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MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

SEMESTER - V

PHILOSOPHY

BLOCK 1



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COURSE INTRODUCTION:

This course introduces to you the subject of Modern Western Philosophy. When we say about Modern philosophy, it mainly refers to the vibrant and renaissance period in western philosophy ranging from the 15th to the 17th century. It is a mixture of new approaches to philosophy fuelled by science and arose as a protest against the religious teachings of Catholic Church prevalent in ancient and medieval period in search of freedom in thought, feeling and action guided by reason. René Descartes is considered to be the father of modern western philosophy. This particular course will include some important thoughts of some of the important modern western philosophers, namely Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Bradley.

BLOCK INTRODUCTION

This course consists of two blocks. The first block consists of seven units. First unit of this block is 'Characteristics of Modern Philosophy'. This unit introduces to you the characteristics of modern philosophy. Along with it, this unit will also present a brief outline of modern philosophy.

The name of the second unit of this block is 'Descartes: Cogito Ergo Sum'. After going through this unit, you will be able to Descartes' basic concept of cogito ergo sum. The meaning of this dictum is I think, therefore I exist. This dictum can be regarded to be backbone of Descartes' Philosophy.

'Spinoza: The Doctrine of Substance' is the third unit of this block. After going through this unit one will be able to know that according to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a mode. A substance is something that needs nothing else in order to exist or be conceived. Substances are independent entities both conceptually and ontologically. He defines God as a substance consisting of infinite attributes. He shows that substances cannot share attributes, that every substance is infinite, that a single substance can have several attributes, and that an infinite substance exists.

The fourth unit of course one is 'Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz: Monadology'. This unit introduces to you Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz is one of the most important proponents of a new kind of Idealism and metaphysical system quite different from either of Plato or of George Berkeley. He is the founder of spiritualistic pluralism which assumes the form of monadism.

The fifth unit of this course is 'Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz: Pre-Established Harmony'. This unit introduces to you G. W. Leibnitz third principle of harmony, and God, the creator of harmony. Accordingly this unit introduces to you Leibnitz doctrine of pre-established harmony. In his theory of Monadology, Leibnitz believes in the existence of unlimited substances and thereby establishes pluralism already discussed in previous unit. For Leibnitz, there are specific or independent monads in the universe.

The sixth unit of this block is 'Locke: Criticism of Innate Ideas, Classification of Ideas'. This unit will introduce to you about the theory of innate ideas. Innate ideas are the ideas which are imprinted on the mind by God at the time of birth. These ideas are clear and distinct. The theory of innate ideas which holds that the human mind is born with ideas or knowledge was put forth most notably by Plato as his theory of satisfactory empirical origin of them could be conceived. In the 17th century the most prominent exponent of this theory was René Descartes.

The seventh unit is 'Berkeley: Esse Est Percipi'. After going through this unit you will be able to know what subjective idealism of Berkeley is. One will also know the dictum "Esse est percipi", Berkeley's rejection of material world and also objections against "Esse est percipi"

While going through this course you will come across some boxes which are put on the left side or right side of the text. These boxes will give us the meanings of some words and concepts within the text. Apart from this, there will be some broad and short questions included under Activity and Check Your Progress in every unit. Activities will increase our thinking capacity because questions put in Activity are not directly derived from the text. But answers to the short questions are put in the section Answers to Check Your Progress. Besides, there are some text-related questions which are put in Model Questions. These questions will help you in selecting and mastering probable topics for the examination so that you can prepare for the examination with confidence.

UNIT 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

UNIT STRUCTURE

1.1 Learning objectives

1.2 Introduction

1.3 A brief outline of modern philosophy

1.4 Characteristics of modern philosophy

1.5 Let us sum up

1.6 Further reading

1.7 Answers to check your progress

1.8 Model questions

1.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- explain briefly the concept of modern philosophy
- discuss the characteristics of modern philosophy

1.2. INTRODUCTION

This unit especially deals with the characteristics of modern philosophy. Before going into the characteristics of modern philosophy, you will be able to learn in a brief manner about the concept of modern philosophy. The basic issues covered in this unit are:

- What is modern philosophy?
- Characteristics of modern philosophy

1.3 A BRIEF OULINE OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Modern philosophy refers to the vibrant and renaissance period in western philosophy ranging from the 15th to the 17th century. It is a mixture of new approaches to philosophy fuelled by science and arose as a protest against the religious teachings of Catholic Church prevalent in ancient and medieval period in search of freedom in thought, feeling and action guided by reason.

Erdmann obseves that modern philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit. Richard Falkenberg in History of Modern Philosophy also opines that philosophy is no longer willing to be handmaid of theology. It must set up a house of her own. Bertrand Russell in his book A History of Modern Philosophy also significantly opines that the period of history is called modern which has a mental outlook which differs from the medieval period in many ways. Of these, two are most important. i) The diminishing authority of the church ii) the increasing authority of the science.

Rene Descartes is considered as the father of modern philosophy. It developes basically three important concepts in philosophy. They are such as philosophical method, formation of philosophical systems, and humanism.

Modern philosophy adopted a critical approach. For instance, Bacon denounced the deductive model of Aristotle and formulated a Novum Organum (a philosophical work by Francis Bacon written in Latin and published in 1620) as a model for attaining real knowledge. On the other hand, Descartes also discredited the old method of philosophy prevalent in ancient and mediaeval age and in place of, it adopted the de novo model (literal meaning new, a Latin expression used in English to mean 'from the beginning) for metaphysics. The tendency to protest against old philosophy was not confined to Descartes and Bacon because Kant and Locke also equally started a campaign against the old method of philosophy in search of a new method in philosophy.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is modern philosophy?

Q 2: Mention the period of modern philosophy.

Q 3: What is modern philosophy, according to Erdmann?

Q 4: How does modern philosophy differ from medieval period, according to Russell?

Q 5: Who is considered the father of modern philosophy?

Q 6: What are three important concepts developed in modern philosophy?

Q 7: Who formulated a Novum organum in philosophy?

Q 8: Name the philosopher who used de novo model in philosophy.

1.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact characteristics of modern philosophy, yet it can be explored that there are some basic features or characteristics which depict it as modern philosophy. They are:

EMERGENCE OF REASON: Modern philosophy is rationalistic in the sense that it makes human reason as the supreme authority in the pursuit of knowledge. It is, therefore, naturalistic in a sense that it seeks to explain inner and outer nature of knowledge without supernatural presuppositions. Thus, it is scientific in nature keeping in touch with the sciences of external nature. The spirit of knowing all things through reason developed the concept of individualism in philosophy. It also emphasised the point that nothing can be initiated beyond the scope of reason. In this context, religion too, is not free from criticism on the ground of its purity and morality. Here, the contribution of Greek spirit in this respect cannot be ignored because it cultivated the concept of reason in the spirit of philosophising. As for instance, the theologians like Anselm, Augustine, and medieval theologians was rejected in favour of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Although the modern philosophy started as a protest against old philosophy or scholastic system, it could not change the mental legacy of the moderners, which is considered the most difficult one to give up. For instance, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Berkley, and Leibnitz accepted the basal doctrines of Christianity. However, it can be viewed that the tendency of accepting reason as the supreme authority against the theological influence brought philosophy back from heaven to earth.

DISCOVERY OF METHOD: It is one of the basic contributions of modern philosophy. The modern philosophy gave us the necessity of introducing new method in philosophy. The new method of philosophy was formulated in the spirit of mathematics. It can be asserted that the new method emphasized on certain, universal, and necessary knowledge. This model of knowledge is grounded in mathematics, especially geometry. This mathematical method of Descartes led to the Geometrical method of Spinoza and influenced the methodology of Leibnitz and Kant. It can be mentioned that the empiricists like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume also could not ignore the model of knowledge, which is grounded in mathematics.

EPISTEMOLOGY: With the greater emphasis on reason and the new method of discovery to a great extent, modern philosophy led to the enquiries into the limit, scope, and functions of knowledge. This enquiry about the nature of knowledge in philosophy is called epistemology. Therefore, epistemology is considered a special contribution to modern philosophy. Modern philosophers took a special interest in discussing theory of knowledge. For instance, we can mention the theories of knowledge namely empiricism and rationalism.

Modern philosophies have been classified as rationalistic or empiristic. It is rationalistic because reason, instead of revelation or authority, is the standard of knowledge. In this sense modern philosophy is rationalistic and it is also a characteristic which enables to classify them as modern. On the other hand, modern philosophy is empiricistic because experience is too counted as the source or norm of knowledge. According to empiricism, all knowledge is derived from experience. Hence, the so called universal and necessary propositions derived from reason claimed are not absolutely certain. Therefore, they may provide probable knowledge. This view is called empiricism. Therefore, we may characterize modern philosophers as rationalists or empiricists on the ground of answering the question of the origin of knowledge. Modern philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Wolff are considered as rationalists. While, the

philosophers like Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are known as empiricists. Immanuel Kant in this context plays a dominant role in the process of acquiring knowledge. He critically shows that neither reason nor experience can claim to be the sole authority of knowledge, both equally plays a role in the process of knowledge. If we accept the claim of rationalism that reason is the only source or authority of knowledge, then the theory of rationalism leads to the criticism of dogmatism. Similarly, empiricism will commit the same mistake. Kant in this context critically holds the view that knowledge is a sum total of the elements of experience and reason. Therefore, Kant's concept of knowledge is known as critical theory of knowledge.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 9: What are the characteristics of modern philosophy?

Q 10: Why the modern philosophy is known as rationalistic?

Q 11: Why modern philosophy is known as naturalistic?

Q 12: Who for the first time introduced the mathematical method in philosophy?

Q 13: Who introduced the geo-metrical method in philosophy?

Q 14: What is epistemology?

Q 15: What are the basic theories of knowledge?



1.5 LET US SUM UP

- Modern philosophy is the result of the advancement of science spanning 15th and 17th century. It goes against the religious teachings of church in ancient and medieval period.

- Descartes is considered as the father of western philosophy. He not only discredited the old method of philosophy prevailed in ancient and medieval period but also devised a new method, especially grounded

in mathematics, for attaining universal and necessary knowledge in philosophy.

- The characteristics of modern philosophy are: a) discovery of method b) insistence on reason c) epistemology

- Modern philosophy is rationalistic, because of reason. Instead of revelation or authority, it is the standard of knowledge. On this ground, modern philosophy is rationalistic and it is also a characteristic which enables to classify them as modern. On the other hand modern philosophy is empiricistic because experience is counted as the standard or norm of knowledge.



1.6 FURTHER READING

1) Falkenberg, Richard. (1977) History of Modern Philosophy. Calcutta. Progressive Publishers

2) Thilly, Frank. (2009). History of Modern Philosophy. Delhi. SBW Publishers

3) Masih, Y. (1994). A Critical History of Modern Philosophy. Delhi. Motilal Banarsidass



1.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No 1: Modern philosophy is the emergence of new approaches to philosophy fuelled by science ranging from 15th to 17th century against the religious teachings of Catholic Church prevalent in ancient and medieval period.

Ans to Q No 2: 15th to the 17th century

Ans to Q No 3: According to Erdmann, modern philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit.

Ans to Q No 4: Russell holds that modern philosophy differs from medieval period on two basic points. They are: i) The diminishing authority of the church ii) the increasing authority of the science.

Ans to Q No 5: Descartes

Ans to Q No 6: Philosophical method, formation of philosophical systems, and humanism.

Ans to Q No 7: Bacon

Ans to Q No 8: Descartes

Ans to Q No 9: a) Emergence of reason, b) Discovery of method, c) Insistence on reason

Ans to Q No 10: It is rationalistic because reason, instead of revelation or authority, is the standard of knowledge. In this sense modern philosophy is rationalistic

Ans to Q No 11: Modern philosophy is naturalistic in a sense that it seeks to explain inner and outer nature of knowledge without supernatural presuppositions.

Ans to Q No 12: Descartes

Ans to Q No 13: Spinoza

Ans to Q No 14: Epistemology is a branch of philosophy, which is concerned with the enquiry about the nature, limit, and functions of knowledge.

Ans to Q No 15: Rationalism and empiricism



1.8 MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions

Q 1: Who are the advocates of empiricism?

Q 2: Write the names of two supporters of rationalism.

Q 3: What are the characteristics of modern philosophy?

Q 4: What is modern philosophy?

B. Short questions (Answer in about 100-150 words)

Q 1: Why is Kant's theory known as critical theory of knowledge? Explain in brief.

Q 2: What is modern philosophy? Explain in brief.

Q 3: Explain briefly the characteristics of modern philosophy.

Q 4: Write a short note on modern philosophy.

C. Long questions (Answer in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: What are the characteristics of modern philosophy? Explain

Q 2: What is modern philosophy? Discuss

Q 3: Is modern philosophy a developed form of old philosophy? Discuss

*** **** ***

UNIT 2: DESCARTES: COGITO-ERGO SUM

UNIT STRUCTURE

2.1. Learning Objectives

2.2. Introduction

2.3. Origination of Descartes Philosophical Method

2.4. Descartes Cogito-ergo-sum

2.5. Is Descartes a sceptic?

2.6. Significance of Descartes method of doubt

2.7. Let us sum up

2.8. Further Reading

2.9. Answer to check your progress

2.10. Model Questions

2.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- To acquire a knowledge about Descarte's philosophy
- To know about the origin of Descarte's philosophical method
- To know about what is cogito-ergo-sum
- To know about significance of Descartes method of doubt

2.2. INTRODUCTION

Rene Descartes (1596 -1650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, scientist and writer of the 'Age of Reason'. He has been called the "Father of Modern Philosophy", and much of subsequent Western philosophy can be seen as a response to his writings. He is responsible for one of the best-known quotations in philosophy: "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am").

At the heart of Descartes' philosophical method was his refusal to accept the authority of previous philosophers, and even of the evidence of his own senses and to trust only that which was clearly and distinctly seen to be beyond any doubt (a process often referred to as methodological skepticism or Cartesian doubt). Only then did he allows himself to reconstruct

knowledge in order to acquire a firm foundation for genuine knowledge and to dispel any Skepticism.

Descartes attempted to narrow down, by what is sometimes called the method of doubt, what was certain and what contained even a shadow of a doubt. For example, he realized that he could doubt even something as apparently fundamental as whether he had a body (it could be that he was just dreaming of it or that it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he could not, under any circumstances, doubt whether he had a mind or that he could think. He followed this up with a pure, abstract thought experiment. Having identified this single indubitable principle, that thought exists, he then argued that, if someone was wondering whether or not he existed, then the very act of thinking was, in and of itself, proof that he did in fact exist: the famous "I think, therefore I am" - the similar statement in Latin, "Cogito ergo sum" is found in his later "Principles of Philosophy". It is worth mentioning here that, by "thinking", Descartes did not just mean conceptual thought, but all forms of consciousness, experience, feelings, etc.

The way he achieved this was to argue that among the contents of our (certain) consciousness was the idea of God, which in itself he saw as proof of the existence of God. He then argued that, if we have the overwhelming impression of the existence of a concrete world around us, as we do, then an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent God would ensure that such a world does in fact exist for us. Furthermore, he asserted that the essence of this physical world was extension (that it takes up space), contrary to the extension less world of the mind.

This was an essential step forward in 17th Century science as it established a physical world which was of a mathematical character and permitted mathematical physics to be used to explain it. Also important is that, although God was indispensable to Descartes' method of arriving at a physical world, once such a world was accepted, it was no longer necessary to involve God in the description and measurement and explanation of how

things work. Thus, the process of science was freed from theological constraints and interference.

2.3. ORIGINATION OF DESCARTES PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD:

René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher and mathematician, credited as a foundational thinker in the development of Western notions of reason and science. His philosophy was built on the idea of radical doubt, in which nothing that is perceived or sensed is necessarily true. The only thing that remains true that there is a mind or consciousness doing the doubting and believing its perceptions, hence the famous formulation, 'I think therefore I am', or in Latin, the cogito-'Cogito ergo sum'. Descartes also proposed that the mind and body were two separate and distinct entities, but even the body was not so certain a thing as the mind, because, like everything else in the world, the body could only be sensed because there was a mind to sense it. In 1663, Descartes' writings were placed on a list of prohibited books by the Pope, because of the central place Descartes gave to reason and mind, rather than God, in his philosophy. Here is his explanation of the centrality of the reasoning mind in knowledge making.

René Descartes is often credited with being the "Father of Modern Philosophy." This title is justified due to both to his break with the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy prevalent at his time and to his development and promotion of the new, mechanistic sciences. His fundamental break with Scholastic philosophy was twofolded. First, Descartes thought that the Scholastics' method was prove to doubt given by their reliance on sensation as the source for all knowledge. Secondly, he wanted to replace their final causal model of scientific explanation with the more modern, mechanistic model.

