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MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

SEMESTER - V

PHILOSOPHY

BLOCK 2



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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

The second block consists of eight units. First unit of this block and the eight unit of this course is 'Characteristics of Modern Philosophy'. This unit introduces to you the fundamental points of David Hume's philosophy and the concepts of empiricism and empirical self in Humean philosophy. By reading this unit one will be able to explain the concepts of impressions and ideas in David Hume's philosophy. After reading this one will also know whether Hume was a sceptic or not.

The name of the ninth unit is 'Hume: Self'. This unit introduces to you Hume's concept of self. After reading this unit, you will be able to know how Hume has rejected the concept of self. One will also know what empiricism is and will be able to explain why Hume's theory can also be regarded to be no self theory.

'Kant on Sensibility' is the 10th unit of this course. After going through this unit one will be able to Kant states that, there are two stems of human knowledge. They are sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, objects are given to us. Through understanding, they are thought. Sensibility is the faculty of intuitions and understanding is the faculty of concepts.

The eleventh unit of course one is Kant on Understanding'. This unit introduces to you about intuition and concepts that constitute the elements of all our knowledge, role of logic, which comprises the rules that govern concepts, general and transcendental logic, the division of transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic, judgments with corresponding concepts.

The twelfth unit of this course is 'Kant: The possibility of synthetic a priori judgment'. After going through this unit one will know the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic judgments, differences between A priori and A posteriori judgments, the Possibility of metaphysics and the Synthetic Apriori Knowledge

The thirteenth unit of this course is 'Kant: Transcendental Deduction of Categories'. After going through this unit, you will be able to learn about the categories. You will be further knowing that the categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding' and before Kant, Aristotle is the first philosopher who mentions different categories in his philosophy. Again one will know certain differences between Aristotle's conception of categories and Kantian categories and about transcendental imagination of Kant.

The fourteenth unit is 'Hegel: Dialectical Method'. After going through this unit you will be able to know that "Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of "dialectics", the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates' interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes.

While going through this course you will come across some boxes which are put on the left side or right side of the text. These boxes will give us the meanings of some words and concepts within the text. Apart from this, there will be some broad and short questions included under Activity and Check Your Progress in every unit. Activities will increase our thinking capacity because questions put in Activity are not directly derived from the text. But answers to the short questions are put in the section Answers to Check Your Progress. Besides, there are some text-related questions which are put in Model Questions. These questions will help you in selecting and mastering probable topics for the examination so that you can prepare for the examination with confidence.

UNIT 8: HUME: IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS

UNIT STRUCTURE

8.1. Learning Objectives
8.2. Fundamentals of Humean Philosophy
8.3. David Hume's theory of empiricism and empirical self
8.4. David Hume's view on impressions and ideas
8.5. Was Hume a sceptic?
8.6. Let us sum up
8.7. Further Reading
8.8. Answer to check your progress
8.9. Model Questions

8.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- to know about the fundamental points of David Hume's philosophy
- to know about the concepts of empiricism and empirical self in Humean philosophy
- to acquire knowledge about the concepts of impressions and ideas in David Hume's philosophy
- to check whether Hume was a sceptic or not

8.2. FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMEAN PHILOSOPHY:

David Hume's philosophy is entirely based on this principle that experience causes our ideas. Hence Hume is an empiricist. Hume makes distinction between impressions or the immediate result of the experience and ideas, or the result of impressions. Locke and Berkeley employed the psychological method in philosophy and Hume quietly inherits it. This consists in the careful analysis of the contents of experience in order to discover the original elements of knowledge. Hume clarified Locke and pointed out that there are two kinds of contents of the mind, namely, impressions and their ideas. These are only perceptions which compose the human mind.

David Hume accepted the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge and the Berkeleyan view that esse est percipi and draws what seem to him the logical conclusions. If all we can know are our own impressions, we have no right to assert the reality either of material or of spiritual substances. We find no impressions that justify the assumption of any kind of substance. We discover nothing in our experience that justifies our notion of necessary connection or causation; cause and effect can mean nothing more than a regular succession of ideas. Hume agrees with Descartes, Hobbes and Locke in requiring that genuine knowledge must be self-evident; but he finds no such knowledge anywhere except in mathematics which merely analyses its own concepts.

Impressions and ideas are divided into simple and complex. All ideas or impressions are those which admit of no separation or distinction. Complex ideas or impressions are those which are composed of simple parts. Again, impressions may be divided into sensation and reflection. Sensations seem to arise from unknown causes but the reflection of passions, desires, emotions and the felt inclination of the mind are 'derived in a great measure from our ideas.' Thus reflection is secondary and sensation is primary. But reflection though secondary is not the copy of the sensation because like all other true elements the impressions of reflection are original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and actions.

8.3. DAVID HUME'S THEORY OF EMPIRICISM AND EMPIRICAL SELF:

The chief problems that occupy Hume are those of the origin and nature of knowledge. What is the source of our knowledge; what degree of certainty does it possess; what are its extent and limitations? What are the meaning and value of the categories of knowledge, such as substance and causality? Of all these questions the basic one for Hume is the question of the origin of knowledge. All the materials of our thinking are derived from outward

and inward impressions. By impressions we mean our more lively perceptions when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will; i.e., all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. All our thoughts or ideas are copies of such impressions; they are the less lively perceptions, the faint or feeble perceptions of which we are conscious when we recall or reflect on any of the sensations or any other impressions just mentioned. Outward impressions or sensations arise in the soul from unknown causes, while the inward impressions are frequently occasioned by our ideas. Knowledge results from compounding, transposing, argumenting, or diminishing the materials furnished us by the senses and experience. The mixture and composition of the impressions alone belongs to the mind and will. Analysis shows that every idea which we examine is copied from similar impressions. Again, where there are no impressions, there can be no ideas.

Our thoughts and ideas introduce one another with a certain degree of method and regularity, there is a bond of union between them, and one calls up another. Thoughts tend to call up thoughts of like things of things contiguous in time and place, and of things related as cause and effect.

The 'empirical self' means the series of mental states-the collection of sensations, feelings and desires-without any principle of unity among them. Mind is but a series of impressions and ideas without any connecting bond. The self, according to David Hume, is nothing more than a series of mental processes. It is a series of thoughts, feelings and volitions. It is not a substance which has these mental processes. The mental processes are combined with one another by the laws of association. Their combination does not require the synthetic activity of the self.

Hume believes in Berkeley's dictum esse est percipi- the existence of an entity consists in being perceived. He applies this dictum to the so-called mind, self, or spirit, which is regarded as a permanent spiritual substance which thinks, perceives, feels, and wills and which abides in the midst of changes in mental states. Hume denies perception of any such

permanent spiritual substance distinct from ideas or mental processes. According to Hume, we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self, that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence, and so are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. When 'I' enter most intimately into what I call 'myself', I always stumble on some particular perception or others. The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different times. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind.

"What we call a 'mind' is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity. The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one. Thus, according to Hume, there is no permanent and abiding spiritual substance apart from a series of feelings and ideas, we can never perceive the so-called permanent self or spirit, whenever we try to perceive it we perceive only a series of feelings, sensations, or ideas, we perceive nothing beyond them. The so-called spirit or self is a figment of the imagination. Thus, the self, according to Hume, is nothing but a series of mental processes. It is not anything that has the states; it is the states themselves. Hume says, "Men are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement."

The empirical account of the self has been given by different thinkers in different ways. J.S. Mill says, "Mind is nothing but the series of sensations and internal feelings as they actually occur, with the addition of possibilities of feelings." "It is a series of mental states, and aware of itself as a series." William James regards the mind as a stream of consciousness. This implies that consciousness instead of being a series of distinct states is a continuum,

and flows on without interruption, without breaking up into discreet units as implied in the Humean conception of the self. Hume regards impressions and ideas as discreet and unconnected with one another, which are connected with one another by the laws of association. James regards them as flowing into one another and forming a stream of consciousness. He regards the self as the preceding judging thought which appropriates the succeeding thought.

However, the concept of empirical self is criticized on the ground that it involves the fallacy of hypostatizing abstractions; it cannot account for the facts of self-consciousness, memory and expectation, personal identity and continuity, and it makes knowledge impossible since it cannot account for assimilation, discrimination and apperception which are involved in knowledge.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 1: Fill up the blanks:

(a) David Hume was an ……

(b) According to Hume impressions and ideas are divided into …….. and ……...

(c) Hume maintained that impressions are more lively …… when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will.

(d) The self, according to David Hume, is nothing more than a series of ……

(e) The spirit or self, in view of Hume, is a figment of the ……

8.4. DAVID HUME'S VIEW ON IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS:

David Hume (1711-1776) develops Locke's empiricism into sensationism in his Treatise of Human Nature. All knowledge comes from impressions and ideas. Ideas are faint copies of impressions, which are called images

in modern psychology. Impressions are lively perceptions. There are impressions of sensation or external perception and impressions of reflection or internal perception. These are the original materials of knowledge. Ideas or images are faint and indistinct copies of impressions, they are feebler than impressions. Hume says, "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, impressions and ideas". The difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name impressions and under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. All our simple ideas in their in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. Impressions and ideas which constitute matter of knowledge are disconnected from one another. They are connected with one another by the laws of association. The law of similarity, the law of contiguity in time or space, and the law of causality connect the discreet impressions and ideas with one another. The like ideas suggest one another; a picture suggests the object it represents owing to the law of similarity. The laws of association are purely subjective. Discreet impressions and ideas are automatically combined with one another according to these laws. They do not require any innate ideas or a priori forms of reason to connect them with one another. Hume advocates through-going empiricism. Impressions or sensations are the first units of knowledge, ideas or images are their faint copies. They are combined with one another according to the laws of association to form complex ideas. Knowledge is composed of sensations and ideas combined by the laws of association.

Sensations are not produced by matter; there is no production or effectuation. There is no causal force or power which produces an effect, as it is never perceived. A cause is an invariable antecedent, and an effect is an invariable consequent. There is no necessary connection between cause and effect. There is only an inner bond of association between two

ideas which owes to their constant conjunction in our experience. We always perceived a fire along with burning. An association has been established in the mind between the idea of a fire and the idea of burning, so that when we perceive a fire, we expect that it will burn. There is no necessity in the idea of causation. Hence we cannot infer that matter is the cause of sensations.

We have no impression of matter. So matter is non-existent. The so-called matter is a series of actual and possible sensations. Different objects are groups of different sensations. Hume denies the existence of matter, like Berkeley. There is mind, soul, or self. The so-called mind is a series of ideas, feeling and volitions. There is not permanent self, as we have no impression of any permanent soul. Whenever we try to catch the so-called soul, we stumble upon some perception of heat or cold, or an idea of pleasure or pain. We always perceive some particular fleeting ideas. So there is no permanent mind or self.

There is no God. There is no valid proof for the existence of God. We have no impression of God. We do not perceive Him, nor can we infer His existence. We wish to believe in God to fulfill our aspirations. So we believe in God. The idea of God is man-made. Hume rejects the existence of matter, soul and God. He rejects all metaphysical entities. He rejects universal and necessary truths. He admits only particular and contingent truths which are given by experience. We can never step beyond sensations to reality outside them. We are within the charmed circle of sensations. We can never transcend them. Thus Hume is landed in sensationism and skepticism. There is no absolute certainty in knowledge. Probability is the guide in life. Hume is an acute thinker. All modern empiricists draw their inspiration from him. Hume's sensationism is the logical outcome of Locke's empiricism.

8.5. WAS HUME A SCEPTIC?

Hume analysed the furniture of the mind in terms of fleeting impressions. Anything called knowledge not derived from impressions, according to him,

could not be based on reason. Taking impression as his touchstone he called in question the validity of the concepts of substance, causality etc. which make up knowledge proper. He after a careful analysis of the main categories of thought came to the conclusion that there is no substance, neither matter nor self. We are left with passing impressions only. Is there any necessary connection between the impressions so that we could pass with certainty from the one to the other? His most careful search into causation showed that there could be no necessary connection between the impressions. Nothing remains-the vast structure of philosophy crumbles or dust. In Hume philosophy finds itself in the midst of ruins of its own making. The result of Humean inquiry appears to us skeptical. Yet lived in an age in which men entertained the highest hope in the possibility of knowledge. It may sound paradoxical but it is quite true that Hume's too much faith in the science of psychology, the science of his own making, was the main cause of his skepticism.

However, it may be held that Hume could not be regarded as a sceptic for he allowed the possibility of mathematical knowledge. Hume rejected the demonstrations of geometry as they are based on the absurd principle of infinite divisibility of extension. But the algebraic and arithmetical demonstration, according to him, maintains 'a perfect exactness and certainty.' Unfortunately he does not tell us, 'how are these ideas of algebra and arithmetic derived?' Like other ideas an enquiry into them will reveal that they are not derived from any impressions. Any way he maintains that the rules of the demonstrative sciences are certain and infallible but due to our frail faculties our application of them is notoriously fallible. So even here knowledge is only probable. Hume was a total sceptic. But the total skepticism is self-contradictory. The doubting of everything leads also to the doubt of that theory which doubts everything. However in recent years a careful analysis of the writings of Hume will show us that Hume was a moderate sceptic and not a total sceptic. His skepticism is not the logical outcome of empiricism. It is not empiricism, but reason which fails to dispel the dark clouds of skepticism.

Hume was a moderate sceptic in the sense that he maintained that reason apart from imagination cannot solve our doubts but then according to him there could be a partly advanced system of thought based on our natural propensities. His display of the skeptical arguments purports to show that truth lies in the custom or habit of imagination and not in reason. True thinking, according to him, is really sensitive and not cognitive in nature. We are constrained to maintain that Hume was not a total sceptic but then he used skepticism as a powerful weapon of attack against rationalism. The skeptical arguments are by no means his original property. According to Hume, empiricism based on naturalistic psychology is not the cause of skepticism but really is a way of escape out of the difficulties in which reason falls. Thus Hume had a constructive empirical philosophy. Thus Hume had a constructive empirical philosophy but due to the following reasons he has been interpreted as a sceptic.

1. First, Hume makes a full display of the skeptical arguments. Thus, critical and negative element is so widespread throughout the discussion that one gets the impression that he is merely negative and destructive.

2. Hume makes skepticism the background of his own philosophy. It provides him with a convenient weapon of attack against rationalism and dogmatism.

3. From the rationalistic point of view his philosophy is really skeptical for he maintains that reason is not capable of making our knowledge intelligible. He gives us almost a counsel of despair, "Carelessness and in attention alone can afford us any remedy." He maintains that reason is really sensitive and no rationalist can ever accept this thesis.

4. Lastly, his own constructive philosophy is weak and powerless to deal adequately with the doubts which he himself had raised.

Hume's philosophy is skeptical with regard to dogmatism and rationalism but not so in relation to skepticism itself. The reply which he supplied to skeptical doubts was unsatisfactory but then it shows that he could not

remain in skepticism. He really hoped to encourage philosophers to think better and never wanted to induce them to remain in despair. Apart from the constructive empirical philosophy he accepted the validity of mathematics and the experimental truths concerning matters of fact. In view of his limitation of knowledge to that which is capable of exact measurement and to that which is present in experience, coupled with his rejection of the suprasensible entities like God or soul, may justly entitle him to be called a positivist rather than a sceptic? Again, in view of his arguments against the capacity of reason to solve our problems, he may be justly styled a pragmatist, an anti-intellectual rather than a sceptic.

