UNIT 7: ANIMAL RIGHTS

UNIT STRUCTURE

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7.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit you will able to

- Know the meaning of rights and its relation to animals
- Know the arguments for and against animal rights
- Know which things are wrong to do animals
- Know the values of the lives of the member of moral community
- Know whether animals posses moral status or not

7.2 INTRODUCTION

The foundation for rigorous thinking about animal use was laid in 1975, with the publication of Peter Singer's book animal liberation. While today Singer is commonly regarded as father of the animal rights movements, ironically animal liberation did not make a concerted attempt to argue that animals in fact have rights. Peter Singer extended Bentham's utilitarian approach to evaluate how animals might ethically be used by humans. Utilitarianism opens the door to a thoughtful dialogue about how humans can ethically make use of animals. But utilitarian

thinking is also hindered by some obvious limitations. Especially intrinsic value of the animal's life a second concept called speciesism that opened the door to considering animal rights.

7.3 MEANING AND DEFINITION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS

The origin of the idea of animal rights is not easy to trace. One view is that this notion is a natural spin-off or even a logical extension of the civil rights and women rights movements. Another view is that it represents nothing more than another system of the tendency, particularly prevalent in the United States to couch all demands for change in the language of rights. But to develop a sensible alternative position on the moral status of animals, it is necessary to examine the foundation of our system of moral beliefs.

The fundamental principle of equality, on which the equality of all human beings rest is the principle of equal considerations of interests. Only a basic moral principle of this kind can defend a form of equality that embraces all human beings with all the differences that exists between them. Having accepted the principle of equality as a sound moral basis for relations with others of our own species, we are also committed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own species, i.e the non human animals. Animals deserves certain kinds of considerations, like what is in their best interests, regardless of whether they are useful to humans or any human cares about them at all. It means recognizing that animals are not to be use as our property for food, clothing, entertainment, or experimentation.

Among the most important moral and political issues facing the world today, issues like moral status of animals should be treated alike. Do not human animas have substantial or full moral status? If so, why? If not, why not? Morality requires equally unless there is some general and relevant differences between them that morally justifies a difference in treatment. Animals are more like humans in almost all sorts of important ways. For eg- like human beings, they are alive, most of them

are capable of suffering, some can arguably think and even emotions. So it would be more precise to ask how those non-human animals should be treated that we standardly use for food, for product and biomedical testing and for their skin. Virtually most of the philosophers, scientists agree that it would be wrong to torture or kill a mammal or bird just for fun. The question here is not about whether these animals have moral status, but rather how much status they have, and why?

Every conscious being has interests that should be respected. No being who is conscious of being alive should be devalued to thinghood, dominated, used as resource or a commodity.

The main part of the idea known as animal rights is a movement to extent moral consideration to all conscious beings. When we stop eating and drinking products derived from other animals, when we stop going to circuses, decline to bread or buy dogs and cats, we are carrying out the idea of animal right. By doing so and giving respect to the animals regardless of how they happen to be classified or name, the purpose of giving rights to animals will be served.

According to the view that an animal's moral claim is equivalent to a moral right, any action that fails to treat the animal as a being with inherent worth would violate that animal's right and will be morally objectionable. According to the animal rights position, to treat an animal as a means to some human end, as many humans do when they eat animals or experiment on them, is to violate animal's right. The animal rights position is an absolutist position. Any being that is a subject of life has inherent worth and the rights that protect such worth and all subjects of a life have these rights equally. Thus any practice that fails to respect the rights of those animals who have them eg- eating animals, hunting animals, experimenting on animals, using animals for entertainment, is wrong, irrespective of human need, context or culture.

In the past, the idea of "the rights of animals has been used to parody the case for women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a fore runner of later feminists, published her vindication of the rights of women

in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as abused, and they were satirized.

In any anonymous publication entitled. A vindication of the rights of bruits the author of this satire tride to refute W ollstonecraft's reasonings by shouring that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when applied to women, why should be arguments not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seem to hold equally will for these "brutes", yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly abused, therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound when applied to brute, it must also be lensound when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in each case.

7.4: CONSEQUNCES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS

Animal rights teach us that certain things are wrong as a matter of principle. There are certain things that are morally wrong to do to animals, even if they do them in a humane way. Accepting the doctrine of animal rights may mean the following points.