Descartes attempted to address the former issue via his method of doubt. His basic strategy was to consider false any belief that falls prey to

even the slightest doubt. This doubt then serves to clear the way for what Descartes considers to be an unprejudiced search for the truth. This clearing of his previously held beliefs then puts him at an epistemological ground-zero. From here Descartes sets out to find something that lies beyond all doubt. He eventually discovers that "I exist" is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely certain. It is from this point that Descartes proceeds to demonstrate God's existence and that God cannot be a deceiver. This, in turn, serves to fix the certainty of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood and provides the epistemological foundation Descartes set out to find.

Once this conclusion is reached, Descartes can proceed to rebuild his system of previously dubious beliefs on this absolutely certain foundation. These beliefs, which are re-established with absolute certainty, include the existence of a world of bodies external to the mind, the dualistic distinction of the immaterial mind from the body, and his mechanistic model of physics based on the clear and distinct ideas of geometry.

The choice of geometrical method was obvious for Descartes given his previous success in applying this method to other disciplines like optics. Yet his application of this method to philosophy was not unproblematic due to a revival of ancient arguments for global or radical skepticism based on the doubtfulness of human reasoning. But Descartes wanted to show that truths both intuitively grasped and deduced are beyond this possibility of doubt. His tactic was to show that, despite the best skeptical arguments, there is at least one intuitive truth that is beyond all doubt and from which the rest of human knowledge can be deduced. This is precisely the project of Descartes' seminal work, Meditations on First Philosophy.

Mathematical beliefs, since they are not based on sensation but on reason. For even though one is dreaming, for example, that, 2 + 3 = 5, the certainty of this proposition is not called into doubt, because 2 + 3 = 5 whether the one believing it is awake or dreaming. Descartes continues to wonder about whether or not God could make him believe there is an earth,

sky and other extended things when, in fact, these things do not exist at all. In fact, people sometimes make mistakes about things they think are most certain such as mathematical calculations. But maybe people are not mistaken just some of the time but all of the time such that believing that 2 + 3 = 5 is some kind of persistent and collective mistake, and so the sum of 2 + 3 is really something other than 5. However, such universal deception seems inconsistent with God's supreme goodness. Indeed, even the occasional deception of mathematical miscalculation also seems inconsistent with God's goodness, yet people do sometimes make mistakes. Then, in line with the skeptics, Descartes supposes, for the sake of his method, that God does not exist, but instead there is an evil demon with supreme power and cunning that puts all his efforts into deceiving him so that he is always mistaken about everything, including mathematics.

In this way, Descartes called all of his previous beliefs into doubt through some of the best skeptical arguments of his day but he was still not satisfied and decided to go a step further by considering false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt. So, by the end of the First Meditation, Descartes finds himself in a whirlpool of false beliefs. However, it is important to realize that these doubts and the supposed falsehood of all his beliefs are for the sake of his method: he does not really believe that he is dreaming or is being deceived by an evil demon; he recognizes that his doubt is merely hyperbolic. But the point of this "methodological" doubt is to clear the mind of preconceived opinions that might obscure the truth. The goal then is to find something that cannot be doubted even though an evil demon is deceiving him and even though he is dreaming. This first indubitable truth will then serve as an intuitively grasped metaphysical "axiom" from which absolutely certain knowledge can be deduced.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 1: Fill up the blanks:

(a) Rene Descartes has been called the "..... of Modern Philosophy"

(b) Descartes "cogito-ergo-sum" has been seen in his later.....

(c) René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher and mathematician, credited as a foundational thinker in the development of Western notions of.....and.....

(d) According to Descartes, mathematical beliefs are based on.....

(e) Descartes discovers that "I exist" is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely .....

2.4. DESCARTES COGITO-ERGO-SUM

Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition presented by René Descartes. It is usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am". The phrase originally appeared in French in his Discourse on the Method, so as to reach a wider audience than Latin would have allowed. It appeared in Latin in his later Principles of Philosophy. As Descartes explained, "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt...." The concept is also sometimes known as the cogito. This proposition became a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to form a secure foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt. While other knowledge could be a figment of imagination, deception, or mistake, Descartes asserted that the very act of doubting one's own existence served as proof of the reality of one's own mind; there must be a thinking entity in this case the self for there to be a thought.

How do we proceed in mathematics, what is the method pursued? We begin with axioms, or principles which are self-evident, which everyone accepts who hears and understands them. From these principles as our starting-point we deduce other propositions which logically follow from them, and which are just as certain as the former, provided no mistake has been made in the reasoning. That is, we begin with simple propositions that are self-evident, and pass from these to more complex ones; our method is synthetic or deductive.

This method must be extended to philosophy. We should proceed from absolutely certain first principles, from propositions which are clear and self-evident, and pass on to new and unknown truths which are equally certain. We look in vain for such truths in the traditional scholastic systems, for in them we find nothing but a mass of divergent opinions. Besides, we cannot accept any truth on the authority of others alone; we must search after it ourselves, never receiving anything as true which we do not clearly and distinctly perceive to be so. We should be on our guard against being influenced by our prejudices, and by transmitted beliefs which have been impressed upon us in our childhood by our parents and teachers. Many of these opinions have been found by experience to be false; perhaps all of them are. Neither can we have faith in our sensations, for these often deceive us, and how do we know that they correspond to anything real? But can we not be sure that our own bodies and actions are realities? No, we cannot be certain even of theses for we are often deceived, we dream, and in our dreams we believe we have realities before us, whereas they are nothing but illusions. Perhaps we are dreaming now, at this present moment; we have no means by which we can with certainty distinguish between waking and dreaming. For all I know, an evil spirit may have made me in order to deceive me. His world which I picture to myself may exist only in my imagination; perhaps it has no existence outside my mind. Even the demonstrations of mathematics may be doubted, for we have sometimes seen men fall into error in such matter and admit as absolutely certain what to us appeared false.

There is no idea of which I can be entirely certain. "I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I see are false; I believe that none of those things which my deceptive memory presents to me are true; I suppose that I have no senses; I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and place are nothing but fictions of my mind. What is there then that can be thought true? Perhaps only that nothing in the world is certain."

But one thing is certain, and that is that I doubt, or think; of that there can be no doubt. It is, indeed, a contradiction to suppose that which thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Descartes does not appeal to an empirical psychical fact, the mind's awareness of itself; but reasons logically that doubt implies a doubter, thinking a thinker, a thinking thing (res cogitans) or spiritual substance; thus he reaches what seems to him a rational, self-evident proposition. To doubt means to think, to think means to be; cogito ergo sum- I think; therefore I am. "It is the first and most certain knowledge that occurs to one who philosophizes in an orderly manner." Here is the principle we have been seeking--a certain, self-evident starting point for our metaphysics. This proposition also furnishes us with a criterion or test of truth. This one proposition is absolutely certain, true, clearly and distinctly perceived; hence, I can establish as a general rule that all things which are like it, clearly and distinctly perceived are true.

In the Second Meditation, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous reasoning: Cogito, ergo sum or "I think, therefore I am." These Meditations are conducted from the first person perspective, from Descartes.' However, he expects his reader to meditate along with him to see how his conclusions were reached. This is especially important in the Second Meditation where the intuitively grasped truth of "I exist" occurs. So the discussion here of this truth will take place from the first person or "I" perspective. All sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the previous meditation, and therefore all such beliefs are now considered false. This includes the belief that I have a body endowed with sense organs. But does the supposed falsehood of this belief mean that I do not exist? No, for

if I convinced myself that my beliefs are false, then surely there must be an "I" that was convinced. Moreover, even if I am being deceived by an evil demon, I must exist in order to be deceived at all. So "I must finally conclude that the proposition, 'I am,' 'I exist,' is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind". This just means that the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not what I am thinking is true or false, implies that there must be something engaged in that activity, namely an "I." Hence, "I exist" is an indubitable and, therefore, absolutely certain belief that serves as an axiom from which other, absolutely certain truths can be deduced.

2.5. IS DESCARTES A SCEPTIC?

Rene Descartes was not a Skeptic. David Hume was the first famous Skeptic in modern philosophy. Rene Descartes, by comparison, was a True Believer. René Descartes was not a sceptic; in fact, it would be more correct to characterize him as an anti-sceptic. His philosophical method has been called methodological scepticism, as he sought to use (at least on a rhetorical level) sceptical doubt as a means to discover indubitable truths. As such, however, seeing that Descartes did find indubitable truths aplenty, his method is less a method of scepticism than a reductio ad absurdum of scepticism: a demonstration that even the most rigorous sceptical doubt terminates in truths that cannot be doubted. That is, scepticism is self-refuting.

Descartes believed in God, and he believed he prove the existence of God. Rene Descartes also believed in Absolute Truths (e.g. the Cartesian Cogito). Descartes also demonstrated his philosophy by inventing Analytical Geometry. Descartes is occasionally mistaken for a Skeptic because of his Method, which he called, the Method of Doubt. This was how he proved Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. If we doubt everything that we can possibly doubt - God, World, Humanity - we are always left with one thing that we can never doubt, no matter how hard we

try, namely, "I think therefore I am." That single fact is beyond any doubt, even though we have no material evidence of the fact of thinking or self. If a person is a rigid, dogmatic, one-sided materialist, then he will insist that the "Self" does not exist, and even that "thinking" does not exist. One cannot put these under a microscope or see them with the naked eye - therefore, for such insensitive clods, "they don't exist." Yet in your invisible and metaphysical world of your mind, you are absolutely and indisputably aware that you are thinking, and therefore that you exist. That is beyond doubt for any rational being. Descartes was the inspiration for Spinoza, as well as for Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The fact of the existence of self (which Descartes maintained that he proved) is the subject of much modern and so-called postmodern skepticism.

Descartes was, first and foremost, a foundationalist - indeed its modern inventor. Foundationalism is the philosophical view or attitude that all knowledge should be based on indubitable, certain foundations, some privileged truths from which all other truths can be derived (similarly to axioms in mathematics). Descartes used methodological scepticism to refute any piece of supposed knowledge that could be doubted, i.e. to discard truths that cannot be used in the foundation. After stripping them away, only one truth remained that he could not doubt: the very act of doubting itself proved that the doubter, Descartes himself, existed. This is captured in his famous slogan: I think, therefore I am (cogito ergo sum). Doubting one's own existence is not possible if one does not already exist and can thus doubt to begin with. It is in this way, as mentioned above, that scepticism proves self-refuting.

Descartes was not a sceptic. He used the method of scepticism to refute scepticism by landing on a truth that is demonstrated by the very act of doubting it: I think, therefore I am. In fact Descartes was a foundationalist, a believer in certain knowledge built on indubitable truths. Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (1596-1650). Cartesian doubt is also known

as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt or hyperbolic doubt.

Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy. This method of doubt was largely popularized in Western philosophy by René Descartes, who sought to doubt the truth of all his beliefs in order to determine which beliefs he could be certain were true. It is the basis for Descartes' statement, "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am").

2.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF DESCARTES METHOD OF DOUBT :

Descartes' method was to search for an indefeasible truth that could function as a starting point for a series of deductions. The nature of a deductive inference is that it transfers the truth value of the premise to the conclusion. One thing that is known to be true can, via deduction, support definite knowledge of the truth of another thing. Using this method, Descartes hoped to develop a body of human knowledge that was necessarily true. Descartes discovered what he claimed was an indefeasibly true a priori proposition in his famous Cogito: "I think; therefore, I am." From that proposition he deduced the existence of the exterior world just as he had set out to do. Few people today think of Descartes' metaphysics as anything but a historical phenomenon, but his thought continues to influence mathematics, philosophy, and cognitive science, among other fields.

Descartes' application of systematic doubt is one of his most influential legacies. He conceived of it as breaking the dogmatic grip of Aristotle, on knowledge of the world around us. Descartes realized that dogmatic acceptance of any claims to authority was an impediment to the advancement of knowledge. And that is finally the most important aspect of Descartes' method.

Descartes' method is doubt. Descartes wants to become absolutely certain of what is real and true. He determines that the best way to do this is test every single thing that he believes to be real and true from his everyday life with doubt. If the thing he tests passes, then he can know absolutely that it is, no longer with any doubt, real and true. Doubt is the single most significant part of Descartes' philosophy as a whole, as it is what leads him to "I am. I exist."

This axiom becomes the basis for many future claims by Descartes, some of which might aren't seen as absolute truths by many philosophers (for example, Descartes' ontological argument for the existence of God depends first on the existence of 'self' as defined by 'cogito ergo sum', however Kant masterfully dismisses the ontological argument and thus takes down a massive part of Descartes' overall philosophy).

Descartes' method of doubt is a way of judging a clear and distinct idea and, as a consequence, forms a foundation of ideas for an entirely new philosophy. Moreover, he believed that if humans had the freedom to seek and find truth, then the clear and distinct ideas which we cannot doubt must be true. Otherwise, these ideas would lead us astray. The best way out of the prejudice of human mind, to him, was this method of doubt, where he would scrutinize every principle and accepted ideas with systematic scrutiny. He would only accept the ideas which he cannot doubt with any amount of mental effort. Through his method, he was able to bring belief in ideas such as the existence of mind, God and Corporeal world and their nature. His method is still used by philosophers to lay a metaphysical foundation to physics. But in the end, it is just one method. It does not, in any way, eliminate the need of the other methods of gaining knowledge. They stand firm in their place as always using his method of doubt Descartes demonstrated that anything and everything can be doubted but not the fact that he (Descartes) is doubting. So he reaches at his famous statement "I think therefore I am". Descartes method was used by Husserl in his phenomenology.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 2: Write short notes on:

(a) Descartes' method of doubt

(b) Descartes' cogito ergo sum.

Question 3: State whether true or false:

(a) Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition by René Descartes usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am".

(b) The phrase "cogito ergo sum" originally appeared in French in his Discourse on the Method according to Descartes.

(c) In the Second Meditation, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous reasoning: Cogito, ergo sum or "I think, therefore I am."

(d) David Hume was the first famous Skeptic in modern philosophy.

(e) Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy.



2.7. LET US SUM UP:

- Rene Descartes who is known as "the Father of Modern Philosophy" is responsible for one of the best-known quotations in philosophy: "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am").

- Descartes attempted to narrow down, by what is sometimes called the method of doubt, what was certain and what contained even a shadow of a doubt. For example, he realized that he could doubt even something as apparently fundamental as whether he had a body (it could be that he was just dreaming of it or that it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he could not, under any circumstances, doubt whether he had a mind or that he could think.

- The only thing that remains true that there is a mind or consciousness doing the doubting and believing its perceptions, hence the famous formulation, 'I think therefore I am', or in Latin, the cogito-'Cogito ergo sum'.

- Descartes also proposed that the mind and body were two separate and distinct entities, but even the body was not so certain a thing as the mind, because, like everything else in the world, the body could only be sensed because there was a mind to sense it.

- René Descartes is often credited with being the "Father of Modern Philosophy." This title is justified due both to his break with the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy prevalent at his time and to his development and promotion of the new, mechanistic sciences.

- Descartes sets out to find something that lies beyond all doubt. He eventually discovers that "I exist" is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely certain. It is from this point that Descartes proceeds to demonstrate God's existence and that God cannot be a deceiver. This, in turn, serves to fix the certainty of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood and provides the epistemological foundation Descartes set out to find.

- Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition by René Descartes usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am". The phrase originally appeared in French in his Discourse on the Method, it appeared in Latin in his later Principles of Philosophy.

- René Descartes was not a sceptic; in fact, it would be more correct to characterize him as an anti-sceptic. His philosophical method has been called methodological scepticism.

- Descartes was not a sceptic: he used the method of scepticism to refute scepticism by landing on a truth that is demonstrated by the very act of doubting it: I think, therefore I am.

- Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy. This method of doubt was largely popularized in Western philosophy by René Descartes, who sought to doubt the truth of all his beliefs in order to determine which beliefs he could be certain were true. It is the basis for Descartes' statement, "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am").

2.7. FURTHER READING:

1. Thilly, Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad.

2. Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy (Greek, Medieval, Modern), Motilal Banarsidass Publishers private limited, Delhi.

3. Wright, M.R., Introducing Greek Philosophy, Routledge.

4. Stace. W.T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, MacMillan and Co. limited, London.

2.8. ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

1. (a) ans. Father

(b) ans. Principles of Philosophy

(c) ans. Reason and science

(d) ans. reason

(e) ans. certain

(2) (a) Ans: Descartes' method was to search for an indefeasible truth that could function as a starting point for a series of deductions. The nature of a deductive inference is that it transfers the truth value of the premise to the conclusion. One thing that is known to be true can, via deduction, support

definite knowledge of the truth of another thing. Using this method, Descartes hoped to develop a body of human knowledge that was necessarily true. Descartes discovered what he claimed was an indefeasibly true a priori proposition in his famous Cogito: "I think; therefore, I am." From that proposition he deduced the existence of the exterior world just as he had set out to do. Few people today think of Descartes' metaphysics as anything but a historical phenomenon, but his thought continues to influence mathematics, philosophy, and cognitive science, among other fields.