If we emphasize Hume's views with regard to his philosophical empiricism, then Hume's acceptance of impressions as the indubitable touchstone of knowledge, coupled with his denial of permanent substance, self and God, then we would place him among the positivists. If, however, we emphasize his doctrine of naturalism, imagination based on associative inference, then Hume would be regarded as a pragmatist. In the history of philosophy, Hume has become famous for his positivism with its negative conclusions and that is how he is viewed even now.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 2: Write short notes on:

(a) Basics of Humean philosophy

(b) Hume's views on impressions and ideas

Question 3: State whether true or false:

(a) David Hume (1711-1776) develops Locke's empiricism into sensationism in his Treatise of Human Nature.

(b) Impressions and ideas get connected with one another by the laws of association.

(c) The self, according to Hume, is nothing but a series of mental processes.

(d) Hume's sensationism is the logical outcome of Locke's empiricism.

(e) Hume applies the dictum "esse est percipi" to the so-called mind, self, or spirit, which is regarded as a permanent spiritual substance which thinks, perceives, feels, and wills and which abides in the midst of changes in mental states.



8.6.LET US SUM UP:

- David Hume's philosophy is entirely based on this principle that experience causes our ideas: hence Hume is a empiricist. Hume differentiates between impressions or the immediate result of the experience and ideas, or the result of impressions.

- According to Hume if all we can know are our own impressions, we have no right to assert the reality either of material or of spiritual substances.

- Impressions and ideas are divided into simple and complex. All ideas or impressions are those which admit of no separation or distinction.

- The self, according to David Hume, is nothing more than a series of mental processes. It is a series of thoughts, feelings and volitions. It is not a substance which has these mental processes.

- Hume believes in Berkeley's dictum esse est percipi- the existence of an entity consists in being perceived. He applies this dictum to the so-called mind, self, or spirit, which is regarded as a permanent spiritual substance which thinks, perceives, feels, and wills and which abides in the midst of changes in mental states.

- According to Hume, we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self, that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence, and so are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.

- Hume could not be regarded as a sceptic for he allowed the possibility of mathematical knowledge. Hume rejected the demonstrations of geometry as they are based on the absurd principle of infinite divisibility of extension. But the algebraic and arithmetical demonstration, according to him, maintains 'a perfect exactness and certainty.'

- According to Hume, empiricism based on naturalistic psychology is not the cause of skepticism but really is a way of escape out of the difficulties in which reason falls. Thus Hume had a constructive empirical philosophy.

- Apart from the constructive empirical philosophy he accepted the validity of mathematics and the experimental truths concerning matters of fact. In view of his limitation of knowledge to that which is capable of exact measurement and to that which is present in experience, coupled with his rejection of the suprasensible entities like God or soul, may justly entitle him to be called a positivist rather than a sceptic?

- If we emphasize Hume's views with regard to his philosophical empiricism, then Hume's acceptance of impressions as the indubitable touchstone of knowledge, coupled with his denial of permanent substance, self and God, then we would place him among the positivists.

- In the history of philosophy, Hume has become famous for his positivism with its negative conclusions and that is how he is viewed even now.



8.7. FURTHER READING:

1. Thilly, Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad.

2. Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy (Greek, Medieval, Modern), Motilal Banarsidass Publishers private limited, Delhi.

3. Wright, M.R., Introducing Greek Philosophy, Routledge.

4. Stace. W.T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, MacMillan and Co. limited, London.

8.8. ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

1.(a) ans: empiricist

(b) ans: simple, complex

(c) ans: perceptions

(d) ans: mental processes

(e) ans: imagination

(2) (a) ans. David Hume's philosophy is entirely based on this principle that experience causes our ideas: hence Hume is an empiricist. Hume differentiates between impressions or the immediate result of the experience and ideas, or the result of impressions. Locke and Berkeley employed the psychological method in philosophy and Hume quietly inherits it. Hume clarified Locke and pointed out that there are two kinds of contents of the mind, namely, impressions and their ideas. These are only perceptions which compose the human mind.

David Hume accepted the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge and the Berkeleyan view that esse est percipi and draws what seem to him the logical conclusions. If all we can know are our own impressions, we have no right to assert the reality either of material or of spiritual substances. We find no impressions that justify the assumption of any kind of substance. We discover nothing in our experience that justifies our notion of necessary connection or causation; cause and effect can mean nothing more than a regular succession of ideas. Hume agrees with Descartes, Hobbes and Locke in requiring that genuine knowledge must be self-evident; but he finds no such knowledge anywhere except in mathematics which merely analyses its own concepts.

Impressions and ideas are divided into simple and complex. All ideas or impressions are those which admit of no separation or distinction. Complex ideas or impressions are those which are composed of simple parts. Again, impressions may be divided into sensation and reflection. Sensations seem to arise from unknown causes but the reflection of passions, desires, emotions and the felt inclination of the mind are 'derived in a great measure from our ideas.' Thus reflection is secondary and sensation is primary. But reflection though secondary is not the copy of the sensation because like all other true elements the impressions of reflection are original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and actions.

(b)ans: David Hume (1711-1776) develops Locke's empiricism into sensationism in his Treatise of Human Nature. All knowledge comes from impressions and ideas. Ideas are faint copies of impressions, which are called images in modern psychology. Impressions are lively perceptions. There are impressions of sensation or external perception and impressions of reflection or internal perception. These are the original materials of knowledge. Ideas or images are faint and indistinct copies of impressions, they are feebler than impressions. The perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name impressions and under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. All our simple ideas in their in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. Impressions and ideas which constitute matter of knowledge are disconnected from one another. They are connected with one another by the laws of association.

There is no God. There is no valid proof for the existence of God. We have no impression of God. We do not perceive Him, nor can we infer His existence. We wish to believe in God to fulfill our aspirations. So we believe in God. The idea of God is man-made. Hume rejects the existence of matter,

soul and God. He rejects all metaphysical entities. He rejects universal and necessary truths. He admits only particular and contingent truths which are given by experience. We can never step beyond sensations to reality outside them. We are within the charmed circle of sensations. We can never transcend them. Thus Hume is landed in sensationism and skepticism. There is no absolute certainty in knowledge. Probability is the guide in life. Hume is an acute thinker. All modern empiricists draw their inspiration from him. Hume's sensationism is the logical outcome of Locke's empiricism.

3.(a)ans: true

(b)ans: true

(c)ans: true

(d)ans: true

(e)ans: true



8.9. MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short questions:-

1. On what principle Hume's philosophy was based?
2. Which theory of origin of knowledge was accepted by Hume?
3. Define impressions?
4. What is empirical self according to Hume?
5. Where did Hume develop Locke's empiricism?

B. Short questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Distinction between impressions and ideas in Hume's philosophy
2. Fundamentals of Hume's philosophy

3. Hume's empiricism

C. Short notes (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Hume's concept of impressions and ideas

2. Hume's concept of empirical self

3. Hume's scepticism

D. Long questions: (Answer each question within 300-500 words)

1. Give a detailed account about David Hume's formulation of impressions and ideas.

2. Give a critical exposition of David Hume's theory of empiricism and his concept of empirical self.

3. Was Hume a sceptic? Discuss.

*** **** ***

UNIT 9: HUME: SELF

UNIT STRUCTURE

9.1: Learning Objectives

9.2: Introduction

9.3: Hume's Theory of Self

9.4: Hume's Rejection of the Conception of a Permanent:

9.5: Hume and Empiricism:

9.6: No Self Theory of Hume:

9.7: Criticisms of Hume's Theory of Self:

9.8: Conclusion

9.9: Let Us Sum Up

9.10: Further Reading

9.11: Answer To Check Your Progress

9.12: Model Questions

9.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- explain Hume's theory of self
- know how Hume has rejected the concept of self
- know what is empiricism
- explain why Hume's theory can also be regarded to be no self theory
- explain the criticisms of Hume's theory of self

9.2 INTRODUCTION:

In this unit, you are going to learn about the David Hume's conception of self. Hume's conception of self can also be regarded to be his conception of mind. This particular concept of Hume is found in his book, "A Treatise of Human Nature (1738-40)". Further he had improved this theory in his letter writings like, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)"It is known by us that Hume is an empiricist. According to empiricism knowledge is something, which is derived from the sense experience. So for Hume

self or mind is something, which gather knowledge for the sense experience. By reading and studying this unit, you will be able to gather knowledge about the David Hume's conception of mind or self. You will also be able to know that how Hume had criticized the existence of self. Finally after reading this unit, you will be able to know that there is no self according to Hume.

9.3: HUME'S THEORY OF SELF:

Hume's theory of self is occupying an important place in the modern western philosophy. Hume was an empiricist and he carries empiricism to its extreme logical end. Locke admitted the existence of both mind and matter. So far as Berkeley is concerned, he admitted the existence of the mental substance alone. According to Berkeley, matter and the material substratum does not exist. Everything that exists only in relation to the knowing mind. So the mind or the self (along with its ideas) alone exists. Hume went a step further and rejected the existence of the mind or the self as abiding substance. What exists is a totality of ideas and impressions. Every idea or every impression is discrete. There is no internal connecting bond among these ideas and impressions.

9.4: HUME'S REJECTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF A PERMANENT:

Hume's rejection of the conception of a permanent abiding substance is very famous. In a well known passage Hume wrote ----------

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at anytime without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for anytime, as by sound sleep; so long as am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not exist."

9.5: HUME AND EMPIRICISM:

The epistemology of Locke developed through Berkeley and culminated in the philosophy of Hume. According to Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison, the epistemology of Locke ultimately culminated in the philosophy of Hume in the form of a theory, which may be called idea-ism. According to this theory ideas alone exist. There is nothing other than and over and above the ideas. There is neither material substance nor mental substance. Berkeley's criticism of material substance was directed by Hume against the mental substance as well. Berkeley's had reduced the spiritual substance to complexes of sensations. What we have is a series of ideas and impressions. There is no abiding permanent substance whether mental or material.

9.6: NO SELF THEORY OF HUME:

According to Hume, every genuine idea must ultimately be derived from some impression. There is no impression from which the idea of the self is derived. Moreover, Hume argued that there is no introspective evidence for the existence of a permanent soul.

According to Hume, what we have is impressions and ideas. Impressions are livelier and more vivid than the ideas and impressions. Our imagination binds together different impressions and ideas and thereby forms the conception of one abiding self.

9.7: CRITICISMS OF HUME'S THEORY OF SELF:

Thus it becomes clear that according to Hume, there is no self. According to the critics, if there is no self then Hume has to explain the illusion of the self. Neither reason nor the senses gives us the self. But imagination is responsible for producing a belief in permanent self. There is only succession of impressions and ideas. An important question arises here, i.e. there must be an idea or an impression which rises above the series and mental

substratum. Which impression or idea can rise above the series and form the idea of a mental substratum. Which impression or idea can rise above the series and form the idea of a mental substance? Again how can one impression or idea rise above the series? To this two questions Hume did not have a clear answer.

Kant said that Hume looked for the self in the wrong place. Therefore Hume did not find the self. The self is not one object among the other object. Therefore the self cannot be found through introspection. For Kant it is the ultimate pre-supposition of knowledge. It is the primal knower. Hume's account fails to take note of this important point.

9.8: CONCLUSION:

So this in brief about the Hume's view on self or mind. When Hume said about self, unlike other philosophers, he has totally rejected the existence of self or mind. According to him there is not anything like self. Hume's theory of self is itself a very unique theory. So far as Hume's theory is concerned, it has some similarities with Buddhism. According to Buddhist notion of not-self, which holds that the unitary self is a fiction and that nothing exists but a collection of five aggregates. Similarly, both Hume and Buddhist philosophy hold that it is perfectly acceptable to speak of personal identity in a mundane and conventional way, while believing that there are ultimately no such things. So far as Hume's theory of self is concerned, it is actually better to be regarded to be not-self theory of Hume, as Hume has strongly rejected the existence of self. So from the above discussion, it can be said that though Hume's theory of self has a different flavour, but it is playing a very dominant role in western philosophy.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q No 1: Who is the author of the book entitled, "Treatise of Human Nature"?

.....

Q No 2: According to which philosopher matter and the material substratum do not exist?

.....

Q No 3: Who has given the concept of idea-ism?

.....

Q No 4: Who has reduced the spiritual substance to complexes of sensations?

.....

Q No 5: Who said that every genuine idea must ultimately be derived from some expressions?

.....

Q No 6: According to Hume, what is livelier and more vivid than the ideas?

.....

Q No 7: Does Hume explain the illustration of the self?

.....

Q No 8: Do you think reason or senses give us the sensations?

.....

Q No 9: Who said that Hume looked for the elf in the wrong place?

.....

Q No 10: Hume's theory of self has similarities with which Indian theory?

.....



9.9: LET US SUM UP

- Hume's conception of self can also be regarded to be his conception of mind.
- According to empiricism knowledge is something, which is derived from the sense experience. So for Hume self or mind is something, which gather knowledge for the sense experience.
- Locke admitted the existence of both mind and matter.
- So far as Berkeley is concerned, he admitted the existence of the mental substance alone.
- According to Berkeley, matter and the material substratum does not exist. Everything that exists only in relation to the knowing mind. So the mind or the self (along with its ideas) alone exists.
- Hume went a step further and rejected the existence of the mind or the self as abiding substance
- Berkeley's criticism of material substance was directed by Hume against the mental substance as well.
- Berkeley's had reduced the spiritual substance to complexes of sensations
- According to Hume, every genuine idea must ultimately be derived from some impression.
- There is no impression from which the idea of the self is derived. Moreover, Hume argued there is no introspective evidence for the existence of a permanent soul.
- According to the critics, if there is no self then Hume has to explain the illusion of the self.

- According to Buddhist notion of not-self, which holds that the unitary self is a fiction and that nothing exists but a collection of five aggregates.
- So far as Hume's theory of self is concerned, it is actually better to be regarded to be not-self theory of Hume, as Hume has strongly rejected the existence of self.



9.10: FURTHER READING

1. Thilly, Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad.
2. Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy (Greek, Medieval, Modern), Motilal Banarsidass Publishers private limited, Delhi.
3. Wright, M.R., Introducing Greek Philosophy, Routledge.
4. Stace. W.T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, MacMillan and Co. limited, London.



9.11: ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans to Q No 1: David Hume

Ans to Q No 2: Berkeley

Ans to Q No 3: Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison

Ans to Q No 4: Berkeley

Ans to Q No 5: David Hume

Ans to Q No 6: Impressions

Ans to Q No 7: No

Ans to Q No 8: No

Ans to Q No 9: Kant

Ans to Q No 10: Buddhism



9.12: MODEL QUESTIONS

A. Very Short Questions:

1) Who has written the book "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding"?

2) Who admitted the existence of both mind and matter?

3) Who rejected the existence of the mind or self?

4) Define empiricism.

5) How the conception of abiding self forms?

B. Short Questions:

1) Write a short note on Hume's rejection of the conception of permanent.

2) Write a short note on Hume and Empiricism.

3) Briefly explain the 'no self theory of Hume'

4) Write a short note on the criticisms of the self.

C) Long Questions:

1) Explain why Hume's theory of self is regarded to be no-self.

2) Discuss the Hume's concept of self or mind.

3) Critically discuss the Hume's theory of self.

