism during the first half of the 20th century. The most notable contributions of both critics are found in essays titled "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy" which are prescribed for you. These were controversial papers, which elaborated a basic tenet of New Criticism: the issue of authorial intention and effect on the reader. 'Intention' and 'Affect' must be avoided in criticism because they are not implicated in the text itself. If a poem expresses certain thoughts and attitudes, they can be ascribed to the 'dramatic speaker' or 'persona' of the poem and not to the biographical author. Therefore, in critical discourse, terms such as sincerity, authenticity, originality need to be replaced by terms like integrity, relevance, unity, function because it is the literary work, which is the sole object of critical scrutiny.



14.8 FURTHER READING

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14.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS (HINTS ONLY)

Ans to Q No 1: Wimsatt and Beardsley argued that the "design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art hence the fallacy… …as a principle it rejected ideas of both classical "imitation" as well as romantic expression… … the most fundamental objection is the impossibility and artificiality of treating literature as a self-contained object.

Ans to Q No 2: Yes… … Affective Fallacy is an answer to the idea of impressionistic criticism, which argues that the reader's response to a poem is the ultimate indication of its value…. …But this is a fallacy because it is based on the practice of evaluating the effect that a literary work has on its reader or audience.

Ans to Q No 3: "intention, as we shall use the term, corresponds to what he intended in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance…In order to judge the poem's performance, we must know what he intended. Intention is designed or planned in the author's mind. Intention has obvious affinities for the author's attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write."

Ans to Q No 4: Intentional Fallacy signifies an error in interpreting and evaluating a literary work by reference to evidence outside the text itself… …that an author's intended aims and meanings in writing a literary work are irrelevant to the literary critic… …because the meaning, structure, and value of a text are inherent within the finished, freestanding, and public work of literature itself.

Ans to Q No 5: Affective Fallacy is the error of evaluating a poem by its effects—especially its emotional effects—upon the reader, as a result of which "the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear."

Ans to Q No 6: They challenged literary historians as they mistakenly believed that when evaluating a poem, one must know its biographical and historical origins. For them, one must attend only to the organization of the words on the page and the coherence that the

words do or do not possess… …they sought to define poetry as an impersonal art by stating 'what matters is the text itself'.

Ans to Q No 7: Stanley Fish in his essay "Literature in the Reader" (I970), explicitly invoked Wimsatt and Beardsley's arguments… …for him, criticism should be concerned with the "analysis of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time."

Ans to Q No 8: One of the objections is against the presupposition that we can treat the poem as an isolated artefact, torn from all of its contexts, including the circumstances of its reading or reception… …but the distinction between internal and external evidence cannot be absolute and will vary according to the reader's knowledge and literary education… … Another objection is that many interpretative disputes arise not from questions of content but rather from questions of form and tone.



14.10 POSSIBLE QUESTIONS

Q 1: Outline the main concerns of the New Critics, with special reference to textual "close reading".

Q 2: How would you name the 'authorial intention' behind any poem you have read? Would this 'intention' help you to understand the poem later?

Q 3: Is New Criticism just a method of reading or does it also embody a distinctive ideology? Discuss with reference to the context of criticism in the early 20th century.

Q 4: What are the major propositions provided by Wimsatt and Brooks in their essay "Intentional Fallacy" and "Affective Fallacy"?

Q 5: Discuss how the critical essays like "Intentional Fallacy" or "Affective Fallacy" hint at many of the significant turns that were taking place in the critical field during the early part of the 20th century?

Q 6: How has the issue of 'intentionality' been viewed by the critics? Discuss.

Q 7: Provide a critical reception of the two essays "Intentional Fallacy" and "Affective Fallacy" by Wimsatt and Beardsley.

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