Descartes' application of systematic doubt is one of his most influential legacies. He conceived of it as breaking the dogmatic grip of Aristotle, on knowledge of the world around us. Descartes realized that dogmatic acceptance of any claims to authority was an impediment to the advancement of knowledge. And that is finally the most important aspect of Descartes' method. Descartes' method is doubt. Descartes wants to become absolutely certain of what is real and true. He determines that the best way to do this is test every single thing that he believes to be real and true from his everyday life with doubt. If the thing he tests passes, then he can know absolutely that it is, no longer with any doubt, real and true. Doubt is the single most significant part of Descartes' philosophy as a whole, as it is what leads him to "I am. I exist."

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Descartes' method of doubt is a way of judging a clear and distinct idea and, as a consequence, forms a foundation of ideas for an entirely new philosophy. Moreover, he believed that if humans had the freedom to seek and find truth, then the clear and distinct ideas which we cannot doubt must be true. Otherwise, these ideas would lead us astray. The best way out of the prejudice of human mind, to him, was this method of doubt, where he would scrutinize every principle and accepted ideas with systematic scrutiny. He would only accept the ideas which he cannot doubt with any amount of mental effort. Through his method, he was able to bring

belief in ideas such as the existence of mind, God and Corporeal world and their nature. His method is still used by philosophers to lay a metaphysical foundation to physics. But in the end, it is just one method. It does not, in any way, eliminate the need of the other methods of gaining knowledge. They stand firm in their place as always using his method of doubt Descartes demonstrated that anything and everything can be doubted but not the fact that he (Descartes) is doubting. So he reaches at his famous statement "I think therefore I am".

Descartes method was used by Husserl in his phenomenology.

(b) Ans: Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition by René Descartes usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am". The phrase originally appeared in French in his Discourse on the Method, so as to reach a wider audience than Latin would have allowed. It appeared in Latin in his later Principles of Philosophy. As Descartes explained, "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt...." The concept is also sometimes known as the cogito. This proposition became a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to form a secure foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt. While other knowledge could be a figment of imagination, deception, or mistake, Descartes asserted that the very act of doubting one's own existence served as proof of the reality of one's own mind; there must be a thinking entity in this case the self for there to be a thought.

This method must be extended to philosophy. We should proceed from absolutely certain first principles, from propositions which are clear and self-evident, and pass on to new and unknown truths which are equally certain. We look in vain for such truths in the traditional scholastic systems, for in them we find nothing but a mass of divergent opinions. Besides, we cannot accept any truth on the authority of others alone; we must search after it ourselves, never receiving anything as true which we do not clearly and distinctly perceive to be so.

In the Second Meditation, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous reasoning: Cogito, ergo sum or "I think, therefore I am." These Meditations are conducted from the first person perspective, from Descartes.' However, he expects his reader to meditate along with him to see how his conclusions were reached. This is especially important in the Second Meditation where the intuitively grasped truth of "I exist" occurs. So the discussion here of this truth will take place from the first person or "I" perspective. All sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the previous meditation, and therefore all such beliefs are now considered false. This includes the belief that I have a body endowed with sense organs. But does the supposed falsehood of this belief mean that I do not exist? No, for if I convinced myself that my beliefs are false, then surely there must be an "I" that was convinced. Moreover, even if I am being deceived by an evil demon, I must exist in order to be deceived at all. So "I must finally conclude that the proposition, 'I am,' 'I exist,' is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind". This just means that the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not what I am thinking is true or false, implies that there must be something engaged in that activity, namely an "I." Hence, "I exist" is an indubitable and, therefore, absolutely certain belief that serves as an axiom from which other, absolutely certain truths can be deduced.

3. (a) Ans: true

(b)Ans: true

(c)Ans: true

(d)Ans: true

(e) Ans: true

2.10. MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short questions:-

1. What is the meaning of "cogito ergo sum"?
2. Who is known as the "Father of Modern philosophy"?
3. Where did Descartes first discuss about "cogito ergo sum"?
4. What was Descartes method of investigating about the certainty of his knowledge?

B. Short questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Descartes' cogito ergo sum
2. Descartes' method of doubt
3. Descartes' scepticism
4. Significance of Descartes' method of doubt

C. Short notes (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Descartes' method of doubt
2. Descartes' criterion of knowledge
3. Origin of Descartes' method of doubt

D. Long questions: (Answer each question within 300-500 words)

1. Analyze "cogito ergo sum"? Explain Descartes' criterion of knowledge.
2. Explain and examine significance of Descartes' method of Doubt.
3. Is Descartes a sceptic? Explain and examine.
4. Give a detailed account of Descartes' philosophy.
5. How did Descartes arrive at "cogito ergo sum", the certain knowledge through his method of doubt? Explain.

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UNIT 3: SPINOZA: THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE

UNIT STRUCTURE

3.1. Learning Objectives

3.2. Introduction

3.3. Origin of Spinoza's concept of substance

3.4. Spinoza's concept of substance (The universal Substance)

3.5. Spinoza's doctrine of modes

3.6. Was Spinoza a pantheist?

3.7. Leibnitz's objection to Spinoza's substance monism argument

3.8. Let us sum up

3.9. Further Reading

3.10. Answer to check your progress

3.11. Model Questions

3.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able-

- to acquire a knowledge about the definition and origin of Spinoza's concept of substance
- to acquire a knowledge about Spinoza's concept of universal substance
- to acquire a knowledge about Spinoza's doctrine of modes

3.2. INTRODUCTION

According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a mode. A substance is something that needs nothing else in order to exist or be conceived. Substances are independent entities both conceptually and ontologically. He defines God as a substance consisting of infinite attributes. He shows that substances cannot share attributes, that every substance is infinite, that a single substance can have several attributes, and that an infinite substance exists. For example, being furry, orange, hungry, angry, etc. are modes that need a substance which is furry, orange, hungry, angry,

etc. Hunger and patches of orange color cannot exist floating around on their own, but rather, hunger and patches of orange color need something (namely, a substance) to be hungry and have the orange color. Hunger and colors are, therefore, dependent entities or modes.

According to almost all of Spinoza's predecessors (including Aristotle and Descartes) there are lots of substances in the universe, each with their own modes or properties. For example, according to Descartes a cat is a substance which has the modes or properties of being furry, orange, soft, etc. Spinoza, however, rejects this traditional view and argues instead that there is only one substance, called "God" or "Nature." Cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are not substances in Spinoza's view, but rather, cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are just modes or properties of one substance. This one substance is simply people-like in places, rock-like in other places, chair-like in still other places, etc. This one substance has an infinite number of attributes. An attribute is simply an essence; a "what it is to be" that kind of thing. According to Descartes, every substance has only one attribute: bodies have only the attribute of extension, and minds have only the attribute of thought. Spinoza, however, argues against this claim that the one substance is absolutely infinite and so it must exist in every way that something can exist. Thus, he infers that the one substance must have an infinite number of attributes. An attribute, according to Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way of conceiving or describing the substance. When we consider substance one way, then we conceive of its essence as extension. When we consider substance another way, then we conceive of its essence as thought. While substance has an infinite number of different attributes, Spinoza argues that human beings only know about two of them: extension and thought.

3.3. ORIGIN OF SPINOZA'S CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE:

The origin of Spinoza's philosophy has been sought by different students of his doctrines in different sources like in the literature of the middle ages,

in the writings of the Jewish scholars. Whatever influence any or all of these teachings may have had on him, it would seem that the philosophy of Descartes furnished the building stones of his system. The problems which occupy his attention, and which he tries to solve, grew out of the theories of the great French rationalist, and the pantheistic conception which characterizes his own solution was a logical consequence of the Cartesian notion of God as the absolute substance. It is possible, however, that the Neo-Platonism of the medieval Jewish thinkers led him to appreciate the pantheistic possibilities of the Cartesian system.

For Spinoza the goal of philosophy is the complete knowledge of things and this can be reached by clear and distinct thinking. If we proceed from self-evident principles and prove every step in the argument, we can fashion a body of truths as certain and universal as mathematics. Spinoza followed the same method like Descartes. He followed the examples set by Descartes. Descartes sharply distinguishes between God and nature, between mind and body: thought is the attribute of mind, extension the attribute of body. Body and mind are mutually independent substances, but he declares that God is the sole absolutely independent substance. Spinoza takes the idea of substance and works out its implications with logical consistency.

3.4. SPINOZA'S CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE (THE UNIVERSAL SUBSTANCE):

Spinoza's philosophy is divided into five parts (1) God; (2) the nature and origin of mind; (3) the nature and origin of the emotions; (4) human bondage and the power of the emotions; (5) the power of the intellect or human liberty. The starting point of thought is the definition of substance. Substance is that which exists in itself or independently of anything else, that which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived: nothing can be conceived without presupposing anything else; it is the absolutely independent underlying principle.

From the definition of substance certain consequences necessarily follow. If substance is absolutely independent being, it must be infinite, for otherwise it would not be independent. There can be only one such being, otherwise, again, it would be limited by others and not independent. It is self-caused, causa sui, for if it were produced by anything else, it would be dependent on that. It is, therefore, free in the sense that nothing outside of it can determine it; it is self-determined, in that all its qualities and actions follow from its own nature as necessarily as the properties of a triangle follow from the nature of a triangle. Individuality or personality cannot be ascribed to substance, for these imply determination or limitation: all determination is negation. Hence, neither intelligence nor will, in the human sense, belong to it; it does not think and plan and decide, it does not act according to conscious purpose or design-such teleology is entirely foreign to its nature. "I confess," says Spinoza, "that the view which subjects all things to the indifferent will of God and makes them depend on divine caprice, comes nearer the truth than the view of those who maintain that God does everything for the sake of the good. For these persons seem to place something outside of God which is independent of him, to which he looks as to a model while he is at work, or at which he aims as if at a mark. This is, indeed, nothing else than subjecting God to fate, and is a most absurd view of him whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence and existence of things."

This single, eternal, infinite, self-caused and necessary principle of things is called God or nature, God is not, as Descartes held, apart from the world an external transcendent cause acting on it from without (theism), but in the world, the immanent principle of the universe. God is in the world and the world in him, he is the source of everything that is (pantheism). God and the world are one. Cause and effect are not distinct here; God does not create in the sense of producing something separate from, and external to himself, something that can exist apart from him; he is the permanent substance, or substratum or essence in all things. As the active principle or

source of all reality, Spinoza, calls him natura naturans; as the plurality of objects, the effects of products of the principle, he calls him natura naturata.

How else shall we define nature, or God; what are the attributes of universal reality? By attribute Spinoza means that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. Spinoza ascribed the infinite substance an infinite number of attributes every one of which is infinite and eternal in its essence. God is so great that he is conceived as possessing infinite attributes in an infinite degree. The infinitude of God is of the second order: he possesses an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite in extent.

Of these infinite attributes the mind of man can grasp but two. Nature expresses itself in an infinite number of ways, of which only extension and thought are knowable by man. God or nature is at least both bodily and mental. Wherever then there is space or matter there is soul or mind and vice versa, the two attributes being essential to the nature of substance, must be present wherever the substance is found everywhere. Each of the two attributes is infinite in its own kind, but not absolutely infinite neither thought nor extension is the sole attribute; since there are infinitely many attributes of God, none of them can be called absolutely infinite. These attributes are absolutely independent of one another and cannot influence each other; mind cannot produce changes in body nor the body changes in mind.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 1: Fill in the blanks:

(a) According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a ……..

(b) A substance is something that needs nothing else in order to ……. or be conceived.

(c) Spinoza defines ……. as a substance consisting of infinite attributes.

(d) Spinoza maintains that one substance must have an ……. number of attributes.

(e) For Spinoza the goal of philosophy is the complete knowledge of things and this can be reached by …… and ……

(f) Spinoza's philosophy is divided into ……parts.

(g) According to Spinoza the single, eternal, infinite, self-caused and necessary principle of things is called …… or nature

3.5 .SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF MODES:

Attributes appear in specific ways or modes. Modes are defined as "the affections or modifications of substance or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived." A mode or modification cannot be conceived except as the mode of a thing. The attribute of extension manifests itself in particular figured bodies, thought expresses itself in particular ideas and acts of will. We never have abstract thought as such, but always particular ideas and particular bodies. We cannot, however, think the latter apart from attributes.

Individual minds and individual bodies are finite temporal modes of substance-the former under the attributes of thought, the latter under the attribute of extension. The eternal infinite substance expresses itself forever indefinite ways, in an eternal and necessary system of physical and mental forms, in a system of ideas and in a system of bodies. Spinoza calls this infinite and necessary system of ideas, the totality of all ideas. Nature, as a whole, may be compared to an individual organism, the elements of which come and go, but form or "face" remains the same.

The particular finite objects and minds are not direct effects of the substance of God; each finite thing has its efficient cause in some other finite thing, and so on ad infinitum. Not a single thought or body could exist

were it not for the permanent underlying reality to which all things belong, of which all are manifestations. Spinoza was well aware that we cannot logically derive this or that particular thing, the finite mode, from the notion of substance; that we can never deduce particulars from concepts. Given the concept of an infinite extended and thinking substance we cannot prove that such and such an individual necessarily follows. But Spinoza believed that given such a substance, thoughts and bodies necessarily follow so also the properties of the universe follow necessarily from the concept of substance. We cannot deduce from the notion of substance or God the existence, number, and properties of the different finite objects in the world, the so-called modes or forms in which substance appears, the particular concrete men, plants, and bodies now existing. These do not follow necessarily from the idea of substance; they are contingent and accidental as regards the abstract concept of God. Spinoza explains individual things as effects of other individual things. Spinoza's rationalism does not pretend to deduce the details of physical or psychological nature from the abstract concept of God, nor from the concepts of pure extension and pure thought. He is asserting only that each is a system of interrelated parts.

Conceived under the form of eternity, God literally is his infinite attributes; conceived under the form of time, or through the imagination, God is the world. To the senses and the imagination, nature appears in the form of isolated separate phenomena, but that is an inadequate and superficial way of viewing it; to the understanding, nature is one universal substance and the particular phenomenon only a limited form of it, a negation of all the other forms in which substance expresses itself. No mode, then, can exist except as the mode or modification of a substance; the substance is the abiding principle, the mode is transitory. The particular mode, therefore, is not permanent; it is but a temporal expression of the substance.

Spinoza's doctrine of modes is determined by his rationalistic presuppositions. Logically, we cannot deduce the particular finite modes from the concept of God; hence they have no true reality, and are not

essential. Yet it is hard to see why Spinoza is not committed to the position that particular modes should be necessary consequences of substance since they have their source in it, and since everything flows necessarily from it. Spinoza's difficulty arises from his attempt to explain the universe logically. Influenced by the method of geometry, he holds that things follow eternally from the first principle, which would make change and evolution impossible; experience, however, convinces him that there is change. In order to do justice to both logic and the facts, Spinoza invents the distinction between the infinite or eternal modes and the finite or temporal modes of God.

3.6. WAS SPINOZA A PANTHEIST?

Is Spinoza a pantheist? Any adequate analysis of Spinoza's identification of God and Nature will show clearly that Spinoza cannot be a pantheist in the second, immanentist sense. For Spinoza, there is nothing but Nature and its attributes and modes. And within Nature there can certainly be nothing that is supernatural. If Spinoza is seeking to eliminate anything, it is that which is above or beyond nature, which escapes the laws and processes of nature. But is he a pantheist in the first, reductive sense?

The issue of whether God is to be identified with the whole of Nature (i.e., Natura naturans and Natura naturata) or only a part of Nature (i.e., Natura naturans alone), which has occupied a good deal of the recent literature, might be seen as crucial to the question of Spinoza's alleged pantheism. After all, if pantheism is the view that God is everything, then Spinoza is a pantheist only if he identifies God with all of Nature. Indeed, this is exactly how the issue is often framed.

Both those who believe that Spinoza is a pantheist and those who believe that he is not a pantheist focus on the question of whether God is to be identified with the whole of Nature, including the infinite and finite modes of Natura naturata, or only with substance and attributes (Natura naturans) but not the modes. Thus, it has been argued that Spinoza is not a pantheist,

because God is to be identified only with substance and its attributes, the most universal, active causal principles of Nature, and not with any modes of substance. Other scholars have argued that Spinoza is a pantheist, just because he does identify God with the whole of nature.

However, this debate about the extent of Spinoza's identification of God with Nature is not really to the point when the question is about Spinoza's alleged pantheism. To be sure, if by 'pantheism' is meant the idea that God is everything, and if one reads Spinoza as saying that God is only Natura naturans, then Spinoza's God is not everything and consequently he is not a pantheist, at least in the ordinary sense. Finite things, on this reading, while caused by the eternal, necessary and active aspects of Nature, are not identical with God or substance, but rather are its effects. But this is not the interesting sense in which Spinoza is not a pantheist. For even if Spinoza does indeed identify God with the whole of Nature, it does not follow that Spinoza is a pantheist. The real issue is not whether the proper reading of the metaphysics of Spinoza's conception of God and its relationship to finite modes. On either interpretation, Spinoza's move is a naturalistic and reductive one. God is identical either with all of Nature or with only a part of Nature; for this reason, Spinoza shares something with the reductive pantheist. But-and this is the important point-even the atheist can, without too much difficulty, admit that God is nothing but Nature. Reductive pantheism and atheism maintain extensionally equivalent ontologies.