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UNIT 10: KANT ON SENSIBILITY

UNIT STRUCTURE

10.1 Learning Objectives

10.2 Introduction

10.3 Faculty of Sensibility

10.4 Forms of Sensibility

10.5 Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time

10.6 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space and Time

10.7 Space and Time: Kant and the (Modern) Physicists and the Philosophers

10.8 Let us sum up

10.9 Further Reading

10.10 Answer to Check Your Progress

10.11 Model Questions

10.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- Know about human sensibility, which is one of the faculty of knowledge.
- Learn about the two a priori forms of sensibility, namely space and time.
- Know about the metaphysical and transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time.
- Know about the comparison between Kantian conception of space and time with modern physicists and philosophers.

10.2 INTRODUCTION:

Kant divides the Critique of Pure Reason into two broad parts, viz., Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. The former is further divided into two parts: (I) Transcendental Aesthetic and (ii) Transcendental Logic. Kant terms the science of all principles of a priori sensibility as transcendental aesthetic. The word

'aesthetic', here derives from the Greek word for sensation, and indicates that the subject matter of this section is the faculty of sensibility, considered independently of the faculty of understanding. In the transcendental aesthetic, Kant analyses the nature of human sensibility and says that space and time are its a priori forms through which all intuitions, that constitute the material of all knowledge, are given. In the Transcendental Logic, Kant makes a further distinction between Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant is concerned with delineating the a priori forms and the principles of pure understanding, which makes the synthetic a priori knowledge in natural sciences. Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic together account for Kant's theory of synthetic a priori knowledge. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant criticises systematically any attempt to apply the categories outside the field of experience. His general argument is that whenever one attempts to do this, one is led into error, contradiction and paradox.

10.3 FACULTY OF SENSIBILITY

Kant states that, there are two stems of human knowledge. They are sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, objects are given to us. Through understanding, they are thought. Sensibility is the faculty of intuitions and understanding is the faculty of concepts. Without sensibility no object would be given to us and without understanding no object would be thought. Kant regards thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

Kant holds that through intuition, knowledge is in immediate relation to objects. But intuition takes place only when we have the objects. In order for the objects to appear, thought must relate to the intuition, and to the sensibility. Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving the representations through the mode in which we are affected by the objects. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility.

By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions. By the faculty of understanding they are thought, and from it arises concepts. Kant however argues that all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility; because there is no other way for an object to be given to us.

Kant says that the sensations are posited and ordered in a certain form. This form is not derived from the sensible intuition and must therefore be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensible intuition is space and time. This pure form of sensibility is also known as 'pure intuition'. Space and time are pure intuitions, because they are like intuited objects in that they are individuals with which our intuition places us in an immediate cognitive relation. Space and time are like objects in that any intuition of an object is also an intuition of the space in which the object is located and of the time in which the experience itself takes place.

10.4 FORMS OF SENSIBILITY

Kant in the transcendental doctrine of elements discusses two pure forms of sensible intuitions, in which all the manifold of intuition is intuited in certain relations. These two pure forms of sensible intuitions are space and time. They must be found in the mind a priori. Kant discusses space and time under the two heads, metaphysical and the transcendental. A metaphysical exposition of space aims to expose the origin and content of our representation of space, while a transcendental exposition aims to explain whether and how our representation can serve as a principle or ground for cognition. The arguments offered in the Metaphysical Exposition are meant to show that our representation of space is a pure intuition, its source is non-empirical, and its content is singular and immediately given. It will follow from this that the object of our representation of space is an individual, whose features are knowable a priori. Kant will proceed to show in the Transcendental Exposition that the representation so described is a

subjective element of cognition that provides the ground for a body of synthetic a priori cognition?namely, geometry, the science of space.

Kant introduces the Metaphysical Exposition of Space by describing features of our sensible experience that he takes to be evident upon simple inspection: we represent things "outside us" as spatially determinate, and we represent things internal to our conscious experience as temporally determinate. For example, an item in our visual field that we might reach out and touch can be represented as having a determinate shape, size, and position in space; a mental state can be represented as having a determinate location and duration in time. However, it should be noted that relation between outer and inner objects is not symmetrical with respect to space and time. The reason is that outer objects can be temporally located, but inner objects cannot be spatially located. This asymmetry, and the temporality of outer objects, plays an important role in Kant's Refutation of Idealism.

10.5 METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE AND TIME

Kant in the metaphysical exposition gives four arguments in favour of the concept of space and five arguments in favour of the concept of time, in order to prove them a priori.

First argument of the concept of space: Space is not an empirical concept, which has been derived from outer experiences. By outer experiences, Kant refers to a property of our mind, through which we represent to ourselves objects as outside us. According to Kant, a representation is a kind of cognitive process through which objects are regarded as outside us. Kant states that sensations arise, when objects, which are outside us, act on our senses. In order to regard different representations as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. It appears that the representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance.

Second argument: Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It is an argument, which concerns about the a priori character of the concept of space. Kant argues that it is not possible to have the representation of an object without space, though it is possible to conceive of the concept of space without the representation of any object. Third argument: Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. Kant states that there is only one space. If we speak of different spaces, then, we mean that they are the parts of that one space.

Fourth argument: Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. This argument is based on the third argument, where, Kant argues that we can conceive of only one space and the different spatial representations are parts of that unique space. This says that the concept of one space contains within itself an infinite number of representations within itself. Therefore, it follows that the concept of one space, which contains within itself infinite number of representations, cannot be derived from sensible intuition, and must be regarded as a priori.

These arguments are put forward in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space. Kant also puts forward five arguments in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time. They are-

First argument: Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. The concept of time is presupposed as the coexistence and the succession of an object. Hence, time is regarded as an a priori concept, because it presupposes for the representation of coexistence and the succession of an object.

Second argument: Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances.

Time is, therefore, given a priori. Kant says that representation and the succession of object is possible only in relation to time though time can be conceived without any representation.

Third argument: Time has only one dimension, that is, one after another. Different temporal representations are conceived in the one dimension of time. Time is a priori and hence it possesses the elements of certainty and necessity. Kant argues that these principles cannot be derived from experience, for experience would give neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty.

Fourth argument: Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts of one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition. Time, like space is one. Different times are the parts of that one time. The concept of time is a pure form of sensible intuition and hence it is regarded as a priori.

Fifth argument: The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited. This argument is based on the previous argument where Kant remarks on the concept of one time and the different representations of the coexistence and the succession of objects are conceived as parts of that one time. He regards the concept of time as unlimited, where infinite representations of coexistence and succession of objects take place. The concept of time as unlimited cannot be derived from sensible intuition and must be regarded as a priori.

10.6 TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE AND TIME

Kant also offers the transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time. Through the transcendental exposition, Kant argues that, even though, space and time cannot be derived from sensible intuition, yet every manifold of sensible intuition has to be received in the form of space and

time, so that we can have the synthetic a priori knowledge. Kant explains transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time, by giving examples from the context of geometry and physics respectively. Kant regards that our knowledge in physics or geometry is possible only through recognition of the concept of space and time as synthetic and a priori. Kant argues that, Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. He says that the proposition 'the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles' is a synthetic proposition because, in order to find out the triangle and the sum of its three angles as equal to the two right angles, we take the help of the sensible intuition. Therefore, the proposition is regarded as synthetic. Again, this proposition also contains the elements of 'necessity' and 'certainty'. Hence, this proposition is also regarded as a priori.

T. E. Wilkerson is of the opinion that Kant makes a very intimate connection between space, time and mathematics. One of Kant's aims is to show against Hume that we can have substantive knowledge of the world a priori, in the form of the general truths of the mathematics and physics. The Aesthetic is devoted among other things to justifying the necessity of mathematics, the necessary application to experience of mathematical truths. It seems that the necessity of mathematics is guaranteed by the central role of space and time in our experience.

Kant in the transcendental exposition of the concept of time states that the third argument put forward in favour of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time is actually a transcendental exposition. According to the third argument of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time, time has only one dimension, i.e., one after the other. Kant holds that the concept of time possesses the elements of certainty and necessity and hence, it is regarded as a priori. At the same time, Kant argues that the concept of alteration and with it the concept of motion is possible only through the representation of time.

Space and time are the two forms of human sensibility, through which we can obtain a priori synthetic knowledge. Pure mathematics is an example of this a priori synthetic knowledge. Space and time are pure forms of all sensible intuition which gives an essential basic structure to our experience.

Kant regards that space and time as empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Space and time are empirically real with respect to things, which can be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. He regards the empirical reality of the concept of space as all things, as outer appearances, are side by side in space. The rule is valid universally and without limitation. Similarly, time is also empirically real, in the sense in which its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses. Empirically, space, time and spatio-temporal objects are real. They are not illusions, which can be distinguished from 'mere appearances' (like dreams, hallucinations, mirages and the like). Their empirical reality, however, does not consist in their being things existing in themselves, independently of the conditions under which we cognise them. It consists rather in the way they conform to an order of nature that is transcendentally necessary if experience is to be possible at all.

Space and time are also transcendentally ideal with respect to things, which cannot be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. Space and time are neither wholly mind independent, self-subsistent entity, nor determinations. They are not objective property of things in themselves, rather they are merely the subjective conditions of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.

10.7 SPACE AND TIME: KANT AND THE (MODERN) PHYSICISTS AND THE PHILOSOPHERS

We can now analyse Kantian conception of space and time in the context of the similarities and differences with that of some of the philosophers and the scientists.

We can here compare Kant's concept of space and time with that of Leibniz and Newton. T. E. Wilkerson remarks that Kant while discussing his concept of space and time is influenced by the views of Newton and Leibniz. But in his opinion, Kant does not refer either to Leibniz or to Newton, while discusses about space and time. Indeed, Kant only mentions Leibniz once in the Aesthetic, and Newton not at all. At the same time, Kant shares most of Newton's views on space and time. Kantian views like, according to Wilkerson, We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects' (A24/B38). 'We cannot… remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances' (A31/B46). 'Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude' (A25/B39). 'The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited' (A32/B48) are similar to Newton.

Apart from this, Kant also agrees with Newton that space and time are prior to any objects or events. At the same time, objects for their existence depend on space and time. According to Kant, it is possible to conceive space and time without any representation of an object, but it is impossible to have representation of objects without space and time. Therefore, for Kant as well as for Newton, space and time are prior to any object or any event.

Newton, similar to Kant, also believes in the concept of one space. According to Newton, space is indivisible. One can indeed talk of parts of space, i.e. different regions actually or in imagination marked out by containing certain material objects or by being traced in pencil or ink. But the parts of space are in principle inseparable.

Newton believes that space and time are absolute, independent of perceivers. Leibniz also holds that space and time are independent of the perceivers. Wilkerson states that whatever their differences, Leibniz and Newton would at least agree that space and time are independent of us, that even if there were no perceivers there would still be space and time.

Kant, however, differs from both Newton and Leibniz. For Kant space and time cannot be independent of the perceivers. Space and time are not relational properties of objects independent of us. Kant here opposes Leibniz. Leibniz held that 'space … is something merely relative, and time is…', that it is 'an order of coexistences as time is an order of succession'. Kant also differs from Newton, when he says that space and time are absolute. According to Kant, space and time are pure forms of intuition. We cannot perceive an object unless it is in space and time.

Einstein's position is different from both Newton and Kant. Einstein's theory of relativity refutes Newtonian position that space and time are absolute. He further differs from both Newton and Kant that space and time are independent of material things and events. For Einstein, space and time cannot exist apart from their relations with material things and events. He believes that every material things and events are in a continuous change, therefore, space and time must be regarded as the continuum. Space and time as conceived in the theory of relativity propounded by Einstein, is a plenum in the sense that it is the ubiquitous material field and such it is obviously a continuum. At the same time, it is a system of relations between continuous events and is nothing at all apart from them.

Kant says that when the manifolds of sensible intuitions are synthesized in the form of space and time, then they are brought to the faculty of understanding, which through its categories organize them. In the next Unit, I shall explain Kant's analysis of the categories of understanding.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1. Who has writen the book entitled, ‘‘critique of Pure Reason’’?

Q2. What are the two broad parts of ‘‘Critique of Pure Reason’’?

Q3. Whare from the term ‘aesthetic’ is derived?

Q4. What are the two stems of human knowledge?

Q5. What are the two pure forms of sensible institutions?

Q6. Who said that space and time are two forms of human sensibility?



10.8 LET US SUM UP

- In the transcendental aesthetic, Kant analyses the nature of human sensibility and says that space and time are its a priori forms through which all intuitions, that constitute the material of all knowledge, are given.

- Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving the representations through the mode in which we are affected by the objects.

- By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions.

- Kant says that the sensations are posited and ordered in a certain form. This form is not derived from the sensible intuition and must therefore be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensible intuition is space and time. This pure form of sensibility is also known as 'pure intuition'.

- Kant discusses space and time under the two heads, metaphysical and the transcendental. A metaphysical exposition of space aims to expose the origin and content of our representation of space, while a transcendental exposition aims to explain whether and how our representation can serve as a principle or ground for cognition.

- Kant regards that space and time as empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Space and time are empirically real with respect to things, which can be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions.

- Empirically, space, time and spatio-temporal objects are real. They are not illusions, which can be distinguished from 'mere appearances' (like

dreams, hallucinations, mirages and the like). Their empirical reality, however, does not consist in their being things existing in themselves, independently of the conditions under which we cognise them. It consists rather in the way they conform to an order of nature that is transcendentally necessary if experience is to be possible at all.

- Space and time are also transcendentally ideal with respect to things, which cannot be given in the manifold of sensible intuitions. Space and time are neither wholly mind independent, self-subsistent entity, nor determinations. They are not objective property of things in themselves, rather they are merely the subjective conditions of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.



10.9 FURTHER READINGS:

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2) Philosophy of Science, edited by R.S. Woolhouse, (America: Oxford University Press, 1981).

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10.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans. to Q No. 1: Kant

Ans. to Q No. 2: Transcendental doctrine of elements and the transcendental doctrine of Method.

Ans. to Q No. 3: The term 'aesthetic' has derived from the Greek Word 'sensation', and endicates that the subject matter of this section is the factulty of sensibility, considered independently of the faculty of understanding.

Ans. to Q No. 4: The two stems of human knowledge are sensibility and understanding.

Ans. to Q No. 5: Space and time.

Ans. to Q No. 6: Kant.

10.11 MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very Short Questions:

Q1. What is human sensibility?

Q2. Mention the name of two philosophers, whose concept have simmilarities with Kant's Concept of space and time.

B. Short Questions:

Q1. What is the faculty of sensibility? Discuss briefly.

Q2. What are the two a priori forms of sensibility? Discuss briefly.

Q3. Explain briefly the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space?

Q4. Explain briefly the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.

C. Long Questions:

Q1. Discuss the transcendental exposition of the concept of space and time.

Q2. What is meant by space and time as 'empirically real and transcendentally ideal?' Discuss.

Q.3 Compare and contrast Kant's concept of space and time with modern physicists.

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UNIT 11 KANT ON UNDERSTANDING

UNIT STRUCTURE

11.1 Learning Objectives

11.2 Introduction

11.3 Transcendental Logic

11.4 Transcendental Analytic

11.5 Let us sum up

11.6 Further Reading

11.7 Answer to Check Your Progress

11.8 Model Questions

11.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- know about intuition and concepts that constitute the elements of all our knowledge.
- learn the role of logic, which comprises the rules that govern concepts.
- know about general and transcendental logic.
- learn the division of transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.
- know about judgments with corresponding concepts.