1) No experiments on animals:

The area in which speciesism can most clearly be observed is the use of animals in experiments. Animals are used in laboratories for three main purposes- education, product safety testing and experimentation-medical research in particulars. The issue here stands in an unpleasant manner because experiments often seek to justify experimenting an animal by claiming that the experiments lead us to discover about humans and if this is so the experiments must agree that human and non human animals are similar in crucial respects. Again sometimes people think that all animal experiments serve vital medical purposes, and can be justified on the grounds that they relieve more suffering than they cause. But this comfortable belief is mistaken. Pressure from the animal liberation movement has led several cosmetic companies to abandon this practice. Thus one who belives in absolute rights might hold that it is always wrong to sacrifice one being, whether human or animal, for the

benefit of another. In that case the experiment should not be carried out whatever be the consequence.

2) No breeding and killing animals for food or cloths:

The use of animals for food is probably the oldest and the most widespread from of animal use. There is also a sense in which it is the most basic form of animal use. The foundation stone on which rests the belief that animal exists for our pleasure and convenience. The case against using animals for food is at its strongest when animals are made to lead miserable lives so that their flesh can be made available to humans at the lowest possible cost. Modern forms of intensive farming apply science and technology to the attitude that animals are objects for us to use. In order to have meat on the table at a price that people can afford our society tolerates methods of meat production that confine sentient animals in cramped unsuitable conditions for the entire duration of their lives. Animals are treated as machines that convert fodder into flesh, and any innovations that results in higher conversion ratio is liable to be adopted. To avoid speciesism we must stop these practices. Our custom is all the support that factory farmers need. We should not eat chicken, pork or veal, unless we know that the meat we are eating was not produced by factory farm method. The lives of free ranging animals are undoubtedly better than those of animals reared in factory farm. So human beings have no rights to take the live of animals for their comfort i.e. for their food and clothing.

3) No use of animals for hard labour :

Another use of animal is in exploiting them by forcing them to do physical labour. Most of the animals are used as a means of transport, to pull plows, carry goods etc. some are also used as police dogs or guide dogs. Again in many places the use of horses for transportation is tourists attraction, which is a similar form of exploitation to that of other domesticated animals used for work. Jobs for which non human animals are used are often tiresome and may cause physical pain. They are stressed and unhappy by the tedium of their activities. Our labour values

tell us that we have a moral duty to treat the animals we share our planet with in a humane and compassionate way. The last labour government achieved much to end the cruel and unnecessary suffering of animals. The banning of hunting with dogs, and others by introducing the animal welfare act 2006.

4) No hunting:

Hunting has contributed to the extinction of several animals over the world. Many animals endure prolonged painful deaths when they are injured. Animals are being hunted for thrill but people do not understand that a balance in the environment should be maintained for their own benefit. Under the terms of the new hunting act, which covers England and wales, a person commits an offense if he hunts a wild mammal with a dog, unless his hunting is exempt. Exempt hunting is defined as stalking or flushing out an animal, using no more than two dogs, with a view to shooting the mammal as soon as it breaks cover. Under animal rights it is a punishable offense to kill or maim any animal including stray animals.

5) No use of animals in entertainment:

Under animal rights it is morally wrong to keep animals in zoo and use them for entertainment. It treats the animals as a means to achieve some human end. Also it falls to treat animals with the respect they deserve. Moreover it violets the animal's right to live in freedom.

7.6: THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS

The case for animal rights is usually derived from the case for human rights. The case for animal rights shows that the animal rights movement is a part of the human rights movement and not antagonistic to it. The theory that rationally grounds the rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. Thus those involve in the animal rights movement are partners in the struggle to secure respect for human rights – the rights of women, for example, or minorities or workers. The animal rights

movement is cut from the same moral cloth as these. The case for animal rights put forwarded the following points

- Human beings and animals have similar levels of biological complexity. Pain is pain wherever it occurs. If someone causing a human being is wrong because of the pain that is caused , moral relevance of the pain that an animal feels cannot rationally be ignored or dismissed.
- Like human beings animals are also conscious and aware of their existence. Consequently the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non human animals including all mammals and birds and many other creatures also possess these neurological substrates.
- Like human beings animals also has preferences of likes and dislikes and make conscious choices.
- Human beings live in such a way to give themselves the best quality of life. So as animals also try the best shelter place. They also find the best food for themselves.

All beings with inherent value are equally valuable and entitled to the same right. Their inherent value does not depend on how useful they are to the world, and it does not diminish if they are a burden to others. Thus, animals have their rights just in the same way, for the reasons , and to the same extent that human beings have rights.