Rather, the question of Spinoza's pantheism is really going to be answered on the psychological side of things, with regard to the proper attitude to take toward Deus sive Natura. And however one reads the relationship between God and Nature in Spinoza, it is a mistake to call him a pantheist in so far as pantheism is still a kind of religious theism. What really distinguishes the pantheist from the atheist is that the pantheist does not reject as inappropriate the religious psychological attitudes demanded by theism. Rather, the pantheist simply asserts that God-conceived as a being before which one is to adopt an attitude of worshipful awe-is or is in

Nature. And nothing could be further from the spirit of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza does not believe that worshipful awe or religious reverence is an appropriate attitude to take before God or Nature. There is nothing holy or sacred about Nature, and it is certainly not the object of a religious experience. Instead, one should strive to understand God or Nature, with the kind of adequate or clear and distinct intellectual knowledge that reveals Nature's most important truths and shows how everything depends essentially and existentially on higher natural causes. The key to discovering and experiencing God, for Spinoza, is philosophy and science, not religious awe and worshipful submission. The latter gives rise only to superstitious behaviour and subservience to ecclesiastic authorities; the former leads to enlightenment, freedom and true blessedness (i.e., peace of mind).

One of the most striking aspects of Spinoza's philosophy is his conception of God, which begins with his elaboration of the Scholastic and Cartesian conceptions of Substance to its logical extremes where nothing else but Substance or God alone exists. This position raises certain important questions concerning the world, the mind and body relationship (as the world is divided into the mental and spiritual substances), the relationship between man and God, human destiny and liberation. Spinoza's pantheism is an answer to all these questions.

Spinoza categorically asserts that God is the source of everything that is and He is the immanent principle of the universe. This leads to the identification of God with the world: God is the world and the world in Him or God and the world are one. Understood in this sense, God is not a mere creator of the world, who has created it and remains separated from it. He is the permanent substratum or essence in all things and the active principle or source of all reality.

To account for the relationship between God and nature Spinoza introduces two terms: Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata. The Latin term Natura Naturans means nature naturing, or nature doing what nature does. The term naturans is the present participle of natura and Natura

Naturans refers to the self-causing activity of nature or nature in the active sense. It is nature in itself and is conceived through itself. On the other hand, the term Natura Naturata refers to the plurality of objects. It stands for the effects or products of the principle and in this sense nature is considered as a passive product of an infinite causal chain. It is whatever follows from the necessity of God's nature, or from God's attributes. All the modes of God's attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God constitute Natura Naturata.

With his pantheism, Spinoza presents a logical theory of God which is derived from the notion of substance and it relates with the way of things actually exist in the world and as we humans experience them. This theory would be complete only with an explanation of the notions of bondage and liberation, which Spinoza describes with the idea of an intellectual love of God.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 2: Write short notes on:

(a) Spinoza's concept of universal substance

(b) Spinoza's doctrine of modes

Question 3: State whether true or false:

(a) A mode or modification cannot be conceived except as the mode of a thing.

(b) We never have abstract thought as such, but always particular ideas and particular bodies.

(c) Nature, as a whole, may be compared to an individual organism, the elements of which come and go, but form or "face" remains the same.

(d) The particular finite objects and minds are not direct effects of the substance of God; each finite thing has its efficient cause in some other finite thing, and so on ad infinitum.

(e) Spinoza does not explain individual things as effects of other individual things.

3.7. LEIBNITZ'S OBJECTION TO SPINOZA'S SUBSTANCE MONISM ARGUMENT:

Spinoza's Argument for Substance Monism is generally deemed a failure by contemporary philosophers. There are a number of ways to attack the argument. The most common way is to reject Spinoza's second premise "That two substances cannot share the same nature or attribute. One of the most popular arguments against this promise was first presented by Leibniz. Leibniz argued that whereby it might be impossible for two substances to have all of their attributes in common (because then they would be indistinguishable), it may be possible for two substances to share an attribute and yet differ by each having another attribute that is not shared. For example, one substance may have attributes A and B and another substance has attributes A and C. The two substances would be distinguishable because each has an attribute the other lacks, but both substances would nevertheless share an attribute. This objection was first presented by Leibnitz to Spinoza himself. Though Spinoza did not find the objection persuasive, he never offered an explicit reply for a plausible solution on Spinoza's behalf based upon the conceptual independence of the attributes.

If Spinoza's Substance Monism Argument were sound, it would prove that the only substance which exists is God or Nature (a substance with an infinite number of attributes). But why does this one substance have any finite modes (properties)? Spinoza provides an answer at. Here Spinoza argues that "from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything which can fall under an infinite intellect)". Spinoza argues that the greater something is, the

greater the number of properties which follow from its nature or essence. For example, it follows from the nature of a triangle that it has three sides. Why do triangles have interior angles of 180 degrees? Because of the kind of things that they are (that is, because of their essence.)

The greater the essence of the thing, the more properties that follow from it. God's essence is the greatest possible essence. Thus, the greatest possible number of properties (that is, an infinite number) must follow from God's essence or nature. Thus, an infinite number of finite modes must follow from the essence of God in just the way those certain properties of triangles (having interior angles of 180 degrees, for example) follow from the essence of a triangle. Because a triangle's essence is finite only a finite number of properties follow from it; because God's essence is infinite an infinite number of properties follow from it. Human beings, chairs, tables, cats, dogs, trees, etc. are some of the properties that follow from God's essence or nature.

Spinoza claims that one important consequence of this proof is that modes are properties of substance. The view that modes are properties of substance has been denied by at least one prominent interpreter of Spinoza. Curley's view has, however, proven unpopular. The dominant interpretation today is that modes are properties of the one substance.



3.8. LET US SUM UP:

- According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a mode.
- Substance is that which exists in itself or independently of anything else, that which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived: nothing can be conceived without presupposing anything else; it is the absolutely independent underlying principle.

- He defines God as a substance consisting of infinite attributes. God is in Spinoza's philosophy single, eternal, infinite, self-caused and necessary principle of things that is also known as the Nature.

- He shows that substances cannot share attributes, that every substance is infinite, that a single substance can have several attributes, and that an infinite substance exists.

- According to Descartes, every substance has only one attribute: bodies have only the attribute of extension, and minds have only the attribute of thought. Spinoza, however, argues against this claim that the one substance is absolutely infinite and so it must exist in every way that something can exist. Thus, he infers that the one substance must have an infinite number of attributes.

- An attribute, according to Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way of conceiving or describing the substance.

- Spinoza followed the same method like Descartes. He followed the examples set by Descartes. Descartes sharply distinguishes between God and nature, between mind and body: thought is the attribute of mind, extension the attribute of body. Body and mind are mutually independent substances, but he declares that God is the sole absolutely independent substance. Spinoza takes the idea of substance and works out its implications with logical consistency.

- God he is the permanent substance, or substratum or essence in all things. As the active principle or source of all reality, Spinoza, calls him natura naturans; as the plurality of objects, the effects of products of the principle, he calls him natura naturata.

- Modes are defined as "the affections or modifications of substance or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived."

- We cannot deduce from the notion of substance or God the existence, number, and properties of the different finite objects in the world, the so-called modes or forms in which substance appears, the particular concrete men, plants, and bodies now existing. These do not follow necessarily from the idea of substance; they are contingent and accidental as regards the abstract concept of God.

- Spinoza is not a pantheist because there is nothing but Nature and its attributes and modes. And within Nature there can certainly be nothing that is supernatural. If Spinoza is seeking to eliminate anything, it is that which is above or beyond nature, which escapes the laws and processes of nature.

- Spinoza presents a logical theory of God derived from the notion of substance and relates it with the way things actually exist in the world and as we humans experience them.



3.9. FURTHER READING:

1. Thilly, Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad.

2. Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy (Greek, Medieval, Modern), Motilal Banarsidass Publishers private limited, Delhi.

3. Wright, M.R., Introducing Greek Philosophy, Routledge.

4. Stace. W.T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, MacMillan and Co. limited, London.



3.10. ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

1. (a) ans: mode

   (b) ans: exist

(c) ans: God

(d) ans: infinite

(e) ans: clear and distinct thinking

(f) ans: five

(g) ans: God

(2) (a) ans: Spinoza's philosophy is divided into five parts (1) God; (2) the nature and origin of mind; (3) the nature and origin of the emotions; (4) human bondage and the power of the emotions; (5) the power of the intellect or human liberty. The starting point of thought is the definition of substance. Substance is that which exists in itself or independently of anything else, that which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived: nothing can be conceived without presupposing anything else; it is the absolutely independent underlying principle.

If substance is absolutely independent being, it must be infinite, for otherwise it would not be independent. There can be only one such being, otherwise, again, it would be limited by others and not independent. It is self-caused, causa sui, for if it were produced by anything else, it would be dependent on that. It is, therefore, free in the sense that nothing outside of it can determine it; it is self-determined, in that all its qualities and actions follow from its own nature as necessarily as the properties of a triangle follow from the nature of a triangle.

This single, eternal, infinite, self-caused and necessary principle of things is called God or nature, God is not, as Descartes held, apart from the world an external transcendent cause acting on it from without (theism), but in the world, the immanent principle of the universe. God is in the world and the world in him, he is the source of everything that is (pantheism). God and the world are one. Cause and effect are not distinct here; God does not create in the sense of producing something separate from, and external to himself, something that can exist apart from him; he is the permanent

substance, or substratum or essence in all things. As the active principle or source of all reality, Spinoza, calls him natura naturans; as the plurality of objects, the effects of products of the principle, he calls him natura naturata.

(b)Ans: Attributes appear in specific ways or modes. Modes are defined as "the affections or modifications of substance or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived." A mode or modification cannot be conceived except as the mode of a thing. The particular finite objects and minds are not direct effects of the substance of God; each finite thing has its efficient cause in some other finite thing, and so on ad infinitum. Not a single thought or body could exist were it not for the permanent underlying reality to which all things belong, of which all are manifestations. Spinoza was well aware that we cannot logically derive this or that particular thing, the finite mode, from the notion of substance; that we can never deduce particulars from concepts. Given the concept of an infinite extended and thinking substance we cannot prove that such and such an individual necessarily follows. But Spinoza believed that given such a substance, thoughts and bodies necessarily follow so also the properties of the universe follow necessarily from the concept of substance. We cannot deduce from the notion of substance or God the existence, number, and properties of the different finite objects in the world, the so-called modes or forms in which substance appears, the particular concrete men, plants, and bodies now existing. These do not follow necessarily from the idea of substance; they are contingent and accidental as regards the abstract concept of God. Spinoza explains individual things as effects of other individual things. Spinoza's rationalism does not pretend to deduce the details of physical or psychological nature from the abstract concept of God, nor from the concepts of pure extension and pure thought. He is asserting only that each is a system of interrelated parts.

Spinoza's doctrine of modes is determined by his rationalistic presuppositions. Logically, we cannot deduce the particular finite modes from the concept of God; hence they have no true reality, and are not

essential. Yet it is hard to see why Spinoza is not committed to the position that particular modes should be necessary consequences of substance since they have their source in it, and since everything flows necessarily from it. Spinoza's difficulty arises from his attempt to explain the universe logically. Influenced by the method of geometry, he holds that things follow eternally from the first principle, which would make change and evolution impossible; experience, however, convinces him that there is change. In order to do justice to both logic and the facts, Spinoza invents the distinction between the infinite or eternal modes and the finite or temporal modes of God.

3. (a) ans: true

(b) ans: true

(c) ans: true

(d) ans: true

(e) ans: false



3.11. MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short questions:-

1. Define substance.
2. What is the ultimate substance according to Spinoza?
3. What is attribute or modes?
4. How many attributes God has in view of Spinoza?
5. What is natura naturans ?

B. Short questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Spinoza's concept of God

2. Attributes in philosophy of Spinoza

3. Spinoza's pantheism

C. Short notes (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Origin of Spinoza's concept of substance

2. Difference between Spinoza's substance and Descartes' substance

3. Leibnitz's criticism of Spinoza's substance

D. Long questions: (Answer each question within 300-500 words)

1. Explain the theory of substance propounded by Spinoza.

2. What are attributes or modes according to Spinoza ? Explain.

3. Is Spinoza a pantheist? Analyze.

4. Give a critical exposition of Spinoza's substance monism with special reference to Leibnitz..

5. Elaborate the definition of substance put forwarded by Spinoza.

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UNIT 4 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ: MONADOLOGY

UNIT STRUCTURE

4. 1. Learning objectives

4. 2. Introduction

4. 3. The Monadology

4. 4. The Doctrine of Monads

4. 5. Characteristics of Monads

4. 6. Kinds of Monads

4. 7. Let sum up

4. 8. Further Reading

4.9. Answer to Check Your Progress

4.10. Model Questions

4.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- Describe the life-sketch of Leibnitz and his Idealism,
- The Monadology in Selections,
- Doctrine of monads,
- What are monads?
- Kinds of Monads,
- Bring out the features of Monads
- Activities of Monads
- Explain and examine Leibnitz's theory of monadism.

4.2. INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz is one of the most important proponents of a new kind of Idealism and metaphysical system quite different from either of Plato or of George Berkeley. He is the founder of spiritualistic pluralism which assumes the form of monadism. Philosophers concerns with spiritualism receive a new dimension with the publication of Monadology by Leibnitz. In his Monadology (French: La Monadologie, 1714),

Leibnitz outlines of his doctrine of monads. His monadology is nothing more than an example of spiritual pluralism.

Gottfried Leibnitz was a German philosopher. Besides being a famous philosopher Leibnitz was "at one and same time a mathematician, a lawyer, a historian, a diplomat - and a philosopher…In the best of all possible worlds he ought to have become the best of all possible philosopher" (Tomlin 1954, 150). He ranks as an outstanding polymath of modern philosophers for his contributions to mathematics, jurisprudence, history and philosophy too. In a literal sense Leibnitz is to be considered to be a man of universal savant of the 17th century. Leibnitz, after Aristotle, fashioned as an encyclopedic genius. Thus, nobody can deny that Leibnitz was really a man of universal attainments and genius. Leibnitz's notable victory is revealed in the motto of his theodicy: "Everything is for the best in the best of possible worlds" (Weber and Perry 2012, 275). He occupies an important place in both history of philosophy and mathematics.

Gottfried Leibnitz is the third of the great rationalist systems of the 17th century. In the history of modern western philosophy the name of Leibnitz follows the famous names of Rene Descartes and of Benedict de Spinoza. He was born on 1st July, 1646 in Leipzig, Germany, to Friedrich Leibnitz and Catherina Schmuck. Leibnitz's father was a Professor of moral philosophy at the University of Leipzig. But, unfortunately, his father passed away when Leibnitz was only 6 (six) years old. Leibnitz was a very precocious child and he was granted free to access his father's personal library from the age seven onwards. He studied Latin Classics and French on his own effort and eventually accelerated his mastery of Latin, besides which he studied philosophical and theological works when he was in his father's library. Leibnitz, in fact, learned his religious and ethical and moral values from his mother since he lost his father when he was an infant which we have just mentioned. These would exert a profound influence on his philosophical thought and ideas in later. Leibnitz often styled himself von Leibnitz when he was an adult. This is, perhaps, the reason why many posthumous editions of his contributions gave his name on the title page as Freiherr (Baron) G. W. von Leibnitz. Leibnitz attended his father's

University at the age 15 and became interested in philosophy and mathematics. He completed Bachelor's degree in Philosophy on 2nd December, 1662. Here it is important to note that he strongly defended his disputation Metaphysica de Principio Individui, which particularly addressed the principle of individuation on 9th June, 1663. Accordingly, Leibnitz completed Master's degree in philosophy on 7th February, 1664. Even Leibnitz defended and published a dissertation Speciman Quaestionum philosophicarum ex Jure Collectarum, arguing for both theoretical and pedagogical relationship between philosophy and law in December 1964. Leibnitz knew merely the bright side of life and so he was paying attention in law and studied law at the University of Jena. He awarded a Bachelor's degree in law on 28th September, 1665. After University of Jena he did Doctor of Law at Altdorf, gaining his doctorate in November, 1666 for Disputatio de Casibus perplexis in Jure. After receiving his Doctorate in Law at the age of 20 Leibnitz offered a professorship at Altdorf, which he refused. From 1667 to 1672 Leibnitz was the Elector of Mainz and engaged himself in political writing to a great extent. Leibnitz visited Paris in 1672, partly to try to persuade Louis XIV to expel the Turks from Egypt. Again, he travelled to England in 1673 and for a second time in 1676. During this period Leibnitz had completed his discovery of the "Differential Calculus". Leibnitz then travelled to Amsterdam and met Spinoza there. Leibnitz was influenced by him and his whole philosophy was greatly influenced by Spinoza. After meeting Spinoza, Leibnitz became court councilor and librarian to the Duke of Brunswick at Hanover, a post he enjoyed until he died on 14th November, 1716. Here it would not be an exaggeration if we claim that Leibnitz is an incomparable and an undying thinker in the history of philosophy and mathematics even he is no more. He is remembered for the Monadology. In between 1680 and 1697 Leibnitz was working on his own philosophy.