11.2 INTRODUCTION:

According to Kant there are two elements of knowledge. They are intuition and the concepts. Neither intuition alone nor the concept in isolation can yield knowledge. Intuition is the capacity of receiving representations (receiving impressions), and the concept is the power of knowing an object through these representations. Through intuition, an object is given to us, and through concept, the object is thought in relation to that representation. Both intuition and the concept may be pure or empirical. When they contain sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object), they are

empirical. When there is no mingling of sensation with the representation, they are pure.

Kant argues that the receptive capacity of the mind, its power of receiving the representations in which it is affected by the object is known as sensibility, and the capacity of the mind to produce these representations are known as the understanding. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. He says that sensibility and understanding, however, do not exchange their functions. It is through their integration, we can have knowledge. According to him, the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.

We are now into the second part of the Transcendental 'Doctrine of Elements'-the elements that synthetically make up cognition. The first, as we know, deals with pure intuitions (we have already discussed in unit13); we are now turning to concepts. The Introduction to this part, though, concerns itself with 'logic,' specifically with 'transcendental logic'. As we shall see, Kant defines logic as the 'science' that deals with the rules of understanding (A52=B76). Since the understanding is Kant's employment for our ability to apply concepts, logic comprises then the rules that govern concepts. Kant says that the rules for determining the sensibility, which provides the object of knowledge, is different from the rules of the understanding in general.

11.3 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

Kant treats logic in a two-fold manner. They are logic of the general and the logic of the special employment of the understanding. Logic of the general, according to Kant, contains, the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment (whatsoever) of the understanding. It therefore treats of understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed. The

logic of the special employment of the understanding contains the rules of correct thinking as regards a certain kind of objects. While distinguishing between the two, the former may be called the logic of elements, the latter the organon of this or that science. The logic of the special employment of the understanding is considered as the propaedeutic to the sciences.

Kant states that general logic may be pure or applied. General logic is pure, when we abstract it from all the empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised. Kant gives certain instances like- the influence of the senses, the play of imagination, the laws of memory, the force of habit, inclination, etc., where understanding exercises under certain circumstances, and to become acquainted with these circumstances experience is required. He says, Pure general logic has to do, therefore, only with principles a priori, and is a canon of understanding and of reason. At the same time, general logic is applied, when it is directed to the rules of the employment of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions. Unlike pure general logic, applied logic has empirical principles. It is general because it refers to the employment of the understanding without regard to the difference in the objects. It is neither a canon of the understanding, nor an organon of special sciences, but merely a cathartic of the common understanding.

Kant puts forward two rules, which govern the operations of pure general logic. They are-

1. As pure general logic, it abstracts from all content of the knowledge of understanding and from all differences in its objects, and deals with the form of thought.

2. As pure general logic, it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and does not borrow anything from psychology, which therefore has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. Pure logic is a body of demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain entirely a priori.

Kant argues that general logic has nothing to do with the origin of knowledge. It deals only with that form which the understanding is able to impart to the representations, from whatever source they may have arisen. Kant distinguishes transcendental logic from general logic, which deals with concepts. These concepts are pure or a priori and not empirical. These concepts belong neither to intuition nor to sensibility but to thought and understanding. The term 'transcendental', signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment.

Kant divides transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. In the transcendental analytic, on the one hand, Kant is concerned with explaining the a priori forms and the principles of pure understanding, which make synthetic a priori judgments. Transcendental analytic on the one hand, is chiefly concerned with the following: (I) that the concepts be pure and not empirical; (2) that they belong, not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) that they be fundamental and be carefully distinguished from those which are derivative or composite; (4) that our table of concepts be complete, covering the whole field of the pure understanding. Transcendental dialectic, on the other hand, is concerned with exposing the illusion of transcendental judgments and at the same time caution us against being deceived by it. A detailed discussion of transcendental aesthetic has been made earlier. Here, we will discuss in detail only the transcendental analytic, the first part of transcendental logic.

11.4 TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

Transcendental analytic, for its proper exposition is divided into two parts- analytic of concepts, and the analytic of principles. The transcendental analytic of concepts is mainly concerned in finding out the a priori concepts in human understanding. According to Kant, understanding is a faculty of judgment. Understanding consists of concepts. Concepts lie in the function. By the term, 'function', Kant refers to, the unity of the act of bringing various

representations under one common representation. In every judgment there is a concept. This concept holds many representations. Among these various representations, there is a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Kant gives an example to illustrate his point. He says, in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us.

Kant divides all kinds of judgments into four main heads- quantity, quality, relation and modality. Each heads contain three sub-divisions. Thus, there are twelve forms of judgments and relate them with the corresponding concepts.

Under quantity, judgments are universal, particular and singular. Kant says singular judgment is different from the universal judgment. According to him, If, therefore, we estimate a singular judgment …according to its quantity in comparison with other knowledge, it is certainly different from general judgments. Here Kant's view is similar to the view of the modern logician. Modern logicians, unlike traditional logicians, give independent status to the singular proposition. A singular proposition, in a traditional classification of proposition, is included under universal proposition.

Under quality, judgments are affirmative, negative and infinite. Infinite judgment, in transcendental logic, must be distinguished from the affirmative judgment. But in general logic, infinite judgment is not different from the affirmative judgment.

Under relation, judgments are categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. Kant says that in a categorical judgment, two concepts are involved, in a hypothetical judgment, two judgments are involved, and in a disjunctive judgment, several judgments are involved. Categorical judgment like all men are mortal, two concepts are involved; the class of men and the class of mortal beings. Hypothetical judgment, such as, 'if there is a perfect justice,

the obstinately wicked are punished'. This judgment contains the relation of two propositions, namely, 'there is a perfect justice', and the 'obstinately wicked are punished'. Disjunctive judgment contains the relation of two or more propositions. In a disjunctive proposition, one proposition may exclude the other proposition, but jointly they give the complete knowledge of the world. Kant gives an example of the disjunctive judgment, 'the world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause.' Each of these propositions gives us a part of the knowledge of the existence of the world. But together they can provide us the complete knowledge. Kant says in a disjunctive judgment the concept of community is involved. He says, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the known constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby determine in their totality the true knowledge.

Under modality, judgments are problematic, assertoric and apodeictic. Kant argues that in a problematic judgment, affirmation or negation is merely possible. For example, 'earth exists through an external cause' is a problematic judgment because it either can possibly affirm or denied. In an assertoric judgment, affirmation or negation is viewed as real. 'There exists a perfect justice' is an assertoric judgment, because the existence of perfect justice is merely an assertion. In an apodeictic judgment, affirmation or negation are viewed as necessary. 'Socrates must be mortal' is an apodeictic judgment, because it expresses necessity and excludes contingency.

According to Kant, there are twelve categories. For him, judgments and categories are relative terms, because corresponding to every judgment there is a category. Kant shows the table of categories in the following way-

Table of Categories

I

Of Quantity

Unity

Plurality

Totality

II

Of Quality

Reality

Negation

Limitation

III

of Relation

of inherence and subsistence

of causality and dependence

of community

IV

of Modality

Possibility-Impossibility

Existence-Non-existence

Necessity- Contingency

Kant says that transcendental logic lays before us the manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic. Space and time are the a priori forms of sensible intuition. The manifold of a priori sensibility serves as the material for the concepts of pure understanding. But he argues that if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought must go

in a certain way. Kant regards it as synthesis. The role of synthesis is discussed in its appropriate place.

According to Kant, the pure concepts of understanding, which apply a priori to the forms of sensible intuitions, are known as the categories. Kant, however, in the Critique of Pure Reason, does not give any specific definition of categories. According to him, the categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding'.

According to Kant, there are twelve categories. For him, judgments and categories are relative terms, because corresponding to every judgment there is a category. According to Kant, Categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori. He divides the categories into two groups- mathematical categories and dynamical categories. The first groups of categories are concerned with the objects of intuition. The second groups of categories are concerned with the existence of these objects. Kant again says that, the former have no correlates; these are to be met with only in the second group.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1. What are the two elements of knowledge, according the Kant?

Q2. What is sensibility?

Q3. What is understanding?

Q4. With what transendental login mainly deals?

Q5. What are the categories mention by Kant?



11.5 LET US SUM UP

- According to Kant there are two elements of knowledge. They are intuition and the concepts.
- Intuition is the capacity of receiving representations (receiving impressions), and the concept is the power of knowing an object through these representations. Through intuition, an object is given to us, and through concept, the object is thought in relation to that representation.
- Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought.
- Kant says that sensibility and understanding, however, do not exchange their functions. It is through their integration, we can have knowledge.
- According to Kant, the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.
- Kant says that the rules for determining the sensibility, which provides the object of knowledge, is different from the rules of the understanding in general.
- Kant treats logic in a two-fold manner. They are logic of the general and the logic of the special employment of the understanding.
- Logic of the general, according to Kant, contains, the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment of the understanding. It therefore treats of understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed.
- The logic of the special employment of the understanding contains the rules of correct thinking as regards a certain kind of objects.
- Kant argues that general logic has nothing to do with the origin of knowledge. It deals only with that form which the understanding is able

to impart to the representations, from whatever source they may have arisen.

- Kant distinguishes transcendental logic from general logic, which deals with concepts. These concepts are pure or a priori and not empirical. These concepts belong neither to intuition nor to sensibility but to thought and understanding.

- Kant divides transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.

- In the transcendental analytic, Kant is concerned with explaining the a priori forms and the principles of pure understanding, which make synthetic a priori judgments. Transcendental dialectic is concerned with exposing the illusion of transcendental judgments and at the same time caution us against being deceived by it.

- Transcendental analytic, for its proper exposition is divided into two parts- analytic of concepts, and the analytic of principles. The transcendental analytic of concepts is mainly concerned in finding out the a priori concepts in human understanding.

- According to Kant, understanding is a faculty of judgment. Understanding consists of concepts. Concepts lie in the function. By the term, 'function', Kant refers to, the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.

- In every judgment there is a concept. This concept holds many representations. Among these various representations, there is a given representation that is immediately related to an object.

- Kant divides all kinds of judgments into four main heads- quantity, quality, relation and modality. Each heads contain three sub-divisions. Thus, there are twelve forms of judgments and relate them with the corresponding concepts.

- Under quantity, judgments are universal, particular and singular. Under quality, judgments are affirmative, negative and infinite. Under relation, judgments are categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. Under modality, judgments are problematic, assertoric and apodeictic.

- According to Kant, the pure concepts of understanding, which apply a priori to the forms of sensible intuitions, are known as the categories.

- The categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding'.



11.6 FURTHER READING:

1) Burnham, Douglas and Young Harvey Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2007).

2) Cassirer, H.W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1961).

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10) Wood, Allen Kant, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

11.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans. to Q No. 1: Intuitions and the concepts.

Ans. to Q No. 2: Kant argues that receptine capacity of mind, its power of receiving the representations in which it is affected by the object is known as sensibility.

Ans. to Q No. 3: IThe capacity of the mind to produce the representations are known as understanding.

Ans. to Q No. 4: Concepts.

Ans. to Q No. 5: Quantity, Quality, Relation & Modality.

11.8 MODEL QUESTIONS:

Q1. Discuss the role of understanding in knowledge formation.

Q2. Distinguish between general and transcendental logic.

Q3. Discuss the function of transcendental logic in detail.

Q4. What is meant by the 'concept' of human understanding? How many concepts are admitted by Kant? Discuss in detail.

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UNIT12 KANT: THE POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENT

UNIT STRUCTURE

12.1 Learning Objectives

12.2 Introduction

12.3 Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

12.4 A priori and A posteriori Judgments

12.5 Synthetic A priori Knowledge

12.6 Let us sum up

12.7 Further Reading

12.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

12.9 Model Questions

12.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- know the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic judgments
- learn the differences between A priori and A posteriori judgments
- possibility of metaphysics
- synthetic A priori Knowledge

12.2 INTRODUCTION:

Immanuel Kant sets out to establish the sources, extent, and limits of synthetic a priori knowledge, with a view to ascertaining the prospects for metaphysics as a scientific enterprise. Kant defines a prioriknowledge as knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience, and distinguishes it from empirical knowledge, whose sources lie in experience. The Critique's second edition frames its overarching goal as a general solution to the problem: How are synthetic judgments a priorijudgments possible? This formulation presupposes two important doctrines that Kant wants to establish in the Critique-First, to defend the possibility of scientific

and every day (common sense) knowledge against Hume's sceptical empiricism, and second, to show that traditional metaphysics is impossible.

The Critique's epistemological investigation aims to assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with reason's own eternal and unalterable laws. Kant's firm conviction regarding possession of synthetic a priori knowledge in the fields of mathematics, physics and metaphysics provides the backdrop for the Critique's claim to explain how such knowledge is possible. It is notable that Kant insists that relevant a priori knowledge in mathematics and physics is secure even without his explanation of its possibility. He writes that pure mathematics and pure natural science would not have needed, for the purpose of their own security and certainty, a deduction of the sort that we have accomplished for them both. The central purpose of the explanation, he explains, is not to correct a deficiency of a priori certainty in these sciences. It is to instruct us regarding the possibility of metaphysical knowledge more broadly by determining how far reason is to be trusted. The Critique does not, however, assert that all metaphysically necessary truths are cognizable a priori. It rejects that claim. For instance, the proposition, "God exists" is treated as metaphysically necessary true proposition, but Kant holds that we cannot have theoretical a priori knowledge of this truth in principle.

But although Kant hols that humans can have no knowledge about any non-empirical reality, he does not deny that the existence of such a reality is a legitimate topic of human concern. On the contrary, he believes that there are three specific topics of rationalist metaphysics that are legitimate and inevitable topics of human concern. These are God, human immortality and human freedom. Kant's position with respect to these topics is that although we cannot know whether God exists, whether there is an immortal human soul, or whether humans have free will, we may believe in God, immortality and freedom. Further more, for purposes of action and morality, we ought to believe in them despite the fact that there is no way we can

know whether these beliefs are true. He argues that whereas we must admit that our knowledge extends only as far as the limits of experience, still there are moral grounds for believing tin God, immortality and freedom.

As Kant puts it in a famous sentence, 'I have…found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.'

Kant thus argues that transcendental critique does establish the possibility of synthetic a priori metaphysical knowledge, but only within very restricted limits. It should be noted that Kantian employment of the 'transcendental' corresponds with that of the 'critical'. Kant holds that transcendental philosophy is a critique, but not a doctrine of pure reason. The word 'pure' here means that it is a priori. Its utility is not to extend our knowledge, but only to clarify our reason, and keep reason free from errors. According to him, its purpose is not to extend knowledge, but only to correct it, and to supply a touchtone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori knowledge. In Kant's analysis, it must begin with a critique of reason, instead of proceeding "dogmatically," i.e., by addressing its questions-about the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the beginning of the world, and so on-without prior investigation into the basis of reason's entitlement to any such insights. It rules our traditionally central claims about the super sensible, and it overthrows the method of analysis favoured by Kant's rationalist predecessors in favour of transcendental arguments about the preconditions for experience. Thus the system of transcendental philosophy marks a departure from all previous metaphysics.

12.3 ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS

In order to understand synthetic a priori judgments in knowledge, Kant differentiates synthetic from the analytic judgments and a priori from the a posteriori judgments. Kant shows the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic judgments as in all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something, which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in

connection with it. In the one case, the judgment is regarded as analytic, and in the other it is regarded as synthetic. In an analytic judgment, the predicate is contained in the subject. Whereas, in a synthetic judgment, the predicate is not contained in the subject.