In all essential respects these animals are physiologically like human beings and human beings are like them. Charles Darwin compares “the mental power of man and the lower animals.” For example – injuries to our brain or spinal cord can diminish aru sense of sight or touch. By analogy Darwin thinks it is reasonable to infer that the same is true of animals that are most physiologically similar to human beings. Because our central nervous system provides the physical basis for our subjective awareness of the world, and because the central nervous system of other mammals resemble human beings in all the relevant respects, it is reasonable to believe that their central nervous system provide the physical basis for their subjective awareness.

Every person of commonsense agrees with Darwin. Dogs and pigs enjoy something and find others painful. In addition both humans and other mammals share a family of cognitive abilities as well as variety of emotions. (Darwin lists fear, jealousy and sadness). Not surprisingly again, these mental capacities affect their behavior. For e.g. other mammal will behave one way rather than another because they remember which ways of acting had pleasant outcomes in the past or because they are afraid or sad.

The psychological complexity of mammals (hence forth “animals”, unless otherwise indicated) plays an important role in arguing for their rights. As in the case of human so in the case of animals. They are the subjects – of – a- life, their life, a life that is experientially better or worse for the one whose life it is. Each is unique somebody not a replaceable something. In this respect, as the subjects –of –a- life other mammals are our equals. And in this case our someness, our equality is important morally, logically, we cannot maintain that harms alone to us matter morally, but that harms done to these animals do not. Relevantly similar cases must be judged similarly. So humans have rights to do these animals.

In the case of the use of animals in science, the rights view is categorically abolitionist. Lab animals are not our testers, we are not their kings. Because these animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true when they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary or unique research as it is when they are used in studies that hold out real promise of human benefits. Harming or killing a human being can’t be justified just these sort of reason neither it can be done even in the case of so lowly creatures as a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement or reduction that is called for not just larger, cleaner cages, not just more generous use of anesthesia or the elimination of multiple surgeries, not just tidying up the system. It is complete replacement the best that can be done when it comes to

using animals in science is-not to use them. That is where one's duty lies according to rights view.

As for commercial animal's agriculture, the rights view takes a similar abolitionist position. The fundamental moral wrong here is not that animals are kept in stressful close confinement or in isolation, or that their pain and suffering their needs and preferences are ignored or discounted. All these are wrong, of course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They are symptoms and effects of the deeper. Systematic wrong that allows these animals to be viewed and treated as lacking independent value, as resources for people—as needed, a renewable resource. Giving farm animals more space, more natural environment more companions does not right the fundamental wrong. Anesthesia or bigger cleaner cages would right the fundamental wrong in their case. Nothing less than the total dissolution of the commercial animal agriculture will do this. Morality requires nothing less than the total elimination of hunting and trapping for commercial and sporting ends. In this way the rights view's implications are stated clearly and uncompromisingly by Tom Regan.

7.6 THE CASE AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS

The argument for animal rights sketched above implies that humans and other animals are equal in morally relevant respects. Some philosophers repudiate any form of species egalitarianism. According to Cohen (Cohen and Regan, 2001), whereas humans are equal in morally relevant respects regardless of our race, gender, or ethnicity humans and other animals are not morally equal in any respect not even when it comes to suffering. Here are a few examples that will clarify Cohen's position.

At first, let us imagine that a boy and a girl suffer equally. If someone assigns greater moral weight to the boy's suffering because he is white made from Ireland and less moral weight to the girl's suffering because she is black female from Kenya Cohen would protest and rightly

so. Human racial, gender and ethnic differences are not morally relevant difference. The situation differs however when it comes to differences in species. When we imagine a cat and a dog both suffer as much as the boy and girl. For Cohen there is nothing morally prejudicial, nothing morally arbitrary in assigning greater importance to the suffering of the children, because they are human, than to the equal suffering of the animals, because they are not.

Proponents of animal rights deny this. It is believed that views like Cohen's reflect a moral prejudice against animals that is fully analogous to moral prejudices like sexism and racism that humans often have against one another. This type of prejudice is called speciesism he denies its prejudicial status because according to him, while there are no morally relevant differences between men and women or between white and blacks the morally relevant differences between humans and other animals are enormous. In particular human beings are morally autonomous and can make moral choices for which they are morally responsible. But animals are not morally autonomous and thus are not morally responsible.

But this defense of speciesism is no defense at all. It not only over look the fact that a very large percentage of the human populations are not morally autonomous, but moral autonomy is notrelevent to the issue at hand.