Leibnitz's best-known philosophical works are the Discourse on Metaphysics (1685), the New essay concerning the human understanding (1704), the Theodicy (1710) and the Monadology (1714).

4. 3. THE MONADOLOGY:

It is not easy to unearth Leibnitz's later philosophy. Originally, Leibnitz's original and single work in French is the Monadology. It has been translated by a number of thinkers. La Monadologie is one of Leibnitz's major works representing his later philosophical interests. This is a short book on a metaphysics of simple substances or monads which sketches in some 90 paragraphs. Of 90 paragraphs, following sections or paragraphs are important for our purpose:

1. The monads of which we shall speak here is merely a simple substances, which enters into composites; simple that is to say, without parts.

3. Now where there are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are true atoms of nature, and in a word, the elements of all things.

6. Thus it may be said that the monads can only begin or end all at once, that is to say, they can only begin by creation and end by annihilations; whereas that which is composite begins or ends by parts.

7. The monads have no windows through which anything can enter or depart.

10. I take it also for granted that every created being, and consequently the created monads also, is subject to change, and even that this change is continuous in each.

18. The name of entelechies might be given to all simple substances or created monads, for they have within themselves the source of their internal activities, and so to speak, make incorporeal automata.

29. But the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what distinguishes us from mere animal and furnishes us with reason and the sciences, raising us to knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what we call the rational soul or spirit in us.

30. It is also by the knowledge of necessary truths, and by their abstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection, which make us think of that which calls itself "I", and to observe that this or that is within us: and it is thus that, in thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, simple or composite, of the immaterial and of God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits.

32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that no fact can be real existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although most often these reasons cannot be known to us.

33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible, and those of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we reach those which are primitives.

39. Now this substance, being a sufficient reason of all these detail, which also linked together throughout, there is but one God, and this God is sufficient.

38. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, perfection being only the magnitude of positive reality taken in its strictest meaning, setting aside the limits or bounds in things which have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God perfection is absolutely infinite.

47. Thus God alone is the primitive unity or the original simple substance; of which all created or derived monads are the products, and are generated, so to speak, by continual figuration of the Divinity, from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature, to whom limitation is essential.

48. In God is power, which is the source of all; then knowledge, which contains the detail of ideas: and finally will which effects changes or produces according to the principle of the best.

53. Now, as there is infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and as only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which determines him to select one rather than another.

54. And this reason can only be found in the fitness or in the degrees of perfection, which these worlds contain, each possible world having a right to claim existence according to the measure of perfection which it possesses.

55. And this is the cause of the existence of the best; namely, that his wisdom makes it known to God, his goodness makes him choose it, and his power makes him produce it.

78. The soul follows its own peculiar laws and the body also follows its own laws, and they agree in virtue of pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe.

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits (espirite) must compose the City of God, that is, the most perfect state which is possible, under the most perfect of monarchs.

86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world, and the highest and most divine of the works of God; it is in this that the glory of God truly consists, for he would have none if his greatness and goodness were not known and admired by spirits. It is, too, in relation to this divine city that he properly has goodness; whereas his wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest.

87. As we have above established a perfect harmony between two natural kingdoms, the one of efficient, the other of final causes, we should also

notice here another harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace; that is, between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the universe and God considered as monarch of the divine city of spirits.

89. It may be said, further, that God as architect satisfies in every respect God as legislator, and that therefore sins by the order of nature and perforce even of the mechanical structure of things, must carry their punishment with them; and that in the same way, good actions will obtain their rewards by mechanical ways through their relations to bodies, although this cannot and ought not always happen immediately.

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action unrewarded, no bad action unpunished; and everything must result in the well-being of the good that is, of those who are not disaffected in this great state, who after having done their duty, trust in providence, and who love and imitate, as does the author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of his perfections, according to the nature of truly pure love, which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved (Kaufmann 1946, 241-243).



ACTIVITY: 4.1

- Give the life-sketch of G. W. Leibnitz.

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- Write a short note on Truths after Leibnitz

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CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Who is the founder of spiritualistic pluralism?
2. Who wrote the Book, La Monadologie?
3. Who was Leibnitz?
4. Write three names of rationalist philosophers?
5. How many paragraphs/sections are there in La Monadologie?
6. "Monads are true atoms of nature" - Who said this?
7. Fill in the blanks:

a. Which is _____ begins or ends by parts.

b. The monads have no_____.

c. _____are necessary and their _____ is impossible.

d. God is absolutely _____

e. _____act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or motion.

8. Define Truths of reasoning.
9. "God is the source not only of existences but also of essences" - explain.
10. What do you mean by City of God? Discuss after Leibnitz.

4. 4. THE DOCTRINE OF MONADS

It appears clear from the above that his doctrine of monads is the outcome of his Monadology. But to understand his theory of monads, idealism in anew and spiritualism, we need to back to the theory of atoms as well as principle of force. Here we can say that all objects of sense or external world are made up of certain ultimate units generally called atoms. Leibnitz thinks that these ultimate units are psychical units or little souls, having the power of perception and of development. However, they are neither physical nor material things, even ultimate units have physical qualities, i.e., size and shape etc. according to Leibnitz. This is a paradox.

Leibnitz considers ultimate units are centers of force rather than external material things or objects. Leibnitz calls them monads as they are non-material. Thus they are not atoms, but monads. "Force is indivisible or simple; hence it is immaterial and un-extended. Simple substances or force are called by Leibnitz metaphysical points, formal atoms, essential forms, substantial forms, monads or units" (Thilly 1994, 387) . According to Leibnitz, physical bodies are composed of group of monads, and the human soul is a governing monad. Human mind is nothing but just a Monad which is immortal and spiritual being differs from physical or material bodies. "The world consists of ultimate units or atoms, which he called Monads. The Monads are not material things. They are centers of force or energy. He calls them little perceptions, being thus mental rather than physical. The Monads of material bodies are sleeping or undeveloped Monads, while those we call minds have developed to complete consciousness." (Patrick 1961, 189). According to Leibnitz, Reality consists of an infinite number of immaterial substances that he calls monads: "simple substances without parts and without windows through which anything could come in or go out" (Collinson 1998, 69).

Force, therefore, conceived by Leibnitz as the simple individual substance or essential attribute of body. We have elsewhere mentioned that Leibnitz was a famous scientist and mathematician and so what he experienced that in science no facts or no bodies or no objects of sense can be explained without relation to bodies and motions. For Leibnitz, in order to explain the concept of motion it is necessary to postulate the existence of force. Force is constant in quantity and it is this which causes motions in bodies and forces them to remain in motion. Force does not vary in quantity. It is a ground of motion. According to Leibnitz, there is no substance that does not act and what does not act does not exist. What is active is real and so only force is real or exists as force is active. Force makes things active and so everything in the universe is an expression of force. Alternatively speaking, there is nothing in the universe that is not the expression of force. So the essential characteristic of the universal

substance is force and activity rather than extension. Since the law of the conservation of motion must give way to the law of the conservation of force. For example, substance (e.g. body) cannot be accepted as the fundamental element or primary principle in that its extension is divisible (e.g. body is made up of parts) and cannot "lead to something which is simple, elementary and really indivisible" (Masih 1994, 248). This makes the sense to say that what is made up of parts or not indivisible cannot be a primary principle or substance. Therefore, Leibnitz concludes that force is a simple and indivisible reality and his theory of monad based on this principle of force. The question then is: can physical atoms be substance? Can mathematical points be substance? Quite truly, in physics atom is the lowest unit which is real but not divisible (physical atoms can be divided). Similarly, in mathematics a point is indivisible but not a real entity (points of mathematics lack reality). But Leibnitz reminds us that the substance must be both real and indivisible. Thus, neither physical atoms nor mathematical points can be substance. Real and indivisible substance Leibnitz calls monads or metaphysical points. They are metaphysical points since they differ from the physical atoms in that monads have no extension on the one hand, and from the points of mathematics as monads are objective realities on the other. In his concept of substance Leibnitz has synthesized the reality of the physical atom and the indivisibility of the point of mathematics. Thus, he says, "metaphysical points or points of substance (they are both exact, like mathematical points, and real, like physical points), formal points, formal atoms, substantial forms…" (Weber and Perry 2012, 273). That means Leibnitz does not consider the atom to be substance for the reason that all material substances, even a thing as small as the atom, is divisible.

Leibnitz is of the opinion that monad is the substance. At this juncture, it is important to note that Leibnitz agrees with Spinoza that substance is that which is free, but they differ in their respective interpretations of freedom. Both are affirms that freedom of substance implies the self-determination and self creation of substance. However, according to Leibnitz, the freedom of the substance lies in action, but not in existence. Whatever happens in a

substance is a manifestation of its nature and nothing influences it from outside. This concept is later on elucidated by Leibnitz himself in his theory of appetition. In fact, both Descartes and Spinoza conceived that substance has the freedom of existence as well as that of action. But what Leibnitz throw-outs the first kind of freedom in substance and admits merely the freedom of action. It has been felt by many thinkers that the opinion of Descartes and Spinoza is more consistent on this issue. Because Spinoza had pointed out that no substance can be conceived to be free if its existence is not free. Later on by introducing the concept of pre-established harmony, we will discuss in next chapter, Leibnitz, in fact, contradicts even the freedom of action that he has postulated to the substance.

In the light of the above discussion, we may conclude that substance to be active and rejects all theories which consider it to be inactive. What Leibnitz has established that passivity is not the nonexistence of motion but the result of resistance offered by other forces and so there is no passivity. It would, then, be proper to say that force is active and everywhere. But from this it does not follow that external force is required to cause motion in any substance. That means that no external force is required to cause motion in substance and all motion is internal. Alternatively speaking, no motion is external. Leibnitz replaces physical atoms by the atoms of motion that are real and indivisible when he says force is substance. Thus, force, we have stated, for Leibnitz is substance or metaphysical principle.

4. 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF MONADS:

We have noticed that the ultimate units of the reality are spiritual atoms that Leibnitz calls monads. Monads are simple, infinite, unextended, immaterial substances. In short, monads are spiritual atoms or forces. Unlike lifeless, immobile objects, monads are metaphysical unit of all living objects. Besides, each monad is eternal and indestructible because a monad can neither be ended nor had it ever begun. Thus, the chief characteristics of monads of Leibnitz would appear to be the following:

1. **Indivisibility:** Monads are simplest kind of substance. Therefore, they are indivisible. Like physical atoms, monads cannot be divided. They occupy no space since monads have no form and no extension.

2. **Eternity and indestructibility:** Monads are eternal and indissoluble. Because they are not affected by anything outside monads. They are without beginning and end. Thus, monads are eternal, permanent and everlasting.

3. **Windowless:** For Leibnitz, the monads are windowless. They neither receive influence nor pass influence nor do they act upon one another. Each monad differs from all others which is forever and unaffected by others. The law of the identity of indiscernible, which is a cardinal principle of Leibnitz's metaphysics, claims that each monad is distinct and no two monads are exactly alike. Thus, It is logically follows here that two individual things cannot be perfectly same in the world.

4. **Monads are self-active:** Monads are self-active and develop from within, not from outside. According to Leibnitz, monads are self-existent and self-centred entities. Thus, it may be granted that no external forces can activate the monads. Whatever changes takes place in the monads occurs only within the monad itself, not otherwise. This is self-mobility which Leibnitz calls appetition. Thus, monad is an active substance which exhibits two kinds of activity, i.e. perception and appetition according to Leibnitz.

5. **Uniqueness:** Each monad is a unity of its states in that each is a unique, unparalleled and independent according to Leibnitz.

6. **Limited and Individualistic:** Each monad presents its own individual view of the universe, and so the universe is represented differently by different monads. In this sense, each monad is limited and individualistic.

4. 6. KINDS OF MONADS:

According to Leibnitz, number of monads being infinite and each monad represents or perceives the whole universe. Every monad is, in this sense, a microcosm of the macrocosm, a mirror of the universe. It has perception and appetition. Perception implies a living mirror of the universe according to Leibnitz. Perceptions, however, are not always conscious, for example, the perceptions of objects like stones are unconscious, perception of human beings in sleep are unconscious etc. There is then a hierarchy of monads, rational or self-conscious, conscious, subconscious and bare or unconscious. Human beings are self-conscious monads because human soul has apperception and free volitions. Animal souls are conscious monads. Plant souls are sub-conscious monads and atoms are unconscious monads. Thus, it appears clear that though there is a perfect continuity in the degree of perception with which the monads ideates the whole world; Leibnitz distinguishes three classes of monads as under:

i. **Sleeping or Material or Naked monads:** Sleeping monads are those monads which are called material monads. Practically they represent nothing of the universe. They can also be said to be unconscious or lowest or bare monads as their perception is most obscure. Sleeping or material monads lie at lowest level of creation in the system of monads. The different material objects found in the nature are the outcome of a conglomeration of such monads.

ii. **Dreaming monads or minds:** Dreaming monads have consciousness and memory. By virtue of the quality of memory what dreaming monads establish an associative relation between different perceptions of the past and present. Dreaming monads are found in all living beings. There is no question of doubt that the mind and memory of every living being is provided by these monads.

iii. **Waking monads:** Waking monads are conscious monads found in rational animals and it is by virtue of them that one can know inevitable

and eternal facts. These serve to separate human beings (rational animals) from animals. Because of them man receives knowledge concerning God and the universe too. They form the rational self for rational animals.



4. 7. LET SUM UP:

We have found with Leibnitz that all monads do not represent the entire universe equally. Monads reproduce the whole universe in different degrees. That means that some monads reproduce the universe better than other monads. This pre-supposes the existence of lowest and highest monads. Highest monads are conscious monads and endowed with memory. The highest monads are called souls or spirits having reason and universal as well as necessary knowledge.

Moreover, the Universe is composed of an infinite number of monads. Of course, there is continuity in creation starting with the lowest, i.e. bare monads and ending at the highest, i.e. God the supreme monad. In other words, all the monads of the universe are linked to each other in an ascending order in which one can find all the stages, from lowest to the highest. According to the law of continuity, which is a fundamental principle of Leibnitz's metaphysics, there is no break in the creation from lowest to God. Thus, in the principle of continuity God is the most developed monad the actus purus, i.e. pure activity. The monads are created by God, who pre-adjusted them to one another. Leibnitz, therefore, believes that God is the highest and perfect monad, the original monad, the monad of monads or a monas monadum. In this sense, Leibnitz's spiritualistic is theistic.

However, Leibnitz's main problem lies in establishing the possibility of communication between the independent monads. Leibnitz seeks to solve this problem via his theory of pre-established harmony. We will discuss it in details in chapter/unit 8.



ACTIVITY: 4.2

- What is Leibnitz's doctrine of monads?

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- Write a short note on the activities of monads.

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CHECK YOUR PROGRESS: 2

11. The existence of God is proved by the need for a sufficient cause of all the various objects existing in the universe. (True/ False)
12. Monads are divided into 6 categories. (True/False)
13. Leibnitz's spiritualistic pluralism is theistic. (True/False)
14. God is the highest and perfect monad. (True/False)
15. Monad is an active/inactive substance.
16. Animal souls are conscious/unconscious monads.
17. Monads have extension /no extension.
18. God is actus purus/ not actus purus.
19. Define Monads.
20. What do you mean by law of continuity?



4.8: FURTHER READING

1) Collinson, D.: (1998). Fifty Great Philosophers, London and New York: Routledge.

2) Masih, Y.: (1994). A Critical History of Western Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

3) Kaufmann, W.: (1946). Philosophic Classics, vol. II., n.p.

4) Patrick, G. T. H.: (1925/1958/1961). Introduction To Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

5) Thilly, F.: (1994). A History of Philosophy, Revised by L. Wood, Allahabad: Central Publishing House.

6) Tomlin, E. W. F.: (1954). The Great Philosophers, London: Skeffington & Son Ltd.

7) Weber, P. and Perry, R. B.: (2012). History of Philosophy, trans., F. Thilly, Delhi: Surjeet Publications.

4.9: ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz.

2. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz.

3. Gottfried Leibnitz was a German philosopher. Gottfried Leibnitz is the third of the great rationalist systems of the 17th century. He is the founder of spiritualistic pluralism.

4. Rene Descartes, Benedict de Spinoza and Gottfried Leibnitz.

5. Leibnitz's La Monadologie (1714) is a short book on a metaphysics of simple substances or monads which sketches in some 90 paragraphs.

6. Leibnitz.

7.

   (a): composite

   (b): windows.

   (c): Truths of reasoning, opposite.

(d): perfect

(e): Bodies

8. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible. When a truth is necessary its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we reach those which are primitives.