Kant elaborates further the distinction between analytic and the synthetic judgments. Kant remarks that the analytic judgment on the one hand is that, in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. The synthetic judgment, on the other hand, is that, in which this connection is thought without identity. Kant regards analytic judgment to be explicative, because the predicate is already contained in the subject. On the other hand, the synthetic judgment is ampliative, because the predicate is not inherent in the subject. Kant gives an example to illustrate an analytic judgment. For instance, 'All bodies are extended', is an analytic judgment, here the concept of the predicate, that is, 'extension', is already contained in the concept of the subject, that is, 'bodies'. But in the judgment 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate 'heaviness' is not inherent in the concept of the subject, that is, 'bodies', and the predicate is something quite different from anything in the mere concept of body in general.

Kant also declares that, we do not find an analytic judgment in the empirical world, because in constructing an analytic judgment, we do not go outside our concept, we do not appeal to the testimony of our experience. At the same time, synthetic judgments are found only in experience, because the predicate of the concept is found only in experience.

According to Kant, there is another distinctive feature of the analytic and the synthetic judgments. In his opinion, analytic judgments do not add anything new to our knowledge. Whereas, synthetic judgments add to the concept of the subject some new information. Moreover, the analytic judgments are universal, certain and necessary, because they are not derived from experience,whereas, synthetic judgments are contingent and probable, because they are derived from experience.

12.4 A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI JUDGMENTS

Kant holds that, like analytic judgments, a priori knowledge is also universal, certain and necessary, and is inseparable from one another. Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another. Kant defines an a priori knowledge as knowledge that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. And an aposteriori knowledge is that knowledge which has its source in experience.

Kant remarks that an analytic judgment must be apriori. However, an apriori judgment may not be analytic. It may be synthetic also. Apriori and analytic judgments are similar for Kant, because they are not derived from experience. But they have also minute difference. Their difference lies in the fact that, while in the a priori judgment, the connection between the subject and the predicate is conceived in terms of 'containedness' and 'identity', but in the analytic judgment, it is not so conceived. He explains an apriori judgment with the example of the category of cause and effect. Everything which happens has its cause. This statement is apriori, as Kant holds, in the sense that the concept of cause is implied in the concept of an effect and it is synthetic because without experience, one cannot connect cause and effect.

12.5 SYNTHETIC APRIORI KNOWLEDGE

The synthetic apriori knowledge of Kant contains both the rationalistic and the empirical aspects of knowledge. Kant here criticizes both Leibniz and Locke, for accepting one aspect of knowledge and ignoring another. Kant argues that without experience no knowledge is possible, because all knowledge begins from experience. However, knowledge is not strictly limited to experience only. It confines to reason also. Kant here opposes David Hume who considers experience to be the only source of knowledge. Kant maintaining his own position says that all our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from there to understanding, and ends with reason,

beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought. The synthetic a priori knowledge of Kant requires for its cognition a priori forms of intuition, synthesis of imagination, concepts and transcendental unity of apperception. In Unit no 13th and 14th, we have discussed in detail sensibility and understanding, i.e., forms of sensibility and the categories.

Kant asserts that mathematics and natural science (physics) contain a priori synthetic judgments as principles because, pure mathematics and natural science are nothing more than principles of possible experience, and can never be related to things in themselves, but only to appearances as objects of experience. He however, argues that metaphysics also contains synthetic a priori knowledge. The Critique claims that the synthetic principles of metaphysics can be justified only in so far as they are conditions for the possibility of experience. Such principles for example, "Every event has a cause", "Substance persists and is always preserved through change" are supposed to explain and guarantee the possibility of experience in general, so they precede it and can be known apriori. But at the same time, the appeal to possible experience is a source of information that provides a "third thing" in terms of which we can justifiably predicate one concept of a second, even when they lack any containment relation. As a result, though, the legitimate domain of metaphysics is sharply limited, its principles have no validity beyond the bounds of possible experience.

Kant argues that we can have immanent metaphysical knowledge of synthetic a priori principles that structure all possible human experience, because they are grounded in our pure forms of intuition (space and time) and the pure concepts of our understanding (the categories). But Kant's argument for this immanent metaphysics rests on his claim that human knowledge can result only from applying concepts to intuitions, or more precisely to schemata mediating the application of concepts to appearances. This key claim implies that transcendent metaphysical knowledge-knowledge of objects that transcend the boundaries of possible human

experience-is impossible for us, since it will involve deploying concepts independently of intuitions or schemata. In fact, this is what Kant wants to establish in the Transcendental Analytic, the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge in the phenomenal domain leaving aside the unknown domain of things as they are in themselves.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1. Who is the author of the book entitled, "Critique of Pure Reason'?

Q2. What are the two rationalist metaphysics that are legitimate and ievitable topic of human concern?

Q3. What is apriori knowledge?

Q4. What is aposteriori knowledge?

Q5. According to Kant whether an analytic judgement is apriori or aposteriori.



12.7 LET US SUM UP

- Immanuel Kant wants to establish the sources, extent, and limits of synthetic a priori knowledge, with a view to ascertaining the prospects for metaphysics as a scientific enterprise.

- Kant's firm conviction regarding possession of synthetic a priori knowledge in the fields of mathematics, physics and metaphysics provides the backdrop for the Critique's claim to explain how such knowledge is possible.

- Kant remarks that the analytic judgment on the one hand is that, in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. The synthetic judgment, on the other hand, is that, in which this connection is thought without identity.

- We do not find an analytic judgment in the empirical world, because in constructing an analytic judgment, we do not go outside our concept, we do not appeal to the testimony of our experience. At the same time, synthetic judgments are found only in experience, because the predicate of the concept is found only in experience.

- Like analytic judgments, a priori knowledge is also universal, certain and necessary, and is inseparable from one another. Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another.

- An a posteriori knowledge is that knowledge which has its source in experience.

- The synthetic a priori knowledge of Kant contains both the rationalistic and the empirical aspects of knowledge.

- According to Kant, all our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from there to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.

- The synthetic a priori knowledge of Kant requires for its cognition a priori forms of intuition, synthesis of imagination, concepts and transcendental unity of apperception.



12.8 FURTHER READING:

1) Burnham, Douglas and Young Harvey Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2007).

2) Cassirer, H.W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1961).

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11) Wood,Allen Kant, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

12.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans. to Q No. 1: Kant.

Ans. to Q No. 2: God, human immartality and human freedom.

Ans. to Q No. 3: According to Kant apriori knowledge is knowledge, that is independent of experience and even all impressions of the senses.

Ans. to Q No. 4: An aporteriori knowledge is that knowledge which has its source in experience.

Ans. to Q No. 5: Apriori.

12.10 MODEL QUESTIONS:

Q1. Distinguish between analytic and synthetic judgments.

Q2. How is an a priori judgment differ from an a posteriori judgment? Discuss

Q3. How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? Explain in detail.

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UNIT13: KANT: TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF CATEGORIES

UNIT STRUCTURE

13.1 Learning Objectives

13.2 Introduction

13.3 Aristotle on Categories

13.4 Transcendental Deduction of Categories

13.5 Transcendental Schema

13.6 Transcendental Imagination

13.7 Transcendental Unity of Apperception

13.8 Let us sum up

13.9 Further Reading

13.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

13.11 Model Questions

13.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- learn about the categories. The categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding'.
- know that before Kant, Aristotle is the first philosopher who mentions different categories in his philosophy.
- know certain differences between Aristotle's conception of categories and Kantian categories.
- about the transcendental deduction of categories.
- know the role of transcendental schema in uniting categories with the sensible intuitions.
- know about transcendental imagination.
- learn 'transcendental apperception,'which is the apriori ground of all our concepts.

13.2 INTRODUCTION:

Kant divides transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. In the transcendental analytic, on the one hand, Kant is concerned with explaining the a priori forms and the principles of pure understanding, which make synthetic a priori judgments. Transcendental analytic on the one hand, is chiefly concerned with the following: (I) that the concepts be pure and not empirical; (2) that they belong, not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) that they be fundamental and be carefully distinguished from those which are derivative or composite; (4) that our table of concepts be complete, covering the whole field of the pure understanding. Transcendental dialectic, on the other hand, is concerned with exposing the illusion of transcendental judgments and at the same time caution us against being deceived by it. A detailed discussion of transcendental aesthetic has been made earlier. Here, we will discuss in detail only the transcendental analytic, the first part of transcendental logic.

According to Kant, the pure concepts of understanding, which apply apriori to the forms of sensible intuitions, are known as the categories. Kant, however, in the Critique of Pure Reason, does not give any specific definition of categories. According to him, the categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding'.

13.3 ARISTOTLE ON CATEGORIES

Before Kant, Aristotle is the first philosopher who mentions different categories in his philosophy. According to Aristotle, there are ten categories. They are-substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, action and difference. Among these various categories, substance is the central and the other categories are predicable to substance and consequently have relative importance. Aristotle says that Substance in

the truest sense of the word is that which is neither predicate of a subject, nor present in a subject.

Kant agrees with Aristotle that the knowledge of an object is possible only through categories. Kant also retains some of the categories, which are already mentioned by Aristotle. They are-substance, quality, quantity, relation, position and state.

Kant appreciates Aristotle's contribution for bringing the categories in epistemology, yet he points out certain short comings of Aristotle's categories. We can point out certain differences between Aristotle's conception of categories and Kantian categories. For Aristotle, An object is the amalgamation of form and content, and is independent of the human mind; for Kant, an object is synthetic a priori in which the a prioriaspects, i.e., the forms, cannot exist independently of the human mind but they can exist independent of the synthetic aspects, which constitute the content. Apart from this, Aristotle regards space and time as categories. But for Kant space and time are the forms of sensible intuitions.

Besides Aristotle and Kant, in the analytical tradition, Russell and Strawson also develop the role of categories. There appears to be four main theories of categories, first, Aristotle's metaphysical theory of categories, second, Kant's epistemological theory of categories, third, Russell's theory of types of categories and fourth, Strawson's descriptive theory of categories. However, we shall not discuss Russell's and Strawson's analysis of categories here.

13.4 TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF CATEGORIES

According to Kant, there are twelve categories. For him, judgments and categories are relative terms, because corresponding to every judgment there is a category. Kant shows the table of categories in the following way-

Table of Categories

I

Of Quantity

Unity

Plurality

Totality

II

Of Quality

Reality

Negation

Limitation

III

of Relation

of inherence and subsistence

of causality and dependence

of community

IV

of Modality

Possibility-Impossibility

Existence-Non-existence

Necessity- Contingency

According to Kant, Categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori. He divides the categories into two groups- mathematical categories and dynamical categories. The first groups of categories are concerned with the objects of intuition. The second groups of categories are concerned with the existence of these objects. Kant again says that, the former have no correlates; these are to be met with only in the second group.

While explaining the role of categories, Kant shows the relation among all three sub-divisions of each main class. Itmay be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first. However, the third category is not a derivative, primary concept of the pure understanding.

Kant shows the inter-relation between the different categories in this way, allnessortotality is just plurality considered as unity; limitation is simply reality combined with negation; community is the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another; lastly, necessity is just the existence which is given through possibility itself.

Kant distinguishes metaphysical deduction of categories from the transcendental deduction of categories. In the metaphysical deduction of categories, Kant argues that the concepts are derived from the experience and reflection upon experience. But in the transcendental deduction, concepts are not derived from experience but they relate a priori to all possible objects in experience. Kant showing the relation between metaphysical and the transcendental deduction of categories states that the explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects is their transcendental deduction; and from it he distinguishes empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de facto mode of origination.

Kant only insists on the transcendental deduction of the categories and not of the empirical deduction. In his words, plainly the only deduction that can be given of this knowledge is one that is transcendental, not empirical. In respect to pure a priori concepts the latter type of deduction is an utterly useless enterprise which can be engaged in only by those who have failed to grasp the quite peculiar nature of these modes of knowledge.

Kant says that knowledge arises only when sensible intuitions are brought under the categories of understanding. However, sensible intuition and categories of understanding are heterogeneous. The sensible intuitions have an empirical content, whereas, the categories of understanding devoid of any empirical content. Therefore, there is no common between sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding. Kant remarks, but pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition.

13.5 TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMA

Question arises- how does the categories, which are non -empirical are applied to the sensible objects? Kant says that there must be some third thing that makes the application of the categories of understanding to the appearances possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is devoid of any empirical content. It must be on the one hand, intellectual and on the other hand, it must be sensible. He says this mediating representation is transcendental schema.

Kant says that the concept of time as the transcendental schema and can serve as the mediator between the categories of understanding and the sensible intuitions. He chooses the concept of time as the transcendental schema because of its dual nature, that it is sensible and a priori. Being an a priori form of sensible intuition, it is pure and universal and therefore it is homogeneous with the categories. At the same time, time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Therefore, it is homogeneous

with the empirical representations. Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.

Moreover, Kant prefers the concept of time as the transcendental schema and not the space, because time is the internal form of intuition, therefore it is more universal, more abstract than space and it is applicable to all mental events (as well as physical events). The categories of understanding and ideas occur on mental level and therefore space is not involved. Space is the form of outer sense and therefore only external objects pass through it, time is the form of inner sense through which not only external objects but the internal objects also pass.

Kant says that the schema of each category contains and makes capable of representations only through determination of time. He gives explanations as to how the transcendental schema, through the concept of time, makes the representations possible. He argues, the schema of magnitude is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object. The schema of quality is the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is the filling of time. The schema of relation is the connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time-determination. Finally, the schema of modality and of its categories is time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time. The schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules.

The role of the transcendental scheme is to act as a mediator between sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding. Through transcendental schema, the subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects. Kant says, the schemata of the pure concepts of

understanding are thus the true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance.

13.6 TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION

In order that knowledge is possible, sensibility and understanding must unite. But the problem arises as to how these dual faculties unite to give us knowledge. Sensibility has the a priori forms of space and time and understanding has categories. Categories are really the ways, peculiar to understanding, in which we combine our representations in objective judgments. Experience, in the humanly significant sense, is the result of arranging the manifold of sense according to pure principles of order and relation, i.e., the categories. But mere sense by itself cannot give us a manifold which requires a synthesis, and sense, which is passive, cannot effect a synthesis. Kant holds that synthesis of manifold of representations is the result of the power of imagination. He explains the synthesis of imagination is the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Synthesis is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.

Kant states that three factors are necessary for the pure synthesis of the a priori sensibility. They are the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept. These three syntheses are in fact aspects of one synthesis. They are explainedbelow-

a) The synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition: Kant says all our representations, being modifications of the mind belong to inner sense. Time is the form of inner sense. Therefore, all our representations are ordered and related in time. Every intuition presents us with a manifold. This manifold can be regarded as a manifold, only in as far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of impressions. This intuition,

which arises through the manifold, can be brought together into unity through a synthesis. This is the synthesis of apprehension.

(b) The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination: Kant says that the synthesis of apprehension in intuition takes the need of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination in order to give us the complete representation of an object. The synthesis of imagination, which serves as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances make their reproduction possible. Without this synthesis of the reproduction in imagination, we cannot experience any object.