It is seen that a number of arguments are put forward against the idea that animals have rights which are as follows:

1) Animals don't think as men do. They are not really conscious. The French philosopher Rene Descartes and many others taught that animals were no more than complicated biological robots. These meant that animals were not the sort of thing that was entitled to have rights or any moral consideration.

2) Animals were put on earth to serve human beings. St Thomas Aquinas taught that the universe was constructed as a hierarchy in which beings at a lower level were there to serve those above them. As human beings were above animals in this hierarchy they were entitled to use animals in any way they wanted.

3) Moreover animals are not 'moral'. Rights only have meaning within a moral community and only human beings live in a moral community. Animal's don't understand or practice living according to a moral code. The differences in the way human beings and animals experience the world are morally relevant. There for rights are only for human and is applicable only to human being.

4) Moreover some argue that since animals don't behave in a moral way they don't deserve moral treatments from other beings. Animals usually behave selfishly and look after their own interests, while human beings will often help other people, even if doing so is it to their own disadvantage.

5) It is also objected by some that if animals have rights, they should be allowed to vote, marry, file for divorce and immigrate, which is absurd. Therefore animals have no rights

6) Another objection raised is that animals are not members of the moral community. A moral community is- A) a group of beings who live in relationship with each other and use and understand moral concepts and rules. B) The members of this community can respect each other moral persons. C) The members of this community respect each other's autonomy.

These characters of moral community are displayed in human beings and are therefore members of the moral community. But animals do not display these characteristics and are therefore not members of moral community. Thus only members of moral community can have rights. Therefore animals don't have rights.

7) Again it is objected that animals have some rights to bodily integrity and life, but the rights they have are not equal to human rights. therefore human vivisection is wrong, but animal vivisection is not.

The objections raised above have been considered because they are among the most important, not because they are the least convincing. Their failure, individually and collectively goes some way towards suggesting logical inadequacy of the anti animal rights position. Morality is certainly not mathematics. In morality there are no proofs like those we

find in geometry. What we can find and what we must live with, are principles and values that have the best reasons, the best arguments on their side. The principles and values that pass this test, whether most people accept them or not, are the ones that should guide our lives. Given this reasonable standard, the principles and values of animal rights should guide our lives.

7.7 MORAL COMMUNITY

Generally moral community is regarded as a group of beings that shares certain characteristics and whose members are bound to observe certain rules of conduct in relation to one another because of their mutual likeness. All the members of the moral community do not have lives of equal value. It is deeply disagreeable to many to think that some lives are less valuable than others, they would dearly love it to be true that atleast all human lives are equally valuable. But when it is said of all lives not being equally valuable, it does not only refer to the differences between animal and normal adult human lives, it also refer to human lives themselves. It is viewed that all human lives are of not equal quality.

If we think that not all human lives have the same value , and if we think about the depths to which human life can tragically plummet , then it may well turn out that some animal lives have a higher quality than some human lives. R.G Frey in his chapter titled ‘Animals and their medical use’ stated that the comparative value of the human and animal life must be subject to scrutiny. The value of human and animal life, Frey thinks, coheres nicely with recent discussions of the value of life in medical ethics and allied areas. The value of a life is a function of its quality,its quality of its richness and its richness of its capacities and scope for enrichment: it matters, then, what a creature’s capacities for a rich life are.

As Frey indicated, since not all human lives have the same richness and potentialities for enrichment, not all human lives are equally

valuable. In fact, some human lives can be so shatter with no or so little prospect for enrichment that the quality of such lives can fall well below that of ordinary ,healthy animals. It might be claimed that we can know nothing of the richness of animal lives, but ethnologists and animal behaviorist, including some sympathetic to the 'animal rights' cause, certainly think otherwise. How else, for example, could the claim that certain rearing practices blight animal lives be sustained? That we cannot know everything about the inner lives of animals, of course, in no implies that we cannot know a good deal.

Quality of life views turn upon richness and if we are to answer the question of the comparative value of human and animal life we must inquire after the richness of their respective lives. Inter-species comparisons of richness and quality of life are likely to be even more difficult, though not possible.

Again, it must not be thought that criteria assessing the richness of human lives apply straightforwardly to animals. Rather we must use all that we know about animals, especially those closest to us, to try to guage the quality of their lives in terms appropriate to their species.

However, one cannot be sure that human life will always and in every case be of higher quality than animal life. And if we are to use the life of lower quality in preference to the life of higher quality, assuming that some life or other has to be used then we seem committed to using the human life of lower quality in this case.