9. It is true that in God is the source not only of existences but also of essences, so far as they are real, or of that which is real in the possible. This is because the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths, or of the ideas on which they depend, and because, without him, there would be nothing real in the possibilities and not only nothing existing but also nothing possible.

10. The assembly of all spirits (espirite) must compose the City of God, that is, the most perfect state which is possible, under the most perfect of monarchs. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world, and the highest and most divine of the works of God; it is in this that the glory of God truly consists, for he would have none if his greatness and goodness were not known and admired by spirits. It is, too, in relation to this divine city that he properly has goodness; whereas his wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest.

11. True.

12. False.

13. True.

14. True.

15. Active.

16. Conscious.

17. No extension.

18. actus purus

19. Ans.: According to Leibnitz, reality consists of an infinite number of immaterial substances that he calls monads: simple substances without parts and without windows through which anything could come in or go out.

20. According to the law of continuity, which is a fundamental principle of Leibnitz's metaphysics, there is no break in the creation from lowest to God.



7.8: MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short type questions.

1. How many monads are there?
2. How many classes of monads are there?
3. Give an example of self-conscious monads.
4. Plant souls are subconscious monads- Is it true?
5. Atoms are unconscious monads -Is it true?
6. What is meant by actus purus?
7. What are the two main principles of Leibnitz's metaphysics?
8. What are the two kinds of activity of monads?
9. Name highest and supreme monad.
10. "Monads are metaphysical points" - who said this?

B. Short type questions:

1. Define Force.
2. Define atom?
3. Distinguish between metaphysical points (monads) and atoms of physics.
4. Is there any difference between monads and points of mathematics?
5. "Monads are windowless." Elucidate.
6. Write a note on Continuity of creation.
7. Write a note on substance after Leibnitz.
8. Explain, with examples, self-conscious, conscious and unconscious monads.
9. What is self-mobility? Explain after Leibnitz.
10. Explain briefly the God of Leibnitz philosophy.

C. Long Questions:

1. Explain and discuss Leibnitz's doctrine of monads.
2. Discuss Leibnitz's theory of monads. How are monads related to each other?
3. What is monad? What are its characteristics?
4. What are monads? Explain different kinds of monads.
5. Explain briefly the theory of Monadism.
6. Each monad is "mirror of the Universe". How does Leibnitz reconcile this statement?

7. What does Leibnitz understand by monads? Explain his doctrine of monadology.

8. How Leibnitz distinguishes three classes of Monads? Explain, with examples, different types of monads.

9. State and comment on Leibnitz's view of Reality.

10. Explain the relation between Monadology and Theism in the philosophy of Leibniz.

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UNIT 5: GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ: PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

UNIT STRUCTURE

5. 1. Learning objectives

5. 2. Introduction

5. 3. Principle of Harmony

5. 4. God the creator of harmony

5. 5. Pre-established harmony

5. 6. Criticism of the doctrine of Pre-established harmony

5. 7. Let sum up

5. 8. Further Reading

5.9. Answer to Check Your Progress

5.10. Model Question

5.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- Know the Third Principle of harmony
- Explain God, the Creator of Harmony
- Explain Harmony between the monads has been pre-established by God.
- Know Describe Leibnitz doctrine of Pre-established harmony,
- Discuss the relation between mind and body.
- Describe Central weakness of the Leibnitz system.
- Know how are monads independent if they are also bound in pre-established harmony?
- Know what has God got to do with the principle of pre-established harmony?

5.2. INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces to you G. W. Leibnitz third principle of harmony, and God, the creator of harmony. Accordingly this unit introduces to you Leibnitz doctrine of pre-established harmony. In his theory of monadology,

Leibnitz believes in the existence of unlimited substances and thereby establishes pluralism already discussed in previous unit. For Leibnitz, there are specific or independent monads in the universe. However, none of the monads is related to any other. The question arises: how do these monads indulge in any communication? Or, put in another way how is it that what happens in one monad can be seen in another? Quite truly, our experience of the universe denies the idea that objects and individuals are completely independent of each other. Thus, it appears that how does windowless monads relate to any other is again a great concern. Consequently, Leibnitz's main problem lies in establishing the possibility of communication among the specific and independent monads. In order to solve this problem, Leibnitz proposes the theory of pre-established harmony. His doctrine of pre-established harmony aimed at introducing unity in variety. According to his theory of pre-established harmony, the Absolute monad God establishes a harmony between the monads while creating them. Thus, Leibnitz tries to establish a link between the monads via principle of harmony. When Leibnitz says that God establishes a harmony between the monads, he asserts the principle of harmony and God, the creator of harmony as under:

5. 3. PRINCIPLE OF HARMONY:

There are two fundamental principles of Leibnitz's metaphysics, namely, the law of continuity and the law of individuality. To this two principles may be added one more principle according to Leibnitz. Thus, for Leibnitz, what's more is a third principle, i.e., principle of harmony. This principle arises especially from his mathematical discipline and partly from the desire to concede the Spinozistic truth of unity as well as partly from the necessity of reconciling the first two laws of continuity and extreme individuality too. In order to give details the variety and richness of finite things Leibnitz took the help of the law of individuality and held the plurality of real things. Moreover, Leibnitz claimed that everything is real because it contains the whole and in some sense is a whole, i.e., a unity within itself. This unity in plurality is called harmony according to Leibnitz. There is no question of

doubt that the law of harmony plays the some role in Leibnitz which the abstract unity played in the philosophy of Spinoza. This is the reason why Leibnitz philosophy has been called the philosophy of pre-established harmony (Cf. Masih 1994, 247).

5. 4. GOD THE CREATOR OF HARMONY:

It would not be exaggeration if we claim that with the law of harmony the inner circle of the thought of Leibnitz is closed. But Leibnitz believed in the existence of God as the principle of continuity, which is a fundamental principle of Leibnitz's metaphysics, demands the existence of a supreme monad. God, according to Leibnitz, is the supreme monad. Again, Leibnitz held that individual things are real. They are knitted together in a grand harmony. This presupposes that some giant intellect has brought about the harmony. God is the name given by Leibnitz to such giant intellect. This makes the sense to say that God, the giant intellect, according to Leibnitz, has brought about the harmony. Thus, in the same vein of Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz chooses to make his system Theocentric, i.e., God-centred (Cf. Masih 1994, 248). "God," Leibnitz argues, "is an infinitely perfect being who, from an infinite number of possible worlds, creates the best possible world within which everything unfolds in accordance with a pattern he has pre-established…" (Collinson 1998, 69).



LET US KNOW

- Write a note on problem of Leibnitz.

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- Explain third principle of harmony.

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CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. The unity in plurality is called harmony. (True/False)
2. According to Leibnitz, everything is real. (True/False)
3. Leibnitz philosophy has been called the philosophy of pre-established harmony. (True/False)
4. Leibnitz denied the existence of God. (True/False)
5. Individual Things are unreal according to Leibnitz. (True/False)
6. "God establishes a harmony between the monads while creating them", - Is this statement true?
7. According to Leibnitz, God is perfect/imperfect.
8. Who is the Creator of Harmony according to Leibnitz?
9. Why Leibnitz's philosophy is called the philosophy of Pre-established harmony?
10. What do you mean by God the creator of harmony?

5. 5. PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY:

According to Leibnitz, monads are eternal, part-less and indivisible. Monads are not mere appearances of the cosmic power but have their own individual characteristics. They differ not only qualitatively but in quantity also. Each monad has its own individual existence. For Leibnitz, each monad is independent of other monads and no exchange with anything out of the monad is possible. In other words, there is no intercommunication between different monads because monads are "windowless" (Blackburn 1994, 248). One may reasonably ask: if monads are absolutely independent of each other then how do we experience a common universe? If monads do not receive any information from outside how shall we explain the mutual behavior of different individuals? He holds that each monad is individual and unique. Monads are the unique units of the universe. "Each monad is a world part, all by itself" (Masih 1994, 250). They are the minute

representatives of the universe. Though monads appear to be material from outside, they are spiritual from inside. In the world of such monads, how is it that there is interaction among different monads and mind (soul) and body (matter)? But closer examination shows that Leibnitz brings in the principle of pre-established harmony to retain the uniqueness and individuality of the monad in a common universe. In his doctrine of pre-established harmony, Leibnitz is of the opinion that the highest monad is God who establishes a harmony among the monads while creating them. Thus, by affirming the theory of pre-established harmony, Leibnitz intends to re-establish the view that "all at once" (Collinson 1998, 71).

Leibnitz, thus, attempted an explanation of the unity or oneness of the universe, while maintaining that monads are independent entities. To do this, Leibnitz introduced the law of per-established harmony. According to Leibnitz, God the creator has created the monads of the universe in such a manner that each monad reflects the whole universe. Thus whatever is found in one monad is paralleled by another monad, although neither of the two monads exchanges anything with the other monads. This is called parallelism. It is due to synthesis created by God alone. A synthesis that we observe between mind and body and individuals and objects etc. are created by God according Leibnitz. This would seem to imply that the monad is not independent but is governed by God's law, i.e., pre-established harmony, not otherwise. "God," Leibnitz tells us, "in creating minds and bodies has arranged it, from the very beginning that the two shall go together: the relation between soul and body is a harmony pre-established by God… There is parallelism, or concomitance, between the mental and physical states: in this sense the body is the material expression of the soul. It must not be forgotten, however, that the body itself consists of infinitude of monads or psychic forces, every one of which is organic and acts in accordance with the preordained law of its nature. "Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by means of desire, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or motions. And the two realms are in harmony with one another." In other words, the organic body and its minutest parts

are performed by God: they are "divine automata" or "divine machines"" (Thilly 1994, 391). What appears to us as interaction is really parallelism or concomitance relation. This can be made clear with help of the following example. A watch-maker who makes two watches and adjusts them in such a way that they show identical time. Equally, God has created body and mind in such a way that whatever happens in one appears to be influencing the other. What Leibnitz describes is that just as the different musical instruments present an orchestra in spite of retaining their distinct individuality similarly the innumerable monads create common world in spite of maintaining their independent existence and unique features. At the root of our common universe, there is the principle of pre-established harmony. Leibnitz, therefore, concludes that each monad represents the order of the whole universe. For him, in each monad the past, present and the future is present in the seed form. This is, in brief, how we experience a common universe via the law of pre-established harmony according to Leibnitz.

Accordingly, the most important problem of Leibnitz's philosophy is the problem of relation between monads. He tried to overcome this by postulating the doctrine of pre-established harmony. In other words, the theory of pre-established harmony seeks to solve the problem of relation between monads. In creating monads, according to Leibnitz, God gave them nature that made it possible for them to exist in harmony. This makes the sense to say that any harmony that can be seen to exist among the windowless monads is the result of a pre-established nature of God, determined at the outset of creation. If this would be the case, whatever something happens in the body or the monad of the body its influence is communicated to the monad of the mind, and any activity in the mental monads is reflected in the monads of the body. "Body and soul seem to act on each other; the former moves when the latter wills it, the latter perceives and conceives when the former receives a physical impression, and this is due to a pre-established harmony" (Weber & Perry 2012, 283). Thus, there is no denying the fact that though monads are windowless, they do influence one another. The mind and the body correspond to each other because

God established a harmony between them. "All monads act together like the parts of an organism…which has been predetermined by God. God, in other words, has arranged his universe in such a way that it works without interference from him: every state in every monad follows as the effect of the preceding state in that monad, and acts in unison with the states of all other monads. There is a complete harmony in the universe" (Thilly 1994, 391).

Falkenberg, the famous historian of Western philosophy, observes that the mutual relation between the monads can be explained even without requiring any divine intervention in that the theory of pre-established harmony advocated by Leibnitz is in fact a natural law. He says that when Leibnitz postulates that the nature of monads has been determined by the law of pre-established harmony, the proposition should be interpreted to mean that the nature of the monads has been determined by natural laws. These natural laws manifest themselves via the perception and appetition of the monads, otherwise not. Leibnitz conceived that "there is an analogy and a family resemblance, so to speak, between them. They resemble each other in that all are endowed with perception and desire or appetition…" (Weber & Perry 2012, 279).

We have already mentioned that each monad represents the order of the complete universe. Thus, everything in nature can be described mechanically because one observes law and order as well as uniformity at the physical level in every part of the universe. In fact, God makes this mechanism possible because God is the last and final cause of all events. This is what is suggested by the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. Leibnitz points out that the principle of harmony or synthesis works everywhere in the universe and this system is caused by God only. "The source of mechanics lies in metaphysics" (Thilly 1994, 391) in the philosophy of Leibnitz. That means that God is the basis of the mechanical nature of the universe as we cannot explain the universal laws of physics and mechanics apart from divine purpose. Nothing in the universe is without

purpose for the reason that the divine provision of pre-established harmony works everywhere. The infinite monads create a remarkable variety. In the universe the greatest possible variety is combined with the greatest possible unity as the present world has been created by God in tune with the highest possibilities of the universe. Thus, we have a kingdom or union of souls because religion and reason, physical kingdom of nature and moral kingdom of grace are harmonized. According to Leibnitz, there is nothing within God disordered. He concludes that there is harmony between God the builder of the machine of the universe and God the monarch of the divine spiritual kingdom. Thus, in a nutshell it can be said that Leibnitz is inspired by the possibility of metaphysics in the sense that he, apart from the religious and natural spheres, makes use of the conception of God to establish harmony in the fields of physics and morality. And by introducing the theory of pre-established harmony Leibnitz rejected the freedom of the monads and his pluralistic theory is replaced by a monistic one.

However, critics differ in their opinion whether Leibnitz philosophy should be considered to be monistic or pluralistic. According to some philosophers, Leibnitz philosophy is basically pluralistic in that in it the unity and harmony of monads has not been properly explained. According to some other thinkers, Leibnitz Monadology can be understood only in the background of a rational system of the universe and the unity of monads. Whatever may be the fact, there is no question of doubt that pluralism is the dominant tendency in the philosophy of Leibnitz. It is because Leibnitz takes for granted that the monads are ultimate substances and spiritual atoms. Therefore, we conclude that, though along with pluralism there is a monistic tendency in Monadology, Leibnitz's philosophy is spiritualistic pluralism is theistic.

5. 6. CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY:

There is no question of doubt that Leibnitz's doctrine of Pre-established harmony occupies a grand place in the history of philosophy. But Leibnitz is not very careful in relation to monads. As a matter of fact he simply assumes their independent existence and their correspondence is due to pre-established harmony. Here he encounters difficulties almost at every step. Of a number of difficulties, the following a short criticism of the doctrine of pre-established harmony will disclose the central weakness of the Leibnitzian system.

Pre-Established harmony is only an assumption: Leibnitz's theory of pre-established harmony is just an assumption to explain order in the universe. But this assumption will remain untested as it is not verifiable. The monads are specific and windowless. Thus, no monad can go outside itself and cannot perceive the unlimited number of monads in their reciprocal relation. This is possible only for a perceiver outside the chain of the monads. God is the highest monad and so He is not a perceiver. Thus, Leibnitz theory is pre-established harmony is only an assumption.

Monads are not independent: Each monad, according to Leibnitz, is individual and unique. Each quality of a specific monad is peculiar to it and is developed from within. But if this development at the same time is the outcome of the law of pre-established harmony, then how can monads be said to be independent? Thus, by introducing the theory of pre-established harmony Leibnitz destroyed the freedom of the monads.

The relation between God and pre-established harmony is wholly untenable: For Leibnitz, God is the highest monad. The question then is He, too, not the subject to the principle of pre-established harmony and determined by it? Here if the answer is true then God cannot be independent on the one hand and if the answer is false then God cannot be a monad on the other hand. If it is false that God is a monad, then Leibnitz's very notion

of continuity meets a fatal objection. In either case, the relation between God and the law of pre-established harmony does not appear to be tenable. Leibnitz further opines that God is a monad. If this would be the case, Leibnitz has then proceeded to use the conception of God to establish the principle of pre-established harmony. As a matter of fact the philosophy of Leibnitz cannot provide any satisfactory and logically tenable explanation of the relation between these two concepts. Further, Leibnitz cannot explain how God could establish harmony between body and matter. He said that God adjusts them and establish harmony between them. Here Leibnitz makes the hypothesis of the interaction of God and monads since he denies causation of interaction in the monads. So, he cannot admit it in God also. Instead of solving the problem, it is pushing the difficulty further back. Thus, there is no question of doubt that the relation between God and pre-established harmony is wholly untenable.