(c) The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept: The synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction are not sufficient in giving us the unity of representations, which constitute the knowledge of an object. When a representation is reproduced in imagination, it must be recognized as identical with what we have already apprehended. Unless we recognize the reproduced parts to be the same as what we have apprehended before, such reproduction will be useless.Kant states, in that case, the manifold of the representation will not form a whole, because it has lack the unity, which only consciousness can give to the representations. Kant here adds the third synthesis, that is, the synthesis of recognition. This recognition entails the identification of the representations that are first apprehended with those that are latter reproduced. Every recognition identifies some concepts. A concept is the consciousness of the representations that are already produced.

According to Kant, categories of understanding in order to systematize the chaotic order of representations require synthesis of imagination. But the categories of understanding and imagination for synthesizing unconnected representations cannot function without assuming a subject of knowledge. This is so because it is the subject minds capacity to synthesize through imagination. Kant here speaks of a unitary self, i.e., the unity of apperception.

13.7 TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION

Kant states that there is a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions and all objects of experience. This transcendental ground, according to Kant, is the transcendental apperception. He says that transcendental apperception precedes all experience, and yet it makes all experience possible. Transcendental apperception is the a priori ground of all our concepts. Without this unity of pure consciousness, no concepts are possible.

Thistranscendental unity of apperception is formed out of all possible appearances, according to laws. This is not possible if the mind is not conscious of the identity of function that synthetically combines all appearances in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of self is also the consciousness of the synthesis of all appearances. He says that we do not find the order and regularity in the appearances,rather we introduce them. The unity of apperception, therefore, is the transcendental ground of all appearances in one experience.

Kant says that all representations have relations to empirical consciousness and all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation with transcendental consciousness. It is necessary in our knowledge situation that all empirical consciousness belong to one transcendental consciousness, that is, the consciousness of 'I' or me. This abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) is the basis of all our representations. Thispure apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge. This consciousness of 'I' or the thinking 'I' expresses the act of determining my existence. I am conscious of my own existence. The consciousness of my existence is given by self-intuition. It is conditioned by sensible a priori form, that is, time.

Kant says that the synthetic unity of consciousness is both objective and subjective conditions of all knowledge. The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition

is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination ofinner sense- through which the manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is empirically given.

The pure apperception must relate to the pure imagination in order to make their function more intelligible. A pure imagination, Kant says, which conditions all a priori knowledge is one of the main function of the human soul. According to him, by its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other.


Kant distinguishes transcendental apperception, which is pure, original and unchangeable consciousness from empirical apperception. Empirical apperception is always changing. Consciousness of self is inner sense or inner perception is empirical. Therefore, such consciousness of self is always changing. He again says that in the transcendental apperception, all representations are united together. It is only when I grasp the different representations as the one consciousness, I call them all these representations, as one and they are all my representations. But in an empirical intuition, representations are not united togetherand they are diverse. They do not have any relation to the identity of the subject.

In Kant's opinion, synthetic unity of apperception is the subject of knowledge of the phenomenal world, which itself cannot be the object of knowledge. This is so because unlike representation of phenomenal object, it cannot be given in sense-experience and categories of understanding will not be applicable to it. Therefore, it is unknown and unknowable. The unitary self or the unity of apperception is related to the categories of understanding and sensible intuition through the faculty of imagination. What will be the case if one tries to know the 'unitary self', if one tries to apply the categories of understanding to it? In Kant's opinion, any attempts to know the 'unitary self' will lead to the 'paralogisms', which are formally invalid

conclusions. Paralogisms are fallacies which come out when certain conclusions are drawn from the judgment 'I think.' They are four in number-

1. That the soul is substance.
2. That it is simple
3. That it is person
4. That it is in relation to possible objects in space.

Kant expounds these paralogisms in order to show that the unity of apperception is unknown and unknowable.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1.What is category?

Q2.What are the two division of transcendental logic?

Q3.Before Kant, which philosopher has discussed about categories?

Q4.How many categories are there, according to Aristotle?

Q5.How many categories are there according to Kant?



13.9 LET US SUM UP

- The pure concepts of understanding, which apply a priori to the forms of sensible intuitions, are known as the categories. Categories are not inductive generalizations but deduced from the concepts of the 'logical employment of the understanding'.
- Before Kant, Aristotle is the first philosopher who mentions different categories in his philosophy. According to Aristotle, there are ten categories. They are-substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, action and difference. Among these various categories,

substance is the central and the other categories are predicable to substance and consequently have relative importance.

- According to Kant, there are twelve categories. For him, judgments and categories are relative terms, because corresponding to every judgment there is a category.

- According to Kant, Categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a priori. He divides the categories into two groups- mathematical categories and dynamical categories. The first groups of categories are concerned with the objects of intuition. The second groups of categories are concerned with the existence of these objects.

- Kant distinguishes metaphysical deduction of categories from the transcendental deduction of categories. In the metaphysical deduction of categories, Kant argues that the concepts are derived from the experience and reflection upon experience. But in the transcendental deduction, concepts are not derived from experience but they relate a priori to all possible objects in experience.

- Kant says that the concept of time as the transcendental schema and can serve as the mediator between the categories of understanding and the sensible intuitions.

- Kant holds that synthesis of manifold of representations is the result of the power of imagination. He explains the synthesis of imagination is the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Kant explains the role of Synthesis of Imagination.

- Kant states that three factors are necessary for the pure synthesis of the a priori sensibility. They are the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept.

- Kant states that there is a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions and all objects of experience. This transcendental ground, according to Kant, is the transcendental apperception.

- Transcendental apperception is the a priori ground of all our concepts. Without this unity of pure consciousness, no concepts are possible.



13.10 FURTHER READING:

1) Burnham, Douglas and Young Harvey Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2007).

2) Cassirer, H.W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1961).

3) Ewing, A.C., A Short Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

4) Falkenberg, Richard, History of Modern Philosophy, (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1977).

5) Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N.K. Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1973).

6) _____, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That will be Able to Come Forward as Science, translated and edited by Gary Hatfield, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

7) O'Connor, D.J., (ed.),A Critical History of Western Philosophy, (New York: The Free Press,1964).

8) Scruton, Roger Kant, (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

9) Wilkerson,T.E. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Commentary for Students,(London: Clarendon Press, 1976).

10) Wood,Allen Kant, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

13.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

Ans. to Q No. 1: According to Kant, the pure concepts of understanding which apply apriori to the forms of sensible intuitions, are known as the categories.

Ans. to Q No. 2: Transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.

Ans. to Q No. 3: Aristotle.

Ans. to Q No. 4: Ten.

Ans. to Q No. 5: Twelve.

13.12 MODEL QUESTIONS:

Q1. Distinguish between metaphysical and transcendental deduction of categories. Discuss transcendental deduction of categories.

Q2. What is transcendental schema?

Q3. Why time is considered as a transcendental schema? Describe

Q4. Discuss the function of transcendental imagination.

Q5. Explain transcendental unity of apperception as the subjective ground of our cognition in detail.

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UNIT 14: HEGEL: DIALECTICAL METHOD

UNIT STRUCTURE

14.1. Learning Objectives

14.2. Origin of dialectical method

14.3. What is dialectic method?

14.4. Hegel's objective idealism

14.5. Hegel's dialectical method

14.6. An appraisal of the Hegelian dialectical method

14.7. Let us sum up

14.8. Further Reading

14.9. Answer to check your progress

14.10. Model Questions

14.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- to know about the origin and meaning dialectical method
- to acquire knowledge about Hegel's absolute idealism or Hegelian monism
- to enquire about Hegel's dialectical method
- to appraise Hegelian dialectical method

14.2. ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL METHOD:

"Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of "dialectics", the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other side. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates' interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes. The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear

progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates' interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates' challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views. The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato's way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more sophisticated ones later.

Plato used the Socratic Method or negative dialectic method to ascertain the nature of truth. It is the method of dialogue by which Socrates used to put searching questions to his philosophical opponent, exposed his dogmas, and disproved his presuppositions with the sharp point of his questions. Plato followed the conversational method in his "Dialogues", considered pros and cons, repeated important arguments, and developed his theme gradually, and adapted his method of philosophical investigation to the understanding of lay men. Socrates did not directly criticize the opponent's positions. By conversation he helped him to find out contradictions in his position, recognize its inadequacy, and amend his position. Again, Socrates put searching questions to him, and helped him to find out contradiction in his amended position, appreciate its insufficiency, and define his position afresh. In this manner Socrates asked his adversary to accept his view and ascertain the nature of truth for himself through self-criticism. The negative dialectical method consists in continuing self-criticism of a position until one free from self-contradiction is reached. Plato followed the dialectical method of his master, which is a method of refutation.

Hegel followed the dialectical method of another type, which was positive. Aristotle conceived virtue as the choice of the "golden mean" between the two extremes of over-indulgence in pleasures and total abstention from them, and the truth as an organic unity of opposed parts. Hegel conceived both thought and reality as dynamic and developing according to the dialectical method through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The movement of thought and reality is through opposition of thesis and antithesis and the reconciliation of it by synthesis, which, again, becomes

a thesis giving rise to an antithesis, both being reconciled by a higher synthesis. The movement of thought corresponds to the movement of things. The dialectic movement of thought corresponds to the dialectic movement of reality. Thought and reality are ultimately identical. The framework of thought corresponds to the framework of reality. The real is rational. The rational is real. In both the cases, there is a dialectical progress from unity through diversity to unity-in-diversity. Thought and reality follow the same law too. Logic and metaphysics are also follow the same law.

Hegel gave seventy categories through which reason moved from the most inadequate category of "being" to the most comprehensive category of the "Absolute Idea". Quality is a mode of being, quantity, a mode of being, proportion, action, etc., modes of being. But being pure and simple, without any determination, is equal to "non-being". It is "being" (thesis) and "non-being" (antithesis). Because it is both, it becomes something else. The contradiction between "being" and "non-being" is resolved in the notion of "becoming". A new contradiction appears in this concept, which is reconciled by a new synthesis, and so on, until the most comprehensive concept of the "Absolute Idea" is reached which reconciles all oppositions and contradictions. Nature is self-development of thought; thought is nature becoming conscious of itself. Hegel was an advocate of dialectical idealism.

14.3. WHAT IS DIALECTIC METHOD?

"Hegel's dialectics" refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, which, like other "dialectical" methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato's "opposing sides" were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the "opposing sides" are in Hegel's work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the "opposing sides" are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, which presents Hegel's epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the "opposing

sides" are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato's dialogues, a contradictory process between "opposing sides" in Hegel's dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel's method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or "speculative mode of cognition" as the hallmark of his philosophy, and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as in all of the mature works he published later-the entire Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.

Although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato's version of dialectics. He argued that Plato's dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness. According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument leads to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false-which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. Hegel argues that, because Plato's dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science.

14.4. HEGEL'S OBJECTIVE IDEALISM:

According to Hegel, the Absolute is spirit, which is not an ego or mind limited by the non-ego, or a transcendental principle beyond the ego and the non-ego, or the neutrum, but which is immanent in it. In Hegel's objective idealism, the absolute spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason. It is unconscious reason in nature and becomes conscious reason in finite minds. The absolute is the universal reason. It is manifested more and more in matter, life and mind. It becomes conscious in the human mind. The individual is the subjective mind. The society is the objective mind. God is the absolute mind. There is a dialectic movement of the absolute or universal reason in nature. There is a dialectic movement of the finite reason in man. They correspond to each other. The dialectic movement is a process or evolution through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. A is thesis. Non-A is antithesis. They are reconciled in synthesis B. B is a thesis. Non-B is antithesis. C is a higher synthesis of B and non-B. The categories move from the lower to the higher until they reach absolute self-consciousness, which is the highest and most comprehensive category. Hegel says, "The reality is the universal, which goes out of itself, particularizes itself, and opposes itself, that it may reach the deepest and most comprehensive unity with itself." The self can be conscious of itself as distinguished from, and related to, the not-self or nature. It can be self-conscious, when it overreaches the distinction between itself and its object, and reconciles them with each other in a higher unity. The absolute is the highest unity of self-consciousness which is manifested in the distinction of subject and object, self and not-self, ego and non-ego, finite minds and nature, and in their inter-relation and harmony. Nature is the externalization of the absolute or universal reason. It is relational. The finite minds are reproductions of the absolute. Nature is akin to spirit. It is intelligible to finite minds. Hegel says, "That only is real which is rational." "That only is rational which is real."

Hegel sought to represent the absolute as an active process by which Nature is turned into Mind, and by which Mind finds itself in Nature. Absolute Mind externalizes itself in Nature. Nature is internalized in Mind. Hegel's absolute is universal reason. The absolute and reason are identical. The universal reason unfolds itself first in inorganic matter, then in living organism, and finally becomes self-conscious, in man. Universal reason generates concrete things. Ideal reason conceives things.

Kant regarded knowledge as made up of two component factors, viz., form and matter of knowledge. But knowledge cannot be the mechanical resultant of two heterogeneous factors, coming from two distinct sources, viz., understanding and experience, for the matter of knowledge given by experience cannot submit to the forms of the understanding. We cannot impose our forms and categories upon the materials of sensations produced by things-in-themselves in us.

Hegel carries out the Kantian theory of knowledge to its logical consequence, and maintains that the forms and the matter of knowledge are not quite foreign to each other, but that the forms of our own mind are already imbedded in experience. The world is the objective manifestation of the Absolute Spirit. The finite minds are the finite reproduction of the Divine Mind. God has evolved the world according to the same forms and categories as we apply to the objects of our experience. The categories of our mind are also the categories of the Divine Mind; hence, the a priori categories of our mind not only apply to phenomena, but also to the so called things-in-themselves beyond phenomena. Thought and reality are at bottom identical. The frame-work thought is in harmony with the frame-work reality. What is real is rational. What is rational is real. The categories of thought correspond to the categories of reality.

There is a dialectic movement of thought from thesis to anti-thesis, and from them to synthesis which reconciles them. The synthesis becomes, again, a thesis, from which thought moves to an antithesis. From the thesis and the antithesis thought moves to a higher synthesis, which reconciles

them, and so on, until it reaches the Absolute Idea which reconciles all contradictions? This is the dialectic movement of human reason. Reality also evolves according to the dialectical method. This is Hegel's dialectical theory of knowledge.

Hegel solves the question that how can our own subjective forms be imposed on the matter of knowledge coming from without. He provided answer to the question why should the matter submit to the forms of the mind? Kant could not answer these questions. Hegel solves the question by removing the opposition between thought and reality, and regarding them as correlative and inseparable moments in the absolute spirit, which evolves the objective world according to the same forms as are applied by the finite minds in knowing it. The forms of human mind correspond to the forms of the world. The categories of human thought are the categories of existence. The framework of thought corresponds to the framework of reality. The categories of the divine thought may be fuller and more comprehensive, but they do not falsify the inadequate categories of human thought. The forms and categories of the human mind do not falsify the reality. Knowledge is an organic whole of interrelated elements. Divine knowledge is a perfect system. The world also is an organic whole of interrelated parts. It is an outward expression of the divine mind. Its evolution corresponds to the dialectic movement of human thought. So there is no opposition between the apriori factors and the a posteriori factors of knowledge. Knowledge is a unity-in-difference, a synthesis of different but related elements. Reality also is unity-in-difference. It is an organic unity of interrelated parts. It is an expression of Absolute self-consciousness. Knowledge and reality are distinct from, and opposed to each other. Yet they are correlative and inseparable moments in the organic unity of the Absolute Spirit. This is the doctrine of Objective Idealism.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 1: Fill up the blanks:

(a) "Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of …….. between opposing sides.