Finally, R.G Frey draws a distinction between two different senses of the moral community. He stated that the patient in the final throes of Alzheimer disease or the severely mentally enfeebled are members of the moral community in the sense of having moral standing, since they remain experiential subjects with a welfare and a quality of life that can be diminished by what we do to them. All kinds of human being presently live lives of massively reduced quality – reduced from the quality of life we find in healthy, normal, adult humans. Yet they remain members of the moral community.

On the other hand, patients in a permanently vegetative state are more problematic candidates for membership in the moral community in this first sense. For all accounts of moral community in this first sense are accompanied by disclaimers that animals are moral agents – are capable, in the sense of agency that matters for the assessment of moral responsibility, of acting for and weighing reasons. They are not morally responsible for what they do, because fall outside the moral community in this first sense, but because they do not weigh reasons for action.

Membership in the moral community in the second sense has nothing to do with whether a being is morally considerable. On a quality of life view of the value of a life, being a member of the moral community in the second sense can enrich one's life and therefore, enhance its quality. It does this by informing the relations in which we stand to others and thus affecting how we live and judge our lives.(Frey unpublished)

It should be noted that the very way we live our lives as, for instance, fathers and sons – in order to fulfill what we see as our obligations within these moral relations – forms part of the texture and richness of our lives. We often cannot explain who we are and what we take some of our prized ends in life to be except in terms of these relationship in a moral community, and we often find it difficult to explain why we did something that obviously was at great cost to ourselves except through citing how we see ourselves linked to certain others. Thus, the fact that most humans are the members of the moral community in the second sense is a powerful and important feature of their lives, they can live lives out of their own choosing, moulded, and shaped in the ways they want, in order to reflect and capture the ends and projects they want to pursue.

When we seek to compare human and animal life, then, in order to make judgements about the comparative richness of life, account must be taken of this fashioning of a life for ourselves in a community of shared moral relations. R.G Frey claims that agency can enable normal adult human to enhance the quality and value of their lives in ways that

no account of the activities that we share with animals comprehends, and in seeking to give some account of the comparative value of human and animal lives , this kind of difference is obviously both relevant and important. When we examine critically each of the characteristics differentiating humans from animals which are morally relevant we find that none of them succeeds in establishing the moral superiority of humans.

7.8 PROBLEMS OF MARGINAL PEOPLE

The argument from marginal cases is an argument that attempts to demonstrate that if animals do not have direct moral status, than neither do such human beings as infants, the senile, the severely cognitively disabled, and other such 'marginal cases' of humanity.

Peter Singer has been very influential in the debate concerning animals and ethics. The publication of his animal liberation marked the beginning of a growing and increasingly powerful movement in both the United States and Europe. Singer attacks the views of those who wish to give the interests of animals less weight than the interests of human beings. He argues that if we attempt to extend such unequal consideration to the interests of animals, we will be forced to give unequal consideration to the interests of different human beings. Singer concludes that we must instead extend a principle of equal consideration of interests to animals as well. To defend his point Singer gave two arguments. First is a version of the argument from marginal cases. Singer's version of argument from marginal cases runs as follows——

1) In order to conclude that all and only human beings deserve a full and equal moral status (and therefore that the animals deserve a full and equal moral status), there must be some property P that all and only human beings have that can ground such a claim.
2) Any P that only human beings have is a property that (some) human beings lack(e.g. the marginal cases)
3) Any P that all human beings have is a property that (most) animals have as well.

4) Therefore, there is no way to defend the claim that all and only human beings deserve a full equal moral status.

Singer does not defend his first premise, but does not need to. The proponents of the view that all and only humans deserves a full and equal moral status rely on it themselves. In support of the second premise, Singer ask us to consider exactly what properties only humans have that can ground such a strong moral status, for e.g. being rational, autonomous or able to act morally have all been used to justify giving a stronger status to human beings than we do to animals. The problem with such a suggestion is that not all human beings have these properties. So if this is what grounds a full and equal moral status, it follows that not all human beings are equal after all. The attempt to grant all and only human beings a full and equal moral status does not work accordingly to singer. We must either conclude that not all human beings are equal, or we must conclude that not only human beings are equal; Singer suggests that the first option is too counter—intuitive to be acceptable, so we are forced to conclude that all animals are equal, human or otherwise.