5. 7. LET SUM UP:

The upshot of the above consideration makes it clear that there are numerous substances or monads in the world and Leibnitz attempted to establish a divine determinism. It has been claimed by Leibnitz that each monad is impenetrable and unaffected by the influence of all others. Because it has no window through which anything can come in or go out. According to Leibnitz, each monad is independent and there is no causal relation between monads. Leibnitz vehemently criticizes any causal relation of monads. If each monad is independent of other crated things entirely and there is no causal relation between the monads, then it is impossible to establish the unity of the world. Here the philosophy of Leibnitz aimed at the synthesis of many monads, while maintaining that substances are independent. Though each monad is independent, Leibnitz points out, yet there is in the system of monad, a perfectly continuous and infinite gradation of intention. The universe is at once continuous and not intently divisible but infinitely divided consisting of our infinity of real elements. Then how the principle of continuity is consistent with changes or becoming that take

place in the substances? To keep up the continuity of the order, for Leibnitz, a hypothesis is needed to the fact that any change within one substance or monad is invariably accompanied by correlative change in other substances or monads. This hypothesis is the principle of pre-established harmony among monads or substances. Thus, Leibnitz attempted an explanation of the unity of the world via the principle of pre-established harmony. According to this principle, monads or substances were created by God, the monas monadum, and pre-adjusted to one another. To sum up, the doctrine of pre-established harmony accounts for correspondence between monads or substances and correspondence between mind or soul and body or matter.



LET US KNOW

- Is it possible to establish unity of the world? Discuss after Leibnitz.

  .....

  .....

- How Leibnitz's philosophy should be considered to be pluralistic? Explain.

  .....

  .....



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

11. Monads are independent entities. (True/False)
12. God establish harmony among monads. (True/False)
13. Spinoza established the unity. (True/ False)
14. Pre-established harmony works everywhere. (True/ False)
15. There is causal relation between monads. (True/False)

16. Define parallelism.
17. Define the law of pre-established harmony.
18. Discuss critically the continuity of creation after Leibnitz.
19. Explain Leibnitz's conception of God.
20. Explain, with examples, the Leibnitz's doctrine of mind and matter.



5.8: FURTHER READING

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5.9: ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

1. Ans.: True
2. Ans.: True
3. Ans.: True
4. Ans.: False
5. Ans.: False.
6. Ans.: True.
7. Ans.: perfect.

8. Ans.: God is the creator of Harmony according to Leibnitz.

9. Ans.: Leibnitz claimed that everything is real because it contains the whole and in some sense is a whole, i.e., a unity within itself. This unity in plurality is called harmony according to Leibnitz. There is no question of doubt that the law of harmony plays the some role in Leibnitz which the abstract unity played in the philosophy of Spinoza. This is the reason why Leibnitz philosophy has been called the philosophy of pre-established harmony.

10. Ans.: With the law of harmony the inner circle of the thought of Leibnitz is closed but it seems certain that Leibnitz believed also in God. He further held that individual things no doubt are real but they are knitted together in a grand harmony. This presupposes that some giant intellect has brought about the harmony. This giant intellect is called God. Thus, in the same vein of Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz chooses to make his system Theocentric, i.e., God-centred.

11. True.

12. True.

13. True.

14. True.

15. False.

16. According to Leibnitz, God the creator has created the monads of the universe in such a manner that each monad reflects the whole universe. Thus whatever is found in one monad is paralleled by another monad, although neither of the two monads exchanges anything with the other monads. This is called parallelism.

17. Leibnitz attempted an explanation of the unity of the world. He introduced the principle of pre-established harmony. According to this principle, monads or substances were created by God, the monas monadum, and pre-adjusted

to one another. The doctrine of pre-established harmony accounts for correspondence between monads or substances and correspondence between mind or soul and body or matter.

18. Leibnitz believes that there is continuity at different levels of creation. Thus, one finds a continuity in which there are plants and lower life at one end, man in the middle and God at the other end. In this chain each level possesses greater activity, clarity of perception and consciousness than the proceeding lower level. God, according to Leibnitz, exists at the highest level of this series.

However following difficulties have been pointed out in Leibnitz's theory of creation:

(a) On the one hand Leibnitz postulates that God is the last and final link in the chain of monads; on the other hand he accepts the fact of creation. How can the supreme monad be the creator? If God is the creator, then He should exist before creation.

(b) The second difficulty concerns the attempt at synthesizing spiritualism and mechanism. In this, role of the supreme monad God follows the principles of creation but because He is the creator and so He should be beyond such limitation. Leibnitz's theory of creation is optimistic and it attempts to synthesize scientific concepts with religious beliefs.

19. Leibnitz believes that God is monad or a monas monadum. That means that God is the monad of monads. There is no question of doubt that God, who is the Absolute monad, occupies an important place in the philosophy of Leibnitz. God is perfect and omniscient and so is not subject to the change and development of the ordinary monad. God is self-created and His knowledge is perfect knowledge. God, for Leibnitz, can perceive all the objects in all time and space, at a single glance. According to Leibnitz, God is the perfect and the ultimate substance.

According to Leibnitz, God is the highest monad. In His form of monad God is an individual. But God is also substratum of the other monads. God is the perfect and real existent. He is beyond nature and reason too. Man can have no conception of the perfect nature of God in that man is limited but God is infinite. In order to comprehend infinity, man's mind too should not be hampered by being finite. God possesses all those attributes in their most perfect form that are to be found in the individual monads. Leibnitz's conception of continuity implies that the attributes are limits of the attributes of monads. God does not offend reason but instead He cannot be comprehended by it. Man makes great efforts to comprehend Him. Different religions existing in the world exemplify the different levels of this endeavour, for at each level God has been perceived to a different degree.

In explicating the nature of God, Leibnitz says that God is pure activity, the fundamental monad, and in keeping with the theory of continuity, the supreme monad. Monads have been created by God and are subject to destruction at His will. Apart from the influence of God, they can neither be created nor destroyed. According to Leibnitz, God established harmony in variety.

20. The principle of pre-established harmony not only aimed at introducing unity in variety, but also hoped to solve the problem concerning mind (soul) and body (matter). In the strict sense there is no body or matter for there is nothing dead in the system of Leibnitz. For him, body is only an aggregate of bare monads. Human body, in this sense, is a machine of infinite complexity. But it does not mean that its parts are like an ordinary machine. Its each and every part is a complete machine as it is an organism of which each part is a living force. Now in this aggregate of bare monads, there is a queen monad which in the first instance mirrors the activity of the surrounding monads and secondly, through the aggregate mirrors the change of all other monads of the universe, more clearly than others. The queen monad by virtue of its superiority in the aggregate may be termed as soul. This ruling monad or soul by virtue of its more developed perception knows

what is going to happen to the other monads. Because God has subordinated the working of the lower monads to those of higher. Hence the lower monads appear as means and conditions for the realization of the ends of the higher monads. Therefore as soon as a conscious desire for the movement of the hand occurs, there take place muscular changes concomitantly in the body, according to the pre-established plan. To the beholder it will appear as if the desire has caused the movement of the arm, but it is due to concomitant variation. "…the laws by which the motions of the body follow each other are likewise so coincident with the thoughts of the soul as to give to our volitions and actions the very same appearance as if the latter were really the natural and the necessary consequence of the former." This relation between mind and body may be illustrated with the help of the simile of two clocks chiming harmoniously. The harmonious relation between the two clocks is possible in three different ways as under:

i. The two clocks may be so connected with each other by a joint mechanism that the motion in one may be communicated to the other for the corresponding movement. This is the kind of relation, according to Descartes, in which the mind and body interact on each other. However, Leibnitz rejects the explanation in terms of inter-action, for mind and body, being windowless monads cannot inter-act.

ii. Two clocks may work harmoniously if a skilled mechanic keeps on regulating the two from time to time. This constant miracle or interference by God to keep the harmonious relation between mind and body was taught by Occasionalists. However, Leibnitz rejected this explanation. Because constant interference by God is unworthy of His divine power according to Leibnitz.

iii. Finally, the two clocks may be constructed with so much skill and perfection that they may always work harmoniously. Leibnitz says that this conception alone is worthy of the creator. The one miracle is to be preferred to constant miracles.

At the end it can be said that the theory of pre-established harmony hinges that the "bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls, and souls act if there were no bodies, and both act as if influenced the other."

5.11: MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short type questions.

1. Spinoza / Leibnitz established the unity.
2. Inter-action is really concomitant / causal.
3. The harmony between the monads has been pre-established by_____.
4. Leibnitz's philosophy is spiritualistic pluralism is _____.
5. The theory of pre-established harmony propounded by Leibnitz is in fact a natural law - who said this?
6. "Leibnitz, like Descartes and Spinoza, chooses to make his system Theocentric" - Is the statement True?
7. Who is the creator of harmony?
8. What is called body?
9. What is queen monad?
10. Define is soul.

B. Short type questions:

1. What do you mean by principle of harmony?
2. Give an example of pre-established harmony?
3. In what sense Leibnitz's philosophy is monistic one?

4. Is there any difference between the highest monad God and the monads?

5. "In each monad the past, present and future is present in seed form." Elucidate.

6. Is God an individual? Distinguish between God and an individual man.

7. How many ways the harmonious relation between two clocks is possible? Explain.

8. Explain, with examples, the relation between the monads.

9. Explain briefly the God of Leibnitz philosophy.

10. Describe the criticisms of the theory of pre-established harmony.

C. Essay type Questions:

1. What is pre-established harmony? Discuss how it can be established?

2. Critically explain the Leibnitz's doctrine of pre-established harmony.

3. How did Leibnitz in his theory of pre-established harmony demonstrate the link between monads?

4. Explain, with examples, the law of pre-established harmony after Leibnitz.

5. Give an account of Leibnitz's theory of mind and matter.

6. Give a critical note on Leibnitz's principle of pre-established harmony.

7. What Explain and examine Leibnitz's theory of continuity of creation.

8. "God establishes a harmony among the monads while creating them." Explain with reference to philosophy of Leibnitz.

9. "All monads act together like the parts of an organism…" Discuss by following Leibnitz.

10. Explain the relation between the monads in the philosophy of Leibniz.

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UNIT : 6 LOCKE : CRITICISM OF INNATE IDEAS, CLASSIFICATION OF IDEAS

UNIT STRUCTURE

6.1 Learning objectives

6.2 Introduction

6.3 Concept of innate ideas

6.4 Locke's criticism of innate ideas

6.5 Classifications of ideas

6.6 Let us sum up

6.7 Further reading

6.8 Answer to check your progress

6.9 Model Questions.

6.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- know about innate ideas
- Explain the concept of innate ideas
- Discuss locke's criticism of innate ideas
- State the classification of ideas of locke

6.2. INTRODUCTION

This unit will introduces to you about the theory of innate ideas. Innate ideas are the ideas which are imprinted on the mind by God at the time of birth.

For example : This ideas of God, eternity, causality, infinity etc are the innate ideas. These ideas are clear and distinct. The theory of innate ideas which holds that the human mind is bom with ideas or knowledge was put forth most notably by plato as his theory of forms. later this belief was put forth by Descartes in his meditation.

This unit will also discusse about Lock is criticism of innate ideas and Locke's classification of teleas too locke argues that if there are innate

ideas actually, then they should have been present in all minds but they are not seen in insane people, idiots and children. In this unit we will discuss about the criticisms of locke and his classifications of ideas elaboratety.

6.3 CONCEPT OF INNATE IDEAS :

In philosophy, innate ideas is an idea allegedly inborn in the human mind as contrasted with those received or compared from experience. According to the doctrine that at reast certain idea e.g. God, infinity substance etc must be innate, because no satisfactory empirical origin of them could be conceived. In the 17th century the most prominent exponent of this theory was Rene Descartes.

Descartes conveys the idea that innate knowledge or ideas are something inborn. Someone says that a certain disease might be 'innate' to signify that a person might be at risk of contacting such a disease. He suggests that something that is 'innate' is effectively present from birth and while it is not necessary that it will reveal it then. It is possible that it likely to present itself later in life. Descartes comparison of innate knowledge to an innate disease, whose symptoms may only show up later in life, unless prohibited by a factor like age etc. It suggests that if an event accurs prohibiting someone from exhibiting an innate behaviour or knowledge did not exist at all but rather it was not expressed they were not able to acquire that knowledge. In other words innate beliefs, ideas and knowledge require experiences to be triggered or they may never be expressed.

The theory took many forms some held that a newborn child has an explicit awareness of such ideas. According to some others, innate ideas have some implicit form their as a tendency or as a dormant capacity for their formulation, which is either case would require favorable experiential conditions for their development.

In the later century, John Locke's vigorous criticism was directed against innate principles and the innate ideas claimed as the terms of the principles but Locke's empiricism had difficulty with certain key concepts like

substance. Locke's seens to have shared some of the assumptions of his opponents. For example If an idea is innate it cannot be wrong. Immannual kant the 18th century philosopher replaced the doctrine of innate ideas with questions about a priori concepts. Apriori concepts he characterized in terms not of theor origin but of their necessity as conditions of human experience of an objective world. In the 20 th century, Noam Chomsky argued the necessity for postulatinf innate ideas to explain the possibility of language.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. What do you mean by Innate Ideas?
2. Who was the exponent of the concept of innate ideas?
3. State true or false
   (a) Innate Ideas are not inborn (Descartes).
   (b) This theory has many forms.
   (c) John Locke's criticised innate ideas.

6.4 LOCKE'S CRITICISM OF INNATE IDEAS :

The doctrine of innate ideas has been vehemently critised by the expiricist philosophers among them John Locke was main. In his book 'As essay concerning human understanding' Locke attempts to enquire into the origin, certainity and extent of human knowledge. In doing so he argues that there are no innate principles in the mind by this he means that there are no notions that are stamped upon the mind of man. Which the soul receives in its very first being and brings to the world. Locke uses various arguements against the theory of innate ideas.

(i) Firstly, locke argues that if there are innate principles then they would have equally present in all minds and universally accepted but it is observed that in case of children, these ideas are differemt that is to

say one may teach a child that whatever is and 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be' but it does not necessarily follow that the child does not already know these truths. Locke's strongest argument against universal assent is in proving that there are other things (not innate ideas) which we agree on universally making universal assent no longer a quality unique to innate ideas. For example we universally agree that 2 + 2 = 4 and mathematics is clearly an empirical science, In provong this we see that if universal assent meant that innate ideas existed, then empirical truths, such as maths or that 'sweet to not sour' and 'black is not while' would also by that criterion be innate truths.

(ii) Again Locke argues against innate ideas lies in the idea that innate principles are self evident and would be assented to upon realization or understanding but how can these ideas be considered innate if they are explicitely known? This belief essentially states that something is innate if we have the capacity to know it. Here Locke says that if thatr were so, we would know everything we could ever possible know. That is to say, we have a capacity to know a lot of thing, it does not necessarily follow that all those things are innate or that we do infact know them.


(iii) Perhaps Locke goes on to criticise the notion that all men know and assent to the innate principles when they come to the use of reason. First he criticised the view that reason is used to discover the innate principles Locke argues if I read him correctly that this would imply that all knowledge gained from reasoning would them be innate. This would either contradict the view that only universally held knowledge i.e. the law of identity have innate principles or imply that knowledge gained by reasoning does not require the discovery of innate principles.

(iv) In the third chapter of the book Locke conclndes the discussion about innate ideas with an attempt to show that the idea of God is not innate. This is in many respects the most important part of his argument for it was an the basis of a belief in innate ideas that so many of Locke's contemporaries had sought to prove the existence of God. Since the

idea of God is the best example for an ionnate idea, in proving that not all cultures have an idea of God as well as the controversial concept of God. Locke manges to assert finally that the basest of innate ideas is not universally agreed upon and there fore connot be innate

Secondly Locke goes against the view that when reason is used these principles become apparent. Locke says that when a person begins to reason from a young age they donot have immediate awariness of it is impossible for the samething to be and not to be, which is one of the primary condidates for innate knowledge. Instead people discover the law of non contradiction by reasoning to it.

In this way Locke has criticised the concept of innate ideas.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

4. In which book Locke posted his criticisms against the doctrine of innate ideas?
5. State one objection of Locke against this theory.

6.5 CLASSIFICATIONS OF IDEAS :

John Locke in his most important work 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', Loche set out to offer an analysis of the human mind and its acquisition of knowledge. He offered an empiricist theory according to which we acquire ideas through our experience of the world. The first chapter of the essay contains an apology for the frequent use of the word 'idea' in the book. According to Locke, ideas are the fundamental units of mental content and therefore play an integral role in his explanation of the human mind and his account of our knowledge.

Locke claims that by 'idea' he means 'what so ever is the object of the understanding when a Man thinks ..... whatever is meant by phantism,

Notion, species or whatever it is, which the mind can be employed about in thinking. 'On one reading ideas are mental objects. The thought is that when an agent perceives an external world object like an apple therer is something in her mind which represents that apple. So, when an agent considers an apple what she is really doing is thinking about the idea of that apple. On a different reading ideas are mental actions. Here the thought is that when an agent perceives an apple she is really perceiving the apple in a direct unmediated way. This idea is the mental act of making perceptnal contact with external would object.