(b) Plato used the Socratic Method or …… dialectic method to ascertain the nature of truth.

(c) Hegel followed the dialectical method of another type, which was …….

(d) Hegel gave …….. categories through which reason moved from the most inadequate category of "being" to the most comprehensive category of the "Absolute Idea".

(e) Hegel's epistemology or philosophy of knowledge is presented in……..

(f) The dialectic movement is a process or evolution through thesis, antithesis and ……..

14.5. HEGEL'S DIALECTICAL METHOD:

Both Plato and Aristotle tried to explain the world of change through eternal ideas. Following the idealistic lead of Plato and Aristotle, Hegel also regards the Absolute as eternal and changeless. Nonetheless the Absolute is a system in which all changes are hushed and silenced in the eternal symphony of the Absolute. Hegel does recognize that the world contains many changes and these changes are neither chaotic nor accidental. They all are logically guided and are regulated by the dialectic advance of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Before Hegel, the idealistic

world of Spinoza was just static. Hegel appeared on the Western scene before the advent of organic evolution propounded powerfully by Charles Darwin. Nonetheless the talk of a dynamic and evolving Reality was quite familiar at the time of Hegel and Hegel took evolutionary process seriously. Whatever be the shortcomings of the dialectic method, it has to be interpreted as a philosophical method to explain a dynamic and evolving world, according to some rational plan. The dialectic method tries to explain this world of change and evolution in terms of unchangeable ideas. Hegel would explain the logical transition from the abstract to the concrete, from the more general to the less general idea. The nerve of the dialectic process is that logical unfoldment can be read off from empirical events, but the dialectic steps do not become empirical on that account. Empirical events are merely illustrative guide of the dialectic advance. The significance of this observation will become clear in the light of the critical appraisal of the dialectic method.

To understand the dialectic method we have to reflect upon the first triad of Being-non-Being-Becoming. We have already said that the dialectic advance traces logical transitions from the abstract to the concrete. Being is most abstract, it is abstract from all determinations, beyond being itself it has no other qualities. In comparison with Being, Becoming is more concrete since it includes both Being and non-Being within itself. But of course, Becoming in comparison with other succeeding categories, is terribly abstract. Becoming simply means a process without being any specific process. It is bare change which again has to be negatively described that it is not mechanical, nor chemical nor organic, nor any such special kind of change. Naturally it has to grow more specific. It will invite its anti-thesis which in turn would lead to a second synthesis. This second synthesis will be more concrete than Becoming itself. Thus, as the dialectic advances the succeeding categories become more and more concrete till we reach the Absolute which is the fullest and richest and the most concrete of all the categories. In the last or highest category all the previous categories are

preserved and nothing is lost. In this sense, Hegel's system is known as concrete monism in contrast with Spinozism which is called abstract monism.

The higher and the more concrete categories contain the lower or the more abstract. For example, Becoming does contain Being and non-Being. But the reverse is also true. The lower category also contains the higher. For example, Being does contain Becoming and if it were not so, Becoming could not be deduced from it. With a view to elucidating this paradoxical position we can say, the higher categories contain the lower (i.e. the abstract) explicitly, but the lower categories also contain the higher (the more concrete) implicitly.

Being implicitly contains Becoming and without Becoming, Being could not be Being. Becoming is therefore an explicit condition on which Being depends. Becoming explicitly contains Being, since Becoming is certainly a kind of Being. Becoming (being a kind of Being) presupposes Being, but Becoming in turn is also the foundation of Being. By 'foundation' is meant that Being is logically deduced from Becoming. Becoming comes later than Being, it is also the logical beginning and foundation of the first category 'Being'. In the most sketchy manner we shall show that Being not only contains non-Being and Becoming, but also all other categories, including the final category, the Absolute. But it is also true to say that the Absolute is the foundation of Being in the sense that Being can be explicitly deduced from it, for the Absolute, the final category contains all previous categories and so Being is naturally contained in it. Thus, the first category is also the last and the last contains all the first and all other previous categories quite explicitly. What is essential for the science (of logic) is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that itself in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the last first. For example, in a drama the first scene contains the last scene, and, the last scene contains the meaning of the first and all other scenes. That the last is also the first category is very important for the Hegelian philosophy and

put in the form of Aristotelian philosophy it forms the very nerve of the logical idealism of Hegel.

In Aristotle's philosophy the form is the reason behind all the changes of an individual thing. Therefore, actus purus (corresponding to the Absolute of Hegel), the Prime Mover is the Absolute Reason or the foundation of all that exists. It is the end (the form in the thing) which is the meaning of the beginning or of a thing and should be said to be logically prior of the actual thing. So in Hegel's terminology, the Absolute is the logical foundation of all that exists. As the category or the form is the reason of the thing, so the Absolute is the absolute reason of the whole world. Understood thus we can quote from Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Law.

"The rational is actual (real)

And the actual is rational."

The whole world is really a system of categories, inter-related dialectically in such a way that the Absolute is the reason of Being and all other previous categories, and, Being too is implicitly the reason of the Absolute. The whole system of categories returns into itself and is self-explanatory. This is tantamount to saying that reason is its own reason, and, is self-determined, wholly rational or logical.

For Hegel, logic is not purely formal which does not contain any material content. For Hegel, logic is ontology: things and thoughts are one and the same. This is easily seen in many statements of Hegel, but is clearly, supported by the following quotation from The Science of Logic.

Thus this older metaphysic stands for the view that thinking and the determinations of thinking are not something foreign to the objects of thought, but are rather of them very essence of those objects; in other words that things and the thinking of them are in harmony in and for themselves….indeed language itself expresses an affinity between them….that thought in its immanent determinations, and the true nature of things, are one and the same content.

Therefore, in order to evaluate the dialectic method of Hegel, we have to see its working in its myriad forms from abstract logic to the history of the mankind.

14.6. AN APPRAISAL OF THE DIALECTICAL METHOD:

The dialectic method has justly been regarded as the contribution of Hegel par excellence. The whole philosophy of Hegel is its detailed illustration and its aptness is the justification of the method. It is this method which has cast so much light on the evolutionary processes themselves that since the time of Hegel it has been adopted as a valid method of evaluating history, philosophy, art, religion through the ages. According to the dialectic process nothing is accidental and so even the dialectic method itself has emerged in philosophy when the time was ripe for its conscious recognition. 'Dialectic' was sufficiently used in the Dialogues of Plato and even the Hegelian type of Dialectic was foreshadowed in the Paramenides, and Symposium of Plato. But it appears that Hegel got substantial hints from Kant whose philosophy was the starting-point of Hegel's philosophy in more respects than one.

Kant has triple division throughout his system.

1. First, Kant divided mind into three faculties of pure reason (cognition), practical reason (conation) and judgement (affection). Corresponding to these faculties Kant wrote three Critiques of pure reason, practical reason and judgement. In pure reason, Kant gives an account of the phenomenal world; in Practical Reason, Kant deals with noumenal self and in judgement, phenomenal and noumenal Reality is synthesized in the doctrine of the Sublime. In the eyes of many commentators the critique of judgment holds the key to the previous two Critiques of Kant, and, in this sense, the Judgment may be taken to be the synthesis of Pure Reason (thesis) and Practical Reason (anti-thesis).

2. Further, even the Critique of Pure Reason has three sub-divisions of Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. Transcendental Dialectic in the form of the three of Ideas of God, World and Soul, serving as regulative principles appear to reconcile the passive forms (of space and time) of Transcendental Aesthetics with the active understanding of transcendental Analytic.

3. Certainly the three Ideas of Reason, namely, the world (outer world), Soul (inner world) and God (as the synthesis of the outer and inner worlds) may be taken as three moments in the dialectic inner-relationship between pure categories. But this triple inter-relationship is most marked in Kant's treatment of the categories of the understanding, where the third category is invariably the synthesis of the first two categories taken as thesis and anti-thesis of each other.

4. Kant's doctrine of antinomies posed a challenge to Hegel. Certainly one cannot remain in the paradoxical position of thesis and anti-thesis of antinomies. Kant comforted himself by regarding the three Ideals of Reason as limiting concepts. The doctrine of limitation of knowledge to phenomena alone could have satisfied Kant, but the bold and intrepid spirit of Hegel challenged the doctrine of the unknowable itself. Hegel found the key to his solution of Kant's riddle in his philosophy of the Dialectic. The synthesis of Kant's paradox could be found in the creative thrust of speculative reason which alone reconciles the opposed notions of phenomena and noumena, and the antithetical character of the antimonies.

5. But there is little doubt that the glimmering of the dialectic advance is clearly visible in the writings of Fichte and Schelling.

Hence, the dialectic method of Hegel is the ripened fruit of the search for the philosophical method which will take philosophy beyond the arena of warring opinions to the certitude of philosophical knowledge. Descartes before Hegel was pre-occupied with the search of the correct method which

will ensure certainty to philosophical conclusions. Descartes found the mathematical method as the method of philosophy for attaining indubitable truth. Since the time of Principia Mathematica mathematics has been reduced to Deductive Logic. So the Dialectic Method of Hegel has to be evaluated in terms of mathematic-deductive method.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Question 2: Write short notes on:

(a) Origin of dialectical method

(b) Meaning of dialectical method

Question 3: State whether true or false:

(a) The dialectic movement is a process or evolution through thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

(b) Plato followed the conversational method in his "Dialogues", considered pros and cons, repeated important arguments, and developed his theme gradually, and adapted his method of philosophical investigation to the understanding of lay men.

(c) In Hegel's objective idealism, the absolute spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason. It is unconscious reason in nature and becomes conscious reason in finite minds.

(d) The dialectic method of Hegel is the ripened fruit of the search for the philosophical method which will take philosophy beyond the arena of warring opinions to the certitude of philosophical knowledge.

(e) Hegel says, "That only is real which is rational." "That only is rational which is real."



14.7. LET US SUM UP:

- "Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides.

- The most classic version of "dialectics", the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other.

- Plato followed the conversational method in his "Dialogues", considered pros and cons, repeated important arguments, and developed his theme gradually, and adapted his method of philosophical investigation to the understanding of lay men.

- The Socratic or negative dialectical method consists in continuing self-criticism of a position until one free from self-contradiction is reached. Plato followed the dialectical method of his master, which is a method of refutation.

- "Hegel's dialectics" refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, which, like other "dialectical" methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides.

- Hegel regarded this dialectical method or "speculative mode of cognition" as the hallmark of his philosophy, and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as in all of the mature works he published later-the entire Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.

- According to Hegel, the Absolute is spirit, which is not an ego or mind limited by the non-ego, or a transcendental principle beyond the ego and the non-ego, or the neutrum, but which is immanent in it. In Hegel's

objective idealism, the absolute spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason.

- In Hegel's objective idealism, the absolute spirit is immanent in nature and mind as universal reason. It is unconscious reason in nature and becomes conscious reason in finite minds.

- The dialectic movement is a process or evolution through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. A is thesis. Non-A is antithesis. They are reconciled in synthesis B.

- Hegel says, "That only is real which is rational." "That only is rational which is real."

- There is a dialectic movement of thought from thesis to anti-thesis, and from them to synthesis which reconciles them. The synthesis becomes, again, a thesis, from which thought moves to an antithesis. From the thesis and the antithesis thought moves to a higher synthesis, which reconcile them, and so on, until it reaches the Absolute Idea that reconciles all contradictions?

- To understand the dialectic method the first triad of Being-non-Being-Becoming has to be understood.

- The whole world is really a system of categories, inter-related dialectically in such a way that the Absolute is the reason of Being and all other previous categories, and, Being too is implicitly the reason of the Absolute. The whole system of categories returns into itself and is self-explanatory.

- The dialectic method of Hegel is the ripened fruit of the search for the philosophical method which will take philosophy beyond the arena of warring opinions to the certitude of philosophical knowledge. Descartes before Hegel was pre-occupied with the search of the correct method which will ensure certainty to philosophical conclusions. Descartes found

the mathematical method as the method of philosophy for attaining indubitable truth. Since the time of Principia Mathematica mathematics has been reduced to Deductive Logic. So the Dialectic Method of Hegel has to be evaluated in terms of mathematic-deductive method.

14.8. FURTHER READING:

1. Thilly, Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad.

2. Masih, Y., A Critical History of Western Philosophy (Greek, Medieval, Modern), Motilal Banarsidass Publishers private limited, Delhi.

3. Wright, M.R., Introducing Greek Philosophy, Routledge.

4. Stace. W.T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, MacMillan and Co. limited, London.

14.9. ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS:

1. (a)ans: contradictory processes

(b) ans: negative

(c) ans: positive

(d) ans: seventy

(e) ans: Phenomenology of spirit

(f)ans: synthesis

2. (a)ans: "Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of "dialectics", the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character

of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other.

Plato used the Socratic Method or negative dialectic method to ascertain the nature of truth. It is the method of dialogue by which Socrates used to put searching questions to his philosophical opponent, exposed his dogmas, and disproved his presuppositions with the sharp point of his questions. Plato followed the conversational method in his "Dialogues", considered pros and cons, repeated important arguments, and developed his theme gradually, and adapted his method of philosophical investigation to the understanding of lay men. The Socratic or negative dialectical method consists in continuing self-criticism of a position until one free from self-contradiction is reached. Plato followed the dialectical method of his master, which is a method of refutation.

Hegel followed the dialectical method of another type, which was positive. Aristotle conceived virtue as the choice of the "golden mean" between the two extremes of over-indulgence in pleasures and total abstention from them, and the truth as an organic unity of opposed parts. Hegel conceived both thought and reality as dynamic and developing according to the dialectical method through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The movement of thought and reality is through opposition of thesis and antithesis and the reconciliation of it by synthesis, which, again, becomes a thesis giving rise to an antithesis, both being reconciled by a higher synthesis. The movement of thought corresponds to the movement of things. The dialectic movement of thought corresponds to the dialectic movement of reality.

Hegel gave seventy categories through which reason moved from the most inadequate category of "being" to the most comprehensive category of the "Absolute Idea". Quality is a mode of being, quantity, a mode of being, proportion, action, etc., modes of being. But being pure and simple, without any determination, is equal to "non-being". It is "being" (thesis) and "non-being" (antithesis). Because it is both, it becomes something else.

The contradiction between "being" and "non-being" is resolved in the notion of "becoming". A new contradiction appears in this concept, which is reconciled by a new synthesis, and so on, until the most comprehensive concept of the "Absolute Idea" is reached which reconciles all oppositions and contradictions. Nature is self-development of thought; thought is nature becoming conscious of itself. Hegel was an advocate of dialectical idealism.

(b)ans: "Hegel's dialectics" refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, which, like other "dialectical" methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato's "opposing sides" were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the "opposing sides" are in Hegel's work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the "opposing sides" are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, which presents Hegel's epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the "opposing sides" are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato's dialogues, a contradictory process between "opposing sides" in Hegel's dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel's method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or "speculative mode of cognition" as the hallmark of his philosophy, and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as in all of the mature works he published later-the entire Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.

Although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato's version of dialectics. He argued that Plato's dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness. According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if

the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false-which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. Hegel argues that, because Plato's dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science.