Tom Regan is of the view that a being with inherent value has rights and these rights act as trumps against the promotion of the overall good. Regan concludes that we must radically alter the ways in which we treat animals, when we rise animals for food, regardless of how they are treated and how they are killed, we are using them as a means to our ends and not treating them as ends in themselves.

Some philosophers are prepared to argue that in fact the marginal human beings don't have rights, most people find that conclusion repellent.

The argument can be rescued by rewriting it like this.

- If an individual is a member of a species that lacks the capacity for free moral judgment than he or she does not have moral rights.
- All non—human animal species lack the capacity for free moral judgment.

Therefore, non –human animals do not have moral rights.

But this is not an argument, it's a statement that human beings have rights and non—human animals don't, which is pure speciesism and hardly persuasive.



CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Q 1: What is the meaning of animal rights?

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Q 2: Does animal have moral status?

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Q 3: What do you understand by the problem of marginal people?

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Q 4: What are the consequences of animal rights?

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Q 5: The idea of THE RIGHTS OF ANIMAL has been used to parody the case for whose right?

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Q 6: Name two advocates of animal rights.

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Q 7: Write the cases for animal rights.

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Q 8: Write the cases against animal rights.

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Q 9: What do you understand by moral community?

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Q 10: Who drew the distinction between two stages of moral community?

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7.9 LET US SUM UP

- Along with the issues of moral and politics the issue , issues like moral status of animals should be treated alike.
- Animal rights teaches us that certain things are morally wrong to do to animals like experiments on them, breeding and killing of animals for food, etc.
- Every conscious being has interest that should be respected. No being should be disvalued or used as a resource or commodity.
- Animals should be not use for hard labour.
- The case for animal rights shows that the animal rights movement is a part of the human rights movement and not antagonistic to it.
- The psychological complexity of mammals plays an important role in arguing for their rights.
- Logically we cannot maintain that harm harm alone to us matter morally, but that harm done to this animals do not. Relevantly similar cases must be judged similarly. S o if human have rights, so too do these animals.



7.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Ans to Q No. 1 : Animal rights means recognizing that animals are not to be used as our property for food , clothing, entertainment or experiment.

Ans to Q No. 2 : Animals are more like humans in almost all sorts of important ways. So they have moral status.

Ans to Q No. 3 : It is an argument that attempts to demonstrate that if animals do not have direct moral status , then neither do such human beings as infants, the senile, and other such marginal cases of humanity.

Ans to Q No. 4 : The consequences of animal rights are –

- No experiments on animals.
- No breeding and killing animals for food or clothes.
- No use of animals for hard labour.
- No hunting of animals.
- No use of animals in entertainment.

Ans to Q No. 5 : In the past the case of the idea of the rights of animals has been used to parody
the case for women's rights.

Ans to Q No. 6 : Peter Singer and Tom Regan.

Ans to Q No. 7 : The cases for animal rights are as follows –

- human beings and animals have similar similar levels of biological complexities.
- like human beings animals also has preferences of likes and dislikes and make conscious choices.
- Like human beings animals also finds the best food and the best shelter for themselves.
- Animals have rights just the same way , for the same reasons and to the same extent that human beings have rights.

Ans to Q No. 8 : The cases against animal rights are as follows ;

- Animals do not think as man do.
- Animals were put on earth to serve human beings.
- Only human beings live in a moral community and not animals.
- Since animals do not behave in a moral way they do not deserve moral rights.
- If animals have rights they should be allowed to vote, marry, file for divorce. Therefore animals have no rights.

Ans to Q No. 9 : Generally moral community is regarded as a group of beings that shares certain characteristics and whose members are bound to observe certain rules of conduct in relation to one another because of their mutual likeness.

Ans to Q No. 10 : R.G FREY drew the distinction between two different senses of moral community.

7.11 MODEL QUESTIONS

A) Very Short Question:

Q 1: What do you understand by the concept of animal rights?

Q 2: What is a moral community?

Q 3: State two consequences of animal rights.

Q 4: What are two views regarding of the concept of animal rights?

Q 5: What are two different senses of moral community according to R.G. frey?

B) Short answers (About 100-150 Words)

Q 1: Briefly in details the cases for animal rights.

Q 2: Briefly in details the cases against animal rights.

Q 3: Briefly in details the consequences of animal rights.

C) Long Questions (About 300-500 Words)

Q 1: State Singer's version of the argument from moral cases.

Q 2: Discuss how the idea of ' the rights of animals' has been used to parody the case for women's right.

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