The two source of all our ideas are sensation and reflection. Sensation means through which the mind is furnished with sensible qualities and reflection or internal sense, which supplies the mind with ideas of its own operations such as perception, thinking doubting, believing, reasonign knowing, willing etc. Thus, the ideas received are simple ideas, which the mind has the power to repeat compare and combine in endless variety and thus to make at pleasure new complen ideas. Yet no understanding has the power to invent or frame one new simple idea some simple ideas enter into our minds by one sense only, like idea of colour, sound, taste heat, cold etc. Some are conveyed into the mind by more senses than one like space or extension, figure, rest and motion which enter through both sight and touch. Some are recived by reflection only that is the mind observes its qwn operations on those ideas it already has and gets other in this way. For example it notices its operations of perception, retention and recall in memory. Discerning comparing naming and abstracting. Finally, some ideas we recive through both sensation and reflection. Among these are pleasure and pain, power, existence, unity, duration and succession.

Although many of our ideas of sensation resemble enternal qualities, the majority are not the likeness of something existing outside ourselves the exact images and resemblances of something interent in the object. The power which objects have to produce definite ideas in us, we call qualitues. Some of these qualities belong to the objects thenselves are

utterly inseparable from them. For Locke they are original or primary qualities, e.g. extension figure, motion, rest number etc and qualities like colour, sound, tastes etc. Which are nothing in the objects thenselves except power to produce various sensation in us by their primary qualities are called secondary qualities.

Complex ideas are formed by the mind by comparing, combining and abstracting from simple ideas. The endless number of complex ideas may all be embraced under three heads. They are modes, substances and relations. Our ideas of modes are complex ideas which do not contain in themselves the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are considered as dependencies on or offections of substances. e.g. triangle, gratitude, murder etc. Again, idea of mode is of two types - Simple mode and mixed mode. A simple mode consists of variation of the same simple idea, repeated in different combinations without the mixture of any other. Mixture modes are compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one, such as beauty. Beauty consists of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight or pleasure in the beholder.

Our ideas of substances are complex ideas mode up of simple ideas, put together by the mind. The complex idea of a substance consists of a combination of ideas of qualities, supposed to represent a distinct particular thing and the confused idea of a support of bearer of these qualities. We have ideas of material and spiritnal substances and of God.

The mind also gets certain ideas of relation by comparing one thing with another. The mind first brings or sets one thing by another and then directing its attention from one to the other, discerns a relation between them. It is oftwo types - causal relation and spatial and temporal relation. The idea of cause and effect is the most comprehensive relation subsisting among ideas. It is a relation derived both from sensation and reflection we call that which produces any simple or complex idea cause, that which is produced effect. Thus heat is the cause of the fluidity of wase.

Objects are always in same space and in same time, ie both in same space and time. Far and near, in or out, above and below are spatial relations. Whereas before - after, prior to and posterion to are words. That express time relations.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

6. In which book did Locke use the word 'idea' frequently?
7. How many ideas are there according to Locke and what are they?
8. What are the two sources of ideas?



6.6 LET US SUM UP :

- Its criticisms or objections as placed by John Locke and Locke's classifications of ideas too, innate ideas are the ideas that are inborn in the human mind.
- In the 17th century the most prominent exponent of this theory was Rene Descartes.
- These ideas are clear and distinct, Descartes suggests that something that is 'innate' is effectively present fum birth and while it may not reveal itself then is more than likely to present later in life Immanual kant the 18 rth century philosopher replaced the doctrine of innate ideas with questions about a priori concepts and in the 20 th century. Noam Chomskey argued the necessity for postulating innate ideas to explain possibility of longuage.
- John Locke has criticised the doctrine of innate ideas in varrious grounds.
- In doing so he argues that there are no innate principles in the mind saying this he means that there are no notions that are stomped upon the mind of man.

- Which the soul receives in its very first being and brings to the world.
- Locke also discussed his idea theory in his book 'Essay concerning human understanding'.
- Locke says that by 'idea' he means 'whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks..... Whatever is meant by phantasm, Notion, species or whatever it is, which is mind can be employed about in thinking.
- The sources of all our ideas are sensation and reftection, Sensation means through which the mind is furnished with sensible qualities and reflection means which supplies the mind with ideas of its own operations.
- Locke's ideas are mainly of two types - Simple ideas and complex ideas. Simple ideas are the elements of through we passively recive through sensation and reflection.
- Complex ideas are formed by the mind by comparing, combining and abstracting from simple ideas. These ideas are of three kinds -

  (i) modes (ii) Substances and (ii) relations.

6.7 FURTHER READING :

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6.8 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS :

1. innate ideas are the ideas that are imprinted on the mind by God at the time of birth as the sationalists holds.

2. Descartes

3. (a) False (b) True (c) True

4. Locke posted his criticisms against the doctrise of innate ideas in his book ' An essay concerning human understanding.'

5. Locke argues that if there are innate ideas then they would have equally present in all minds and universally accepted but it is observed that in case of children, these ideas are different, Thus he refuted the concept of innate ideas.

6. 'Essay Concerning human understanding:

7. Locke has classified the ideas into two kinds, They are

   (a) Simple ideas

   (b) Complex ideas

6.9 MODEL QUESTIONS :

1. What do you mean by innate ideas? State in brief.

2. Discuss the theory of innate ideas.

3. How does Locke refuted the theory of innate Ideas?

4. Short notes -

   (a) Innate Ideas

   (b) Locke's classification of Ideas

(c) Complex Ideas

5. What are the different kinds of Ideas? Discuss Locke's view.

6. Explain with examples - Simple Ideas and Complex Ideas.

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UNIT-7: BERKELEY: ESSE EST PERCIPI

UNIT STRUCTURE

9.1: Learning Objectives

9.2: Introduction

9.3: Subjective idealism of Berkeley

9.4: "Esse est percipi"

9.5: Rejection of material world

9.6 Objections against "Esse est percipi"

9.7: Conclusion

9.8: Check your Progress

9.9 Let us sum up

9.10: Further Reading

9.11: Answer to check your Progress

9.12: Model Questions

7.1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- know the background of Berkeley's philosophy
- know what subjective idealism is.
- know the Berkeley's refutation of Locke's primary qualities and material world
- know the dictum "Esse est percipi".
- know the criticism of "Esse est percipi"

7.2. INTRODUCTION

George Berkeley was an Irish philosopher. During his days, materialism and atheism were slowly making themselves established. But, going against his contemporary tendencies Berkeley hold that the reality of the physical world is essentially spiritual. The chief philosophical initiative that he showed is the refutation of materialism. The philosophy of Berkeley was chiefly inherited from Locke. But, he rejected the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects. According to him, primary and secondary

qualities cannot be separated, because both of them are subjective and dependent on the knowing mind. The concepts of objects exist in mind; and apart from the concepts, there is no separate existence of the objects of the external world. This is the subjective idealism of Berkeley.

Berkeley's philosophy in a significant manner contributed both epistemology and idealism. The epistemological position of Berkeley was summarised by his dictum "Esse est percipi". With the help of this dictum Berkeley attempted to reject the so-called extra mental world and established immaterialism and subjective idealism.

9.3: SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY:

Berkeley was a descendent of Locke. In his philosophy of Locke gave a scientific account of the experiences of the external world. Locke was an empiricist philosopher. In his book, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", his philosophy is reflected. According to him, knowledge proper is certain, instructive and real. He believed in the independent existence of world of objects. As an empiricist philosopher Locke believes that, there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously present in the senses. Thus, Locke stated that the external world consists of things, which possess both primary and secondary qualities. But, Berkeley rejected this distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the whole representative theory of ideas put forwarded by Locke. Berkeley refutes the external world of perception and retains mind only. In this way, he laid the foundation of subjective idealism by reasoning out a belief in finite and infinite minds, their ideas and real objects. His philosophy is akin to idealism since in its ultimate analysis the sole existents are either minds or ideas belonging to them. The chief tenets of subjective idealism of Berkeley are,

- Esse est percipi.
- Knowledge of objects is direct.
- Objects are not public and they have no objective existence.

- There is no independent material world.
- All the qualities of the objects are subjective and exist only when perceived.

9.4: ESSE EST PERCIPI:

According to Locke, the external world consists of things which possess primary qualities. Primary qualities are thus object-dependent. They belong to the objective order of things. They are independent of knowing mind. They require substratum and Locke considered matter to the substratum. Apart from primary qualities, there are secondary qualities. The secondary qualities are mind-dependent. They are characterised by phenomenal variability. That means, they differ from person to person. On the other hand, primary qualities are not characterised by phenomenal variability. Berkeley rejected this distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Having rejecting this distinction Berkeley went on to establish the dictum "Esse est percipi"

"Esse est percipi" is a Latin sentence which is translated as "to be is to be perceived" or "to exist is to be perceived". The argument of Berkeley was that, there is no real ground to postulate the existence of material substance. According to Berkeley, the argument that Locke offered to proof the subjectivity of secondary qualities may be, with equal force offered to proof the subjectivity of the so called primary qualities. Locke regarded shape, size, motion etc as primary qualities. And taste, sound, colour, smell etc. as secondary qualities. Berkeley examined one after another all the primary qualities, and established that they differ from person to person. For example, size is regarded to be the primary quality. Berkeley pointed out that things look big when we are near them. They look small when we are at a distance. So, size is characterised by variability. So, it can not be a primary quality. It is a secondary quality. Again, for a similar reason, movement also cannot be regarded as primary quality. The same movement which appears to be quick to one person may be slow for another person.

Thus, Berkeley concluded that all qualities are secondary. Something that exists is regarded by him as a collection of ideas generated by secondary qualities. All these ideas are mind-dependent. They exist in so far as they are experienced. Therefore, to exist is to be perceived. That which is not perceived, does not exist.

Berkeley's philosophy is subjective Idealism in a qualified sense. He did not say that, something in order to exist must exist as an idea in my mind. If I do not perceive it, if presumably no mind perceives it, yet it will continue to exist in the mind of the God. But, in that case also it will be mind-dependent. So, Berkeley very carefully concluded that "to exist is to be perceived" or "Esse est percipi". All objects of our experience exist ultimately in the mind of God as ideas. Thus, Berkeley's dictum also rejected Atheism.

9.5: REJECTION OF MATERIAL WORLD:

The philosophy of Berkeley was established on the basis of the dictum "Esse est percipi". The objective of his philosophy is to show that matter is nothing but a cluster of qualities. All the qualities of matter, both primary and secondary, are nothing but subjective states or ideas of our mind. Perception is the criterion of existence in his philosophy. For Berkeley the conception of extra mental world itself is dogmatic. Thus, according to him, external world does not possess any independent existence apart from ideas. The material world, its primary and secondary qualities are nothing but, perceptions or ideas of our mind. The material world in itself neither hard nor soft, neither sweet nor sour, neither bright nor dark. Rather, creations of the God, who is the cause of our sensations. In this way, Berkeley established that minds alone, of the finite mind and infinite or the God, exist. Berkeley rejected the independent existence of material world. He put forwarded following points for refutation of material world,

- According to Berkeley, Locke himself admitted that matter or objects are not directly known. They are substratum of qualities and can not be

perceived directly. Same argument was given by Berkeley that, as matter is not subject to direct perception, so matter does not exist independently.

- Locke regarded matters as the substratum of primary qualities. But, as per interpretation of Berkeley, there is no external primary quality. Therefore, all ideas reside in minds and not in the matter. In this way matter is not evidenced to exist.

9.6: OBJECTIONS AGAINST "ESSE EST PERCIPI":

Berkeley's dictum was criticised by some philosophers in the later period.

- G. E. Moore gave a detailed criticism of Berkeley's dictum "Esse est percipi". According to Moore, one experience is different from another experience because of the point that one object is different from another object. Therefore, reality can not be mind-dependent. According to Moore, in every sensation there are two distinct elements. Firstly, consciousness in respect of which all sensations are alike. And secondly, the object of consciousness, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. He stated as consciousness all sensations are alike. But, the objects of experience make sensation of blue different from sensation of green. Therefore, objects of consciousness have a objective status.

- The realistic thinkers criticised Berkeley's "Esse est percipi". Everything is perceived in relation to the thinking self. From this argument Berkeley concluded that, there is nothing outside of relation of this thinking self. In this argument conclusion is not warranted by the premise. Here, he committed the fallacy of "Ego centric predicament". On this basis, realist thinkers rejected Berkeley's dictum.

9.7: CONCLUSION:

Berkeley's philosophy is a great contribution towards British Empiricism. His philosophy falls under theocentric immaterialism. The dictum "Esse est

percipi" is the chief essence of his philosophy. The objective of this dictum is to establish the subjective existence of ideas and reject the material world. It is the basis of subjective idealism. In spite the criticisms, this dictum is recognised as central and epochal in the post-Berkeleyan idealism. David Hume carried on this tradition of empiricism on the basis of the philosophy of Locke and Berkeley with a great deal of logical vigour.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1: Was Berkeley an atheist philosopher?

.....

Q2: Did Berkeley accept materialism?

.....

Q3: Did Berkeley accept the distinction between primary and secondary qualities?

.....

Q4: What is the literal meaning of 'Esse est percipi"?

.....

Q5: "Berkeley's philosophy is objective idealism"- is the statement true or false?

.....

Q6: Are the ideas of objects real in Berkeley's philosophy?

.....

Q7: Did Berkeley accept the existence of God?

.....

Q8: What is the substratum of qualities according to Berkeley, objects or ideas?

.....

Q9: Are matters public in the philosophy of Berkeley?

.....

Q10: Who is the cause of our sensations according to Berkeley?

.....



9.9: LET US SUM UP

- Berkeley was a descendent of John Locke.
- Berkeley went against his contemporary philosophical traditions atheism and materialism.
- Berkeley rejected the Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
- According to Berkeley, there is no primary quality.
- According to Berkeley, knowledge of objects is direct.
- According to Berkeley, objects are not public and they have no objective existence.
- According to Berkeley, there is no independent material world.
- According to Berkeley, all the qualities of the objects are subjective and exist only when perceived.
- According to Locke, the external world consists of things which possess primary qualities.
- Berkeley examined one after another all the primary qualities, and established that they differ from person to person.
- "Esse est percipi" is a Latin sentence which is translated as "to be is to be perceived" or "to exist is to be perceived".
- Berkeley concluded that all qualities are secondary.
- All these ideas are mind-dependent in the philosophy of Berkeley.
- According to Berkeley, to exist is to be perceived and that which is not perceived, does not exist.
- Berkeley's philosophy is subjective Idealism in a qualified sense.

- All objects of our experience exist ultimately in the mind of God as ideas.
- The objective of Berkeley's philosophy is to show that matter is nothing but a cluster of qualities.
- All the qualities of matter, both primary and secondary, are nothing but subjective states or ideas of our mind.
- Perception is the criterion of existence in Berkeley's philosophy.
- For Berkeley the conception of extra mental world itself is dogmatic.
- The material world in itself neither hard nor soft, neither sweet nor sour, neither bright nor dark, rather, creations of the God, who is the cause of our sensations.
- G. E. Moore gave a detailed criticism of Berkeley's dictum "Esse est percipi".
- Berkeley's philosophy is a great contribution towards British Empiricism.
- His philosophy falls under theocentric immaterialism.



9.10: FURTHER READING:

1) Masih, Y. (1993). A Critical History of Western Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass.

2) Sinha, J. (2001). Introduction to Philosophy. New Central Book Agency (P)Ltd.

3) Sharma,R.M (2010). Western and Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. Surjeet Publication.

9.11: ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q 1: No, Berkeley was not a atheist philosopher. Rather he was a theist.

Ans to Q 2: Berkeley did not accept materialism.

Ans to Q 3: Berkeley did not accept the distinction between primary and secondary qualities

Ans to Q 4: "Esse est percipi" is a Latin sentence which is translated as "to be is to be perceived" or "to exist is to be perceived".

Ans to Q 5: The statement false. His philosophy is subjective idealism.

Ans to Q 6: According to Berkeley, ideas have subjective existence.

Ans to Q 7: Berkeley accepted the existence of God

Ans to Q 8: According to Berkeley, ideas are the substratum of qualities.

Ans to Q 9: In the philosophy of Berkeley, matters are not public.

Ans to Q 10: God is the cause of our sensations according to Berkeley.

9.12: MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very Short Questions:

Q 1: What is subjective idealism?

Q 2: Why Berkeley rejected the distinction between primary quality and secondary qualities?

Q 3: What is the literal meaning of the term "Esse est percipi"?

Q 4: Why Berkeley rejected material world?

Q 5: Did Berkeley accept existence of God?

Q 6: What is the reaction of Moore about Berkeley?

Q 7: What all the substratum of ideas?

Q8: What are the two types of minds discussed by Berkeley?

B. Short Questions: (Write in about 150 words)

Q 1: Write briefly about subjective idealism.

Q 2: Write a short note on "Esse est percipi".

Q 3: Briefly explain Berkeley's concept of infinite and finite mind.

Q 4: What is meant by immaterialism?

Q 5: Write briefly about the Moore's criticism of "Esse est percipi".

C. Long Questions: (Write in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Explain subjective idealism.

Q 2: Explain Berkeley's rejection of material world?

Q3: Explain Berkeley's rejection of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary quality.

Q 4: Explain critically Berkeley's dictum "Esse est percipi"?

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