3. (a) ans: true

(b) ans: true

(c) ans: true

(d) ans: true

(e) ans: true

14.10. MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very short questions:-

1. What is dialectical method?

2. Where did Hegel present his theory of knowledge?

3. What is synthesis in Hegelian philosophy?

4. Define Hegelian absolute idealism.

5. What is the need for dialectical method?

B. Short questions (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Meaning of dialectical method
2. Absolute idealism of Hegel
3. Difference between Plato's dialectics and Hegelian dialectics

C. Short notes (Answer each question in about 150 words)

1. Origin of dialectical method
2. Criticism of Hegel's dialectical method
3. Concept of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis in Hegel's philosophy

D. Long questions: (Answer each question within 300-500 words)

1. Explain the Hegelian dictum "the rational is real and the real is rational".
2. Explain and examine Hegel's objective idealism.
3. Give a critical exposition about Hegel's dialectical method.
4. Give a description about dialectical method in general.

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UNIT-15: THOUGHT AND REALITY: BRADLEY

UNIT STRUCTURE

15.1: Learning Objectives

15.2: Introduction

15.3: Bradley's Concept of Reality

15.4: Bradley's Concept of Thought

15.5: Relation between thought and Reality

15.6: Conclusion

15.7: Let us sum up

15.8: Further Reading

4.9: Answer to check your Progress

4.10: Model Questions

15.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to-

- Describe what is Bradley's Concept of Reality
- Explain that Bradley's Concept of thought
- Discuss the relation between thought and reality

15.2 INTRODUCTION:

Bradley elaborately discusses his view about thought and reality in his book 'Appearance and Reality' in the chapter "Thought and Reality". The main point of Bradley is that thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide. The main point of Bradley is that thought is incapable of grasping reality because of its relational and discursive nature. With thought, there is an inherent urge to transcend limitations. But if thought transcends its limitations, it would no longer remain thought. But Bradley said that if reality is to be apprehended then thought is to transcend its limitations. Thought is to be observed in fuller experience. But in that case, thought will stop being thought.

15.3: BRADLEY'S CONCEPT OF REALITY:

In his book Appearance and reality Bradley stated that reality is a harmonious undivided whole. Reality for Bradley is coextensive with experience. Whatever cannot be experienced cannot be real. The term 'experience' is employed in a technical sense by Bradley. According to him, the experience is not simply thought. It covers feeling, willing also. All these remain merged in one undifferentiated absolute. For Bradley, the absolute is beyond all relations. Whatever is relational is not real. This was one of the convictions of Bradley. Reality contains all thought and feelings. But these thought and feeling are not split up into different elements in reality. Bradley stated that reality is an organic whole. It is an organic whole in two different senses. First, it contains finite elements. But these finite elements are dependent on the whole. Secondly, the finite elements contained in reality as an interdependent element. In reality, we get mutual interdependence among finites.

Bradley regarded reality to be such that thought cannot apprehend its nature. The relational way of thinking contains an inescapable contradiction within it. It cannot overcome the contradiction. Therefore it is basically faulty. It is incapable of apprehending reality.

In stating his conception of reality, Bradley presented one very significant criterion. According Bradley ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself. If something contradicts itself, then it cannot be real. The ultimate reality cannot be self-contradictory. The real must exclude all contradictions.

Bradley also pointed out that the real must be one. If reality is to be free from contradictions and conflicts, then there cannot be many independent reals. At the same time, Bradley said that real is not an individual. Here, we come across his important concept of concrete universal. The concrete universal is not obtained merely by a process of intellectual abstraction. It is rather a universal which includes within itself all diversities of concrete existence.

Bradley in his philosophy stated that real must exclude all contradictions. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself. But the thought is full of contradictions. Therefore, thought is incapable of grasping reality. Thought must be absorbed into a fuller experience if it is to become perfect and is to grasp reality. In such a situation thought will undergo transformation. Only when thought undergoes transformation then alone, it can apprehend reality. But in such a case thought will so radically transform itself that it will no longer remain thought. This is called by Bradley the suicide of thought.

15.4: BRADLEY'S CONCEPT OF THOUGHT:

According to Bradley immediate experience is the background of thought. In immediate experience, there is no distinction between subject and predicate. When we have immediate experience, thought comes to function upon it. When thought begins to function, it gradually turns into knowledge. The thought is co-extensive with judgement. The essential function of thought is to analyse and to make a distinction within the immediate experience. But the function of thought is not confined to immediate experience. It's aim is to rest in reality. But Bradley says that thought cannot fulfil its purpose; for it has certain defects within itself.

In anything real, we find that it possesses two aspects, namely, a "that" and a "what". The "that" aspect of a thing means that it is and the "what" aspect of the thing means what it is. The former refers to the existence of the thing,and the latter means the quality of it. But these two aspects are inseparable. They cannot exist apart from each other. If any of these two characteristics is absent in anything, it falls short of reality. So Bradley says that there is no bare existence and the bare existence of a thing means that it exist without quality or content, but it is not possible; for a thing cannot exist without quality or content; Bradley holds that in the same way, a bare adjective is not possible. According to Bradley, a bare adjective is not possible, for as an adjective it must qualify some subject of which it is

an adjective. Thus we see that neither of these two aspects can be real in isolation from each other. And we are mistaken if we try to isolate them.

Bradley says that they are distinguishable only and are not divisible. That is we can distinguish between "that" and "what", but we cannot make a physical division between them. These two are inseparable. Yet thought consists in their separation and division.The thought is ideal. Without an idea, there is no thinking. And idea implies a separation of content from existence. According to Bradley, judgement is the complete form of thought,and in judgement, an idea is predicated of a reality. The predicate is a mere 'what' which is used to qualify further the 'that' of the subject. The predicate is an ideal content and not a fact, the subject is an actual existence. "Judgement" according to Bradley, is essentially the reunion of two sides, 'what' and 'that', provisionally separated. But it is the separation of these two aspects in which thought's ideality consists. As these two aspects are inseparable in reality, thought is bound to fail to give us knowledge of reality.

Bradley in his philosophy pointed out that thought is in incapable of grasping reality. The ultimate reality was regarded by Bradley to be self-consistent whole embracing all differences in an inclusive harmony. The perplexing diversity of the phenomenal world must be brought into unity and made self-consistent. Moreover, the content of reality is nothing but sentient experience. Thought is discursive and relational. It cannot give us the reality which is a harmonious totality. If thought ceases to be discursive and analytical, it ceases to be thought. In the language of Bradley thought then commits suicide.

In judgement, we find thought in its completed form. In a judgement, there is initially a provisional separation between 'that' and 'what', existence and content. But subsequently, judgement tries to reunite these two which are provisionally separated. But the thought is ideal in the sense that without idea there is no judgemental thinking. An idea implies the separation of content from existence. So without the initial separation of 'that' and 'what' thought cannot be found. The ideality of thought consists in this separation.

Again thought tries to overcome this separation. Therefore, within thought, there is an inconsistency

Bradley keeps before him the subject-predicate form of judgement in particular. According to him, in judgement, an idea is predicated of a reality. A judgement adds an adjective to reality. This adjective is found in the form of an idea. The predicate namely 'what' has been separated from its immediate existence namely 'that'. A judgement tries to re-establish the unity.

By trying to establish the unity between 'that' and 'what', 'existence' and 'content' judgemental thought tries to transcend dualism. But this dualism is the very foundation of judgemental thought. So by trying to overcome the dualism of existence and content, thought aims at suicide.

If there is the difference then alone there can be judgement. Judgemental thought is by nature relational and discursive. If judgemental thought tries to overcome this discursive nature, it would no longer remain a thought. Reality is an integral experience. It is a harmonious whole. Judgemental thought, therefore, cannot grasp reality.

Discussing the nature of thought, Bradley pointed out that without an idea there is no thinking. An idea implies the separation of content from existence. But Bradley pointed out that they are inseparable. Analysing the nature of judgement, Bradley pointed out that in judgement we find the essential reunion of the aspect of the content and the aspect of existence.

Thought cannot transcend the duality of 'that' and 'what'. As long as it is a thought, it must operate within this duality. Bradley completed thought. In no judgement, the subject and the predicate is the same. According to Bradley, in every judgement, the genuine subject is reality. This reality goes beyond the predicate. The predicate may be understood as an objective of it. Thought has a desire to transcend this dualism of that and what; existent and content. But according to Bradley, thought is trying to overcome this distinction between that and what and aiming at its suicide. As long as

thought exists as judgemental thought, there is a clear distinction between that and what. But, within thought, there is a desire to overcome this distinction only by ceasing to be thought. This is regarded by Bradley to be the suicide of thought.

15.5: RELATION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND REALITY:

Explaining the relation between thought and reality, Bradley pointed out that judgemental thought or discursive thought is incapable of apprehending reality. Bradley pointed out that in every genuine judgement the subject is more than the predicate. The subject is that beyond mere 'what'. The subject is never bare existence without character. The subject quite definitely has unspecified content which is not stated in the predicate.

It may be argued that when thought is perfected then there is no opposition or discrepancy between the subject and the predicate, existence and content. Bradley further pointed out that if there is no judgement, there is no thought. Again if there is no difference, there is no judgement. Without the difference, there cannot be any self-consciousness also.

In the philosophy of Bradley, absolute reality is absolute experience. Whatever cannot be experienced cannot be regarded to be real. If thought is to grasp reality, it must be absorbedinto a fuller experience.

For Bradley, reality overcomes all contradictions. Reality in the opinion of Bradley cannot be self-contradictory. But an inherent self- contradiction is always there in thinking. So, thinking is its present judgemental form is incapable of grasping reality. This is how Bradley conceived the relation between thought and reality.

According to Bradley, our knowledge is in essence relational and discursive. So according to Bradley to fully realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. Kant rejected the things-in-themselves as unknown and unknowable. So his concept leads him to

agnosticism, as he states that we know that noumena or things-in-themselves exist, but we do not know what they are. Against this Kantian argument, Bradley says that if reality were not a subject of knowledge we could not know that such a thing even existed. Our knowledge of the Absolute is limited. But this is not good ground for our declining to entertain it. Mere thinking, by its nature relational, and does not give us the complete knowledge of Reality.

Thought yields a dissection of experience. In order to transcend its relational form, thought commits suicide

By committing suicide thought can transcend the dualism of content and existence and then only the knowledge of Absolute is possible. But if thought ceased to be relational then it would cease to be thought. Thus thought by its very nature fails to grasp the reality. Bradley therefore reaches the conclusion that by transcending its relational form i.e., by committing suicide thought can grasp the supra-relational whole. Suicide of thought means the transcendence of its inherent dualism between 'that' and 'what, 'when thought attains immediacy of feeling as a harmonious whole, it would be transformed into a supra-relational immediate experience and it would cease to be thought.

15.6: CONCLUSION:

There is a serious drawback of Bradley's view here. Bradley pointed out the limitations of thinking. He pointed out that thinking thrives on the separation between 'that' and 'what'. It is therefore incapable of grasping reality. But Bradley employed thinking itself to point out the limitations of thinking. The critics, therefore, have discovered a serious inconsistency.

From the idealist point of view perhaps it is rather meaningless to talk about the suicide of thought. Thought does not annihilate itself. It rather gets itself absorbed to supra-relational thought. Bradley, of course, himself recognises this point.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q1: What is the absolute criterion of reality?

.Q2: what is the content ofreality?

Q3: How many realities are there according to Bradley?

Q4: According to Bradley what is the background of thought?

Q5: What are the two aspects that anything real possesses?

Q6: Are these two aspects separable in reality?



15.7: LET US SUM UP:

- The Problem of Thought and Reality plays a vital issue in metaphysics.
- The ultimate reality is as elf-consistent whole. It includes in itself all differences and forms in an inclusive harmony.
- Bradley also pointed out that the real must be one. If reality is to be free from contradictions and conflicts, then there cannot be many independent reals.
- The content of reality is nothing but sentient experience. Thought, feeling, volition are the only materials of existence.
- The reality for Bradley is coextensive with experience. Whatever cannot be experienced cannot be real.
- For Bradley, the absolute is beyond all relations. Whatever is relational is not real.
- The finite minds should be in a position to give a general outline of the nature of the Absolute, but the detailed description of the Absolute is impossible.

- As according to Bradley, ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; For Bradley reality is one organic whole. It expresses itself immediately in all its appearances. All appearance must belong to reality.

- According to Bradley, to fully realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. But reality cannot be considered as unknowable.

- According to Bradley immediate experience is the background of thought. In immediate experience, there is no distinction between subject and predicate. The essential function of thought is to analyse and to make a distinction within the immediate experience.

- In anything real we find that it possesses two aspects, namely, a "that" and a "what". The "that" aspect of a thing means that it is and the "what" aspect of the thing means what it is. The former refers to the existence of the thing and the latter means the quality of it.

- We can distinguish between "that" and "what", but we cannot make a physical division between them. These two are inseparable. Yet thought consists in their separation and division. Thought is ideal. And idea implies a separation of content from existence. As these two aspects are inseparable in reality, the thought is bound to fail to give us knowledge of reality.



15.8: FURTHER READING:

1) Bradley, F.H. (1893). Appearance and Reality. London:George Allen and Unwin LTD.

2) Chakravarty, D. K.(2000). Fundamental Questions of epistemology and Metaphysics. New Delhi: Omsons Publications.

3) Masih, Y. (1993). A Critical History of Western Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass.

15.9: ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q 1: Non-contradictory is the absolute criterion of reality.

Ans to Q 2: The content of reality is nothing but sentient experience.

Ans to Q 3: The Realityfor Bradley must be one.

Ans to Q 4: According to Bradley immediate experience is the background of thought.

Ans to Q 5: In anything real we find that it possesses two aspects, namely, a "that" and a "what".

Ans to Q 6: These two aspects are inseparable in reality.

15.10: MODEL QUESTIONS:

A. Very Short Questions:

Q 1: Is there a difference between 'that' and 'what' in immediate experience?

Q2: Is it possible for finite beings to fully realize the existence of the Absolute according to Bradley?

Q 3: Are these two aspects namely 'that' and 'what' separable in reality?

Q 4: Does thought cannot transcend the duality of 'that' and 'what' according to Bradley?

Q 5: Is thought ideal according to Bradley?

B. Short Questions: (Write in about 150 words)

Q 1: What is Reality according to Bradley?

Q 2: What is thought according to Bradley?

Q 3: How thought is related to Reality According to Bradley?

Q 4: What is meant by the suicide of thought?

C. Long Questions: (Write in about 300-500 words)

Q 1: Give an account of Bradley's view regarding the relation between thought and reality?

Q 2: Why does Bradley maintain that thought commit suicide? Discuss in this connection the relation between thought and reality.

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9) Tomlin, E. W. F.: (1954). The Great Philosophers, London: Skeffington & Son Ltd.

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12) Bradley, F.H. (1893). Appearance and Reality. London:George Allen and Unwin LTD

13) Chakravarty, D. K.(2000). Fundamental Questions of epistemology and Metaphysics. New Delhi: Omsons Publications.

14) Collinson, D.: (1998). Fifty Great Philosophers, London and New York: Routledge.

15) Weber, P. and Perry, R. B.: (2012). History of Philosophy, trans., F. Thilly, Delhi: Surjeet Publications

16) Locke's J. The clarendon edition of the works of John Locke, Oxford University press 2015.

17) Thilly, Frank: A history of philosophy - Central publishing hence, Allahbad, 1984.

18) Nidditch. P (ed) An essay concerning human understanding.